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Psychotic experiences beyond psychotic disorders: from measurement to
computational mechanisms
Daniel Jay Davies
Abstract
Psychotic experiences (PEs) occur in the general population, beyond psychotic disorders.
PEs are a risk factor for mental ill health in young people but can occur benignly in selected
samples of adults. Environmental factors predispose to PEs but their underlying mecha-
nisms are not well-understood. Progress in understanding PEs may be limited by diverse
conceptualisations, imprecise measurement and a lack of explanatory frameworks that can
bridge the gaps between aetiological factors, their effects on the brain and their behavioural
manifestations. In this thesis, I undertook a comprehensive investigation of the measure-
ment, health implications, aetiology and computational mechanisms of PEs in adolescents
and young adults using data from two large cohort samples, supplemented with smaller-scale
behavioural studies.
I first investigated the measurement of PEs. I assessed and optimised the measurement
of PEs in young people by two self-report instruments. I then used latent variable modelling
to show that a self-report and interview instrument measured the same underlying psychotic
phenomena. Both instruments were able to measure severe PEs, while the self-report ques-
tionnaire also measured more mild psychotic phenomena.
I then investigated the health implications of PEs. Using cluster analysis in both cohorts,
I found replicable patterns of PEs at similar levels of intensity and persistence but with and
without depressive symptoms and with varying risk of mental disorder. Paranoid ideation
was more associated with depressive symptoms than non-paranoid unusual perceptions and
beliefs. Childhood adversity was associated with both PE-prone groups, but later social sup-
port from family and friends was far higher in those with PEs and low depressive symptoms
than those with PEs and high depressive symptoms.
Subsequently, I investigated the role of the social environment in the development of PEs
and psychopathology using longitudinal structural equation modelling. I found that asocial
dispositions increased or preceded increase in PEs over one year, mediated by detriment
to social support. Conversely, PEs did not precede or increase asociality. I then showed
that dimensions of PEs and depressive symptoms were promoted by childhood adversity but
differentially affected by later social support, with paranoid ideation being more influenced
by support than non-paranoid unusual perceptions/beliefs.
Finally, I investigated specific mechanisms of PEs in two behavioural studies. In the sev-
enth study, I used computational modelling of reward learning to link PEs to reduced ability
to modulate learning by confidence, replicating computational effects of a pharmacological
model of psychosis. I also used a novel visual task to show that the manifestation of PEs
as anomalous perceptions versus anomalous beliefs might be explained by over-reliance on
different types of prior knowledge in perceptual inference.
These results suggest that different conceptual approaches to PEs might be synthesised
despite issues with their measurement. PEs in young people, while not entirely benign, are
heterogeneously associated with psychopathology. Importantly, they characterise a minority
of young people who are at very high transdiagnostic risk of mental illness but also occur
without distress in young people, often in the context of a supportive social environment.
Health outcomes in young people with PEs are predicted and potentially modified by social
functioning and social relationships. PEs might arise from atypicalities in how the influences
of information sources on perception and belief-updating are modulated according to their
reliabilities.
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Introduction
Psychosis is a syndrome featuring abnormalities in thought, perception and emotion that can
lead to a loss of contact with reality. Psychotic experiences (PEs) comprise a diverse and complex
set of phenomena that are among some of the most bizarre and fascinating studied in clinical
neuroscience. PEs are typified by hallucinations, which are percepts occurring in the absence of a
stimulus, and delusions, which are fixed, false beliefs that are out of keeping with a person’s social
or cultural background. PEs characterise psychotic disorders, a set of severe mental illnesses,
including schizophrenia, that cause significant morbidity and mortality.
Individual or several PEs can occur without the full syndromes of psychopathology that define
psychotic disorders. There is now compelling epidemiological evidence that PEs occur in the
general population who do not have any diagnosable mental illness (van Os et al., 2009; Linscott
and van Os, 2013; McGrath et al., 2015), particularly in children and adolescents (Kelleher et
al., 2012a). PEs occur in ‘non-psychotic’ mental disorders (Olfson et al., 2002; Hanssen et al.,
2003; Yung et al., 2006a; Wigman et al., 2012), both preceding and following the onset of many
common mental illnesses (McGrath et al., 2016a). PEs are also associated with diseases not
generally considered to be psychotic disorders, like a number of non-psychotic mental illnesses
(McGrath et al., 2016a) and Parkinson’s disease (Fénelon et al., 2000; Diederich et al., 2009).
While the majority of PEs are likely to be transient (Linscott and van Os, 2013) and some
have no significant detrimental impact on health (Peters et al., 2016), some PEs may become
abnormally persistent or intrusive and mark the onset of a clinical illness like a psychotic disorder
(Smeets et al., 2012b; Zammit et al., 2013). Various features of PEs, such as their frequency,
their persistence and the amount of distress they cause are thought to contribute to their clinical
relevance (van Os et al., 2009). Following the principle that early intervention can improve
outcomes in people with psychotic illnesses (McGorry and Yung, 2003), sets of criteria based on
the presence of PEs and risk factors have been designed to identify young people at high-risk of
psychosis and implemented internationally, though not without challenges (Csillag et al., 2016)
and controversy (Pelosi and Birchwood, 2003).
We have limited understanding of the mechanisms by which PEs occur within and outside of
psychotic disorders, the aetiological pathways that cause them and the determinants of mental
health in people who experience them. There is a pressing need to shed further light on these
questions. This is especially important when considering clinical psychosis, in that early psy-
chotic illnesses still tend to go untreated for long periods (Birchwood et al., 2013) and studying
subclinical PE may reveal some mechanisms by which clinical psychosis develops. The impor-
tance of these questions can also be argued from broader perspectives of psychiatry and public
health. High-risk for psychosis criteria also identify young people at risk of nonpsychotic disor-
ders (Kaymaz et al., 2012) and some of those who are at high-risk but who do not transition
to a first episode psychosis have fairly poor functional and symptomatic outcomes in the future
(Schlosser et al., 2012; Simon et al., 2013). PEs in the general population may be a marker
of severe distress (Stochl et al., 2015) and indicate generalised increased risk of mental illness
(Kaymaz et al., 2012).
Perhaps the most critical stages of the life course for studying PEs are adolescence and early
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adulthood (McGorry, 2011). Most serious mental disorders have their onset around the transition
to adulthood (Insel and Fenton, 2005; Kessler et al., 2005) including psychotic disorders (Häfner
et al., 1993). This epoch is thought to be critical for development of long-term societal functioning
and peer networks (Coleman and Hendry, 1999; Lerner and Steinberg, 2009) as well as aspects
of cognition and brain function, particularly related to social relationships (Choudhury et al.,
2006; Blakemore, 2012). With respect to schizophrenia, adolescence and early adulthood are
considered as a time of both vulnerability to environmental stressors and potential for disease
modification (McGorry, 2011; Selemon and Zecevic, 2015), so interventions targeted at this
period may be more effective. Given the higher prevalence of PEs than psychotic disorders
and evidence that PEs that occur persistently in adults without need for care have their onsets
in adolescence (Peters et al., 2016), we can be certain that not all PEs in young people mark
the onset of clinical psychosis. PEs in this age range may occur from diverse mechanisms and
diverse aetiological influences. Studying PEs in adolescence and young adulthood, particularly
in representative samples, should enable us to measure the full distribution of how PEs manifest,
capturing phenomena that may indeed be the beginnings of a psychotic illness but also those
that may be comorbid with other psychopathology and those that may have no negative health
implications, possibly even being beneficial (Mohr and Claridge, 2015).
A significant limitation on our mechanistic understanding of PEs, and indeed of how any mental
states arise from physical states, has been the lack of conceptual and methodological frameworks
that can bridge levels of explanation, from aetiological factors to neurobiology to cognition, be-
haviour and subjective experience. The application of methods from computational neuroscience
may equip us with the tools to traverse these explanatory gaps (Teufel and Fletcher, 2016). Com-
putational methods focus on using information-processing as an intermediate between physical
states and mental states, by mapping out all of the informational quantities and algorithms
that could be used to perform a certain function and how they could be physically implemented
in a biological system (Marr, 1982). The promise of computational methods have led to the
emergence of ‘computational psychiatry’ (Maia and Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 2012; Corlett
and Fletcher, 2014; Wang and Krystal, 2014), a field that aims to apply these methods to the
understanding and treatment of mental disorders.
In this thesis, I investigate PEs occurring in adolescents and young adults (hereon referred to as
‘young people’, for conciseness) in the general population and not limited to psychotic disorders. I
do this by drawing on methods from epidemiology, psychometrics and computational psychiatry.
In the following review chapters, I describe how I identified a number of important questions
that did not have clear answers in the existing literature. In short, I aimed to clarify the
dimensionality and measurement of PEs, whether PEs manifest both with and without distress
and accompanying mental disorders and what factors determine health outcomes associated with
them. This initial set of studies focusing on epidemiological approaches helped me to identify
and refine a further set of specific, tractable questions regarding aetiological pathways to PEs
and why PEs occur in terms of aberrant information-processing. My experimental approaches
to these questions is set out in the latter part of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Review I: Psychotic experiences beyond
psychotic disorders in the general
population
In this chapter, I will review past and current theories and empirical evidence regarding PEs
outside of psychotic disorders, henceforth referred to as PEs for conciseness.
1.1 PEs from the perspective of clinical psychosis: brief historical
perspectives
It has long been recognised that psychotic phenomena occur in people without a diagnosable psy-
chotic illness. Isaac Ray, an American 19th century psychiatrist, noted that people displaying
subtle psychosis-like manifestations could function well, with the ‘insane element. . . often crop-
ping out in the shape of extravagancies or irregularities of thought or action’ (Ray, 1863).
In the early 20th century, psychiatrists including Kraepelin (Kraepelin, 1921), Bleuler (Bleuler,
1911) and Kretschmer (Kretschmer, 1921), described how the onset of psychotic illness was
preceded by subtler manifestations of the disease that were also often present in the rela-
tives of patients. At the time, the concept of psychotic illness was undergoing transformation,
through Kraepelin’s ‘dementia praecox’ then Bleuler’s ‘group of schizophenias’ (Bleuler and Jung,
1908).
Bleuler advocated a distinction between ‘fundamental symptoms’ of schizophrenia, caused by the
biological disease processes, and ‘accessory symptoms’ that were brought on by certain ‘psychic
mechanisms’ and included state markers of psychotic episodes, like frank hallucinations, delusions
and catatonia. Bleuler’s fundamental symptoms included autism (withdrawal from interactions
into an internal fantasy world), ambivalence (division of mental states into contradictory ten-
dencies), thought disorder (particularly loosening of mental associations), affective changes and
disorders of volition and behaviour. In contrast to Kraepelin, Bleuler considered many of these
fundamental symptoms as occurring on a spectrum that was continuous with normality, which
may occur in people without needing to be symptoms of mental illness. Bleuler furthered the
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argument of continuity with normality by describing ‘latent schizophrenias’, attenuated forms of
the fundamental symptoms that were not necessarily accompanied by accessory symptoms and
might not have a deteriorating course. To Bleuler, these were the core of psychosis and were
psychosis (‘A latent schizophrenia already is a psychosis’, Bleuler, 1917).
Kurt Schneider (Schneider, 1925, 1959), influenced by the two approaches to understanding men-
tal phenomena outlined in Jaspers’ ‘General Psychopathology’ (the natural scientific approach
investigating the physical or neurobiological causes of disease, and the empathic psychological ap-
proach investigating phenomena from the patient’s perspective, Jaspers, 1963), emphasised that
we must accept the clinical entities of the psychoses as pragmatic constructs. This conservative
approach to psychopathology proved influential, helping, along with Kraepelinian traditions, to
shape diagnostic systems such as the DSM-III (Association, 1980; Häfner, 2014). Though Schnei-
der considered his classifications atheoretical, this approach formed the skeleton upon which later
research attempted to add theoretical and mechanistic flesh, something some argue now limits
modern scientific progress (Insel et al., 2010).
Today, the range of ‘psychotic disorders’ includes schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, schizophreni-
form disorder, delusional disorder, psychotic disorder NOS (not-otherwise-specified), brief psy-
chotic disorder, psychotic depression, psychotic bipolar disorder and substance-induced psychotic
disorder. Psychotic disorders have a prevalence of about 3.5%, about 1% of which is schizophre-
nia.
1.2 PEs occur in the general population, beyond psychotic disor-
ders
There is now a large body of evidence, including individual studies with tens of thousands of
participants (McGrath et al., 2015) and meta-analyses (van Os et al., 2009; Linscott and van
Os, 2013), that PEs occur outside of psychotic disorders.
A meta-analysis of 62 cohort studies found a median annual incidence of PEs of 2.5% and a
prevalence of 7.5% (Linscott and van Os, 2013). These are conservative estimates, given that
the analysis included only PEs assessed by interview diagnostic or screening instruments or self-
report measurements of specific experiences or phenomena. Around 20% of these experiences
were found to be persistent, with the majority being transient and subsiding over time. In an
earlier systematic review that used less conservative inclusion criteria regarding PEs, median
lifetime prevalence was 5% and median incidence around 3%, again supporting that the majority
of PEs are probably transient (van Os et al., 2009).
Different types of PEs probably have different prevalences in the general population. Using cross-
national data of PEs in 31,261 adults (McGrath et al., 2015) from the World Health Organisation
(WHO) World Mental Health surveys (aged over 18, people with possible psychotic disorder
excluded), McGrath et al. reported lifetime prevalence of a narrow set of hallucinatory and
delusional phenomena, not attributable to sleep or substance use, of 5.8%, with hallucinatory
experiences (5.2% prevalence) being more common than delusions (1.3% prevalence).
Studies reporting prevalence of PEs in children and adolescents tend to report higher preva-
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lences than in adult samples. A meta-analysis of 19 population studies found median psychotic
experience prevalence of 17% in children aged 9 to 12 and 7.5% in adolescents aged 13 to 18
(Kelleher et al., 2012a). Importantly, this analysis included only interview-verified PEs, or those
elicited by a self-report question on auditory hallucinations, shown to have excellent sensitivity,
specificity and positive and negative predictive values for psychosis (Kelleher et al., 2011). Use
of conservative criteria makes it unlikely that these high prevalences are measurement artefacts.
A recent population-based sample of 9,646 adolescents aged 16-19 reported that prevalence of
hearing a voice speaking thoughts aloud was 10.6% (Kompus et al., 2015).
Most PEs have their onset in adolescence or young adulthood. A study, again using data from
the World Mental Health surveys, showed that the median age of onset of PEs was 26, with the
interquartile range from 17-41 (McGrath et al., 2016b). While the age of onset is diverse, these
findings, combined with high incidence of PEs, relative to prevalence (van Os et al., 2009; Linscott
and van Os, 2013), supports that the majority of PEs occur in this younger age range.
1.3 Theories of psychotic phenomena outside of psychotic disor-
ders
Numerous theories have been developed on why PEs occur. The most influential theories, to
date, have centred on the relationship between PEs and clinical psychosis. As a simplification,
I will discuss two broad theories and their associated research frameworks that have been used
to investigate PEs over recent decades. ‘Schizotypy’ theories posit that psychotic phenomena
are considered the manifestation in personality of the latent liability for schizophrenia. ‘Psy-
chosis high-risk’ theories posit that some PEs are early manifestations of psychotic disorder,
thus indexing high-risk for psychotic illness and potentially facilitating early intervention.
Researchers framing their investigations within one of these perspectives have tended to utilise
methodological paradigms from different traditions: schizotypy developing through the lens of
individual differences and psychosis high-risk through clinically-orientated research into disease
pathology and prediction. These theoretical perspectives are by no means incompatible and have
developed alongside one another, often interacting. Indeed, summarising current thinking on PEs
is complex due to high volumes of research, heterogeneity of theories and empirical traditions
and lack of consensus over organising frameworks, constructs or even terminology. Perhaps the
most widely-accepted perspective is to consider PEs as part of a ‘psychosis continuum’ (Strauss,
1969), though some argue that is has been insufficiently scrutinised and has inadequate empirical
support (David, 2010; Lawrie et al., 2010; Lawrie, 2016).
1.3.1 Schizotypy: a distribution of the latent liability for schizophrenia
‘Schizotypy’ was originally conceived of as the latent liability for schizophrenia manifesting in
personality traits. Rado (Rado, 1960) coined the portmanteau ‘schizotype’ to describe people
with a schizophrenia-phenotype; the traits deriving from this phenotype were the ‘schizotypal
organisation’, which manifested as ‘schizotypal behaviour’. Rado theorised that a common aeti-
ology could generate diverse clinical and nonclinical outcomes.
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Shortly after, Paul Meehl wrote his seminal account of ‘schizotaxia, schizotypy and schizophrenia’
(Meehl, 1962). In this ambitious work, he described a synaptic atypicality, which he called
‘hypokrisia’, that occurred across the brain, resulting in a pervasive integrative deficit in the
central nervous system that he called ‘schizotaxia’. This arose because of a single dominant
genetic influence, the ‘schizogene’, and resulting in a personality organisation, ‘schizotypy’, that
represented ‘latent liability’ for schizophrenia. Schizotypy was necessary but not sufficient for
the development of schizophrenia. If a person could ‘compensate’ for schizotypy, they might
not manifest clinical psychosis. However, ‘decompensated’ schizotypy was schizophrenia. Thus,
Meehl’s theory integrated genetic, neurobiological and behavioural levels of explanation to arrive
at a mechanistic framework within which we could consider schizophrenia and all manifestations
of schizophrenia-like phenomena. Meehl, following Bleuler, actually considered positive PEs
‘accessory symptoms’ (Meehl, 1990), rather than core features.
Meehl argued schizotaxia had a prevalence of about 10% and represented a discrete taxon, or
category, in the population. It was possible, but unlikely, for a schizotaxic person to not develop
schizotypy if they developed in a sufficiently benign environment. Meehl’s account is sometimes
referred to as ‘quasi-dimensional’, with thresholds or categories underlying a distribution of
psychotic phenomena.
1.3.2 Also schizotypy: a fully-dimensional distribution with adaptive and
maladaptive manifestation
The schizotypy model was developed further by Gordon Claridge, who proposed the ‘fully-
dimensional’ theory (Claridge, 1997). This posits that schizotypy represents natural variation
in the central nervous system that produces variation in behaviour and experience. At its ex-
treme, this confers susceptibility to psychotic disorder, but this variability is fully continuous
with normality and can have adaptive or beneficial manifestations too.
Beneficial associations of schizotypy are thought to include creativity, openness to experience
and spirituality (Mohr and Claridge, 2015). This emphasis on possible adaptive manifestations
has drawn criticism, particularly from researchers like Mark Lenzenweger (Lenzenweger, 2011), a
proponent of Meehl’s taxonic model, who argue that schizotypy represents ill health, and remains
a point of controversy and active investigation.
1.3.3 Schizotypy is multidimensional
Schizotypy, whether considered quasi-dimensional or fully-dimensional, is thought to be multi-
dimensional. A large number of studies have attempted to identify the number of dimensions of
schizotypy using factor analysis, a method that explains observed data as a function of unob-
servable, ’latent’ variables. The majority of studies support for three or four latent dimensions
(Raine et al., 1994; Bergman et al., 1996; Chen et al., 1997; Vollema and Hoijtink, 2000; Reynolds
et al., 2000; Fossati et al., 2003; Stefanis et al., 2004; Wuthrich and Bates, 2006; Compton et
al., 2009; Badoud et al., 2011; Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2014; Barron et al., 2015), though with
important exceptions (Chmielewski and Watson, 2008).
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These dimensions are considered broadly comparable to dimensions of psychotic illness. A ‘pos-
itive’ or ‘cognitive-perceptual’ dimension (Raine et al., 1994) comprises what I refer to as PEs:
distortions of reality, unusual perceptual experiences and anomalous beliefs or ideation, such as
paranoia or grandiosity. A ‘negative’ or ‘interpersonal’ dimension (Raine et al., 1994) comprises
difficulties with social relationships, social anhedonia, lack of close friends, restricted experi-
ence and expression of affect and social anxiety. A ‘disorganisation’ dimension (Raine et al.,
1994) comprises unusual or hard to understand speech and eccentric or odd behaviour. Some
models include different constructs or separate these constructs further, such as the ‘impulsive
non-conformity’ scale in the O-LIFE questionnaires, devised by Claridge (Mason and Claridge,
2006) or separating a ‘paranoia’ dimension from the cognitive-perceptual dimension (Stefanis et
al., 2004).
1.3.4 PEs as the precursors of psychotic disorders: prodrome and psychosis-
risk research
Another critical perspective in the study of PEs outside of diagnosed psychotic disorders is that
they can represent the ‘prodrome’ of psychotic illness. A prodrome is a set of signs and/or
symptoms that precede a disease’s characteristic manifestations. A prodrome is a retrospective
concept; it can only be truly diagnosed once definitive disease markers have developed.
The initial prodrome of psychotic disorders is varied and challenging to identify, but some gen-
eral patterns have been identified. There is evidence of a progression through unspecific symp-
toms, followed by ‘basic symptoms’ (Ebel et al., 1989; Schultze-Lutter and Klosterkötter, 2002;
Vollmer-Larsen et al., 2007) (a set of supposedly ‘core’ symptoms, including subjective distur-
bances of language, perception, thought and motor function, reduced stress tolerance, altered
bodily sensations, changes in emotion, concentration and memory and impaired social functioning
(Klosterkötter et al., 2001)), then attenuated forms of PEs, then transient psychotic symptoms,
before the onset of a psychotic episode (Schultze-Lutter et al., 2010).
PEs in the general population might therefore represent the early stages of disease. The early
promise of prodromal research was that earlier identification and intervention in psychotic disor-
ders would improve patient outcomes and deliver healthcare more efficiently. McGorry & Yung
(McGorry and Yung, 2003) clearly laid out the case that interventions for psychotic illness should
be as early in the disease course as possible. Contrary to the public perception that interven-
tions for psychosis are ineffectual and psychosis has a poor outcome, there are highly effective
treatments that promote symptomatic recovery (Schennach et al., 2012). Delaying access to such
interventions, or a greater duration of untreated psychosis (DUP), may confer poorer prognosis
in psychotic illness, an observation that dates as far back as Krapelin (Kraepelin, 1921). Re-
cent meta-analyses showed association between DUP and symptom severity, lower probability
of remission, poor social functioning and poor global outcomes (Penttilä et al., 2014), as well as
poorer treatment response (Perkins et al., 2005) and greater negative symptoms (Boonstra et
al., 2012). Intervening early may also allow better management of comorbid psychopathology,
which is often present both in psychosis (Buckley et al., 2009) and its prodrome (Rosen et al.,
2006).
19
1.3.5 Synthesis
Researchers in each field have tended to utilise different paradigms. Schizotypy, with its interest
in personality traits, has been less associated with longitudinal studies, such as developmental
trajectories of schizotypy or long-term health outcomes in people with schizotypal traits (though
with important exceptions, like the Chapmans’ landmark longitudinal studies (Chapman et al.,
1994)). In contrast, the high-risk paradigm, with its interest in prediction of who will and will
not develop a psychotic disorder, is fundamentally temporal in nature but tends to consider
state symptoms and change over short periods, like worsening psychotic symptoms or decline in
functioning. It has focused less on stable, trait-like manifestations of psychotic phenomena.
This is changing, and these fields are perhaps converging (Debbané et al., 2015). Schizotypy has
been suggested as an ‘organising framework’ within which to investigate disturbances to social
functioning and affect, as well as psychotic disorders (Cohen et al., 2015). Though the shape of
the distribution or what even is distributed in the psychosis continuum is not always made clear,
some suggest it is an extension of Claridge’s dimensional model and can easily accommodate
epidemiological, aetiological and mechanistic work linking psychotic disorders and PEs (Nelson
et al., 2013b).
Bringing together methods and theoretical insights from schizotypy and high-risk research could
help advance our understanding of psychotic phenomena in both clinical and nonclinical popula-
tions. Methods from individual differences research are well placed to investigate heterogeneity
and variability. High-risk paradigms tend to be more epidemiologically rigorous, such as in sam-
pling and inference of causality, while schizotypy work has been criticised for commonly using
undergraduate samples, cross-sectional studies and self-report measurement.
However, schizotypy, high-risk paradigms and the continuum model all focus on a specific rela-
tionship between PEs and psychotic disorders. The reality of the relationships between PEs and
psychopathology appears more complex, with significant implications for theoretical and empir-
ical approaches to their study, as I will discuss in the remainder of this chapter.I will discuss
how PEs may mark the onset of psychotic disorder but also predict non-psychotic psychopathol-
ogy and sometimes occur without need for clinical care, supporting that PEs in the general
population are associated with diverse health outcomes.
1.4 PEs and related phenomena may mark the early stages of
psychotic disorders
1.4.1 Psychotic disorders may arise when nonclinical PEs become aberrantly
persistent and cause distress and functional impairment
The majority of PEs are probably transient, supported by their similar prevalence and incidence
(van Os et al., 2009) and by longitudinal investigations (Zammit et al., 2013). There is consistent,
direct evidence from large-scale longitudinal designs that some psychotic disorders are the result
of ‘subclinical’ PEs becoming persistent and distressing during adolescence and early adulthood
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(Chapman et al., 1994; Poulton et al., 2000; Hanssen et al., 2005; Welham et al., 2009; Dominguez
et al., 2011; Werbeloff et al., 2012; Zammit et al., 2013).
Poulton et al. (Poulton et al., 2000) showed in the Dunedin birth cohort that 11-year-old children
with delusional beliefs or hallucinations had a very high risk of a schizophreniform diagnosis at
age 26, with 42% of the cases at age 26 reporting 1 or more symptom at age 11. Importantly,
this prediction was specific; it did not predict mania or depression at 26.
In Early Developmental Stages of Psychopathology (EDSP) study, a prospective general-population
sample of adolescents (aged 14-17), in which PEs were measured at four times points spanning
8.4 years. Clinical psychosis, defined as PEs with significant functional impairment, had a dose-
response relationship with the number of times PEs were expressed at the earlier time points
(Dominguez et al., 2011).
A study in the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) investigated the
continuity of interview-verified PEs measured at age 12 and age 18 (Zammit et al., 2013). Of the
4060 participants who took part at both time points, 2.5% had PEs (suspected or definite) at
both time points, making up 21.3% of the total population with PEs at age 12. 9.1% had them
at age 12 only and 4.7% had them at age 18 only. From this, we can infer that 80% of childhood
PEs are likely to be subside over the course of adolescence, with 20% persisting. Having PEs at
age 12 increased the odds of having PEs at 18, with definite experiences predicting higher odds
than suspected ones.
A recent systematic review and meta-analysis examined evidence for prediction of clinical psy-
chosis from nonclinical PEs in the general population (Kaymaz et al., 2012), finding 3.5 times in-
creased yearly risk of conversion to clinical psychosis in people with PEs (0.56% conversion) than
those without (0.16% conversion). Importantly, there was, again, evidence of a dose-response
relationship with the severity/persistence of PEs.
These studies support that subclinical PEs are mostly transient, but around one fifth of them
become persistent. The more PEs persist, the greater the risk of onset of a clinical psychotic
disorder.
1.4.2 Operationalised high-risk states can predict development of psychotic
disorders and facilitate early intervention but most will not develop
clinical psychosis
Different instruments, operationalised criteria and clinical services have been established with
the aim of reliably measuring risk of psychotic disorders and identifying individuals with a
trajectory towards psychotic illness (Miller et al., 2003; Yung et al., 2005; Riecher-Rössler et
al., 2007). The criteria generally require ‘attenuated psychotic symptoms’ (APS), ‘brief limited
intermittent psychotic symptoms’ (BLIPS) and either familial risk or poor functioning. APS are
subthreshold, attenuated positive symptoms, like unusual ideas of reference or paranoid ideation,
present for over a week. BLIPS are periods of transient positive psychotic symptoms, occurring
for less than a week.
Prospectively identified UHR states are reasonably predictive of conversion to psychotic disorders,
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with upper estimates of rate of conversion to psychotic disorders of around 40% (Cannon et al.,
2008). A meta-analysis found mean transition risks of 18% at 6-month follow-up, 22% at 1 year,
29% at 2 years and 36% after 3 years (Fusar-Poli et al., 2012).
Thus, while people meeting UHR criteria are at increased risk of psychotic disorders, most people
who meet these criteria do not transition. Indeed, it has been observed that rates of conversion
to psychosis have declined in more recent studies (Yung et al., 2006b). Most studies, until
recently, considered conversion to psychosis and psychotic symptoms as the primary outcome.
These studies suggest that around one third of people meeting UHR criteria will transition, while
around another third will not convert but remain systematic and functionally impaired, while
about a third recovery symptomatically and functionally (Gee and Cannon, 2011). Combining
these criteria with other predictors in multivariate analyses, such as basic symptoms, or other
symptoms like depression or disorganised symptoms, may improve positive predictive values
(Yung et al., 2003; Ruhrmann and Schultze-Lutter, 2010).
The concept of the prodrome of psychosis and psychosis-risk clearly has practical and clinical
utility, suggestive of construct validity and continuity between early, clinically relevant PEs and
psychotic disorders. However, it is not yet sufficiently clear which PEs are the precursors of
psychotic illness and which are not, though differentiation may be possible based on features like
persistence and associated distress or functional impairment (van Os et al., 2009). The success
of high-risk paradigms lets us conclude that some, but not all PEs in the general population are
early manifestations of psychotic disorders.
1.4.3 Schizotypal personality traits in the general population indicate risk of
psychotic and non-psychotic disorders, but more evidence is needed
Longitudinal studies of schizotypal personality traits predicting psychotic disorders are uncom-
mon, but generally find that these traits do predict psychosis or personality disorders considered
related to psychotic disorders (Kwapil, 1998; Kwapil et al., 2000, 2013; Gooding et al., 2005;
Bogren et al., 2010; Miettunen et al., 2011). The specific patterns of association vary according
to the outcomes and the measures used.
Studies using the Chapmans’ 10-year longitudinal data have produced evidence that ‘schizophrenia-
spectrum’ personality disorders (schizotypal personality disorder, schizoid personality disorder,
paranoid personality disorder’) are predicted by social anhedonia (Kwapil, 1998) and by both
positive and negative schizotypy (Kwapil et al., 2013), while clinical psychosis is predicted by
perceptual aberrations and magical ideation (Chapman et al., 1994). This work is limited by
hypothesis-driven groupings of deviant scorers as they are likely to be arbitrary definitions and
do not capture the full distribution of psychotic phenomena.
To my knowledge, the only study using a representative sample used data from the Northern
Finland 1966 Birth cohort (Jääskeläinen et al., 2015), and found that perceptual aberrations
concurrently differentiated schizophrenia from other psychotic disorders and psychotic disorders
from nonpsychotic psychiatric disorders. Over a subsequent 11-year follow-up period, social
anhedonia predicted development of any psychotic disorder, while lower scores on physical anhe-
donia differentially predicted development of a psychotic disorder versus a nonpsychotic disorder
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(Miettunen et al., 2011).
1.4.4 Implications
The link between PEs in the general population and clinical psychosis goes beyond phenomeno-
logical similarity. PEs can be early signs of a severe psychotic illness, which explains the drive
to understand and utilise them for better clinical prediction and intervention. However, as I will
discuss, this link may not be specific, when considering how PEs are related to psychotic and
non-psychotic mental illnesses.
1.5 PEs predict nonpsychotic disorders and may indicate general
psychopathology
1.5.1 High-risk criteria are associated with risk of nonpsychotic disorders
Recent prospective psychosis high-risk studies have considered a plurality of psychiatric outcomes
beyond psychotic disorders and more thoroughly mapped out the health trajectories of people
at clinical high-risk for psychosis. In the same meta-analysis that showed PEs in the general
population increase risk of psychotic disorders, it was found that they also increase the risk of
nonpsychotic psychiatric disorders (Kaymaz et al., 2012), albeit with weaker association. Recent
studies have reported a decline in rates of transition to psychosis (Simon et al., 2011; Fusar-Poli
et al., 2012). Comorbidity, particularly with depression, anxiety and substance use are common
in the high-risk state (de Wit et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2015; McAusland et al., 2015; Azar et
al., 2016), suggesting that high-risk criteria may capture people with high levels of generalised
psychopathology. In the Chapman’s 10-year cohort, positive schizotypy also predicted mood
disorders, substance use disorder and any mental health treatment while negative symptoms
predicted social impairment (Kwapil et al., 2013).
Non-conversion to psychotic disorder from a high-risk state does not always indicate return to
good health and levels of functioning. Meta-analysis of 8 studies (Miller et al., 1999; Haroun
et al., 2006; Lemos-Giráldez et al., 2009; Simon and Umbricht, 2010; Addington et al., 2011;
Velthorst et al., 2011; Ziermans et al., 2011; Schlosser et al., 2012) that examined remission
rates suggests that, while around three quarters of people will not transition to psychosis within
two years, only around half of them will achieve remission, suggesting remission rates of up to
35% of the initial high-risk population (Simon et al., 2013). Functional recovery does not always
accompany symptomatic recovery (Schlosser et al., 2012) and functioning can still be low, even
years after first being identified as high-risk. These results are complicated by using fairly short
follow-up periods, as transitions may occur after a longer time (Nelson et al., 2013a), particularly
in younger people (Riecher-Rössler et al., 2009; Fusar-Poli et al., 2012).
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1.5.2 PEs occur in non-psychotic psychiatric disorders and indicate sever-
ity
PEs also occur in people with non-psychotic psychiatric disorders (Olfson et al., 2002; Hanssen
et al., 2003; Yung et al., 2006a). In a general population sample of adolescents and young adults
(Wigman et al., 2012), around 27% of people with depression or anxiety disorders had at least one
lifetime psychotic experience and were 2.2 times more likely to have had a psychotic experience
than those without a disorder. Presence of such comorbid PEs in non-psychotic disorder tended
to occur in younger participants and predicted poorer illness course. The presence of PEs in
non-psychotic disorder is promoted by many of the same risk factors for clinical and nonclinical
psychosis (Guloksuz et al., 2015a). Further evidence that PEs occur commonly in other disorders
comes from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, in which McGrath et al (McGrath et al.,
2016a) reported that first onset of PEs preceded the onset of 8 of 21 common mental disorders,
but that the onset of 18 of 21 disorders were associated with subsequent first onset of PEs.
1.5.3 PEs in the general population indicate severity on a general distress
factor that also underlies depressive and anxious symptoms
While there is evidence of some PEs occurring without distress and without need for care, PEs
in the general population do commonly occur with subclinical depressive and anxious symptoms
(van Nierop et al., 2012, 2014, 2015). As discussed, the onset of PEs precedes development of
some common mental disorders (Rössler et al., 2011) and follows development of many disorders
(McGrath et al., 2016a). Stochl et al. showed that covariance among PEs and depressive
symptoms can be summarised by a latent factor of common mental distress (Stochl et al., 2015),
with specific factors explaining residual variance in each domain. Using item response theoretic
analyses, the authors showed that PEs uniquely measured a more severe range of the distribution
of distress than classical depressive symptoms.
1.5.4 Implications
These sets of findings clearly demonstrate that PEs do not respect current nosological bound-
aries. Neither does detection of PEs in the general population or at-risk populations necessarily
signify specific risk for psychotic disorders. PEs may be a common manifestation of mental
distress, similar to general symptoms like low mood, worry, fatigue or sleep disturbance. Such
a conceptualisation echoes earlier models of psychopathology as arranged hierarchically (Foulds
and Bedford, 1975), in which relatively rarer symptoms, like PEs, are co-expressed with a variety
of common symptoms (Sturt, 1981).
This undermines theoretical work that takes clinical psychosis as a landmark and, from there,
forms perspectives on nonclinical PEs. While there is clearly phenomenological overlap and
association between nonclinical PEs and later psychotic disorders, considering a single continuum
that links them is probably an oversimplification (Kaymaz and van Os, 2010).
This has significant implications for public health approaches to mental health (Wahlbeck, 2015),
in that it may be important to assess PEs to measure the full distribution of mental distress.
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A common distress factor may also partly explain the non-specificity of many environmental
(Kounali et al., 2014) and genetic risk factors for mental disorders (Cross-Disorder Group of the
Psychiatric Genomics Consortium et al., 2013).
1.6 PEs, even when persistent, are not always associated with
clinical illness, distress or impairment
1.6.1 Ultra-high risk states have a low prevalence
Not everyone who has PEs will meet UHR criteria. PEs alone far from qualify a person for high-
risk states, though APS are the most common route into UHR status. UHR criteria require a
person to be help-seeking, so it is difficult to epidemiologically assess how prevalence UHR states
are in the general population. Kelleher et al. investigated prevalence of prodromal syndromes in a
sample of 212 adolescents, aged 11-13 and enriched for those scoring highly on a self-report screen
for psychotic symptoms (Kelleher et al., 2012c). Using the Structured Interview for Prodromal
Symptoms (Miller et al., 2003) criteria, 7.7% met criteria for APS and 3.5% met criteria for
BLIPS, with 8.1% meeting UHR criteria overall. Using Comprehensive Assessment for At-Risk
Mental States criteria (Yung et al., 2005), 7.7% met criterion for an UHR state, excluding the
decline in psychosocial functioning. With the criterion for decline in functioning, just 0.9% of the
sample met CAARMS UHR criteria. This suggests that most people with PEs are not impaired
by them and not at imminent risk of clinical psychosis.
1.6.2 Some (and possibly most) PEs occur benignly
Evidence that PEs can occur without subjective distress or impaired wellbeing can broadly
(and somewhat artificially) be divided into two strands. One strand has considered non-clinical
psychotic phenomena in the framework of ‘healthy schizotypy’, discussed prominently by Gordon
Claridge (Mohr and Claridge, 2015). The other strand has investigated discrete PEs occurring
without a need for care and auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), a common type of non-clinical
PE, in particular.
Healthy schizotypy is characterised by cognitive-perceptual schizotypy in the absence of inter-
personal/negative schizotypy (Mohr and Claridge, 2015). Positive schizotypy has been shown
to occur without other schizotypal dimensions and without high levels of distress or impaired
wellbeing in a number of studies employing person-centred classification analyses (Loughland
and Williams, 1997; Goulding, 2005; Goulding and Ödéhn, 2009; Cella et al., 2013; Tabak et al.,
2013; Ruzich et al., 2015; Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2016). Using a data-driven clustering analysis
on positive PEs, disorganisation and negative schizotypy in 420 undergraduates, Tabak et al.
(Tabak et al., 2013) found evidence of six distinct clusters of schizotypal trait expression, in
some of which the dimensions dissociated. High scores on all dimensions, high scores on negative
schizotypy alone and high scores on negative schizotypy and disorganisation predicted poor well-
being and quality of life. The presence of positive PEs without the other schizotypal dimensions
predicted similar wellbeing and quality of life to people with low scores on all schizotypal traits.
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A very similar clustering pattern was recently found by Fonseca-Pedrero et al. in a general pop-
ulation sample of adolescents, with similar associations with mental health (Fonseca-Pedrero et
al., 2016). A limitation of this work is it tends to rely on self-report of general trait proneness
to PEs, rather than specific PEs or ones that have been validated by an external assessor, like
in interviews. Some authors suggest such ‘benign’ PEs may be artefactual or simply very mild,
transient psychotic phenomena (Stanghellini et al., 2012) that are not truly comparable to those
occurring in psychosis (David, 2010).
More convincing evidence of non-clinical PEs comes from extensive investigations comparing
people with PEs in the context of clinical psychosis and people with PEs but no need for clinical
care, that have used interviews or detailed self-report measures to verify psychotic phenomena.
Critically, these studies support that non-clinical PEs can occur with a similar intensity and
persistence as observed in clinical psychosis (Brett et al., 2014b; Peters et al., 2016). This
complicates the idea that persistence of PEs reflects increasing psychopathology or the onset
of psychotic disorder. There are replicable differences between clinical and non-clinical PEs.
Delusions and odd beliefs tend to be more commonly associated with a need for care (Rössler et
al., 2015; Peters et al., 2016). Similarly, PEs that invoke distress (Hill et al., 2012; Johns et al.,
2014), PEs occurring in the context of cognitive deficits (Badcock and Hugdahl, 2012) and biases
(Daalman et al., 2013) and PEs for which people develop distressing or maladaptive appraisals
(Garety and Kuipers, 2001; Peters et al., 2012; Brett et al., 2014a) are more associated with a
need for care.
1.6.3 Implications
Not all PEs are associated with distress, impairment or illness, but some of this evidence is
complicated by methodological issues related to measurement and sampling. It is not known
whether such ‘benign’ PEs reflect the same underlying mechanisms as clinical PEs but in the
absence of additional risk factors or the presence of additional protective factors, or a different
underlying mechanism.
1.7 Is continuity between PEs and clinical psychosis supported by
overlapping environmental factors involved in the aetiology
of nonclinical PEs and psychotic disorders?
There is good evidence from multiple epidemiological studies that some risk factors for psychotic
disorders also promote nonclinical PEs, which is often stated as evidence in favour of a psychosis
continuum (van Os and Reininghaus, 2016). Nonclinical PEs may share genetic influences with
clinical psychosis, given that the earliest observations of PEs outside of psychotic disorders were
in the relatives of psychotic patients and PEs, like psychotic disorders, are heritable. Heritability
estimates from twin studies range from 15-59% (Ericson et al., 2011; Hur et al., 2012; Zavos et
al., 2014).
Factors that predispose to both psychotic disorders and PEs include migrant status or belonging
to an ethnic minority (Johns et al., 2002; Cantor-Graae and Selten, 2005; Morgan et al., 2009;
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Veling et al., 2010; Linscott and van Os, 2013), cannabis use (Moore et al., 2007; Kuepper et al.,
2011b), male sex (van Os et al., 2009), socioeconomic adversity, urbanicity (McGrath et al., 2004;
Kuepper et al., 2011a; Vassos et al., 2012), family history of psychotic disorder (Krabbendam
et al., 2004; Polanczyk et al., 2010), pregnancy and birth complications (Zammit et al., 2009),
developmental impairments (Cannon et al., 2002), low IQ (Cannon et al., 2002; Horwood et al.,
2008), distressing life events (Beards et al., 2013), childhood trauma and maltreatment (Varese
et al., 2012), victimization by peers (Schreier et al., 2009; Varese et al., 2012), and poor social
functioning (Polanczyk et al., 2010).
However, most of these risk factors also predispose generally to most common mental disorders,
such as depression and anxiety. Few studies have ever investigated the association between
putative aetiological factors and PEs and other disorders within the same studies (Krabbendam
et al., 2004; Breetvelt et al., 2010) and only one study has quantitatively tested whether these
associations differ across disorders (Kounali et al., 2014), finding that most environmental and
familial risk factors predispose equally to depression and PEs. Some specificity was found, in
that female sex and a family history of depression predispose more to depression, while abnormal
neurodevelopment predisposed more to PEs.
Regarding common genetic influences, a recent study investigated the phenotypic manifestations
of genetic risk for schizophrenia by capitalising on results from the Psychiatric Genetics Consor-
tium to calculate polygenic risk scores in an epidemiological cohort of adolescents (Jones et al.,
2016). The authors found associations between genetic risk and increased negative symptoms
and anxiety disorder, but not PEs or depression. This suggests that the continuum of genetic
liability for schizophrenia does not manifest as PEs.
1.7.1 Implications
The paucity of research on this question and the lack of specificity evident in existing research
means that the argument that common aetiological factors indicate a specific psychosis contin-
uum is unconvincing. Further research in large samples, possibly stratifying by environmental
exposures or genetic factors (van Winkel et al., 2015), may hold more promise to identify specific
relationships, should any exist. Given the common overlap in PEs and symptoms of depression
and anxiety (Stochl et al., 2015), it is possible that studies will identify few specific risk factors
because current nosological boundaries do not reflect underlying mechanisms.
1.8 Discussion
1.8.1 PEs in young people are heterogeneous
The evidence reviewed above supports that PEs in the general population are a heterogeneous
set of phenomena with varying clinical relevance. Clearly, some PEs mark the prodrome of a
psychotic illness, but these are the minority of cases. Most PEs are likely to be transient and
some PEs, even if persisting for years, will never be associated with distress or impairment. PEs
feature in a state of high general risk of mental disorders that is associated with high levels of
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distress and often with functional impairment. Other features, like social functioning, anhedonia
or comorbid depression or anxiety increase the likelihood of developing a psychotic illness from
this state.
The success of psychosis high-risk research was reflected in the recent debate over inclusion of
‘psychosis risk syndrome’ into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 (DSM-
5) as a diagnosable disorder (Corcoran et al., 2010; Drake and Lewis, 2010; Woods et al., 2010;
Carpenter and Van Os, 2011; Tandon et al., 2012; Yung et al., 2012; McGorry and van Os, 2013).
For the reasons discussed above, as well as concerns over diagnostic reliability, state versus trait
nature of the high-risk state and potential for stigma and unnecessary intervention, psychosis-
risk was not included as a standalone diagnosis but included as a condition warranting further
study, termed the ‘attenuated psychosis syndrome’ (Tsuang et al., 2013). In this debate, some
authors emphasised that high-risk criteria also capture participants at risk of other disorders and
that it may be more practical to take a transdiagnostic approach (McGorry and van Os, 2013)
that would allow clinical staging of emerging mental illness (McGorry et al., 2014). I argue that
the current evidence supports this better than theories of a specific psychosis continuum that
considering nonclinical PEs as part of a distribution with normality at one end and schizophrenia
at the other. I make three main criticisms of the continuum model of psychosis.
Firstly, what is continuously distributed is sometimes ambiguous or not even stated. Possibilities
include a distribution of the latent liability or risk of schizophrenia, a phenomenological contin-
uum of qualitatively similar experiences ranging in intensity, a continuum of distress/impairment
associated with PEs and a temporal continuum whereby early, nonclinical PEs can develop over
time into clinical psychosis. A significant limitation in disentangling these is that instruments
like questionnaires or interviews will probably not be able to fully separate these dimensions,
unless designed specifically to do so (Peters et al., 2004; Bell et al., 2006) or to elicit rich phe-
nomenological information (Woods et al., 2015).
Secondly, were we able to prove that psychosis manifests as a continuum from normality to
clinical disorder, we would still need to set points on that continuum above and below which
we are justified to take certain actions, like interventions (Lawrie et al., 2010). Even if the
continuum offered a more parsimonious account of psychosis or mapped better on to aetiology or
biology, we would need to know it does better than the existing conceptualisation of categorical
syndromes in terms of patient outcomes (David, 2010).
Finally, phenotypic continuity (in whatever dimension) of PEs in clinical and nonclinical pop-
ulations does not mean that they arise from continuity in underlying mechanisms in terms of
information-processing and its neurobiological implementation, or in terms of aetiological factors.
I will discuss the challenges of working across such levels of explanation and potential solutions
further in the next chapter.
1.8.2 Moving forwards I: recommendations
Below, I outline recommendations to make progress in understanding nonclinical PEs that will
shape the investigations in this thesis.
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1. PEs require unbiased investigation as transdiagnostic phenomena
Study of PEs in the general population must be disentangled from the study of schizophrenia.
The evidence is insufficient for a specific continuum traversing normality, nonclinical PEs and
clinical psychosis. In part, this is because the kinds of studies needed to claim specificity have
not been done. For example, even studies that have directly compared people with no PEs,
with nonclinical PEs and with clinically relevant PEs have almost never included a nonpsychotic
psychiatric control group without PEs to show that any effects are PE specific. Studies that
could identify specificity, such as in environmental or genetic aetiological factors, support non-
specificity (Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium et al., 2013; Kounali
et al., 2014).
Perhaps more importantly, focusing on the relationship between nonclinical PEs and psychotic
disorders, without considering the full range of health outcomes, may limit advances in scientific
understanding and clinical practise. Continuing to focus on a specific psychosis continuum could
limit progress in understanding the development of mental disorders and changes in experience
that commonly occur during childhood, adolescence and early adulthood. Strongly claiming a
specific link between nonclinical PEs and schizophrenia is potentially stigmatizing and distressing
for a young person who experiences them. Critically, it ignores the plurality of outcomes for a
population of non-help-seeking young people with PEs. The most likely outcome appears to be
that their PEs will subside without clinical relevance. A small proportion will unfortunately
go on to develop clinical psychosis. Another proportion will go on to develop other mental
disorders. Another proportion may have persistent mild functional impairment, distress and PEs
without ever meeting diagnostic criteria for disorder or seeking help. The reasons that determine
outcomes for this population are poorly understood, but we do them a disservice by conceptually
and empirically focusing on the minority that will develop a psychotic disorder.
One recently proposed framework may already have gone some way towards generalising and
unifying the study of nonclinical PEs as transdiagnostic phenomena: the ‘extended psychosis
phenotype’ (Wigman et al., 2011). Van Os characterises this as the ‘behavioural expression of
vulnerability for psychotic disorder in populations’ (van Os and Linscott, 2012). While this is
essentially restating some principles of schizotypy, the formation of a new, mostly-descriptive
construct, rooted in epidemiological observations while preserving theoretical features borne
out in schizotypy and high-risk research, has the potential to reorganise the field and drive
research in fruitful directions. Psychosis as an extended, transdiagnostic phenotype is supported
by evidence reviewed in this chapter and may be a sensible generalisation for a field that has
been focused narrowly on schizophrenia and psychotic disorders. However, in my opinion, the
conceptualisation offered by van Os is still too oriented towards psychotic disorders. PEs in
the general population deserve unbiased investigation, considering a plurality of positive and
negative mental health outcomes.
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2. Strands of evidence might be better integrated if we could integrate different
theories of PEs, but any synthesis requires empirical support
It is possible, if not probable, that similar psychotic phenomena are captured by instruments
arising from different research traditions, such as schizotypal personality or high-risk states for
psychosis. It might be possible to integrate aspects of different theories of PEs into a common
framework but synthesis is limited by the tendency to use different instruments to measure PEs
and related traits without knowledge of whether they are comparable. Integration might be fa-
cilitated by testing whether different instrument types measuring PEs are measuring the same or
different things. This would require careful comparison of instruments and, ideally, administra-
tion in the same population. If diverse instruments prove to be measuring the same underlying
phenomena, we may be able to generalise their findings. It is also important to understand differ-
ences in what is being measured. If, for example, interview instruments measuring discrete PEs
prove to be measuring more severe psychotic phenomena than a self-report instrument measuring
schizotypy, this has significant implications for conclusions drawn from empirical studies.
3. We must look beyond positive PEs to associated traits like distress and social
functioning
Our theories should consider the diversity of health outcomes in people with nonclinical PEs and
that PEs manifest in conjunction with various other traits. To understand the associated traits
and health outcomes associated with PEs, schizotypy presents an excellent foundation upon
which to build, having long-considered PEs to be part of a multidimensional construct. Social
difficulties feature prominently in schizotypy theories. ‘Interpersonal schizotypy’, characterised
by social anhedonia, lack of close friends, reduced expression of affect, is an important predictor
of future health (Miettunen et al., 2011). Social dysfunction is reliably found in high-risk groups
(Addington et al., 2008; Velthorst et al., 2010) , with poor (Fusar-Poli et al., 2010; Cornblatt et
al., 2012) or declining (Cornblatt et al., 2015) social functioning associated with risk of clinical
psychosis. However, it is questionable how specifically this domain is related to psychosis, or
how ‘schizotypal’ it really is; social difficulties are a feature of most, if not all mental disorders.
Similarly, ‘disorganisation’ is considered a dimension of schizotypy, though in some prominent
instruments like the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (Raine, 1991), this dimension is made
up of having odd or difficult to understand speech and having odd habits or perceiving one’s
self as eccentric. Recent research has emphasised how PEs often manifest alongside common
depressive and anxious symptoms (Stochl et al., 2015; Guloksuz et al., 2015b), particularly in
those meeting high-risk for psychosis criteria (Woods et al., 2009). We must therefore look
beyond positive PEs to broader phenotypic measurements.
4. It is particularly important to investigate PEs in adolescence and early adult-
hood
As described, many PEs, as well as many mental disorders including psychotic disorders, have
their onset in adolescence or early adulthood. Many such PEs will be transient and not survive
into adulthood. This developmental epoch spans the full transition from the end of childhood to
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adulthood and is a time of significant development of cognition, neurobiology and social relation-
ships (McGorry, 2011). It may represent a time in which environmental influences particularly
influence future trajectories of health and functioning, for better or worse. For these reasons,
studying PEs in samples of young people that are representative of the general population is
critical for improving understanding of PEs and for facilitating treatment or even prevention
of psychotic disorders. Working with young people from representative samples is often practi-
cally challenging due to issues of ethics and accessibility. This likely explains why the majority
of schizotypy work has relied on university samples of undergraduates, who may not manifest
the representative distribution of PEs or schizotypal traits. Investigating PEs in adolescence
and early adulthood, which I will refer to for conciseness as PEs occurring in ‘young people’, is
critical for understanding their impact on health.
1.8.3 Moving forwards II: key questions
Based on this evidence, I selected three tractable questions to address in the first studies in this
thesis.
1. Do existing theories of schizotypy account for dimensionality of PEs and related
traits in young people? How well can we measure PEs with self-report instru-
ments?
Theories of schizotypal personality posit that PEs are best considered as a multidimensional set
of related traits. While this is well-supported, the exact number and nature of dimensions is not
clear. Much has been made of whether schizotypy has e.g. three or four factors, and whether
specific features group together. However, some of this work is limited by not investigating the
dimensionality at the level of explicitly measured items. Furthermore, many instruments measur-
ing PEs have not been subject to rigorous psychometric analyses to quantify their measurement
precision and what range of intensity or severity of phenomena they can measure. These are
important properties to know when using these instruments in applied empirical studies.
2. Do instruments designed to measure different theoretical conceptualisations of
PEs measure the same underlying phenomena in young people? If so, do they
measure the same or distinct severity ranges of PEs?
Instruments measuring PEs but derived through different traditions may measure the same
underlying phenomena. This is supported by correlational studies, but not by direct comparison
of latent variable models. Different instruments may also measure PEs occurring at different
levels of severity and measure them with different levels of precision. This could have important
implications for empirical work.
The use of different instrument types, such as questionnaires versus interviews, can dramatically
change results, such as estimates of the population prevalence of PEs (van Os et al., 2009),
with suggestions that self-report instruments generate many false positives (van Os et al., 2001).
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However, ‘false-positive’ PEs are still associated with increased risk of psychotic disorders (Bak
et al., 2003.) and non-psychotic disorders and social dysfunction (van Nierop et al., 2012).
If different PE instruments measured the same phenomena, it would support synthesis of ev-
idence collected using different methods. But if instruments measure PEs (or PEs within a
particular severity range) with low measurement precision, empirical work using those instru-
ments would lose power and risk spurious associations. PEs of high and low severity could also
be continuous in terms of behavioural phenotype but discontinuous in terms of mechanisms or
aetiology. As a further test of convergent validity, I attempted to replicate the findings of Stochl
et al. (2015) showing that interview-verified PEs and depressive symptoms measured a com-
mon mental distress dimension with PEs measuring the more severe range, using self-report PEs
only.
3. Do PEs always co-occur with other symptoms of psychopathology in young people
in the general population or can they occur without distress or functional impair-
ment? What factors differentiate between PEs with and without distress?
PEs may be an index of severe distress and a risk factor for mental disorder but can occur without
associated psychopathology. PEs occurring without a need for clinical care have been reported in
highly selected samples. However, there is not conclusive evidence on whether some PEs occur
‘benignly’ (i.e. without mental distress and psychiatric risk) in young people in the general
population. This suggests that PEs may be heterogeneously associated with risk of mental
disorders. Importantly, we do not know the robustness, prevalence and characteristics of any
benign PE-prone phenotype in representative samples. Were there strong evidence of a phenotype
of benignly-occurring PEs in young people, it would complicate current theoretical models of
psychosis risk and clinical strategies of using PEs as the focus of early intervention studies. It
is also not known whether PEs occurring with and without distress share computational and
aetiological mechanisms. Comparing phenotypes of PEs occurring with and without distress and
impairment could reveal risk and protective factors. Some of these factors may be modifiable,
such as exposure to childhood adversity or cannabis use, suggesting that it may be possible to
intervene to help some at-risk young people learn to live and cope with their PEs, as opposed to
trying to prevent or eliminate their PEs.
Understanding PEs in terms of mechanisms requires investigating relationships be-
tween different levels of explanation.
Ultimately, to improve our understanding of PEs in the general population we will need to move
beyond symptom-based descriptions (Insel et al., 2010). We can consider how behavioural pheno-
types, measured using questionnaires and instruments, arise from atypicalities in computations
or information-processing, how that information-processing is implemented neurobiologically and
how genetic, environmental and gene-environment effects could cause them. I consider these per-
spectives further in the next chapter, to outline the terms with which I will discuss mechanisms
of PEs in the remainder of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Review II: Understanding the
mechanisms of PEs in terms of
information-processing, its
neurobiological implementation and
aetiology
The assumption that mental states arise from physical states in the body underpins much modern
research in psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience. Biological psychiatry promises that we should
be able to identify and correct aberrant mental states by manipulating physical states (Montague
et al., 2012). However, there remains a huge explanatory gap in understanding how physical
states produce mental states, whether normative or pathological.
Similar explanatory gaps exist between aetiological factors (which we can group into genetics,
the environment, and potentially gene-environment interactions) and mental states. We have
evidence that some factors make PEs and clinical psychosis more or less likely but cannot explain
the full pathways by which those effects occur, even if we know something about its influences on
physical states like the pharmacological effects of cannabis or structural brain changes associated
with childhood trauma.
Bridging the explanatory gaps between aetiological factors, physical states and mental states
might drive progress in psychiatry. Explaining the mechanisms of interventions might let us
develop more effective versions or predict in whom they will be successful. Explaining the
mechanisms by which an environmental factor predisposes to a disorder might let us develop
markers to measure risk and resilience in those exposed. Importantly, explaining the pathways
by which aberrant mental states arise from aetiological factors and physical states might reduce
the societal stigma of mental illness and provide greater clarity to people who suffer from it and
their loved ones.
Bridging these gaps requires more than just advances in technology, such as neuroimaging or
genomics. Today, neurobiology can be characterised in unprecedented detail in both humans
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and model organisms. However, without some principled way of understanding the function of
physical states in the body and how their functions produce mental states, the nervous system
will remain a ‘black box’ with inputs and outputs but little understanding of what goes on
inside.
Advances in computational neuroscience offer methods that can help bridge the explanatory
gaps. It is now possible to recapitulate behavioural markers of mental states using ‘computa-
tional’ models, in which the informational quantities and the operations performed on them to
generate a behaviour are made explicit. Such models are arguably most powerful when expressed
mathematically but can be expressed in informal language. Were we to identify neurobiological
correlates of those quantities and operations, it would be evidence that those features of the
nervous system generate those mental states by performing that information-processing. What
computational methods offer is an intermediate level of explanation between the physical and
the mental. It could therefore serve as a ‘Rosetta stone’ (Corlett and Fletcher, 2014), allowing
us to translate between physical states and mental states.
The emerging field of ‘computational psychiatry’ (Maia and Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 2012;
Corlett and Fletcher, 2014; Friston et al., 2014; Stephan and Mathys, 2014) attempts to use
methods from computational neuroscience to understand aberrant mental states arising in men-
tal disorders. Using computational approaches and mathematical techniques in general should
have the advantage of increasing the precision and clarity of theoretical models because theories
are mathematically formalised, rather than expressed in purely linguistic terms. In practise, this
may not always be the case (Teufel and Fletcher, 2016). Computational approaches to psychi-
atry are sometimes considered to be opaque and, in their current implementations, unhelpfully
mutable and flexible, failing to make sufficiently precise predictions about observations that can
be confirmed or refuted.
In this chapter, I will summarise the problem of understanding mental states at different levels of
explanation, following the seminal work of David Marr (Marr, 1982) that will shape the discourse
in the remainder of this thesis. I will then discuss the promising computational framework of
‘predictive processing’ (for review, see Clark et al., 2013) that shows promise for understanding
normative perception, belief and actions and their atypicalities in mental disorders. I will high-
light how this framework can incorporate insights from other fields, particularly reinforcement
learning (Maia and Frank, 2011).
2.1 Levels of explanation
Marr outlines three levels of explanation we should consider when trying to understand how phys-
ical states give rise to mental states: the ‘computational’, ‘algorithmic’ and ‘implementational’
levels (Marr, 1982) .
The computational level describes what the system is doing and why it is doing it. A full
description at the computational level requires defining what a system is doing in terms of
informational inputs and outputs. The mapping from inputs to outputs and the constraints
placed on the system should be precisely defined. Finally, it should be demonstrated how and
why the process is appropriate and adequate to perform the required function.
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The algorithmic level describes the representation of specific informational quantities and the
algorithms required to perform the function described at the computational level. A full de-
scription at this level requires a choice of input and output representations and the algorithms
needed to transform one into the other. Marr stresses that there is not necessarily a single map-
ping across levels of explanation. There are usually a wide range of both representations and
algorithms at the algorithmic level that could perform a given computation.
The implementational level describes how algorithmic processing could be physically realised, pri-
marily by a biological system. Again, Marr notes that the same algorithm could be implemented
in different ways (Marr, 1982).
Before proceeding, I will define some terms. A representation is ‘a formal system for making
explicit certain entities or types of information, together with a specification of how the system
does this.’ (Marr, 1982) Describing something as a formal scheme ‘means only that it is a set of
symbols with rules for putting them together – no more and no less’ (Marr, 1982). Finally, it is
important to consider what information a choice of representation captures and what information
it loses. Marr write that ‘[any] particular representation makes certain information explicit at
the expense of information that is pushed into the background and may be quite hard to recover’
(Marr, 1982).
2.2 Bridging levels: computational psychiatry
Computational psychiatry is an emerging field that aims to apply computational methods and
principles to further understanding of mental illness. Computational psychiatry spans two broad
approaches (Maia and Frank, 2011; Huys et al., 2016).
The first is applying data-driven analytical methods from computer science and machine learning
to psychiatric problems. These methods incorporate and extend traditional statistical analyses.
They are well-suited to problems of prediction of outcomes e.g. conversion to psychosis. They are
also suited to cluster populations into groups e.g. people with similar symptom profiles.
The second approach is applying theory-driven, ‘computational models’ that mathematically
specify variables and the relationships between them, which may be observed or hidden. These
methods give us the tools to specify Marr’s algorithmic level, making explicit what we have and
have not represented and how performing operations on those representations give rise to com-
putations. Computational models can represent informational quantities and transformations
that could plausibly be implemented by the nervous system and used to generate behaviour and
experience.
These approaches are complementary and might drive progress on some of the most challenging
aspects of psychiatry.
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2.2.1 Computational methods may help define mechanistically homogenous
disorders
A set of symptoms could be underpinned by different atypicalities in information-processing and
neurobiology, meaning disorders with similar symptom profiles may have different underlying
mechanisms. A symptom or aberrant mental state, defined at the computational level, could
plausibly be caused by more than one mechanism at the algorithmic level. Each form of al-
gorithmic processing might then have multiple possible implementations at the neurobiological
level. Marr emphasised this, in saying that levels of explanation could be independent (Marr,
1982). This possible one-to-many mapping from behaviours to mechanisms is a challenge when
we attempt to predict or intervene to modify a disease course, as the optimal intervention may
be determined by the underlying pathophysiology.
2.2.2 Prediction and targeted intervention based on underlying mechanisms
Having precise information on underlying pathophysiological mechanisms might improve predic-
tion and allow targeted intervention for mental illness. Different interventions would logically
be more or less effective based on correspondence between their mechanism of action and patho-
physiology. This might enable us to predict and maximise benefit from specific pharmacological
medications or psychological therapies.
2.2.3 Principled development of novel interventions
Most of the effective psychopharmacological interventions available in psychiatry have been dis-
covered by serendipity, rather than principled search. A limit on principled development of
new interventions is lack of understanding of their underlying mechanisms. Computational ap-
proaches may be able to shed light on the pathophysiology of mental illness at a deeper level and
so enable precision or individualised medicine in psychiatry.
2.2.4 Integration of biological, psychological and social factors
Computational psychiatry has the potential to comprehensively integrate the biological, psy-
chological and social factors that interact to influence mental health. It could achieve this by
translating work at each domain into a common language that makes sense across levels. This is
in contrast to biological approaches, which can struggle to describe how subjective experiences
arise or how psychological and social factors affect mental health. It is also in contrast to psy-
chological approaches, which might struggle to find plausible and meaningful biological accounts
for psychological theories.
2.3 Applying computational principles to perception and belief
I will attempt to describe aberrant percepts and beliefs at the computational, algorithmic and
(briefly) implementational levels , by defining how they could arise as deviations from normative
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function. I will discuss evidence for this model of how PEs arise and emphasise important
questions that I will investigate in this thesis.
By asking broad questions about why PEs arise, we may be able to extract general principles of
aberrant experiences and beliefs. However, these questions will, by necessity, ignore some of the
complexity of PEs. Understanding specific PEs will require specific computational questions. In
this work, I will limit my enquiry to broad questions on the occurrence of aberrant percepts and
aberrant beliefs, not in-keeping with the social consensus. This is informed by first considering
perception and belief in normative terms (or, at least, how they seem to occur in the majority
of people).
2.3.1 Perception at the computational level
I consider perception, at the computational level, as the process of deriving properties of the
environment from sensory inputs. This requires going from information detected by sensory re-
ceptors into information about what caused it, in a form that facilitates adaptive behaviours and
promotes success and survival. The purpose of perception depends on the evolutionary history
and environment of the organism in question. An important constraint is that perception involves
deriving properties based on current sensory inputs. In other words, perception is the derivation
of properties of the environment, spatially-constrained to the immediate environment (which
includes internal states of the body) and temporally-constrained to the present moment.
I consider hallucinations and aberrant percepts as inappropriate derivations of properties of the
environment from sensory inputs. ‘Inappropriate’ is fundamentally subjective and refers to de-
riving properties that are not in keeping with the social consensus. The representations used may
be the same as the representations used in perception by the majority but just with different final
outputs selected i.e. a normal representation but outputted in the wrong context. The represen-
tational outputs in hallucinations may also be fundamentally different and incomprehensible to
those of perception in the majority. The ‘purpose’ of hallucinations is an interesting question;
they may be a by-product of evolutionary advantages of heterogeneity in how properties of the
environment are derived by members of a social group (Pearlson and Folley, 2008).
2.3.2 Belief at the computational level
I consider beliefs, at the computational level, as knowledge of properties of the environment,
including abstract properties for which we have no current or even past sensory data. In these
terms, beliefs are stored derivations of properties of the world, not spatially or temporally con-
strained to the present environment. The process of forming or updating beliefs involves going
from information on things in the environment that may be driven by sensory evidence, to in-
formation on other statistical regularities, such as relationships between things or features of
things. The purpose is probably prediction of spatially and/or temporally distant world states
to enable planning, preparing and executing behaviours, including complex behaviours over long
periods of time, that promote success and survival.
I consider delusions, at the computational level, as inappropriate stored knowledge of proper-
ties of the environment, not constrained to the immediate spatial and temporal context. Like
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hallucinations, this is subjective; inappropriate means out of keeping with societal consensus.
The representations used may be of things in the world at different levels of abstraction e.g.
individual things to relationships between things or temporal changes in things. Delusions, like
hallucinations, may be a by-product of evolutionary advantages of heterogeneity in how prop-
erties of the environment are derived by social groups (Pearlson and Folley, 2008). From these
arguments, it is apparent that beliefs may be computationally very similar to perceptions but
not constrained to the immediate spatiotemporal context and stored over time. This may make
intuitive sense; it is not unreasonable to think of perception as a belief that something is present
in the current environment.
Beliefs could be founded on representations that are separate from sensory inputs, but what would
be their value if they had no meaning or implication in the environment or internal states? It is
likely that beliefs largely represent relationships between representations empirically defined (at
some level) by perception. This can easily be considered as a hierarchy, e.g. moving from sensory
inputs to causes of sensory input to relationships between causes of sensory inputs (Mesulam,
1998).
2.4 Aberrant perceptions and beliefs at the algorithmic level
2.4.1 The challenges of inferring properties of the environment from sensa-
tions
Recent advances in computational neuroscience make algorithmic models of PEs theoretically
and empirically tractable where they were not before (Clark et al., 2013). ‘Predictive processing’
or ‘predictive coding’ (Srinivasan et al., 1982; Rao and Ballard, 1999) is currently the dominant
computational framework within which to simultaneously consider perception, belief and action
(Clark et al., 2013). I will use this framework to discuss mechanisms of normative and aberrant
perceptions and beliefs.
At the computational level, I discussed that perception and belief may be deriving the properties
of the environment over different spatial and temporal scales. An important constraint is that
all the system has access to is information collected by its senses (barring any information that
is hard-coded evolutionarily) (Dayan et al., 1995).
Sensory information is not enough to unambiguously derive properties of the environment, for
a number of reasons (Helmholtz, 1860). Firstly, it is conveyed by imperfect biological agents
(neurons). Secondly, there are potentially infinite mappings from some patterns of sensory in-
formation to their causes, such as deriving depth from a 2-dimensional retinal image or deriv-
ing whether movement of an image was caused by the eye moving or the environment moving
(Helmholtz, 1860). Thirdly, it has no ‘teaching signals’ (objective information with which to
train performance), so the problem is unsupervised. This problem might be aided by corre-
spondence between different sources of sensory information e.g. multisensory integration or by
correspondence between personally-derived information and socially-derived information (Boyd
et al., 2011). But overall, deriving properties of the environment is limited by separation between
organism and environment (Friston, 2013).
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The system could solve the problem of deriving environmental properties from sensory informa-
tion by drawing on past experiences or ‘prior knowledge’ (MacKay, 1956; Neisser, 1976; Gregory,
1980; Yuille and Kersten, 2006). Current sensory inputs could be compared to stored knowledge
of previous inputs and what they were associated with, letting the system derive properties of the
current environment by similarity or dissimilarity with previous environments. With the same
approach, the system could use stored knowledge from past experiences to predict environmental
properties in the future or past (i.e. temporally distant) or for which there is no current sensory
data (i.e. spatially distant).
2.4.2 Prior knowledge as a hierarchy of perceptions and belief
Algorithmically, we can think of stored prior knowledge learned from past experiences as internal
models of statistical regularities between observed patterns of sensory evidence and their ‘hidden’
causes (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2005, 2010). ‘Hidden’ denotes that they are not directly
observable. Causes can vary over scale and nature. For example, in the visual system, a cause
could be an edge, a shape, an object or a scene. Importantly, tracking statistical regularities
would let the system define internal models empirically without any teaching signals.
Regularities between causes can themselves be tracked by other internal models, effectively lay-
ered on top of one another: these edges make this shape, which is the shape of this object, which
is usually present in this scene. This can be considered as a hierarchy of processing levels (Mum-
ford, 1992). At lower levels, internal models are more closely concerned with current sensory
inputs. In other words, lower levels derive properties of spatially and temporally constrained
sensory information i.e. perception. At higher levels, these internal models become increas-
ingly abstracted from sensory input (Mumford, 1992; Mesulam, 1998). In other words, higher
level internal models track regularities between things that may not be spatially and temporally
constrained by sensory input, so might plausibly be considered ‘beliefs’.
2.4.3 Predictive processing: from internal models to abductive inference
To compare current inputs to stored knowledge, internal models can generate predictions of what
sensations would arise from a given hidden cause. These predictions can be likened to hypotheses
that can be tested against observed sensory data (Gregory, 1980). By calculating an index of
how well predictions match sensory data and comparing a family of predictions from different
models, the system can infer the most probable cause of its inputs and thus the most probable
properties of the environment. This is an abductive inference (Peirce, 1974); internal models
describe how causes result in sensory evidence, while predictive processing enables the system
to go in the opposite direction, from sensory evidence to causes. In these terms, we consider
sensory evidence entering the hierarchy at the lowest level and being fed forward from low levels
to higher levels. ‘Feedforward’ is sometimes used synonymously with ‘bottom-up’ or ‘ascending’.
We consider predictions as being ‘feedback’ or ‘top-down’, coming from higher hierarchical levels
to lower levels. Inference over the causes of low-level sensory information, constrained to the
current spatiotemporal context, would correspond to perception. Inference over causes at higher
hierarchical levels, not constrained to sensations in the current spatiotemporal context, might
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correspond to inference of more abstract properties.
In algorithmic terms, the system could therefore derive properties of the environment using in-
formation on current sensory inputs, predictions from stored knowledge and a way of comparing
the fit of predictions to inputs to select the best-fitting one. In other words, the system must
calculate the probability of different hypotheses being true, given observed evidence (their ‘poste-
rior probabilities’), and then select between them. The comparison of fit of predictions to inputs
could be performed by calculating ‘prediction errors’, analogous to residuals in a regression anal-
ysis. The best-fitting hypothesis would be the one that generates fewest prediction errors (i.e.
maximises predictive accuracy).
This framework can be extended to accommodate action by essentially equipping it with reflex
arcs and allowing it to minimise prediction errors not by updating internal models but by chang-
ing the locations of its sensory detectors to match predictions, a process termed ‘active inference’
(Friston, 2003; Friston et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2011).
2.4.4 Learning by updating internal models using prediction errors
Within this scheme, prediction errors can reflect failure of internal models to predict sensory
inputs, suggesting the models may be suboptimal e.g. the environment has changed. Prediction
errors can drive updating of internal models and the predictions they generate to accommodate
new information. Predictions from an updated model may better explain sensory input, so
minimising or ‘explaining away’ prediction errors. The updated model therefore better captures
the causes of sensory inputs. Within this scheme, updating internal models at higher hierarchical
levels reflects learning and updating of beliefs. In other words, sensory information enters the
system, is transformed at every stage into only its unexplained component (prediction error) and
reverberates through the system, changing predictions, until the set of predictions that minimise
prediction error across all levels is identified. What the system is doing is therefore maximising
prediction of its incoming information.
2.4.5 Modulating learning by the reliability of prediction errors and prior
knowledge
Predictions may fail to explain sensory evidence, generating prediction errors, because of noise
rather than because the models generating those predictions are suboptimal. The greater the
noise in the prediction error signal, the less useful they are and the less they should shape
inference and model updating. When sensory information is rendered variable by noise, such as
visual information in poor illumination, it could be inefficient to minimise that error to derive
properties of the environment. Similarly, when predictions from internal models are known to be
highly reliable in the current context, it would not make sense to be over-ready to update those
internal models based on isolated instances of prediction error.
Both the variability in prediction error and in predictions can be described by their ‘reliability’
or ‘precision’, which is the inverse of variability. The more precise a prediction error, the more
likely it is that it reflects meaningful information and predictions should be updated to minimise
it. The more precise a prediction is, the more likely it is that it already captures true statistical
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regularities and its predictions should not be changed. The relative precision of different infor-
mation sources (predictions and sensory evidence/prediction errors) thus shapes their influence
on model updating and learning (Knill and Pouget, 2004).
The optimal way to combine probabilistic information sources is defined by Bayes theorem (Bayes
and Price, 1763). Weighting each information source by its precision accommodates changes in
the quality of information sources in different circumstances (Knill and Pouget, 2004), like varying
illumination. Precision could also be important when considering actions or updating models
with significant consequences e.g. inferring that a trusted friend has intentionally harmed you
would need very good evidence, otherwise it is more likely that harm was unintentional.
2.4.6 Aberrant perceptions and beliefs at the algorithmic level
To recap the computational level, I considered aberrant perceptions as false inference of prop-
erties of the current spatiotemporal environment and aberrant beliefs as prior knowledge that
misrepresents statistical regularities in the environment, not limited to the current spatiotemporal
context. Both could arise from deviation of functioning of the algorithmic predictive process-
ing scheme outlined above. Specifically, they could arise from perturbations to the precision or
precision-weighting of information sources (Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
Aberrant perceptions could arise from over-estimating the precision of predictions (equivalent to
underestimating the precision of sensory prediction errors), such that they have an overly-strong
influence on inference of environmental properties. This might let something be inferred as the
cause of sensations despite poor evidence (Behrendt, 1998; Aleman et al., 2003), manifesting as
a false or inappropriate percept.
Atypical internal models might be arrived at through inappropriate model updating from pre-
diction errors that are not tied to meaningful statistical regularities or changes in regularities
in the environment. Specifically, this could be caused by weighting the precision of prediction
errors as relatively higher than top-down predictions (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al.,
2010; Adams et al., 2013). This is fully consistent with ‘aberrant salience’ accounts of delusion
formation that posit inappropriate formation of associations (Kapur, 2003).
These theories can seem opposing (Corlett et al., 2016): one posits that the system ignores
prediction errors while the other posits that it learns too much from prediction errors. One reso-
lution to the apparent paradox is to suggest that the former explanation explains hallucinations
while the latter explains delusions. But this would be inconsistent with evidence that aberrant
percepts and aberrant beliefs co-occur more commonly than they occur independently so prof-
fering two distinct explanations for the two phenomena is unsatisfying in its lack of parsimony.
A possible reconciliation may be arrived at by considering the hierarchical nature of informa-
tion processing. Both over-influential and under-influential prediction errors might co-occur at
different levels of a processing hierarchy.
False derivation of causes of current sensory inputs (spatially and temporally constrained) could
be driven by ignoring prediction errors at low sensory levels (equivalent to excessive influence
of predictions at low levels). Aberrant internal models could be arrived at because of excessive
influence of prediction errors at higher levels. These could co-occur for a number of reasons.
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Firstly, over-influential predictions may generate over-influential prediction errors at high levels.
Secondly, aberrant prediction errors at low levels may be suppressed by over-reliance on predic-
tions, but there may be a limit to this suppression. If aberrant prediction errors ‘break through’
at this level, they may be represented as highly precise and drive updating of aberrant rela-
tionships between things in the environment. Finally, aberrant inferences themselves may cause
prediction errors elsewhere by violating predictions from other models, particularly higher-level
models that track regularities between things .
2.5 Evidence supporting disrupted predictive processing as a mech-
anism of PEs
Multiple lines of evidence support disrupted predictive processing associated with PEs. Not all
this work has been carried out in both clinical psychosis and in populations with nonclinical
PEs.
2.5.1 Impaired low-level sensory processing could cause unreliability of sen-
sory evidence
One line of evidence that supports disruption to predictive processing is evidence of abnormalities
in sensory processing associated with psychosis. Disruptions to the precision (i.e. reliability) of
sensory information, or to the estimation and signalling of precision of sensory information, could
cause changes in updating and use of internal models (outlined above) that distort experience of
reality. The outputs of early stages of sensory processing may come to be poor representations
of the environment and inputs to complex, higher-level computations that shape behaviour and
subjective experience might become less well-structured and less reliable.
Psychosis-associated changes in visual and auditory processing have been best studied, compared
to other sensory modalities. The literature on perceptual processing in schizophrenia is rich and
complex; a full review is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.5.2 Approaches to early sensory processing: gain control and integration
Butler, Silverstein and Dakin (2008) grouped early visual deficits into impairments of ‘gain con-
trol’ and ‘integration’ (Butler et al., 2008). Comparable processes exist in the auditory system
(Robinson and McAlpine, 2009) and may provide a useful framework to think about the compu-
tations carried out in the early sensory processing stages. Gain control refers to processes that
optimise information-signalling with respect to the surrounding context. (Butler et al., 2008).
Gain control computations can be considered as increasing the precision of low-level sensory infor-
mation by improving the integrity of how the system registers sensory events. Integration refers
to processes that link lower-level stimuli into more complex stimuli, such as linking local features
into global stimulus properties (Butler et al., 2008). Integration therefore refers to a diverse set
of computations, including those that might be termed ‘perceptual organisation’.
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2.5.3 Abnormalities in gain control processes associated with PEs
Deficits in visual gain control associated with clinical psychosis are evident in contrast sensitiv-
ity (Slaghuis, 1998; Kéri et al., 2002) and in abnormal effects of surrounding context (‘surround
suppression’) on perception of contrast (Robol et al., 2013; Schallmo et al., 2013, 2015; Tibber
et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013; Serrano-Pedraza et al., 2014), supported by reduced contextual
effects on BOLD signal (Seymour et al., 2013). Abnormal visual surround effects are not likely
to be global but rather specific for certain types of information, such as contrast or size, rather
than luminance or orientation (Tibber et al., 2013), which may reflect deficits at later stages
of early visual processing. In the auditory domain, aberrant gain control may be suggested by
schizophrenia-associated deficits match tones after a delay (Strous et al., 1995; March et al.,
1999; Gold et al., 2012b), but normal influences on performance of distracting stimuli (Rabinow-
icz et al., 2000) and delay (Javitt et al., 1997), suggesting problems accurately encoding tone
information. This could be due to failure to adequately modulate the gain on auditory sensory
detectors.
There is less evidence on gain control deficits associated with nonclinical PEs or psychosis high-
risk states. Studies have reported increased visual surround effects of contrast (Kéri and Benedek,
2007), and reduced surround effects of size (Uhlhaas et al., 2004), though the size effect may be
explained by reaction time (Bressan and Kramer, 2013).
Abnormal gain control in psychosis is possibly supported by reduced evoked brain responses
to visual stimuli (Butler et al., 2005, 2007; Martínez et al., 2015) and by reduced ‘mismatch
negativity’ (MMN) (Urban et al., 2008; Csukly et al., 2013; Neuhaus et al., 2013; Farkas et
al., 2015), an electrophysiological response to deviant or oddball stimuli that may be a marker
of prediction error and its influence on internal models (Garrido et al., 2009). Reductions in
the auditory MMN in schizophrenia are reliable and of a large effect size (Umbricht and Krljes,
2005). Reductions in auditory MMN are also evident in psychosis high-risk groups (Brockhaus-
Dumke et al., 2005; Atkinson et al., 2012), with some evidence of larger MMN reductions in those
who later converted to clinical psychosis (Bodatsch et al., 2011; Shaikh et al., 2012). There is
mixed evidence of MMN reductions in first-degree relatives of people with schizophrenia, with
evidence of reductions and no reductions (Bramon et al., 2004; Magno et al., 2008). Both
reduced (Murphy et al., 2013) and increased (Bruggemann et al., 2013) auditory MMN have
been found in young adolescents with PEs, compared to those without PEs. In adults, a larger
MMN correlated with paranoid ideation, measured by the Suspiciousness scale of the Schizotypal
Personality Questionnaire (Broyd et al., 2016). To my knowledge, no studies have examined the
visual MMN associated with PEs outside of psychotic disorders.
2.5.4 Abnormalities in integration processes associated with PEs
Clinical psychosis is also associated with deficits in various processes thought to depend on
integration computations (Uhlhaas and Silverstein, 2005; Silverstein and Keane, 2011), including
contour integration (Schenkel et al., 2005; Silverstein et al., 2006, 2009; Kurylo et al., 2007;
Sehatpour et al., 2010), perceptual grouping by similarity (Uhlhaas et al., 2006; Kurylo et al.,
2007), recognition of fragmented drawings (Sehatpour et al., 2010) and integration of moving
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stimuli (Cocchi et al., 2007; Tschacher et al., 2008). Phenomenologically, deficits in integration
would fit with descriptions of altered experience in psychosis, such as only seeing parts of on
object or fragmentation of the visual field, rather than forming holistic percepts (McGhie and
Chapman, 1961). In the auditory domain, schizophrenia is associated with deficits segregating
auditory streams (Ramage et al., 2012; Weintraub et al., 2012) and abnormal electrophysiological
markers of auditory pattern perception (Coffman et al., 2016; Haigh et al., 2016).
As with gain control, there is less evidence regarding atypicalities in integration associated with
nonclinical PEs, schizotypal personality traits and people at high-risk of psychosis. In studies in-
vestigating processing of global percepts, rather than local details, schizotypy has been associated
with both disadvantage (Goodarzi et al., 2000) and advantage (Granholm et al., 2002). A recent
meta-analysis showed deficits in Gestalt figure perception when groups at high-risk for psychosis
were compared to controls (Panton et al., 2016). However, there was no evidence of deficit when
healthy participants with high schizotypy-scores were compared with controls or evidence of cor-
relation between deficits and schizotypal traits (Panton et al., 2016). To my knowledge, early
auditory perceptual organisation has not been directly investigated in PEs outside of clinical
psychosis.
While aberrant gain control and integration processes are robustly associated with clinical psy-
chosis, inconsistent results in those with PEs or in groups at high-risk for psychosis necessitates
further investigation.
2.5.5 Effects of abnormalities in early sensory processing on higher func-
tions
The impact of impairments in gain control and integration on higher functions, like perceptual
inference, memory or attentional allocation, may be diverse. A growing number of studies have
examined these relationships directly, linking gain control deficits to deficits in encoding stimuli
into visual working memory (Dias et al., 2011), reading (Martínez et al., 2013) and object
recognition (Calderone et al., 2013). Deficits in tone perception contribute to social difficulties
in schizophrenia, in that inference of emotions (Gold et al., 2012b; Kantrowitz et al., 2013) and
attitudes (Kantrowitz et al., 2014) from prosody is impaired.
The effects on higher functions could depend on how the system adapts to this unreliability.
If the unreliability in inputs is properly signalled and the relative precision of incoming sensory
information is down-weighted, the system may come to rely more on other sources of information
or from predictions from higher-level internal models for functions like perceptual inference.
This is consistent with suggestions of overly-strong influences of expectations or predictions
on perception in psychosis (Behrendt, 1998; Aleman et al., 2003; Corlett et al., 2009). Over-
estimating the precision of incoming sensory information (which may in fact reflect failing to
down-weight it) could lead to inappropriate updating of internal models. This is consistent with
evidence of sensory information being overly influential in psychosis in various paradigms, such
as smooth pursuit eye movements (Hong et al., 2005, 2008; O’Driscoll and Callahan, 2008) or
matching of somatosensory forces (Shergill et al., 2005). These atypicalities can be framed as
predictive deficits, particularly in corollary discharge mechanisms that down-weight the sensory
consequences of self-generated actions (Blakemore et al., 2000; Farrer et al., 2004; Lindner et al.,
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2005), and plausibly explain certain phenomena like delusions of control or other experiences of
abnormal agency. Similar deficits in ‘self-monitoring’ have been shown in relatives of patients
with schizophrenia (Hommes et al., 2012), in people at high-risk for psychosis (Johns et al., 2010)
and with nonclinical PEs (Teufel et al., 2010; Oestreich et al., 2015; Roché et al., 2015).
These lines of evidence suggesting both excessive and deficient influence of predictions on information-
processing can seem opposing. More recent work has begun to investigate whether both can be
accommodated by appealing to the hierarchical nature of information-processing, considering
interactions or compensations across processing stages.
Schmack et al. (2013) investigated the interaction of low-level sensory processing and higher-
order beliefs in a large sample of healthy volunteers. Delusional ideation was associated with
reduced stability of a bistable stereoscopic illusion of a rotating sphere that could be perceived
rotating in either direction. Participants were then given a pair of glasses they were told would
bias the direction of rotation. In fact, the glasses did nothing but participants went through a
training phase in which the direction of rotation was biased to be one direction over the other,
to generate a belief that the glasses would change perception. In a final test phase, the fully
bistable illusion was presented again while participants wore the glasses to measure the influence
of the learned belief on perception. Delusional ideation, and the conviction people felt in their
delusion-like beliefs, predicted stronger influence of the glasses-belief on the perceived rotation
of the sphere, which was reflected in connectivity between prefrontal regions and early visual
cortices measured using fMRI (Schmack et al., 2013).
Similarly, Teufel et al. (2015) investigated the influence of experimentally-acquired prior knowl-
edge on perception of natural images, binarised into black and white ‘two-tone’ images so as
to appear meaningless. However, after viewing the natural images from which the two-tone
images were made, participants were able to clearly see the two-tone image content, such as
embedded figures of people or animals. In a task that measured objective ability to discriminate
the content of two-tone images, people at high clinical risk for psychosis (ARMS), compared to
healthy controls, showed similar initial discrimination of two-tones but greater improvement in
discrimination after viewing the natural images, suggesting a stronger influence of higher-order
predictions from prior knowledge on perception. In a sample of healthy volunteers, proneness to
anomalous perceptions correlated with improvement in discrimination from viewing the natural
images, supporting that this may be a common mechanism of clinical and nonclinical PEs.
2.5.6 Resistance to visual illusions
A number of recent articles have emphasised the value of visual illusion paradigms to develop
our understanding of psychosis (Notredame et al., 2014; King et al., 2016). Illusions are often
described as measuring ‘top-down’ influences on vision, and the resistance to some illusions seen
in schizophrenia taken as evidence of reduced influence of top-down processing (Notredame et
al., 2014). This approach has been criticised (Barlow, 1997). There is a significant risk of over-
simplification in suggesting illusions have common mechanisms. Illusions probably arise from
diverse mechanisms, as was recently suggested by low correlation between individual differences
in surround suppression effects of contrast and motion in healthy volunteers (Yazdani et al., 2015).
Some of these illusions, such as size illusions or contrast illusions, may better be considered as gain
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control effects and may not be mediated by top-down effects. Nonetheless, evidence of reduced
susceptibility to illusions in psychosis supports altered integration of information sources when
generating percepts. In depth-inversion illusions, concave objects are falsely perceived as convex,
such as faces in the ‘hollow mask’ illusion. Patients with schizophrenia are less susceptible to this
illusion (Schneider et al., 2002; Koethe et al., 2006; Dima et al., 2009), with illusion resistance
normalising in psychosis patients after admission and treatment on an inpatient unit (Keane et
al., 2013). Importantly, resistance to depth-inversion illusions is evident in people at high-risk
for psychosis and people in early stages of psychotic illness (Koethe et al., 2009), suggesting it
may be a key mechanism of all forms of psychotic experience, rather than being associated only
with illness severity, chronicity or intervention.
2.5.7 Atypical reinforcement learning and aberrant salience
Studies of reinforcement learning measure processes of prediction error-driven learning. When
complemented with computational modelling of behaviour, such studies present a powerful tool
to investigate atypical information-processing associated with PEs.
Schizophrenia is associated with deficits in behavioural tasks measuring learning of reward con-
tingencies through experience (‘reward learning’) and in rapid changing of strategies when en-
vironmental contingencies change (‘reversal learning’). Studies using computational models in
chronic schizophrenia patients support that the disease and negative symptoms, in particular,
are associated with impaired learning from rewards, with often spared learning from punish-
ments, consistent with a rigid and inflexible learning style and failure to learn adaptively from
prediction error (Gold et al., 2008, 2012a; Murray et al., 2008b; Koch et al., 2010; Gradin et al.,
2011; Strauss et al., 2011; Waltz et al., 2011). Due to the heterogeneity and often widespread
impairment in schizophrenia patients, some of these findings may be partly explained by deficits
in working memory (Collins et al., 2014; Culbreth et al., 2016), which are considered a key
feature of the disease (Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Lee and Park, 2005).
Fewer studies have examined prediction error-driven learning in early psychosis and nonclinical
PEs. Reward and reversal learning were shown to be aberrant in a large sample of unmedicated
first episode psychosis patients, particularly associated with negative symptoms (Murray et al.,
2008a), consistent with results in chronic disease.
Some studies suggest different computational changes across nonclinical PEs or early clinical
psychosis and chronic psychotic disorders. Using a task that measured adaptive and aberrant
salience mechanisms using the speed of reaction times for decisions in the presence of relevant and
irrelevant conditioned stimuli, Roiser et al. found that medicated patients did not display aber-
rant salience, but instead displayed reduced adaptive salience, compared to controls (Roiser et
al., 2009). Using the same task, schizophrenia patients with treatment-resistant persistent delu-
sions were also found to have reduced adaptive salience but not aberrant salience (Abboud et al.,
2016). When the same task was used with people meeting ultra-high-risk criteria for psychosis,
they displayed normal adaptive salience but increased aberrant salience, compared to controls
(Roiser et al., 2013). Similarly, another study showed some evidence that people with subclinical
delusional ideation display implicit aberrant salience at intermediate levels, between health con-
trols and schizophrenia patients (Pankow et al., 2016). This raises the possibility that different
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stages of psychotic illness might be associated with different computational changes.
2.5.8 Aberrant perceptions and beliefs at the implementational level
A full discussion of how atypical processing at the algorithmic level might be implemented
neurobiologically is beyond the scope of this work. To keep this review focused, I have included
a limited discussion in Appendix A.
2.6 Discussion
The application of computational methods and principles to psychiatry holds a number of
promises (Teufel and Fletcher, 2016). It could enforce precision by demanding that theories
can be expressed in formal terms (i.e. mathematically). It could enable translation of existing
work in psychology and neurobiology into a common language and facilitate integration and
collaboration. It could also bridge the explanatory gaps between mental states, neurobiology
and aetiological factors, furthering our understanding of how people develop and recover from
mental illness as departure from and return to adaptive/normative functioning. The application
of data-driven analyses also has much to offer for classification and prediction, which may lead to
improvements in understanding disease heterogeneity and comorbidity and in early intervention
or prevention of mental illness.
The success of computational approaches is reflected in the popularity of predictive processing
frameworks. These posit that the brain performs statistical inference about the environment and
its internal states by building generative models of statistical regularities. Predictive processing
offers novel ways to conceptualise psychotic phenomena and to integrate different theories within
a computational scheme that could plausibly be implemented by neuronal circuits. Disruptions
to predictive processing is far from a full explanation of why PEs occur. Rather, it presents a
framework within which to construct and test models to explain changes in mental or physical
states in psychosis.
In the remainder of this thesis, I interpreted evidence regarding the manifestation, aetiology and
health implications of PEs in the general population in the computational terms of the predictive
processing framework, drawing on Marr’s principles of levels of analysis to attempt to provide
clear and testable theories that can bridge levels of explanation. Based on the principle of
integrating data-driven and theory-driven work, I set out first to answer the three key questions
described at the end of the last chapter, then to review those findings and decide on tractable
theory-driven studies that would shed further light on the aetiology or mechanisms of PEs.
The questions were:
• Do existing theories of schizotypy account for dimensionality of PEs and related traits in
young people? How well can we measure PEs with self-report instruments?
• Do instruments designed to measure different theoretical conceptualisations of PEs measure
the same underlying phenomena in young people? If so, do they measure the same or
distinct severity ranges of PEs?
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• Do PEs always co-occur with other symptoms of psychopathology in young people in the
general population or can they occur without distress or functional impairment? What
factors differentiate between PEs with and without distress?
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Data-driven research questions
At the end of Chapter 2, I discussed the following three questions:
3.1.1 Do existing theories of schizotypy account for dimensionality of PEs
and related traits in young people? How well can we measure PEs
with self-report instruments?
Latent dimensionality can be investigated using factor analytical methods on responses on ques-
tionnaire items in a sufficiently large sample. These methods can be used to test models of
dimensional structures based on the literature. Should those models prove insufficient, these
methods can be used in an exploratory data subset to identify novel structures and compare how
well novel and literature-derived models perform when tested in a non-overlapping validation
subset. Measurement precision can be quantified using methods from factor analysis and item
response theory.
3.1.2 Do instruments designed to measure different theoretical conceptu-
alisations of PEs measure the same underlying phenomena in young
people? If so, do they measure the same or distinct severity ranges of
PEs?
Factor analytical methods to investigate latent dimensionality could shed light on these questions,
given sufficient sample size and measurements. Importantly, the fit of different latent model
structures to data can be compared, such as a unidimensional model, correlated factors models
and bifactor models (with a general factor explaining some variance in all items and specific
factors explaining variance in some items). Again, measurement precision can be quantified using
methods from factor analysis and item response theory. In particular, it is possible to map out
over which parts of a distribution a given item is able to discriminate participants. Considering a
distribution of increasingly severe psychotic phenomena, this mapping would reveal the severity
range of PEs measured by items and instruments. I also followed the analysis pathway of Stochl et
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al. (2014) to test whether I could replicate their findings of a common distress factor underlying
PEs and depressive symptoms using self-report instruments only.
3.1.3 Do PEs always co-occur with other symptoms of psychopathology in
young people in the general population or can they occur without dis-
tress or functional impairment? What factors differentiate between
PEs with and without distress?
Cluster analysis aims to separate the population into homogenous subgroups. Combined with
approaches from machine learning and psychometrics to assess the optimal number of clusters and
their robustness, these methods could test whether PEs occurring without distress form a reliable
phenotype and how prevalent that phenotype is. Comparison of phenotypes without distress or
PEs, with PEs but no distress, and with distress and PEs, could reveal risk and protective
factors for distress and impairment in people prone to psychotic phenomena. Comparing these
phenotypes on factor scores estimated from latent variable modelling of combined PEs and
distress could help resolve why PEs are an index of extreme distress while occurring benignly in
some people.
3.2 Data sources
These planned studies require large datasets with measurements of PEs, depressive symptoms,
mental disorder and putative aetiological factors. Preferably, these datasets would be collected
using principles of epidemiological sampling to ensure the samples are representative of the wider
population.
Two datasets collected by researchers at the University of Cambridge are suitable for this set of
analyses: the ROOTS cohort and the Neuroscience in Psychiatry Network (NSPN) cohort. Both
cohorts utilised a wide range of instruments. I highlight the most relevant instruments for the
investigating the questions outlined above.
3.2.1 ROOTS
ROOTS is a longitudinal study of adolescence (Goodyer et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2016). The
study aimed to identify the biological bases of mental illnesses and their sub-clinical manifes-
tations in young people. The study investigated the roles of genetic, environmental, social and
psychological factors in pathways to mental illness. ROOTS was funded by the Wellcome Trust.
Ethical approval for the ROOTS study was granted by Cambridgeshire 2 REC, in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki and Good Clinical Practice guidelines. At study entry, all
participants and their parents gave written informed consent. The ROOTS sample was largely
representative of Cambridgeshire in terms of socioeconomic status.
The study involved assessments at three time points (T1-3): T1 at age 14, T2 at age 15.5 and
T3 at age 17. A summary of the recruitment, time points and relevant assessments is shown
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in Figure 3.1. Self-reported questionnaire data were collected from adolescents, parents and
teachers at each time point.
Sociodemographic information
Sociodemographic information was collected from parents at baseline. Socio-economic status
(SES) was estimated from postcodes, using ACORN categories (http://www.caci.co.uk). The
ACORN category of ‘Hard-Pressed’ was taken as a marker of low SES. Ethnicity and family
history of mental illness were assessed.
Emotions/behaviours/symptoms
State depressive symptoms were measured using the Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (MFQ)
(Costello and Angold, 1988). Anxiety symptoms were measured using the Revised Children’s
Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS) (Reynolds and Richmond, 1978). Obsessive-compulsive symp-
toms were measured using the Leyton Obsessional Inventory (LOI, 11-item version) (Bamber et
al., 2002). Antisocial behaviours were measured with an 11-item behaviours checklist (BC).
At T3, state psychotic phenomena and social anxiety over the past 2 weeks were measured
using the Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory (BSSI) (Hodgekins et al., 2012) and wellbe-
ing was measured using the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (Tennant et al., 2007)
(WEMWBS). Distressing life events in the past year were measured using a life events question-
naire (LEQ).
Relationships with family and peers
At all time points, family functioning and support was measured using the General Functioning
scale of the Family Assessment Device (FAD) (Epstein and Baldwin, 1983). Friendship quality
and peer difficulties were measured using the Cambridge Friendships Questionnaire (CFQ) (van
Harmelen et al., 2016). Drug use, alcohol intake and non-suicidal self-injury were assessed using
a screening instrument. The Cambridge Early Experiences Interview (CAMEEI) (Dunn et al.,
2011) was conducted with parents at T1 to investigate early-life experiences and exposure to
childhood adversity.
Education and employment
At T3, number of secondary school qualifications (GCSEs) and educational/employment status
were assessed.
Mental disorders and PEs
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with adolescents at T1 and T3. At T1 and T3, com-
mon mental disorders were assessed with the Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders, present and
lifetime version (KSADS-PL) (Kaufman et al., 1997). At T3, discrete psychotic experiences over
52
the lifetime were measured using the Psychotic-Like Symptoms Inventory (PLIKSi) (Horwood
et al., 2008).
Sub-studies
The ROOTS study also featured nested sub-studies investigating cognition, brain structure and
brain function. Cognition was investigated in a sub-study between T2 and T3, when participants
were aged approximately 16.5. The cognitive tasks assessed associative learning, behavioural
inhibition and reversal learning in 273 participants were assessed at this time point. The sample
was targeted to be enriched for exposure to childhood adversity, such that approximately half of
the sample were exposed (Owens et al., 2012), as the focus of this study was interactions between
genetic polymorphisms of the 5-HTTPLR and childhood adversity.
3.2.2 Neuroscience in Psychiatry Network (NSPN)
The NSPN 2400 cohort is an accelerated longitudinal cohort study designed to investigate be-
haviour and psychopathology, cognition and neurobiology over adolescence and young adulthood.
The study is collaboration between the University of Cambridge and University College London,
with the cohort recruited across both centres. The NSPN cohort study is ongoing. NSPN is
supported by a strategic award by the Wellcome Trust (095844/Z/11/Z). Additional support
was provided by the National Institute for Health Research Cambridge Biomedical Research
Centre and the Medical Research Council (MRC)/Wellcome Trust Behavioural and Clinical
Neuroscience Institute.
The study was designed to recruit a general population sample of people aged between 14-25.
The study aimed to recruit roughly equal numbers of males and females in five equally-sized age
groups: 14-15, 16-17, 18-19, 20-21 and 22-25.
The study involves assessments at up to three points: Baseline (BL), Follow-Up 1 (FU1) and
Follow-Up 2 (FU2). A summary of the recruitment, time points and relevant assessments is
shown in Figure 3.2. Self-reported questionnaire data were collected from participants using a
postal Home Questionnaire Pack (HQP), with some filled in by parents if participants were under
the age of 16.
The NSPN 2400 cohort was representative of England and Wales in terms of ethnicity (% for
England andWales | % for NSPN 2400: White: 82% | 78%; Mixed: 4% | 6; Asian: 9% | 10%;
Black: 4% | 4%; Other 1% | %) and country of birth (% for England andWales | % for NSPN
2400: UK birth: 87% | 85; non-UK birth: 13% | 15%). Parents of NSPN 2400 participants were
less likely to have no qualifications and more likely to have undergraduate or higher degrees than
the average for England and Wales ((% for England and Wales | % for NSPN 2400: No
qualifications: 23% | 8%; Vocational qualifications: 4% | 3%; GCSE/A-level qualifications: 41%
| 51%, undergraduate or higher degree: 27% | 38%). Socioeconomic deprivation was measured
using the Index of Multiple Deprivation (https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/english-
indices-of-deprivation). When the proportions of the NSPN 2400 cohort falling in each decile of
socio-economic deprivation for England and Wales were calculated, each decile contained around
10% of the sample except the 1st decile, which was underrepresented and the 9th decile, which
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was overrepresented (Decile of deprivation | % of cohort: 1 | 5%; 2 | 9%; 3 | 7%; 4 | 8 %;
5 | 9 %; 6 | 11%; 7 | 9%; 8 | 13%; 9 | 19%; 10 | 10%). Participants from Cambridgeshire came
from less deprived areas than participants from London.
Participants expressed their interest to take part in the study using ‘Expression of Interest’
(EOI) forms. On receipt of the EOI form, if participants were still being recruited in that
age/sex bin and the participant was eligible, the participant was sent the postal questionnaire
pack. Participants returning the BL questionnaire pack formed the NSPN 2400 cohort.
To maximise representativeness, EOI forms were distributed through general practise surgeries
using the NIHR Primary Care Research Network and local schools and further education colleges.
Purposive advertisement through adverts and leaflets was also used. The median time between
return of questionnaire packs was 1 year for BL to FU1, 823 days from BL to FU2 and 405 days
from FU1 to FU2. Unless otherwise stated, the following instruments were assessed at each time
point.
Sociodemographic information
Sociodemographic information was collected from participants (or from their parents, if the
participant was younger than 16)at baseline. SES was estimated from postcodes, using the IMD.
Ethnicity, years of parental education and family history of mental illness were assessed.
Emotions/behaviours/symptoms
Depressive symptoms (MFQ), anxiety symptoms (RCMAS), obsessive-compulsive symptoms
(LOI), antisocial behaviours (BC), wellbeing (WEMWBS) were measured with the same instru-
ments as in ROOTS. Schizotypy was measured using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire
(SPQ, 74-item version) (Raine, 1991). Drug use, alcohol intake and non-suicidal self-injury were
assessed using the same screening instrument as in ROOTS, the Drugs, Alcohol and Self-Injury
Screening Instrument.
Relationships with family and peers
Family functioning (FAD) and friendship quality and peer difficulties (CFQ) were measured using
the same instruments as in ROOTS. Parent-focused childhood adversity in the first 16 years of
life was measured using the Measures of Parenting Style questionnaire (MOPS) (Parker et al.,
1997).
Education and employment
Whether the participant was in full-time education, employment or unemployed was assessed.
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Mental disorders
Current and past help-seeking or diagnoses for mental illnesses were assessed using simple self-
report questions (reported by parents for participants younger than 16).
Sub-studies
The NSPN study featured a number of nested sub-studies. 300 participants (MRI cohort) un-
derwent a series of structural and functional MRI assessments, a battery of behavioural tasks,
IQ assessment and diagnostic interviews for mental disorders and PEs. A further at least 300
participants (Cognition cohort) will complete the battery of behavioural tasks, IQ assessment
and diagnostic interviews. These participants will also be invited to provide blood and saliva
samples for genetic analysis.
Due to the smaller size of this sample and limitations on data availability, I limited my investi-
gations to data from the NSPN 2400 Cohort and did not use the data collected in the MRI or
Cognition cohort.
3.3 Study design
Over the next 3 empirical chapters, I report studies designed to answer the 3 questions described
at the beginning of this chapter. Due to the variety of methods and differences in relevant
literature, I have expanded on relevant background, where necessary, and reported the methods
in full in each chapter. I will not describe methods in this chapter.
In these studies, I utilised methods from psychometrics, latent variable modelling and data-driven
clustering analyses. This work mainly uses cross-sectional data on symptoms, behaviours and
potential aetiological factors. Following these studies, I selected a further set of questions to
investigate using longitudinal data and behavioural tasks to which I could apply computational
modelling.
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Chapter 4
Properties of self-report instruments
measuring psychotic phenomena
Abstract
Investigations into the dimensionality of instruments measuring psychotic phenomena and
related schizotypal traits have produced divergent results and their measurement properties
have rarely been systematically assessed in young people. I designed a validation path-
way to assess the latent factorial structure and measurement properties of two schizotypy
questionnaires, the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) and the Brief Schizotypal
Symptoms Inventory (BSSI), in two epidemiologically-principled general population cohorts
of young people (age 17 or age 14-25). Dimensionality was assessed first by testing existing
dimensional structures derived from the literature then, were those models inadequate, by
model comparison of existing structures and novel structures generated using exploratory
factor analysis. To assess measurement properties of individual schizotypy dimensions, I in-
vestigated their unidimensionality, internal consistency, measurement precision across levels
of severity, systematic biases with sex and age (where possible) and reliability of sum scores
to order participants by severity. I found that existing models of the dimensional structure
of the SPQ either fit the data poorly or had redundant, non-distinct dimensions. A novel
6-factor solution outperformed novel and existing structures while maintaining distinct di-
mensions. All 6 dimensions were adequately unidimensional, had high internal consistency,
had reasonable measurement precision over levels of severity, could be used reliably as sum
scores and showed at least no bias in factorial structure over age and sex. These results sup-
port little advantage in using the 9 subscales of the SPQ and strongly question the validity
of the three-factor and four-factor models that are often considered to be the basic structure
of schizotypy. Existing three-factor models of the BSSI fit the data well. The BSSI scales
were largely unidimensional, had high internal consistency and were strongly invariant over
sex, though issues may arise due to rarity of some of the measured phenomena.
4.1 Research Questions
• What is the dimensionality of schizotypy and do existing models in the literature optimally
describe empirical data when measured in young people?
• How reliably do self-report instruments measure PEs?
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4.2 Introduction
In this chapter, I analysed the dimensionality and measurement properties of the two self-report
instruments measuring PEs in the NSPN and ROOTS cohorts: the Schizotypal Personality Ques-
tionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991) and Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory (BSSI) (Hodgekins et
al., 2012a).
Psychometrics is the field concerned with the quality of measurements of mental phenomena. It
offers mathematical methods to estimate unobservable (i.e. ‘latent’) systems, often referred to as
latent traits1, that supposedly cause observations measured with instruments. Estimating and
comparing structures of latent systems can test hypotheses on the dimensionality of unobservable
systems. It also offers methods to estimate the precision with which an instrument measures
the ‘true’ state of a system, like a person’s true level of hallucination-proneness. This precision
should modulate the extent to which empirical observations are relied upon to update and refine
theories.
While there is not complete consensus, psychotic phenomena in the general population, particu-
larly within the schizotypy field, are widely considered to comprise three systems (a ‘three-factor
model’): ‘positive’ or ‘cognitive-perceptual’ schizotypy, including anomalous perceptions and
anomalous beliefs, ‘interpersonal’ or ‘negative’ schizotypy, including social difficulties, asociality
and social anxiety, and ‘disorganised’ schizotypy, including odd speech and odd behaviours. It
has been suggested that these domains map on to the dimensionality of clinical psychosis.
4.2.1 The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ)
The SPQ comprises 74 ’true’/’false’ statements and is one of the most widely used schizotypy
questionnaires. It was originally intended to measure nine dimensions of schizotypal personality
disorder, as of DSM-III (Association, 2013). Commonly, researchers investigating the structure
of schizotypy have factor-analysed sum scores on these subscales, effectively identifying ‘second-
order’ structures, with respect to the items measured.
There is not a consensus on the optimal dimensional structure of the SPQ. Studies have identified
three-factor structures (Badoud, Chanal, Van Der Linden, Eliez, & Debbané, 2011; Bergman et
al., 1996; Chen, Hsiao, & Lin, 1997; Fossati, Raine, Carretta, Leonardi, & Maffei, 2003; Raine
et al., 1994; Reynolds, Raine, Mellingen, Venables, & Mednick, 2000; Vollema & Hoijtink, 2000;
Wuthrich & Bates, 2006), four-factor structures (Compton, Goulding, Bakeman, & McClure-
Tone, 2009; Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2014; Stefanis et al., 2004) and a bifactor structure (Preti
et al., 2015). This inconsistency is concerning and may arise because the nine original scales of
the SPQ are themselves flawed, introducing measurement error. In support of this, the validities
of the nine subscales and three/four-factor structures are questionable when estimated from
item-level data (Chmielewski & Watson, 2008).
There are methodological issues with previous analyses of the SPQ. The subscale approach is
convoluted, discards potentially valuable information measured at the item-level and means that
the validity of second-order factors rests on the validity of the first-order subscales. Given the
1The term ’trait’ is a convention and does not reflect that the system is stable over time
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conceptual similarity and high correlations observed between these subscales, it is probable that
some of the subscales are overlapping to the point of redundancy. Including multiple redundant
items and/or subscales in analyses may introduce collinearity and artificial patterns of covariance,
leading to spurious factors that do not represent ‘true’ variation with underlying mechanisms
or aetiology. In particular, some scales tend to group together and may not practically be
distinct, particularly Magical Thinking (MT) and Unusual Perceptual Experiences (UPE); Ideas
of Reference (IoR) and Suspiciousness (Sus); Odd Speech (OS) and Odd Behaviour (OB); and No
Close Friends (NCF) and Constricted Affect (CA) (Chmielewski & Watson, 2008). As a further
limitation, the majority of work with the SPQ has used adult undergraduate samples, rather
than community samples and samples with younger age ranges, when psychotic phenomena are
more common but may not persist into adulthood (Zammit et al., 2013).
4.2.2 The Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory (BSSI)
The BSSI comprises 20 statements with Likert-scale frequency responses with 5 categories indi-
cating how often that statement has applied in the last two weeks (‘Not at all’, ‘Occasionally’,
‘Sometimes’, ‘Often, ‘All of the time’). The BSSI is based on the SPQ, with very similar if not
identically worded items. It is designed to have three subscales: Paranoid Ideation (PI), with
items from the SPQ Ideas of Reference and Suspiciousness scales; Anomalous Experiences &
Beliefs (AEB – originally ‘Anomalous Experiences’ but not all items are strictly experiences),
with items from the SPQ Magical Thinking, Unusual Perceptual Experiences and Ideas of Refer-
ence, and Social Anxiety (SA), with items from the SPQ Excessive Social Anxiety scale. To my
knowledge, this instrument has only been used in two studies since its development (Freeman et
al., 2015; Hodgekins et al., 2012b).
4.2.3 Analysis of factorial structure, or dimensionality
I investigated the dimensionality of the SPQ and the BSSI using factor analysis. Factor analytical
approaches are a form of dimensionality reduction and are founded on the premise that covariance
among groups of measured phenomena, labelled ‘indicators’ (e.g. questionnaire items), can be
modelled as being caused by a smaller number of unobservable, ‘latent’, dimensions.
If dimensionality is poorly specified, it can introduce error into measurement. Dimensional
structures might have various problems. A dimensional structure may fit the item-level data
poorly, suggesting its dimensions do not capture empirical data well. Instruments can have
spurious dimensions that perform well psychometrically but have little validity, usually caused
by items that are re-phrasings of each other. Instruments can have items that are included
in dimensions but are poorly related to the overall constructs or to other items, adding noise.
Dimensions can have very few numbers of items, which makes their measurement unreliable
as it relies more on each noisy individual item. Dimensions can be very highly related to one
another to the point of redundancy, suggesting they do not truly have separate mechanisms or
aetiologies. Finally, the complexity of dimensions may be lost in reducing their composite items
to a summary label, such as ‘Suspiciousness’.
I set out to validate the existing factorial structures of dimensions of the SPQ and the BSSI to see
59
Figure 4.1: Dimensionality analysis pathway
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Figure 4.1: Flowchart of dimensionality analysis pathway. The pathway can be divided into
three stages: 1) validation that items are distinct but moderately related to other items, 2)
validating dimensional models derived from the literature and 3) comparing and validating novel
dimensional models, if literature-derived models are inadequate.
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Figure 4.2: Validation of dimensional models
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Figure 4.2: Flowchart of validation of dimensional models. The pathway was designed to test
whether a dimensional model fit the data well, had interpretable factors, had factors with enough
items to be used as standalone instruments and had factors that were likely to be meaningfully
distinct.
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whether their dimensions displayed any of these problems and, if so, to attempt to derive novel
factorial structures that mitigated those problems. The analysis pathway is shown in Figure
4.1.
The pathway was designed to identify an ‘optimal’ factorial structure that: 1) was estimated
from a pool of items that were all distinct but at least moderately-related to one another; 2)
showed sufficient goodness of fit to item-level data and 3) had distinct, interpretable dimensions
with enough items to be reliable (at least 5) (see Figure 4.2).
4.2.4 Measurement properties
I then assessed the measurement properties of all dimensions in the optimal factorial structure.
Estimating the reliability of a scale is challenging, and reliability is a term used loosely, par-
ticularly in applied psychology research. Most applied research discusses ‘internal consistency’
of scales, which can be estimated from a single set of measurements made with an instrument.
However, internal consistency means different things to different researchers (Revelle & Zinbarg,
2009; Sijtsma, 2009). Using terms suggested by Revelle & Zinbarg (2009) (Revelle & Zinbarg,
2009), I investigated the following set of properties:
1. Unidimensionality, or whether a dimension is truly measuring one thing.
2. Homogeneity, or the proportion of variance in observed measurements that is caused by
one factor. This helps assess how appropriate it is to use sum scores on an instrument.
3. Internal consistency, or the upper bound on the variance in observed measurements
that is not due to noise. In effect, this is the greatest meaningful correlation that could be
achieved between the dimension and other variables.
4. Measurement precision across all severity/intensity levels. This is important to
know whether measurements become less reliable in people with higher or lower scores.
5. Systematic biases caused by other factors. This is important to know whether factors
like age or sex will bias results.
6. Appropriateness of sum scores to rank participants by severity/intensity. This
is important as instruments are almost always used as sum scores in empirical studies.
Properties 1-3 can be estimated using hierarchical latent factor modelling (Figure 4.3). Proper-
ties 4 and 6 can be estimated using parametric and nonparametric item response theory (IRT)
analysis, respectively. IRT analyses define mathematical functions of how different levels of a
latent trait will translate into different observed responses on items, known as ‘item response
functions’ (IRFs, Figure 4.4). Property 5 can be investigated using latent variable modelling
across different groups of interest.
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Figure 4.3 Hierarchical latent variable modelling approaches to estimating
reliability
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Figure 4.3: Variance in a test can be partitioned into four components. These are a general factor (g),
explaining covariance in all items (i), r specific factors (f) explaining additional covariance among some
items, a specific factor (s) for each item that explains unique measurement variance for that item, and
measurement error or noise (e). This model can be estimated from observed data as a ‘bifactor’ model.
This model has a general factor that explains some variance in all items and specific factors that explain
variance in smaller groups of items. For purposes of model identifiability, the specific factors are often
constrained to be orthogonal to the general factor. This model assumes uncorrelated factors and factor
errors, and that the variances of all latent factors are fixed to 1. With this approach we can estimate ωH
and ωT.
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Figure 4.4 Item response theory (IRT) analyses
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Figure 4.4: Item response theory analysis (IRT). A) An item response function (IRF) described
by two-parameters of a logistic curve (2PL). B) Parametric IRT can be used to quantify where
on the trait distribution each item measures in terms of information contributed. Due to the
assumption that items are locally independent, IRFs and information is additive and can be used
for single items or whole scales. C) IRFs estimated empirically using Mokken scaling. This can
be used to investigate whether sum scores order participants correctly by the latent trait.
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4.3 Method
4.3.1 Data
Data on the SPQ come from the NSPN baseline assessment only. The SPQ formed part of the
postal questionnaire pack sent to the NSPN 2400 cohort. At time of analysis, 2388 participants
returned questionnaire packs. Data on the BSSI come from the ROOTS cohort at time 3 only.
The BSSI formed a part of a postal questionnaire pack. For further details on the cohorts, see
Methodology. Of the 1238 participants who entered the study at time 1, 1054 took part at time
3 and 966 completed the BSSI. All analyses were performed using R for Statistical Computing
(R Core Team, 2016).
4.3.2 Investigating dimensionality
Ensuring items were distinct but moderately-related to other items
I ensured items were distinct but moderately related to other items by examination of inter-item
correlation matrices. Items were considered not distinct if they had any inter-item correlations
exceeding 0.9. Items were considered unrelated to other items if they had no inter-item correla-
tions of at least 0.3. I used a step-wise procedure in which offending items were identified, the one
with the lowest average inter-item correlation removed, and the correlation matrix re-estimated.
I performed this procedure for non-distinct and for unrelated items separately, till no such items
remained. To accommodate categorical item-level data, I used polychoric (for the multi-level
ordinal responses on the BSSI) and tetrachoric (for the binary responses on the SPQ) correlation
matrices.
Literature-Derived Dimensional Structures
I generated a set of item-level models from currently-used models of the SPQ and the BSSI. Cross-
loadings were not allowed. When studies reported second-order structures in which subscales
cross-loaded on to multiple second-order factors, I generated all possible combinations of model
structures in which the cross-loading item loaded on to one of those factors.
Choice of factor analysis model estimator
Specialised robust estimation methods, like diagonally weighted-least-squares, mean- and vari-
ance adjusted (WLSMV), exist for estimating latent variable models from categorical data. These
may be more appropriate than traditional maximum likelihood (ML) methods as they estimate
polychoric correlations. For analyses not involving comparison of two or more models, I used
a WLSMV estimator. All models were fit using the lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) package, supported
with functions from psych (Revelle, 2014) and semTools (semTools Contributors, 2016).
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Goodness of fit
I assessed fit of WLSMV-estimated models using two robust versions of CFI and TLI, which
should both exceed 0.9 and preferably 0.95, and a robust version of RMSEA, which should not
exceed 0.8 and preferably 0.5.
Distinct, sufficiently large and interpretable dimensions
These properties were assessed from factor models fit using WLSMV-estimated models. Factors
were declared distinct if no inter-factor correlations exceeded 0.8. Factors were sufficiently large
if they had at least 5 items. Items loading on each factor were examined for whether the whole
factor was interpretable.
Novel Factorial Structures
If no model structures based on the literature met the above criteria, I proceeded to define
novel model structures using exploratory factor analysis (EFA). I randomly split the sample into
an equally sized ‘Discovery’ set and ‘Validation’ set, preserving the proportions of male and
female participants and, for NSPN, participants in different age bins (14-16, 17-18, 19-20, 21-22,
22-25).
EFA estimates loadings on a given number of latent factors, from which model structures can
be identified. I estimated EFA solutions with 1 to 9 factors, using a ‘minres’ estimator and
‘oblimin’ rotation with the ‘psych’ package (Revelle, 2014), allowing for correlated factors. Model
structures were generated by setting each item to load on to its highest loading factor, with no
cross-loading allowed. No items were removed to preserve the same pool of items across all
models for model comparison.
All novel and literature-derived models were then fit to the Validation set, using a robust
maximum likelihood estimator (MLR), with missing values estimated using full-information
maximum-likelihood (fiML). Log-likelihood based fit indices, the AIC, BIC and SABIC were
used for model comparison because they trade-off model fit and model parsimony; lower val-
ues indicate a better-performing model. I selected the best performing model that measured
broadly interpretable domains and had at least 5 items per factor. I re-estimated that model in
the Validation set and full dataset with a WLSMV estimator to examine goodness of fit, factor
distinctness, size and interpretability (Figure 4.2). If the model did not meet these criteria, I
moved on to the next best-fitting model according to AIC, BIC and SABIC until an adequate
model was found.
4.3.3 Investigating measurement properties of individual scales
Once adequate dimensions had been identified, I examined their measurement properties inde-
pendently.
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Unidimensionality
I investigated unidimensionality by attempting to fit a bifactor model to scale items that were
supposedly measuring a single factor. Adequate fit of the bifactor model indicates that there is
some variance common to all items that can be explained by a single factor.
Homogeneity
I quantified how much variance is caused by a single factor by calculating the proportion of
variance in the observed measurements explained by the general factor in a bifactor model (Figure
4.3). This value is McDonald’s coefficient Omega (McDonald, 1978) (ω), which Zinbarg et al.,
relabelled as ‘Omega Hierarchical’ (Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005) (ωH). ωH gives an index
of how ‘homogenous’ an instrument is and how useful sum scores of that instrument will be. It
is recommended that ωH must exceed 0.5 if sum scores for an instrument are to be used.
Internal consistency, or upper bound on reliability
Due to limitations on our theories and measurements, no instrument will ever be perfectly uni-
dimensional. However, variance that is not associated with a single dimension is not necessarily
noise. We can estimate the proportion of variance that is non-noise, which would be the highest
meaningful correlation we should expect to make with other instruments, or the ‘greatest upper
bound’ on reliability.
I approximated the proportion of variance in observed measurements explained by the general
factor and additional specific factors (Figure 4.3). This value is McDonald’s coefficient ‘Omega
Total’ (McDonald, 1999) (ωT) and is an upper bound on the reliability (Revelle & Zinbarg,
2009). It is an estimate of the maximum meaningful correlation we should be able to identify
between the system in question and another system, and Revelle & Zinbarg (Revelle & Zinbarg,
2009) suggest this is used to indicate ‘internal consistency’
Measurement precision across severity/intensity levels
It is important to know whether an instrument can measure the full distribution of the latent
trait with reasonable accuracy. Uneven measurement precision across the trait distribution means
that measurement may be systematically less reliable in certain people. This can reduce power
to detect associations and produce spurious associations, such as when an instrument is used to
calculate change scores over time (Reise & Haviland, 2005). This may be particularly relevant for
psychopathology research, in that many symptom instruments measure high levels of symptoms
accurately but low levels of symptoms inaccurately (Reise & Waller, 2009).
I investigated measurement precision across the latent trait using pIRT. I fit two-parameter lo-
gistic (2PL) IRT models to the items for each scale and calculated item information distributions
that indicated what severity of the latent trait the item could measure (4.4). I fit 2PL pIRT by
expectation-maximization (EM) with the Newton-Raphson method using the mirt (Chalmers,
2012) package.
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Systematic biases caused by other characteristics
Systematic biases can occur when different groups, like men and women, tend to interpret items
in a different way. We refer to this as a failure of ‘measurement invariance’ or the presence of
‘differential item functioning’, for specific items. I tested this property by fitting multi-group
latent variable models with increasingly strict constraints that model parameters must be equal
across groups. Significantly poorer fit when models are constrained to be equal indicates failure
of measurement invariance.
Increasingly strict equality constraints were imposed such that the item loadings (weak invari-
ance), then also item thresholds (strong invariance), then also item residuals (strict invariance)
were equal across groups. I tested change in model fit by the difference in the CFI. A change
in CFI (∆CFI) of -0.01 or a greater decrement was taken to indicate failure of invariance. For
dichotomous items, such as those in the SPQ, residual variances must be constrained to 1 to
ensure model identifiability, so I tested only weak and strong invariance.
In ROOTS and NSPN, I tested invariance over sex. In NSPN, I also tested invariance over age,
as the sample aged between 14-25. Age was split into two age bins: adolescents aged 14-17,
and young adults aged 18-25. Models were fit with a WLSMV estimator to complete cases
data.
Appropriateness of sum scores to rank participants by severity/intensity
Sum scores are, by far, the most common use of psychometric instruments like the SPQ and
the BSSI. Sum scores give every item equal weighting, and if people with different levels of a
system do not all interpret the items as having the same rank order of severity, the sum score
may misorder people in terms of their ‘true’ system values (Figure 4.4). If items are ranked in
terms of severity in the same way by all participants, they form a hierarchy and this property is
known as ‘invariant item ordering’. The presence of invariant item ordering indicates that sum
scores are a reliable way to measure a continuously varying system in a population.
I investigated invariant item ordering using Mokken scaling, which estimates the full IRF empir-
ically rather than summarising it parametrically. I tested whether a Mokken scale fits the data
and whether any of the item-response functions (IRFs) significantly intersected, indicating that
the severity ranking of items is not the same over all participants. The number of items that
do not have intersecting IRFs was calculated and the strength of IIO estimated with parameter
HT. HT > 0.3 indicates at least weak IIO and presence of a hierarchy, strengthening the use of
sum scores.
I report the scalability coefficient for the instrument, H (Loevinger, 1947), which is a measure of
‘homogeneity’ and indicates how strongly the items form a Mokken scale, which supports use of
sum scores. H values > 0.3 indicate that the items form a weak Mokken scale, H > 0.4 indicates
a moderate Mokken scale and H > 0.5 indicates a strong Mokken scale. Recent extensions of
Mokken scaling show that it is possible to directly measure ‘manifest invariant item ordering’
(Ligtvoet et al., 2010) and indicate the strength of any hierarchies with coefficient HT. I used
a backwards step-wise item selection procedure to remove items that have intersection IRFs
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and calculated HT from any remaining, invariantly ordered items. HT gives an indication of the
accuracy of invariant item ordering: HT > 0.3 indicates low, but acceptable hierarchical ordering,
HT > 0.4 indicates moderate hierarchical ordering and HT > 0.5 indicates strong hierarchical
ordering. Mokken scales were fit to the data using the Mokken (van der Ark, 2007) package for
R.
4.3.4 Missing Data
Using only complete cases is a suboptimal strategy for dealing with missing data, if that missing
data is not missing completely at random (MCAR). If data is missing at random (MAR), missing-
ness depends on other measured factors such as age or sex. Ignoring MAR data (or data missing
not at random, where missingness depends on unmeasured factors) can introduce bias into anal-
yses. This bias can be reduced using methods that estimate MAR data. In checking assumptions
of MAR and reporting results of analyses using missing data, I followed recommendations by
(Sterne et al., 2009).
For factor analyses, I used two strategies for dealing with MAR data, depending on the estimator
used to fit models to data and purpose of the analysis. A full-information ML (fiML) estimator
was used for model comparisons as it allows computation of appropriate comparative fit indices
based on log-likelihood (e.g. AIC, BIC, SABIC). A WLSMV estimator with 25 multiply imputed
data sets was used to assess fit of individual models because it is more appropriate for categorical
indicators and robust to non-normal variables. Imputed values were generated using predictive
mean matching, with auxiliary variables included to improve the plausibility of imputations
(Table 4.1). For measurement invariance, pIRT and nIRT analyses I used complete-cases data
only.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 SPQ
Missing data: SPQ
Table 4.1: Missing data for the SPQ in NSPN. The missing values were judged to meet missing-
at-random (MAR) assumptions so were suitable for multiple imputation and estimation using
full-information maximum-likelihood.
Reporting Guideline Description
Number of missing val-
ues for variables of in-
terest
2388 filled in SPQ. 2106/2388 had complete data (88.1% of filled
in questionnaire. 45 partially complete questionnaires had more
than 5 items missing.
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
Possible reasons for
missingness
Higher psychopathology, sociodemographic features (e.g. sex, low
socioeconomic status)
Differences in key expo-
sures and outcomes of
interest in missing and
observed data
Logistic regressions were used to predict having incomplete data
on the BSSI from other variables (see ?Auxiliary variables used in
imputation procedure? below). Numbers in brackets indicate OR
and 95% CI. Incomplete data was predicted by: male sex (1.9,
1.47 - 2.46), low socioeconomic status (1.95, 1.38 - 2.75), years of
maternal education (0.92, 0.87 - 0.98), lifetime PEs (1.67, 1.03 -
2.64), and childhood adversity (1.74, 1.31 - 2.30).
Assumptions about
missing data?
Missing at random (MAR)
Imputation software Predictive mean matching (PMM), Hmisc package, R for statis-
tical computing
N imputed datasets 25
Auxiliary variables used
in imputation procedure
Non-white ethnicity, SES, years of mother’s education after age
16, family history of psychiatric disorder, lifetime, past-year and
persistent psychotic experiences measured using the Psychotic-
Like Symptoms Interview (Horwood et al., 2008) nonpsychotic
disorders measured with the K-SADS-PL (Kaufman et al., 1997)
(occurring before age 14, at age 14 and at age 17, age 14), child-
hood adversity between 0-14 measured with the CAMEEI (Dunn
et al., 2011), age 17 item-level responses about depressive symp-
toms (MFQ) (Angold et al., 1995), age 14 and age 17 self-report
anxiety symptoms (RCMAS) (Reynolds and Richmond, 1997),
obsessive-compulsive symptoms (LOI) (Berg et al., 1986; Bamber
et al., 2002), antisocial behaviours (BC) (Cousins et al., 2016),
friendship quality (CFQ) (van Harmelen et al., 2016) family sup-
port (FAD) (Epstein and Baldwin, 1983) and age 17 self-report
wellbeing (WEMWBS) (Tennant et al., 2007).
Approach to non-
normal and categorical
variables
PMM preserves the distribution of observed variables by borrow-
ing real values from observed data that could plausibly be the
missing value
Interactions None included
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
Plausibility of observed
and imputed values
Visual inspection showed very similar distributions of distribu-
tions of observed and imputed values
Plausibility of MAR as-
sumption supported by
variables included in im-
putation model?
Logistic regressions confirmed that missingness on individual BSSI
items was predicted by one or more of the imputation variables
(see "Auxiliary variables used in imputation procedure").
Complete cases analyses I also reported complete cases analyses
Sensitivity analyses Sensitivity analyses for investigating dimensionality with missing
data are complex, e.g. "do the participants with missing data
have three dimensions of schizotypy, rather than six?" Possible
sensitivity analyses might impute sets of missing data that were
most-like or least-like the set of factorial structures tested and es-
timate the variability in winning dimensional structures. Given
this complexity and the high proportion of complete data, I chose
not to conduct sensitivity analyses, though these might be impor-
tant future investigations.
The SPQ missing data was judged to be plausibly MAR (Table 4.1).
Redundant and Unrelated Items
One pair of items from the ‘Suspiciousness’ scale had a correlation coefficient of 0.93 (“18: Do
you often feel that others have it in for you?” and “59: I often feel that others have it in for me”).
Item 18 had the lowest average correlation with all other items (Item 18: average correlation =
0.398; Item 59: average correlation = 0.404) and was removed from subsequent analyses. On
re-estimation of the correlation matrix, no item correlations exceeded 0.9.
Item 49, “Writing letters to friends is more trouble than it is worth”, showed no inter-item
correlations over 0.3 and was removed from subsequent analyses. On re-estimating the correlation
matrix, no other items had no correlations over 0.3. The remaining 72 items were used as the
final item pool.
Literature-Derived Dimensional Structures
I derived model structures from the three-factor (Raine et al., 1994) and four-factor (Stefanis et
al., 2004) models that have been most widely replicated in the literature (Table 4.2).
All models converged normally when fit to 25 imputed datasets. However, no three-factor or four-
factor structure showed acceptable values of CFI and TLI (Table 4.3). By comparison, Raine’s
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Table 4.2: Models of the SPQ derived from prominent existing models in the literature (Raine,
1991 and Stefanis et al., 2004). Both models feature cross-loadings, which reduce factor inter-
pretability and may cause undue influence of a few items in the overall model. I constructed all
possible model combinations with no cross-loadings.
Scale IoR ESA MT UPE OB NCF OS CA SUS
Raine 3F A CP IP CP CP Dis IP Dis IP CP
Raine 3F B CP IP CP CP Dis IP Dis IP IP
Stefanis 4F A Para Para CP CP Dis IP Dis IP Para
Stefanis 4F B Para IP CP CP Dis IP Dis IP Para
Stefanis 4F C Para Para CP CP Dis IP Dis IP IP
Stefanis 4F D Para IP CP CP Dis IP Dis IP IP
9-factor model did show acceptable CFI and TLI. However, some factors showed some very high
inter-factor correlations (Inter-factor correlations: Ideas of Reference & Suspiciousness = 0.86;
Unusual Perceptual Experiences & Magical Thinking = 0.80, No Close Friends & Constricted
Affect = 0.95), suggesting these domains are not truly distinct. Full parameter estimates of
the original 9-factor model fit to the imputed datasets are given in Appendix B. I proceeded to
generate novel factorial structures using EFA.
Table 4.3: Fit indices of literature-derived dimensional structures of the SPQ (WLSMV, 25
imputed datasets). Only Raine’s (1991) 9-factor model showed adequate fit to the data. However,
some of the model’s factor correlations exceeded 0.8, so may not be truly distinct. This model
therefore does not meet my validation criteria.
Model CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA
(Lower 95%
CI)
RMSEA
(Upper 95%
CI)
Raine 3F A 0.864 0.86 0.045 0.045 0.046
Raine 3F B 0.84 0.835 0.049 0.048 0.05
Stefanis 4F A 0.839 0.834 0.049 0.049 0.05
Stefanis 4F B 0.877 0.873 0.043 0.042 0.044
Stefanis 4F C 0.831 0.826 0.05 0.05 0.051
Stefanis 4F D 0.847 0.842 0.048 0.047 0.049
Raine 9F 0.911 0.907 0.037 0.036 0.038
Novel Dimensional Structures
Table 4.4: Novel dimensional structures of the SPQ derived from exploratory factor analysis
Item Original Scale EFA
1F
EFA
2F
EFA
3F
EFA
4F
EFA
5F
EFA
6F
EFA
7F
EFA
8F
EFA
9F
1 IoR 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 7 8
2 ESA 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 1
3 MT 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
4 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 8 9
5 OB 1 2 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
6 NCF 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 7
7 OS 1 2 3 3 1 5 3 2 7
8 CA 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 2 2
9 Sus 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
10 IoR 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
11 ESA 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 1
12 MT 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
13 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
14 OB 1 2 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
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Item Original Scale EFA
1F
EFA
2F
EFA
3F
EFA
4F
EFA
5F
EFA
6F
EFA
7F
EFA
8F
EFA
9F
15 NCF 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
16 OS 1 2 3 3 1 5 7 6 6
17 CA 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
19 IoR 1 2 3 3 5 3 4 7 8
20 ESA 1 1 1 4 4 4 2 3 1
21 MT 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 7 8
22 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
23 OB 1 2 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
24 NCF 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 1
25 OS 1 2 2 4 1 5 7 6 6
26 CA 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
27 Sus 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
28 IoR 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 7 8
29 ESA 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 1
30 MT 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
31 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 8 9
32 OB 1 2 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
33 NCF 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
34 OS 1 2 3 3 1 5 7 6 6
35 CA 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
36 Sus 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 4
37 IoR 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 7 8
38 ESA 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 1
39 MT 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 7 8
40 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
41 NCF 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
42 OS 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 7
43 CA 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 2
44 Sus 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
45 IoR 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
46 ESA 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 1
47 MT 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
48 UPE 1 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 5
50 OS 1 2 3 3 1 6 6 2 2
51 CA 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
52 Sus 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
53 IoR 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
54 ESA 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 1
55 MT 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
56 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
57 NCF 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 3 1
58 OS 1 2 3 3 1 5 7 6 6
59 Sus 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
60 IoR 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
61 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 8 9
62 NCF 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 8
63 IoR 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 4 3
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Item Original Scale EFA
1F
EFA
2F
EFA
3F
EFA
4F
EFA
5F
EFA
6F
EFA
7F
EFA
8F
EFA
9F
64 UPE 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 8 9
65 Sus 1 2 2 4 5 3 4 1 4
66 NCF 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
67 OB 1 2 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
68 CA 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 7
69 OS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
70 OB 1 2 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
71 ESA 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 1
72 OS 1 2 3 3 1 5 7 6 6
73 CA 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4
74 OB 1 2 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
Table 4.4 shows the structures of the models derived from EFA. Figure 4.5 shows the AIC, BIC
and SABIC values for all novel and literature-derived models, in order of BIC values. Importantly,
all novel models with four or more factors outperformed all three- and four-factor literature
derived models. These models, while successful when fit to subscale scores in other studies,
perform poorly at the item-level.
The winning model on AIC, BIC and SABIC was the novel 9-factor model. However, the
structure of this model is quite different from Raine’s 9 subscales (Table 4.2). This model
showed good fit to the Validation set and to the 25 imputed full datasets, using a WLSMV
estimator (Validation set: CFI = 0.931, TLI = 0.929, RMSEA = 0.031; Imputed datasets: CFI
= 0.915; TLI = 0.913; RMSEA = 0.035). However, 3 of the inter-factor correlations exceeded
0.8 and one factor had fewer than 5 items, so the model did not meet validation criteria.
The novel 6-factor structure was the next best-fitting model on all indices compared to the next
best novel model (the novel 7-factor model), though Raine’s 9-factor model outperformed it on
AIC and SABIC (Figure 4.5). However, despite its good performance in model comparison,
Raine’s model may have contained likely-redundant factors.
The novel 6-factor model fit well to the Validation set and to the 25 imputed datasets with a
WLSMV estimator (Validation: CFI = 0.927, TLI = 0.924, RMSEA = 0.032; Imputed datasets:
CFI = 0.914; TLI = 0.911; RMSEA = 0.036). Parameter estimates for the 6-factor model fit to
25 imputed datasets are given in Appendix B.
I interpreted the six factors as ‘Asociality’, ‘Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs’, ‘Paranoid Ideation’,
‘Social Anxiety’, ‘Eccentricity’ and ‘Odd Speech’. Importantly, the structure of the 6-factor so-
lution resolves the issue of highly overlapping domains identified in Raine’s 9-factor model, as
the factors that showed inter-factor correlations over 0.8 were mostly merged into single factors
(Ideas of Reference & Suspiciousness; Unusual Perceptual Experiences & Magical Thinking; No
Close Friends & Constricted Affect). Figure 4.6 is a river-plot showing how the original 9 SPQ
subscales relate to the novel 6-factor solution.
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Figure 4.5 Model comparison of SPQ structures
Figure 4.5: Model comparison of novel and literature-derived dimensional structures of the SPQ
with three log-likelihood based indices (AIC, BIC, SABIC) that trade off model fit with model
parsimony. Lower values indicate better performance.
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Figure 4.6 Riverplot of relationship between the original 9-factors of the SPQ and
the novel 6-factor model
Figure 4.6: The structure of the 6-factor solution is recognisable in the 9-factor solution. Of the
original 9 scales, those that showed very high inter-factor correlations have largely merged into
larger factors in the 6-factor solution e.g. No Close Friends and Constricted Affect now form a
larger Asociality construct, with some items from Odd Speech and Suspiciousness.
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Table 4.5: Measurement properties of the 6-factor SPQ model. ωT = ’Omega Total’, the greatest
upper bound on reliability. ωH = ’Omega Hierarchical’, the proportion of variance attributable
to a single construct. α = Cronbach’s (1951) ’coefficient alpha’, reported for convention only.
H = Loevinger’s scaleability coefficient, an index of the strength of a Mokken scale. H > 0.3 =
weak, H > 0.4 = moderate, H > 0.5 = strong. S.E.(H) = standard error of H. N IRF intersections
= number of times IRFs intersect, indicating a failure of invariant item ordering. HT = index of
the strength of hierarchical ordering after items with intersecting IRFs were removed. HT > 0.3
= weak, HT > 0.4 = moderate. Higher HT values show that sum scores are more likely to order
participants by the latent trait.
Scale ωT ωH α H S.E.(H) N IRF inter-
sections
HT
Asociality 0.8 0.96 0.95 0.42 0.011 5 0.36
Anomalous
Experiences
& Beliefs
0.71 0.94 0.93 0.32 0.012 1 0.21
Paranoid
Ideation
0.81 0.95 0.93 0.42 0.011 4 0.23
Eccentricity 0.83 0.95 0.93 0.55 0.012 2 0.46
Social Anx-
iety
0.89 0.93 0.91 0.52 0.011 3 0.44
Odd Speech 0.75 0.91 0.85 0.44 0.014 1 0.32
Measurement properties of the novel 6-factor solution
Table 4.5 shows the results of bifactor modelling with polychoric correlations (and coefficient
alpha computed with Pearson correlations, for comparison to other literature). Every scale
showed sufficiently high ωH to compute sum scores and excellent internal consistency, indicated
by ωT > 0.9.
Measurement precision across severity/intensity levels
Figure 4.7 shows the standard error of measurement across the range of the latent traits for all
models, measured using 2PL pIRT models. Standard error curves are overlaid for factors from
Raine’s solution and the 6-factor solution that share at least 5 items.
Many of the factors show less precise measurement at the extremes of the latent trait, which
is common, particularly in clinical or symptom-based scales. This is particularly true for the
extreme low ends of some scales. While the curves for a number of scales are similar in both
solutions, the 6-factor AEB and Aso factors have more precise measurement at both the extreme
high and extreme low ends than Raine’s scales. This improvement in precision is quite substantial
for the AEB factor.
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Figure 4.7 Measurement precision across the distribution of latent traits in the
SPQ
Figure 4.7: Measurement precision across the distribution of latent traits in the SPQ, calculated
from parametric item response theory analyses. The novel 6-factor solutions are compared to
scales from the original 9-factor model that share at least 5 items. The latent trait (x-axis) is
scaled to 0-mean and unit variance. The novel factors improve measurement precision, relative
to the original factors, indicated by lower standard error of measurement.
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Appropriateness of sum scores to rank participants by severity/intensity
Results of nIRT analyses to investigate item hierarchies are also shown in Table 4.5. All of the
scales formed at least a weak Mokken scale (H > 0.3). All scales showed at least one significant
intersection of IRFs, thus violating IIO. Subsets of items within 4 of the 6 novel scales contained
hierarchies, evidenced by HT values greater than 0.3. However, none of the complete scales
showed evidence of hierarchical ordering. This suggests that sum scores on all scales are likely
to misorder some participants with respect to the trait in question.
Systematic biases caused by other characteristics
Table 4.6: Systematic biases with age/sex were investigated by increasingly constraining models
fit to different groups to be equal and examining model fit, indexed by CFI. Aso, AEB and PI
were strongly invariant over age and sex. Ecc, SA and OS were strongly invariance over age but
only weakly invariant over sex, suggesting they may not be suitable to compare men and women.
Invariance over age (14-17, 18-25) (CFI) Invariance over sex (male/female) (CFI)
Scale Equiv.
struc-
tures
Weak
in-
vari-
ance
Change
in fit
(weak)
Strong
in-
vari-
ance
Change
in fit (
strong)
Equiv.
struc-
tures
Weak
in-
vari-
ance
Change
in fit
(weak)
Strong
in-
vari-
ance
Change
in fit
(strong)
Aso 0.957 0.965 0.008 0.963 -0.001 0.955 0.963 0.008 0.959 -0.004
AEB 0.914 0.927 0.013 0.921 -0.005 0.913 0.928 0.015 0.921 -0.007
PI 0.946 0.955 0.01 0.953 -0.003 0.946 0.955 0.009 0.951 -0.004
Ecc 0.992 0.994 0.002 0.994 0 0.992 0.994 0.002 0.982 -0.012
SA 0.997 0.998 0.001 0.997 -0.001 0.997 0.998 0.001 0.98 -0.018
OS 0.969 0.971 0.002 0.97 -0.001 0.969 0.972 0.002 0.958 -0.014
Table 4.7: Partial invariance of scales from the 6-factor SPQ model. For Ecc, SA and OS,
strong invariance was achieved after allowing the thresholds for one item to differ across groups,
suggesting that systematic biases due to sex may be small.
Scale Item
Num-
ber
Item Fit with item
unconstrained
(CFI)
Change in fit
from weak to
strong invari-
ance (CFI)
Ecc 5 Other people see me as slightly
eccentric or odd
0.9856 -0.0083
SA 2 I sometimes avoid going to places
where there will be many people
because I will get anxious
0.9921 -0.0061
OS 7 People sometimes find it hard to
understand what I am saying
0.9618 -0.0099
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Results of measurement invariance testing are shown in Table 4.6. All factors in the novel solution
showed invariant factor loadings with age (weak invariance) and invariant item thresholds (strong
invariance), supporting that sum scores on these instruments can accurately compare adolescents
and young adults.
All factors in the novel solution showed invariant factor loadings (weak invariance) with sex.
Aso, AEB and PI also showed invariant thresholds (strong invariance). Ecc, SA and OS failed
strong invariance, but partial invariance was achieved by allowing 1 item in each scale with the
highest modification index to be equal across the groups (Table 4.7). These three scales may be
less suitable for comparing men and women.
4.4.2 BSSI
Missing data: SPQ
Table 4.8: Missing data on the BSSI.The missing values were judged to meet missing-at-
random (MAR) assumptions so were suitable for multiple imputation and estimation using
full-information maximum-likelihood.
Reporting Guideline Description
Number of missing val-
ues for variables of in-
terest
966/1238 filled in BSSI (78.0% of baseline sample, 91.7% of time
3 sample). 917/966 had complete data (95.0% of filled in ques-
tionnaires, 74.1% of baseline sample). 42/48 partially complete
questionnaires only had 1 item missing.
Possible reasons for
missingness
Higher psychopathology, sociodemographic features (e.g. sex, low
socioeconomic status)
Differences in key expo-
sures and outcomes of
interest in missing and
observed data
Logistic regressions were used to predict having incomplete data
on the BSSI from other variables (see "Variables used in impu-
tation procedure" below). Numbers in brackets indicate OR and
95% CI. Incomplete data was predicted by: male sex (1.9, 1.47 -
2.46), low socioeconomic status (1.95, 1.38 - 2.75), years of mater-
nal education (0.92, 0.87 - 0.98), lifetime PEs (1.67, 1.03 - 2.64),
and childhood adversity (1.74, 1.31 - 2.30).
Assumptions about
missing data?
Missing at random (MAR)
Imputation software Predictive mean matching (PMM), Hmisc package, R for statisti-
cal computing
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Table 4.8 – continued from previous page
N imputed datasets 25
Variables used in impu-
tation procedure
Non-white ethnicity, SES, years of mother’s education after age
16, family history of psychiatric disorder, lifetime, past-year and
persistent psychotic experiences measured using the Psychotic-
Like Symptoms Interview (Horwood et al., 2008) nonpsychotic
disorders measured with the K-SADS-PL (Kaufman et al., 1997)
(occurring before age 14, at age 14 and at age 17, age 14), child-
hood adversity between 0-14 measured with the CAMEEI (Dunn
et al., 2011), age 17 item-level responses about depressive symp-
toms (MFQ) (Angold et al., 1995), age 14 and age 17 self-report
anxiety symptoms (RCMAS) (Reynolds and Richmond, 1997),
obsessive-compulsive symptoms (LOI) (Berg et al., 1986; Bamber
et al., 2002), antisocial behaviours (BC) (Cousins et al., 2016),
friendship quality (CFQ) (van Harmelen et al., 2016) family sup-
port (FAD) (Epstein and Baldwin, 1983) and age 17 self-report
wellbeing (WEMWBS) (Tennant et al., 2007).
Approach to non-
normal and categorical
variables
PMM preserves the distribution of observed variables by borrow-
ing real values from observed data that could plausibly be the
missing value
Interactions None included
Plausibility of observed
and imputed values
Plot distributions of observed and imputed values
Plausibility of MAR as-
sumption supported by
variables included in im-
putation model?
Logistic regressions confirmed that missingness on individual BSSI
items was predicted by one or more of the imputation variables.
Complete cases analyses I also reported complete cases analyses
Sensitivity analyses Not conducted, see Table 3.1 for justification.
The BSSI missing data was judged to be plausibly MAR (Table 4.8).
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Endorsement of BSSI categories
The BSSI was answered on a 5-point frequency scale. Some of these categories were very rarely
endorsed (Table 4.9). Rare endorsements make it difficult to estimate polychoric correlations,
because it increases the number of combinations of response levels (cells in the bivariate table)
with 0 participants, which must be corrected by adding a numeric constant (usually 0.5), which
allows estimation but potentially adds noise to the data. A high number of response levels also
makes latent variable models more computationally demanding, while potentially introducing
unreliability as different people may not treat the distances between the levels equally. Some-
times, scales with large numbers of response levels are treated as continuous measurements. This
is potentially inappropriate as the response intervals are not truly equally spaced. However, col-
lapsing categories may lose valuable information that can separate more intense PEs from more
attenuated ones.
I proceeded to test the factorial structure of the BSSI subscales by both treating the responses
as continuous by using a robust ML (MLR) estimator, and treating data as categorical, using a
WLSMV estimator, in the unmodified data, and a data sets in which 3 most extreme response
categories were collapsed, to produce 3-point data. This ensured that no response categories
were endorsed by less than 1% of the sample.
Redundant and Unrelated Items
When estimating polychoric correlation matrices from 5, 4 and 3 category data, 151, 47 and 1
cell(s) needed correcting for 0 responses of that pattern, respectively.
In all matrices, item 6, ‘Do you often feel that other people have got it in for you?’ and item 12,
‘I often feel that others have it in for me’ had correlations over 0.9. Item 6 had the lowest average
inter-item correlation in all matrices and was removed. The other 19 items showed no redundantly
high correlations and all items had at least 8 correlations over 0.3 in all matrices.
Literature-Derived Dimensional Structures
The three-factor model fit well to the 5-category data, both to complete cases data (N = 918,
CFI = 0.920, TLI = 0.908, RMSEA = 0.052 (95% CI = 0.048 – 0.056)) and to partially complete
data estimated using full-information maximum likelihood (N = 966, CFI = 0.920, TLI = 0.910,
RMSEA = 0.052 (95% CI = 0.052 – 0.048)).
The model fit very well to the 5-category data with a WLSMV estimator, though with a large
number of corrections for empty bivariate cells (N = 918, CFI = 0.977, TLI = 0.973, RMSEA
= 0.063 (95% CI = 0.059 – 0.068)).
The WLSMV-estimated model also fit very well to the 3-category data, with only one correction
for empty bivariate cells (N = 918, CFI = 0.974, TLI = 0.970, RMSEA = 0.059 (95% CI = 0.054
– 0.064)). The model also showed good fit to 25 imputed datasets (N = 1238, CFI = 0.915, TLI
= 0.902, RMSEA = 0.040 (95% CI = 0.035 – 0.044)). The inter-factor correlations from the
imputed model were: r(AEB, SA) = 0.32, r(AEB, PI) = 0.57, r(SA, PI) = 0.49.
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The BSSI therefore has a well-fitting factorial structure with related factors that can probably be
measured distinctly. I therefore did not use EFA to construct any novel factorial structures. Full
parameter estimates from the full-information MLR-estimated model fit to 5-category data and
the WLSMV-estimated model fit to 3-category imputed datasets are given in Appendix B.
Measurement properties of the BSSI dimensions
Table 4.10: Measurement properties of the BSSI scales. ωT = ’Omega Total’, the greatest upper
bound on reliability. ωH = ’Omega Hierarchical’, the proportion of variance attributable to a
single construct. α = Cronbach’s (1951) ’coefficient alpha’, reported for convention only.
5 response categories 3 response categories
Scale ωH ωT α ωH ωT α
SA 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.65 0.95 0.93
AEB 0.74 0.93 0.9 0.71 0.93 0.9
PI 0.88 0.93 0.9 0.88 0.93 0.9
Results of reliability testing using bifactor modelling are shown in Table 4.10. All scales of the
BSSI showed a large proportion of variance explained by a general factor and good internal
consistency.
Measurement precision across severity/intensity levels
Figure 4.8 shows information distributions for the BSSI scales. Notably, the 5-category model
had better measurement precision at the more severe range of the trait. This suggested that the
full 5-category solution captured meaningful variance that is lost by collapsing response levels,
particularly in PI and SA. However, the gain in precision for AEB was low and the measurement
precision of the 3-category data was still reasonable at high levels. There is therefore a trade-off
between tractability and stability of analyses versus capturing variance at the most severe ranges
of psychotic phenomena.
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Figure 4.8 Measurement precision across the distribution of latent traits in the
SPQ
Figure 4.8: Measurement precision across the distribution of latent traits in the BSSI, calculated
from parametric item response theory analyses. Collapsing responses from 5 to 3 categories loses
some information at the extreme end of the distribution but improves the stability of latent
variable modelling.
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Appropriateness of sum scores to rank participants by severity/intensity
Table 4.11: Mokken scale properties of the scales of the 3-factor BSSI model. H = Loevinger’s
scaleability coefficient, an index of the strength of a Mokken scale. H > 0.3 = weak, H > 0.4 =
moderate, H > 0.5 = strong. S.E.(H) = standard error of H. N IRF intersections = number of
times IRFs intersect, indicating a failure of invariant item ordering. HT = index of the strength
of hierarchical ordering after items with intersecting IRFs were removed. HT > 0.3 = weak, HT
> 0.4 = moderate. Higher HT values show that sum scores are more likely to order participants
by the latent trait.
5 response categories 3 response categories
Scale H S.E.(H) N IRF inter-
sections
HT H S.E.(H) N IRF inter-
sections
HT
SA 0.674 0.017 0 0.2 0.648 0.016 0 0.2
AEB 0.372 0.024 0 0.19 0.396 0.022 0 0.19
PI 0.622 0.021 0 0.3 0.607 0.019 1 0.3
Table 4.11
Results of Mokken scaling are shown in Table 4.11. All scales, particularly SA and PI, showed
good Mokken scalability, supporting the use of sum scores, though there was little evidence
of hierarchical item ordering; only the PI scale showed very weak hierarchical ordering. This
suggests that sum scores may misorder some participants on the measured systems.
Systematic biases caused by other characteristics
Table 4.12: The BSSI scales showed strong invariance over sex, indicating no systematic bias
across male and female adolescents.
Invariance over sex (male/female) (CFI)
Scale Equiv.
structures
Weak in-
variance
Change in
fit (weak)
Strong in-
variance
Change
in fit (
strong)
SA 0.998 0.997 -0.001 0.997 0
AEB 0.974 0.969 -0.005 0.96 -0.009
PI 0.996 0.996 0 0.995 0
Table 4.12
Results of measurement invariance testing over sex are shown in Table 4.12. The models fit
to the 5-category data did not converge for the AEB scale due to very low numbers of item
endorsements. I therefore reported results from 3-category data only. All scales showed weak
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and strong measurement invariance, supporting the use of sum scores to compare males and
females on this instrument.
4.5 Summary
Thorough analysis of the measurement properties of two instruments measuring psychotic phe-
nomena, the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) and the Brief Schizotypal Symptoms
Inventory (BSSI), revealed strengths and weaknesses of each instrument.
4.5.1 SPQ
The dominant three-factor and four-factor structures of the SPQ in the literature are likely to be
artefacts of the subscale constructions. Some subscales of the SPQ are unlikely to be measuring
distinct constructs, particularly: Ideas of Reference (IoR) and Suspiciousness (Sus), Constricted
Affect (CA) and No Close Friends (NCF), and Magical Thinking (MT) and Unusual Perceptual
Experiences (UPE). These similarities may underlie why there are inconsistent findings regarding
the factorial structure of the SPQ. In Raine’s 3-factor model IoR, Sus, MT and UPE all load
on to a ‘Cognitive-Perceptual’ factor. In the major challenger to this structure, the four-factor
model of Stefanis et al. (2004), IoR and Sus load on to a specific Paranoia factor. Fluctuations
and variable measurement error across samples may lead to the correlations between IoR and
Sus items and between MT and UPE items being attenuated or exaggerated, which may lead to
better or worse fit for a single latent factor constructed from all of them.
The factorial structure I identified is very similar to that of Watson et al. (2008), in that closely
related pairs of SPQ subscales largely merged into larger scales. In that study, a 5-factor model
won overall but a 6-factor model also fit the data well, with the difference being the division of an
‘Eccentricity/Oddity’ factor into odd speech and odd behaviour, as was evident in the 6-factor
model I identified. Watson interpreted their findings in terms of the dimensions of schizotypal
personality disorder. However, the high correlations between SPQ scales and the Chapman
schizotypy scales (Wuthrich and Bates, 2006), which are conceptually closer to Meehl’s (Meehl,
1962) model of schizotypy, and the fact that these results were obtained in the general population,
supports a broader interpretation. To what extent the factors identified are specifically associated
with positive psychotic experiences is a question of further research. For example, asociality (or
social anhedonia, as Watson et al. (2008) described their factor comprising No Close Friends and
Constricted Affect), is far from limited to those with psychotic experiences and social difficulties
feature in most, if not all, psychiatric disorders. Similar phenomena, like social difficulties and
social anxiety, are measured across research into different psychiatric domains, and the tendency
for ‘working in silos’ means specificity and ‘transdiagnosticity’ have rarely been investigated.
In the general population, this is likely to be particularly important, as the early stages of
psychopathology may present as general and nonspecific symptoms (Stochl et al., 2015), before
crystallising into more recognisable disorders at greater severity (McGorry et al., 2014).
Practically, these results provide a set of 6 interpretable scales of the SPQ that are largely uni-
dimensional, have high internal consistency, have reasonable measurement precision over the full
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range of the systems being measured (particularly the Asociality (Aso), Anomalous Experiences
& Beliefs (AEB) and Paranoid Ideation (PI) scales), can be used as sum scores, are equally able
to measure adolescents and young adults and, for Aso, AEB and PI, are also strongly invariant
over sex. These results support little advantage in using the 9 subscales of the SPQ and strongly
question the validity of the three-factor and four-factor models that are often considered to be
the basic structure of schizotypy (Kwapil and Barrantes-Vidal, 2015).
4.5.2 BSSI
Beyond a single redundant pair of items, the BSSI demonstrated few psychometric weaknesses.
The three-factor model, comprising Social Anxiety, Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs and Para-
noid Ideation fit the data well, whether the original 5 response categories were used or the severe
categories were collapsed due to low endorsement. When used as a 5-category instrument, it pro-
vides high measurement precision even up to severe levels of the systems measured and can be
used as a sum score. The BSSI scales are largely unidimensional, have high internal consistency
and are strongly invariant over sex.
However, large numbers of rarely endorsed categories can cause some methods, like latent variable
modelling, to fail or be unreliable. I therefore recommend that sum scores on the BSSI be
calculated from the 5-category data, but latent variable modelling or similar analyses where rarely
endorsed levels are problematic should consider collapsing response categories. The information
loss from collapsing categories was minimal for Anomalous Experiences and Beliefs, though
slightly more for Social Anxiety and Paranoid Ideation.
4.5.3 General summary
Both instruments showed, with some revision, to give adequate measurements of psychotic phe-
nomena. However, the extents to which these phenomena are related to definite psychotic expe-
riences (PEs) and to more general distress, depressive symptoms or anxious symptoms remains
unclear. This work supports that both instruments can be taken forward in revised forms for
future empirical work.
4.5.4 Strengths & limitations
This study was strengthened by use of large, representative or near-representative cohorts of
young people, rigorous psychometric assessment, generation and validation of models in a split
sample (for the SPQ) and near-replication of model structures in the literature. A major lim-
itation, shared with the theory of schizotypy generally, is the lack of external validation that
the associations between so-called ‘schizotypal’ traits are more associated with one another than
traits that are not schizotypal, like depressive symptoms, general anxiety or obsessive symp-
toms.
The results of this study will be discussed in greater detail at the end of the next chapter in a
broader consideration of the measurement of PEs.
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Chapter 5
Self-report and interview instruments
measure overlapping but
partially-distinct severity ranges of the
same psychotic phenomena in
adolescents
Abstract
Psychotic experiences (PEs) can be measured by self-report instruments or interview in-
struments, where the veracity of the PEs is externally assessed. These instruments tend
to be developed and applied in different fields; self-report instruments through schizotypy
and individual differences frameworks and interview instruments through clinically-oriented
psychosis-risk research. It is not known whether self-report and interview instruments mea-
sure the same underlying phenomena and whether they measure PEs of the same or different
severity/intensity. In this chapter, I used data from a representative cohort of 1054 17-
year-olds to compare self-report and interview measurements of PEs. ‘Verified’ (interview-
assessed) PEs had a lifetime prevalence of 12.6%. Combining two dimensions of self-report
PEs in the past two weeks (AEB: anomalous experiences and beliefs; PI: Paranoid Ideation)
improved criterion validity of predicting lifetime verified PEs but some people with past ver-
ified PEs had no current self-report PEs. Comparison of latent variable modelling showed
that a common underlying factor underlies both self-report AEB and PI and verified PEs,
explaining 77.5% of the total variance. In comparison, two correlated factors best explain
self-report social anxiety and verified PEs. Item response theory analysis showed that inter-
view items measured PEs of high severity, but that self-report items could measure PEs of
similar severity and also measured PEs of far lower severity. These results indicate that self-
report and interview instruments measure partly-overlapping severity ranges of a common
underlying distribution and support the validity of self-report measurements.
89
5.1 Research Questions
• Do instruments designed to measure different theoretical conceptualisations of PEs measure
the same underlying phenomena in young people?
• If so, do they measure the same or distinct severity ranges of PEs?
5.2 Introduction
PEs are measured by a large number of different instruments, often designed to measure subtly
different theoretical conceptualisations of them. While the details of these theories and the precise
measurements vary across instruments, medium to high correlations are often observed between
them (Peters et al., 2004; Kwapil et al., 2008; Compton et al., 2009; Kline et al., 2012; Cicero et
al., 2014), raising the possibility that they may largely be measuring the same thing.
A crucial difference between families of instruments is between ‘verified’ instruments that use an
assessor’s judgment and/or a set of criteria to verify whether a reported phenomenon should be
classified as a psychotic or psychotic-like experience, and ‘self-report’ instruments that accept
a person’s response without verification. The former are predominantly interview instruments,
while the latter are predominantly questionnaires. Differences in measurement type, study de-
signs and study cohorts account for half of the heterogeneity in rates of psychotic phenomena in
the general population (Linscott and Os, 2010). In particular, self-report assessment is associated
with higher rates of psychotic phenomena than verified assessment.
Verified and self-report instruments might be considered as arising from different traditions;
verified instruments are descended from clinical practise while self-report instruments are more
closely related to personality research. These traditions take different approaches to ensure the
quality of their measurements. Verified instruments rely on more detailed questioning, expertise
of another person or group of people and a set of criteria that allow standardization of diverse
phenomena. Given appropriate instrument properties and implementation, one could argue that
verified instruments should measure PEs with negligible measurement error.
Many self-report instruments rely on using a set of items, like statements or questions, and model
the covariance between them as if it were explained by an unobservable or ‘latent’ variable, such
as ‘cognitive-perceptual schizotypy’ (Raine et al., 1994). This latent variable explains some of the
variance in the measured responses, though some residual variance is attributed to measurement
error. It is accepted (and explicitly modelled, in latent variable modelling) that every item is
measured with error. This error often makes single items unreliable. Item responses on self-report
instruments are usually summed for an instrument/scale, generating a total score that provides
a continuous estimate of the latent variable. Sometimes, self-report items are used in isolation,
particularly in screening instruments. Here, the aim is often to establish a quick and reliable way
to predict or rule out psychotic phenomena that could be confirmed or disconfirmed with a verified
instrument. There is evidence that self-report psychotic phenomena predict verified psychotic
phenomena, though a large number of self-report experiences fail to meet verification criteria
(estimates of proportion of non-verification include 7% (van Os et al., 2001), 61% (Kelleher et
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al., 2011) and 64% (van Nierop et al., 2012).
However, accumulating evidence shows that self-report PEs that fail to meet verification criteria
are still associated with increased risk of psychotic disorder (Bak et al., 2003.; Poulton et al.,
2000), as well as psychopathology and exposure to risk factors (van Nierop et al., 2012). This
suggests that verification may discard valuable information in some cases and the border between
‘psychotic’ and ‘non-psychotic’ may be more nuanced than the boundary imposed by interview
measurements.
Different instrument types may therefore be measuring common psychotic phenomena, but mea-
suring different severity ranges with varying precision. In this chapter, I set out to test whether
a self-report questionnaire of state psychotic phenomena and a verified interview instrument of
lifetime PEs measured the same thing.
In the first set of analyses, I investigated the characteristics of PEs in this cohort as measured by
a verified interview instrument. In the second set, I tested whether and to what extent self-report
psychotic phenomena and verified PEs measure a common factor using latent variable modelling.
As a control, I tested whether a single factor also explained combined interview items on PEs
and self-report measurements of social anxiety. Then, were verified and self-report items shown
to measure a common psychosis factor, I tested whether they measured overlapping or distinct
severity ranges.
I predicted that a single underlying factor would explain most of the variance in interview and
self-report PE items but that two correlated factors would explain combined PE and social
anxiety items. I predicted interview items would measure a more severe range of PEs that self-
report items would not measure well, which could produce ‘ceiling effects’ when self-report items
are used alone. Similarly, I predicted interview items would not measure variance in less severe
psychosis-proneness, which could be valuable in some studies as a predictor of future health and
when studying underlying cognitive/brain mechanisms of psychosis.
5.3 Methods
5.3.1 Instruments
The Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory
Self-report PEs were measured using the Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory (Hodgekins et
al., 2012) (BSSI). For detailed information and analysis of the measurement properties of the
BSSI, see Chapter 1. The Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory (BSSI) is a 20-item self-report
instrument measuring psychotic phenomena in the last two weeks. It measures three domains:
Anomalous Experiences and Beliefs (AEB), comprising perceptual abnormalities and magical
thinking (8 items); Paranoid Ideation (PI), comprising suspiciousness and ideas of reference (6
items, of which one is redundant); and Social Anxiety (SA, 8 items). One item from PI is
redundant with another and was removed.
Questions were structured as a set of statements or questions. Participants indicated how often
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that statement applied to them in the last two weeks on a 5-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occasion-
ally’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’ and ‘All the time’. SSI scales are likely to be unidimensional (ωH: SA
= 0.65, AEB = 0.71, PI = 0.88) and have high internal consistency (ωT: SA = 0.95, AEB =
0.93, PI = 0.93) (Revelle and Zinbarg, 2009).
Due to low endorsement of some categories, in analyses using latent variable modelling, re-
sponses were collapsed into a 3-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occasionally’, ‘Sometimes/Often/All
the time’). Collapsing these high-severity responses loses some measurement precision at the
more severe ranges of the traits, more so for PI and SA than AEB, but is necessary for model
convergence.
Sum scores calculated form 5-category data may preserve this information, so in all analyses
other than latent variable modelling, sum scores were calculated from the original response
categories.
The Psychotic-Like Symptoms Interview
A modified version of the Psychotic-Like Symptoms Interview (Horwood et al., 2008) (PLIKSi),
was administered to participants in schools, mostly during free periods. Due to time constraints,
the initial opening questions, designed to put participants at ease, were omitted. In addition
to the 12 core PEs, it measured 5 additional types. The types of PEs measured were audi-
tory hallucinations, visual hallucinations, hallucinations not-otherwise-specified, derealisation,
depersonalisation, bodily distortion, body dysmorphia, delusions of being spied on, delusions of
persecution, delusions of thoughts being read, delusions of reference, delusions of control, delu-
sions of grandiosity, delusions not-otherwise-specified, thought broadcasting, thought insertion
and thought withdrawal.
Each PE type occurring over the lifetime was initially probed using a base question, then probed
further to verify whether the experience was a definite PE, a possible PE or not a PE. Possible
PEs were discussed at consensus meetings with a consultant psychiatrist (P.B. Jones) in an
attempt to assign them to either definite or no PEs.
When participants endorsed a base question, further information was then acquired on the age
of onset of the PE, its persistence (single experience, weeks, months, or a year or more), whether
they were always or sometimes attributable to other factors like sleep, illness or substance use
and whether they occurred in the past year.
In the first part of this chapter, I report the results of PLIKSi assessments in this population.
For the remaining sets of analyses, I grouped lifetime PEs into hallucinations (visual, auditory,
not-otherwise-specified), delusions (persecution, being spied on, mind-reading, control, reference,
grandiosity and other unspecified delusions) and ‘anomalous experiences’ (thought broadcasting,
thought insertion, thought withdrawal, body dysmorphia, bodily distortion, depersonalisation,
derealisation) and also used composite variables of any lifetime PEs and any PEs definitely
occurring in the past year.
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5.3.2 Data
Data came from the ROOTS cohort (Lewis et al., 2016). All data were collected at the third
time point, when participants were aged 17. For further information on ROOTS, see Methodol-
ogy.
5.3.3 Analysis Set 1: PEs in the ROOTS cohort
I calculated the prevalence and persistence of lifetime and past-year PEs in any modality and
for specific hallucinations, delusions or anomalous experiences. I calculated the occurrence of
multiple PEs, persistence of PEs across modalities, the age of onset of PEs and the relationships
between age of onset and persistence.
5.3.4 Analysis Set 2: Analysis of underlying latent variables
Latent variable model comparison
I used latent variable modelling to test to what extent the different instruments are measuring
a common psychosis factor. I performed model comparison of four latent variable structures
(Figure 5.1) fit to the data from combined instruments, firstly for PLIKSi, AEB and PI items
and secondly, as a control, for PLIKSI and SA items.
The models structures are:
• A unidimensional model
• A correlated-factors model (one factor per instrument/subscale)
• An uncorrelated-factors model (one factor per instrument/subscale)
• A bifactor model (one general factor explaining some variance in all items and specific
factors for residual variance in instruments/subscales)
I fit these models using a robust full-information Maximum Likelihood estimator (MLR), es-
timating partially incomplete missing data patterns using maximum likelihood. I compared
models on log-likelihood-based fit indices that trade-off model fit with model parsimony (AIC,
BIC and SABIC). The model with the lowest values was the winner. If a unidimensional or
bifactor model fit the data best, I re-estimated that model with a robust weighted-least-squares
(WLSMV) estimator. In the previous chapter, I fit WLSMV models to imputed datasets to
account for missing data. In this chapter, I fit WLSMV-estimated models only to complete-cases
data for three reasons. Firstly, analyses with many imputed datasets are computationally de-
manding. Secondly, the results of complete cases and imputed analyses in Chapter 4 were very
similar, suggesting that bias due to using only complete-cases may be low. Finally, the item
response theory methods I used to estimate item information distributions were only supported
for complete-cases data in R at time of analysis.
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Figure 5.1: Family of model structures compared
Figure 5.1: Diagrams of latent variable model structures. To investigate whether self-report
and interview instruments measured the same underlying PEs or distinct constructs, I com-
pared a model with a single factor, two uncorrelated factors, two correlated factors or a bifactor
model with a general factor explaining common variance and specific factors explaining residual
instrument-specific variance.
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To what extent do self-report and verified items measure a common psychosis fac-
tor?
Even were a bifactor model to outperform the other models, it was still possible that the general
factor would not explain a large proportion of the variance. I calculated ωH, the proportion of
variance explained by the general factor. I also approximated ωT, the variance in the test that
is attributable to all meaningful (non-noise) sources of variance, and variance explained by each
specific factor and variance attributable to noise/error. For further details on ω statistics, see
Chapter 4.
For factor models estimated from ordered categorical items, calculating ω is non-trivial due to
the complexity introduced by having item thresholds summarising continuous distributions. I
calculated ωH, a specific type of ω coefficient, for the general factor. This provided a conservative
but more appropriate approximation of the variance attributable to a single factor. The concept
is identical to that of ω as described in Chapter 4, but the decimator changes to give a more con-
servative estimate (using the observed variance-covariance matrix, instead of the model-implied
variance-covariance matrix, which gives a more conservative estimate because the model assumes
perfect fit). I provided 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for ωH.
Measuring different levels of psychosis severity (I): item threshold comparison
The WLSMV-estimated model allowed the calculation of item thresholds, which are the val-
ues of severity of the latent variable at which different categorical responses are emitted e.g.
‘Hallucinations present’ versus ‘Hallucinations absent’.
I compared thresholds for interview items and for each level of the self-report items. If the
locations of the thresholds for interview items exceeded all thresholds for self-report items, it
would have suggested they measure a more severe range of the latent trait that is not measured
by self-report items. Similarly, if self-report items had lower thresholds than all interview items,
it would have suggested they more extensively measured lower-severity psychosis.
Measuring different levels of psychosis severity (II): test information distributions
If a unidimensional or bifactor model fit the data best, I planned to fit two-parameter logistic
(2PL) item response theory (IRT) models using an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm.
This allowed the estimation of ‘information’ contributed per item. The standard error of mea-
surement is inversely proportional to the square root of information at a given severity, so I
could quantify measurement precision across any severity range. Information is additive, so total
information distribution for self-report and verified items can be calculated and compared. If an
information distribution spans a severity range not covered by another, it shows that there are
differences in the severities of psychosis-proneness that the instruments are capable of measur-
ing.
IRT models traditionally assume a normal distribution of the latent trait. This is unlikely to
be the case for psychosis-proneness, given evidence of skewed trait distributions. Therefore, I
estimated IRT solutions using both the assumption of a Gaussian trait distribution and using an
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‘empirical histogram’ method, that constructs priors on the distribution of the latent trait based
on item scores.
5.3.5 Implementation
All analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2016), augmented by packages lavaan (Rosseel,
2012), semTools (semTools Contributors, 2016), mirt (Chalmers, 2012) and psych (Revelle,
2014).
5.3.6 Supplementary analysis: Concurrent associations between self-report
PEs and depressive symptoms
Interview-verified PEs can be modelled as a marker of severe common mental distress. In addition
to investigating whether a common factor explained interview-verified and self-report PEs, I
tested the concurrent validity of self-report PEs by testing whether they also index severe common
mental distress in a replication of the study by Stochl et al. (2013), in both NSPN and ROOTS.
For full details, see Appendix C.
5.4 Results
Of the 1238 participants who entered the study, 1074 took part at the third time point. 1056
participants completed the PLIKSi. 966 participants completed the BSSI.For discussion of miss-
ing data on the BSSI and investigations to support missing-at-random (MAR) assumptions, see
Chapter 4.
914 participants had complete data on all BSSI scales and the PLIKSi.
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Table 5.1: Prevalence and persistence of interview-verified PEs in ROOTS
Variable N %
Any PEs (Including Attributions) 156 14.8
Any PEs 133 12.6
Any Definite PEs In Past Year 84 8
Definite/Possible PEs In Past Year 94 8.9
Any Transient PEs 26 2.5
Any PEs Persisting For Weeks/Months 32 3
Any PEs Persisting For At Least 1 year 68 6.4
Any PEs Persisting For Years, Including Definite Last Year 52 4.9
Any PEs Persisting For Years, Including Definite/Possible Last Year 57 5.4
Single PE Type 88 8.3
Multiple PE Types 45 4.3
Grouped Hallucinations 74 7
Grouped Delusions 68 6.4
Grouped Anomalous Experiences 28 2.7
Table 5.1: For Ecc, SA and OS, strong invariance was achieved after allowing the thresholds for
one item to differ across groups, suggesting that systematic biases due to sex may be small.
5.4.1 Analysis Set 1: PEs in the ROOTS Cohort
Prevalence of lifetime and past-year PEs in adolescents
Table 5.2: Endorsement of specific PEs in ROOTS
None Possible Definite
Psychotic Experience N % N % N %
Auditory Hallucinations 1022 96.8 2 0.2 32 3
Visual Hallucinations 1007 95.4 2 0.2 46 4.4
Derealisation 1045 99 0 0 10 0.9
Depersonalisation 1043 98.8 1 0.1 12 1.1
Bodily Distortion 1051 99.5 0 0 5 0.5
Body Dysmorphia 1056 100 0 0 0 0
Perceptual Anomalies 1041 98.6 0 0 15 1.4
Delusions Of Being Spied On 1007 95.4 0 0 49 4.6
Delusions Of Persecution 1052 99.6 1 0.1 2 0.2
Delusions of Thoughts Being Read 1048 99.2 0 0 7 0.7
Delusions Of Reference 1045 99 2 0.2 8 0.8
Delusions Of Control 1052 99.6 0 0 3 0.3
Delusions Of Grandiosity 1048 99.2 0 0 7 0.7
Other Delusions 1053 99.7 0 0 2 0.2
Thought Broadcasting 1051 99.5 1 0.1 3 0.3
Thought Insertion 1053 99.7 0 0 2 0.2
Thought Withdrawal 1054 99.8 0 0 1 0.1
Table 5.2: Prevalences of specific PEs, including those that were definitely absent, possibly
present and definitely present.
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1056 adolescents completed the PLIKSi at age 17 (see Table 5.1). Of these, 156 (14.8%) had
one or more lifetime PEs. 6 (0.6%) further adolescents had possible lifetime PEs only. PEs were
always attributable to sleep, illness or drugs in 23 participants, leaving 133 participants (12.6%)
with definite, unattributable PEs.
236 definite individual lifetime PEs and 9 possible individual lifetime PEs were endorsed overall.
Due to the low number of possible PEs, I included only definite PEs in further analyses. Of the
236 PEs, 32 always had an attribution to sleep, illness or drugs (Sleep: 14, Drugs: 12, Illness:
6), leaving 204 unattributable definite lifetime PEs.
84 adolescents (8.0%) definitely experienced a combined total of 117 individual PEs in the past
year. Including definite lifetime PEs that possibly occurred in the past year means 94 adolescents
experienced a combined total of 133 definite lifetime PEs in the past year.
Persistence of lifetime and past-year PEs
Most lifetime PEs were ones that persisted for at least a year. Data on PE persistence over the
lifetime was available for 169 of the 204 definite, unattributable lifetime PEs. 28 (16.6%) were
single experiences, 43 (25.4%) had persisted for weeks or months and 98 (58.0%) had persisted
for at least one year. Of the full sample, 26 (2.5%) experienced one or more transient, single-
occurrence PEs, 32 (3%) had one or more PEs that lasted for weeks/months and 68 (6.4%) had
one or more PEs that persisted for at least a year.
Similarly, most PEs that occurred in the last year at age 17 were ones that had occurred for at
least one year, though information was not available on how frequent they had been over that
period. Data on the persistence was available for 107 of the 117 lifetime PEs definitely occurring
in the past year. 10 (9.3%) were single occurrences, 27 (25.2%) lasted for weeks/months and
70 (65.4%) had persisted for at least one year. Data on the persistence was available for 118
of the 133 lifetime PEs definitely or possibly occurring in the past year. 13 (11.0%) were single
occurrences, 28 (23.7%) lasted for weeks/months and 77 (65.3%) had persisted for at least one
year.
Modalities of PEs
See Table 5.1 for prevalence of definite PEs grouped into modalities and Table 5.2 for possible
and definite occurrences of individual types of PEs.
Lifetime hallucinations (N individual PEs = 93, 45.6% of lifetime PEs) and lifetime delusions
(N individual PEs = 78, 38.2% of lifetime PEs) were more common than lifetime anomalous
experiences (N individual PEs = 33, 16.2% of lifetime PEs).
Similarly, past-year hallucinations (N individual PEs = 47, 40.2% of past-year PEs) and delusions
(N individual PEs = 51, 43.6% of past-year PEs) were more common than anomalous experiences
(N individual PEs = 19, 16.2% of past-year PEs).
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Occurrence of multiple PEs
Table 5.3: Prevalence of multiple co-occurring PEs.
Number
of PEs
N % of full
sample
% of ado-
lescents
with PEs
0 920 87.1 NA
1 88 8.3 66.2
2 27 2.6 20.3
3 12 1.1 9
4 4 0.4 3
5 2 0.2 1.5
Some adolescents had multiple individual (ungrouped) PEs (see Table 5.3). Two-thirds of ado-
lescents (66.2%) who experienced PEs experienced a single type, though some experienced up to
5 individual PEs (ungrouped).
PEs in one modality-group increased the likelihood of PEs in other modality-groups. A series of
univariate logistic regressions indicated that the odds of hallucinations increased with experience
of delusions (OR = 7.70, 95% CI = 4.08 – 14.11) and with anomalous experiences (OR = 6.41,
2.41 - 15.35). Odds of delusions increased with hallucinations (OR = 7.70, 4.08 – 14.11) and
with anomalous experiences (OR = 17.38, 7.47 – 40.21). Odds ratios and confidence intervals
for regressions with anomalous experiences as the outcome variable are equal to those in which
it is a predictor variable for delusions/hallucinations.
Persistence of lifetime PEs across modalities
PEs grouped into different modalities had different patterns of durations. In all modalities,
most PEs occurred for at least one year (Hallucinations: 27.8% = Single Experience, 17.7% =
Weeks/Months, 54.4% = > 1 year; Delusions: 5.1% = Single Experience, 28.8% =Weeks/Months,
66.1% = > 1 year; Anomalous Experiences: 9.7% = Single Experience, 38.7% = Weeks/Months,
51.6% = > 1 year). Most single-experience PEs were hallucinations (78.6% of all single experi-
ences).
Age of onset of PEs
Age of onset of PEs was available for 178 of the 204 definite lifetime PEs. Onsets were distributed
across development, though were more common in adolescence (Figure 5.2). When PEs were
reported to occur over the entire lifetime or since birth, an onset of 0 was recorded. Due to
the probable unreliability of retrospective reporting from very early life, nonparametric statistics
were used to avoid influence of extreme values and distributional assumptions.
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Figure 5.2: Age of onset of PEs
Figure 5.2: Age of onset of any PEs and PEs grouped into hallucinations, delusions and anoma-
lous experiences. The majority of PEs had their onsets in adolescence, though some PEs occurred
for as long as the participant could remember, indicated by an onset of 0 years.
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Table 5.4: Results of comparison of different model structures fit to combined interview and
self-report PEs
Model AIC BIC SABIC
Unidimensional 18353.31 18591.68 18439.23
Three Correlated Factors 17438.30 17691.57 17529.59
Three Uncorrelated Factors 17751.22 17989.59 17837.13
Bifactor A 17081.01 17398.83 17195.56
Bifactor B 17239.46 17557.28 17354.01
Table 5.4: Results of model comparison of competing structures fit to self-report and interview
PEs data using fit indices that trade-off model fit with model parsimony. Lower values indicate
better fit. The winning model was Bifactor B with a specific factor for each instrument, followed
by Bifactor A with a specific factor for PLIKSi items and one for all BSSI items.
The median age of onset (median absolute deviation) for all PEs was 14.0 (3.0). Median onsets
for hallucinations, delusions and anomalous experiences were 14.5 (2.2), 14.0 (3.0) and 15 (1.5),
respectively. Neither medians nor histograms suggested difference in age of onset by specific
modality, confirmed by non-significant one-way Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA (chiH = 0.27, df = 2, p
= 0.87).
5.4.2 Analysis Set 2: Analysis of underlying latent variables
Latent variable model comparison: AEB, PI & PEs
Table 5.4 shows the fit indices from full-information MLRmodels of AEB, PI and PEs items.
AIC, BIC and SABIC favoured the model with a general factor and an orthogonal specific factor
for each item type (verified, self-report AEB and self-report PI). However, when I re-estimated
this model with a WLSMV estimator, the variances of one of the BSSI-PI items was negative.
This tends to occur when a model is mis-specified, such as an item loading on too many indicators
and leaving no residual variance, or when one of the indicators is overly influential. The negative
variance persisted when re-estimating the model, so it is unlikely to be due to sampling error.
This negative variance made the results of this model inadmissible.
The next winning model was the bifactor model with two specific factors, one explaining covari-
ance among verified interview items and one explaining variance in all self-report items.
When estimated with a WLSMV estimator, there were no negative variances and the model
fit was excellent (N = 921, CFI = 0.987, TLI = 0.982, RMSEA = 0.035). The only difference
between the best and second-best fitting models was the composition of specific factors, which
are of little interest here.
Parameter estimates of the winning WLSMV-estimated bifactor model are given in Appendix B.
The loadings of the interview items on their specific factor were non-significant, indicating that
there is not much information remaining in these items after accounting for the general factor.
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Table 5.5: Results of comparison of different model structures fit to combined interview and
self-report PEs
Model AIC BIC SABIC
Unidimensional 9362.08 9496.16 9410.40
Two Correlated Factors 9227.73 9366.78 9277.84
Two Uncorrelated Factors 9253.76 9387.84 9302.08
Bifactor 9197.29 9376.07 9261.73
Table 5.5: Results of model comparison of competing structures fit to interview-verified PEs and
self-report social anxiety using fit indices that trade-off model fit with model parsimony. Lower
values indicate better fit. The winning model was the Bifactor model, followed by two correlated
factors.
Similarly, 5 of the 13 loadings of the self-report items on their specific factor were non-significant.
However, loadings of some items were significant. This indicates that these items share some
significant covariance that is orthogonal to that explained by the general factor.
The MLR-estimated winning bifactor model fit the data well (CFI = 0.940, TLI = 0.918, RMSEA
= 0.04). I therefore used this model to calculate approximate ω statistics.
Approximate ω statistics indicated that a large amount of variance was explained by the general
factor. For the general factor, ωH indicated that 77.5% of the variance in the items was explained
by the general factor. The specific factors explained less of the variance; ω for the verified-item
specific factor was 1.7%, supporting that there is little information remaining in these items. ω
for the self-report item specific factor was 7.9%, reflecting that this factor still captures some
variance in the self-report items.
A conservative estimate of ωT was 87.1%, suggesting good internal consistency. Measurement
error accounted for 12.9% of the variance.
ωH estimated for the general factor from the WLSMV model, properly adjusted for categorical
items, was 89.6%, with bootstrap 95% confidence intervals of 81.4% – 92.0%. This strongly
supports a common psychosis factor underlying self-report and verified items.
Latent variable model comparison: SA & PEs
Table 5.5 shows the results of MLR-estimated model comparison. BIC favoured the two-
correlated-factors model over the bifactor model, while AIC and SABIC favoured the bifac-
tor model. However, the bifactor model did not converge when fit to categorical data with a
WLSMV estimator, while the WLSMV-estimated two-correlated-factors model converged and
showed excellent fit (CFI = 0.999, TLI = 0.998, RMSEA = 0.027). This supports specificity of
the associations between AEB, PI and interview-verified PEs.
102
Figure 5.3: Thresholds estimated from bifactor model of combined self-report and
interview PEs items
Figure 5.3: Thresholds (level of the latent variable at which a different categorical response is
emitted) for interview and self-report items. Interview items had high thresholds but fell within
the range of the self-report thresholds. Some self-report items had far lower thresholds, extending
measurement to lower-severity psychotic phenomena.
Measuring different levels of psychosis severity (I): item threshold comparison
I extracted the item thresholds estimated from this bifactor model (Figure 5.3). The thresholds
for verified interview items were high, with anomalous experiences ranking joint second-highest
with the ‘Sometimes/Mostly/Always’ threshold for “Have you seen things invisible to other peo-
ple?”, delusions ranking fifth highest and hallucinations ranking sixth highest.
However, these thresholds were all within the range of the self-report thresholds. Furthermore,
the lowest self-report threshold (from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Occasionally’ for item “I am sure I am being
talked about behind my back”) was 1.85 standard deviations of the latent trait below the lowest
verified item threshold.This suggests that the self-report items measure a range of psychosis
severity from a similar upper limit to the verified interview items down to a far less-severe lower
limit.
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Figure 5.4: Information distributions for self-report and interview items
Figure 5.4: Information distributions were estimated using parametric item response theory
analyses with two-parameter logistic curves. The curves quantify where along the distribution
of a latent trait an item contributes information and thus is able to measure PEs. Interview
items uniquely measure a slightly more severe range of PEs than self-report items but self-report
items uniquely measure far less severe range of psychotic phenomena. The distributions were
very similar for both traits assumed to have a normal distribution and empirically-estimated
distributions.
Measuring different levels of psychosis severity (II): test information distributions
Two unidimensional IRT models were fit to all verified and self-report items, as an approximation
of the general factor, one with the conventional assumption of a normally distributed latent trait
and the other using a histogram method to construct a prior distribution of the latent trait
empirically. Information distributions across the latent trait range were calculated for each item
and summed for self-report and interview items separately.
Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the AUC values of the item information distributions showed that
self-report items contributed more information, on average, than verified items (Normal trait
distribution: self-report mean AUC = 2.68 & SD = 0.91, verified mean AUC = 1.27 & SD =
0.33, W = 38, p = 0.007; empirical trait distribution: self-report mean AUC = 1.94 & SD =
0.67, verified mean AUC = 0.88 & SD = 0.30, W = 38, p = 0.007). Examining information
distributions (Figure 5.4), it is evident in both solutions that verified items do contribute infor-
mation to the higher severity range of the latent trait and slightly extend that range further than
the self-report items.
However, the self-report items measure a broader range of severities at lower levels that are
not measured by verified items at all. This is consistent with the item thresholds estimated
from latent variable modelling. Furthermore, the verified items uniquely measure a slightly more
severe range.
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5.4.3 Supplementary results: Concurrent associations between self-report
PEs and depressive symptoms
In both cohorts, I replicated the finding that a common distress factor explained variance in both
PEs and classical depressive symptoms, with PEs measuring more severe distress (Appendix
C).
5.5 Summary
In a representative population sample, I found prevalence of PEs to be comparable to other stud-
ies, if slightly higher than meta-analytical estimates. The majority of PEs were not attributable
to sleep, drugs or illness and, contrary to expectations, were reported to have persisted for at
least one year. People often only experienced a single modality of PEs, but having PEs in one
or two modalities increase the odds of having them in another modality.
Most PEs reported at this age have their onsets in early-mid adolescence, with age of onset related
to persistence. Single experience or shorter duration PEs tend to have onset more recently than
persistent ones. Inference is complicated by retrospective reporting from a single measurement.
The relationship between earlier onset and persistence may be because more recent PEs have
not had time to persist for over one year; some of the PEs lasting for weeks/months at 17, with
median onset of 16, may become PEs that persist for years if allowed more time. However, it was
rare for adolescents with long-lasting PEs not to have at least possibly experienced PEs in the
past year, suggesting little evidence of persistent PEs early in adolescence that then subsided,
though recall may be biased against such experiences.
I then compared the measurement properties of unverified self-report and verified interview-
assessed psychotic phenomena in a large general population sample of adolescents. As predicted,
I found strong evidence for a common psychosis factor underlying self-report measurement of
anomalous experiences & beliefs (AEB), paranoid ideation (PI) and interview-verified hallucina-
tions, delusions and anomalous experiences. Contrary to predictions, most of the severity range
measured by interview-verified PEs was also measured by self-report items. Consistent with
predictions, interview items did measure severe psychosis-proneness and uniquely measured a
small, very severe range that was not measured by self-report items. Self-report items uniquely
measured a broad lower-severity range of the psychosis distribution.
5.5.1 Strengths and limitations
This study was strengthened by use of a large, representative cohorts of young people, use of
latent variable model comparison, specificity (with respect to social anxiety), careful handling
of missing data and thorough psychometric validation using multiple techniques. The study
was limited by the fact that the BSSI is an uncommonly-used instrument that only measures
PEs over the past two weeks and there being slightly more missing data on the BSSI than the
PLIKSi.
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Chapter 6
Discussion: The measurement of
psychotic experiences in the general
population
6.1 Summary of findings
I review the main findings, strengths and limitations of each study below, with reference to my
research questions. I then discuss the implications of these results for the measurement, dimen-
sionality and health implications of PEs and how I could build on these results by investigating
their aetiology and mechanisms.
6.1.1 General strengths and limitations
All studies were strengthened by use of large, representative or near-representative cohorts of
young people. All studies were limited by use of self-report instruments, though questions in
Chapter 2 and 3 related specifically to comparison of interview and self-report instruments and
replication of previous findings with interview measurements, respectively.
6.1.2 Question 1: Do existing theories of schizotypy account for dimensional-
ity of PEs and related traits in young people? How well can we measure
PEs with self-report instruments?
I began by investigating the measurement of PEs and personality characteristics traditionally
grouped together as ‘schizotypal’ traits. I identified the optimal latent dimensional structures of
two instruments measuring self-report PEs and schizotypal traits in adolescence. The optimal
structure was defined as whatever best traded-off fit to observed data with model parsimony and
reliability of measurement. The optimal structure of the Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory
(BSSI) (Hodgekins et al., 2012a) was similar to existing models, while a novel 6-factor struc-
ture of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991) outperformed all existing
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dimensional structures and improved measurement precision. This was similar to factorial struc-
tures identified using similar techniques in a smaller sample of undergraduates (Chmielewski
and Watson, 2008). The largest (in terms of numbers of items) and most relevant factors for
study, measuring asociality and interpersonal difficulties (Aso), paranoid ideation (PI) and non-
paranoid anomalous experiences and beliefs (AEB) showed strong measurement invariance over
age and sex. This lends strong support to a 6-factor model of schizotypal traits.
6.1.3 Question 2: Do instruments designed to measure different theoretical
conceptualisations of PEs measure the same underlying phenomena in
young people? If so, do they measure the same or distinct severity
ranges of PEs?
In Chapter 5, I showed that interview and self-report measurements of PEs measure a common
underlying factor. This was specific to anomalous experiences & beliefs and paranoid ideation;
two distinct factors explained pooled data on interview-verified PEs and self-report social anx-
iety. This lends support to a generalised approach to PEs, such as in the ‘extended psychosis
phenotype’ (van Os and Reininghaus, 2016) approach, and suggests that instruments arising
from different traditions are measuring a common underlying system. While this study was not
intended to address questions of the shape or taxonicity of the extended psychosis phenotype,
it indicates that variation in the severity of PEs in the general population can be satisfactorily
modelled as a continuous distribution (though it may truly be a series of discontinuous popu-
lations (Linscott & van Os, 2010)). It supports the synthesis of work from different domains
such as schizotypy and psychosis-risk populations, though clearly these findings would need to
be replicated for other instruments and populations.
These results also support the validity of self-report psychotic phenomena to measure the distri-
bution of PEs in the general population of young people. In particular, the finding that self-report
items are better at measuring lower severity psychosis-proneness, including around the popula-
tion mean, may have important implications for future empirical work. The full distribution of
intensity or severity of psychotic phenomena is poorly captured by interview instruments alone.
Combining self-report and interview measurements can provide finer-grained discrimination of
individuals by their levels of psychotic phenomena. This may be very relevant when attempting
to identify genetic (Xu et al., 2015) and environmental aetiological factors and cognitive or brain
mechanisms of psychotic phenomena.
This study was strengthened by use of latent variable model comparison, specificity (with respect
to social anxiety), careful handling of missing data and thorough psychometric validation using
a number of techniques. The study was limited by the fact that the BSSI is a fairly uncommon
instrument that only measures PEs over the past two weeks and there being slightly more missing
data on the BSSI than the PLIKSi.
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6.2 Discussion
Together, the results of Chapters 6 and 5 provide important information on how PEs are measured
in the general population and what measurements of PEs by traditional instruments reflect.
Compared to interviews, self-report instruments may extend the severity range measured towards
the less-severe end of the distribution. Importantly, the BSSI could still measure almost as severe
PEs as the PLIKSi, lending support to the use of this instrument and suggesting there is a
distribution of PEs in the general population, with phenotypic continuity between less and more
severe PEs.
A key question is whether phenotypic continuity of PEs arises from continuity in underlying
mechanisms in terms of information-processing and its neurobiological implementation. Mild
and more severe PEs share aetiological factors (Zavos et al., 2014), implying mechanistic con-
tinuity. However, this will remain an open question until it is tested directly by large-scale
computational and neurobiological phenotyping (Friston et al., 2014) across the breadth of the
psychosis distribution.
If lower-severity psychotic phenomena are phenotypically and mechanistically continuous with
more severe psychosis, research using psychosis-prone people in the general population could
generate predictions about clinical psychosis and aid in the search for biomarkers for psychotic
disorders. If the lower severity range are phenotypically continuous but mechanistically discon-
tinuous, it may enable classification of psychotic phenomena into likely clinical relevance based
on underlying mechanisms.
If we are to test whether the same mechanisms exist across the distribution of PEs and even across
clinical psychosis, we need to ensure we know what severity range we are measuring. Comparing
populations based solely on a binary interview measure, like those experiencing verified PEs
versus not, may be reliable and comparable to clinical measurement but it is blind to variability
at the lower-severity range that may be valuable in individual differences studies or stratified
sampling. PE-like phenomena that fall below the threshold on an interview measure are also
unlikely to be purely measurement error, but rather capture meaningful variability with potential
clinical relevance (van Nierop et al., 2012).
Similarly, measuring the lower severity range may allow us to identify the effects of risk and
protective factors, such as drug use or social support, on psychotic phenomena more sensitively
than comparing whether verified PEs are present or absent. However, further work is necessary
on the shape of the distribution of psychosis severity (and other related factors). If, for example,
an intervention reduces the severity of psychotic phenomena but is not able to move people over
a threshold or step in the distribution of risk or need for clinical care, its clinical value may be
limited.
The results of this study may explain why instrument type has such a large effect on estimates
of PE prevalence in the general population. Different instruments and items may all be mea-
suring the same underlying psychosis distribution(s), but with varying response thresholds that
define the mappings from ‘true’ levels of psychosis-proneness to observed measurements. Pool-
ing prevalence estimates from instruments with a wide range of threshold values will of course
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introduce huge variability. This does not fundamentally compromise self-report instruments, but
does require careful consideration of what severity of PEs they are really measuring. Similarly,
self-report items may have low positive-predictive value for PEs (Horwood et al., 2008) partly
because they have different response thresholds. Conversely, some self-report items are good
predictors of interview-verified PEs (Kelleher et al., 2011), which may in part arise because these
items have similar thresholds.
In these studies, I have discussed and mathematically modelled a distribution of psychotic phe-
nomena in the general population. However, ambiguity remains over what exactly is distributed
about a distributed psychosis phenotype (David, 2010; Lawrie et al., 2010). My results cannot
speak to the complex question of whether this is continuous with clinical psychosis (Lawrie, 2016)
and whether this distribution is specifically related to psychotic disorder versus nonpsychotic
disorders (Kounali et al., 2014). We can, however, attempt to interpret what phenomenologi-
cal properties make experiences or beliefs more or less ‘psychotic’. While I modelled a general
factor underlying various dimensions of PEs, various properties of PEs may exist as correlated
distributions, like their frequency, their persistence, their vividness or intrusiveness or the dis-
tress and impairment they cause. Some recent self-report instruments capture these properties
explicitly (Peters et al., 2004; Bell et al., 2006). Many older instruments, particularly those
arising from personality and individual differences research, capture these dimensions implicitly
by the phrasing of statements or questions. The latent factor estimated from agreement or dis-
agreement with these statements is really a model of item covariance and its meaning must be
interpreted from the statements and the relationships between them, captured by their loadings
and thresholds.
Using variously phrased statements and questions can make it difficult to rigorously define the
psychosis distribution. For example, item thresholds show that it takes a higher level on the
distribution to even ‘occasionally’ (first response threshold) respond that you see things invisible
to other people than it does to say that you ‘sometimes’, ‘mostly’ or ‘all of the time’ (second
response threshold) believe in clairvoyancy or think that people talk about you behind your back.
This is broadly consistent with an increasing aberrance of subjective experience from social or
cultural norms with interestingly reliable content between individuals, such as people reading
your thoughts or conspiring against you. The distribution estimated here has elements of how
malign or threatening the experiences are (e.g. thresholds model people talking about you, then
watching you, then ‘having it in for you’ as being progressively more ‘psychotic’), how frequent
they are (e.g. the more frequent thresholds are higher than the less frequent thresholds) and how
much conviction or personal experience you have of them (e.g. thresholds suggest believing in
mind-reading is far less ‘psychotic’ than reporting actual telepathic experiences). However, we
cannot separate these aspects, we do not know which of them are the most impairing and we could
not use this measurement to investigate if they have different mechanisms or aetiological factors.
Newer generations of psychometric instruments and careful study design may make it possible
to specifically define what exactly is distributed about psychosis and how those distributions
map onto computational and brain mechanisms and aetiological factors. Carefully specified
theories of what is distributed about psychosis and, critically, instruments that can reliably and
validly measure those distributions, will be essential for future research into psychotic experiences
occurring in and outside of psychotic disorders.
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For synthesis of psychiatric research that uses a great variety of instruments, studies such as
this are necessary to establish how measurements made by different instruments map onto an
underlying psychosis-proneness distribution and on to one another, establishing inter-instrument
reliability. Improving the precision of measurement of psychosis phenotypes will enable testing
of more sophisticated hypotheses and, hopefully, lead to better understanding of their underlying
mechanisms.
This is further complicated by my findings that some of the variance in PEs is shared with
depressive symptoms. The common distress factor is potentially troubling for empirical stud-
ies, particularly those that investigate paranoid ideation because some of the variance in sum
score measurements is non-specific variance in distress that will manifest as (at least) depressive
symptoms, anomalous experiences/beliefs and paranoid ideation. In Appendix C, I estimated
this proportion of non-specific variance to be 0.35-0.44 for anomalous experiences/beliefs and
0.88-0.91 for paranoid ideation. While I did not empirically test this, it is possible that the gen-
eral factor explaining shared variance in depressive symptoms and PEs would be highly related
to a general factor explaining, for example, shared variance in depressive symptoms and anxiety
(Brodbeck et al., 2011) or overlap in psychiatric diagnoses (Caspi et al., 2014). When a vari-
able like performance on a behavioural task is found to be associated with paranoid ideation or
unusual perceptions without testing associations with other symptom dimensions, it would not
be possible to ascertain whether the relationship is specific to psychotic phenomena or reflects
either a stronger relationship with a different, correlated symptom dimension or a relationship
with all overlapping symptom dimensions. When trying to uncover the mechanisms or aetiology
of a particular symptom dimension, these results emphasise that it is critical to either estimate
proportions of shared and unique variance using latent variable modelling or simultaneously in-
vestigate different symptom dimensions and look for specificity of relationships, i.e. mechanism
A is associated with symptom dimension X and not symptom dimension Y, with the association
between A and X being greater than the association between A and Y. The former method is
likely to be impractical due to requirements for large sample sizes but the latter method can
easily be implemented.
In terms of information-processing, PEs might index high levels of distress because extreme
negative affect or psychosocial stress shift the parameters of perceptual inference and belief up-
dating, in favour of aberrant inference of the causes of sensory data from prior expectations
(hallucinations/delusional appraisals), aberrant updating of internal models from prediction er-
rors (delusion formation) and overgeneralisation or overweighting of high-level beliefs to explain
low-level prediction errors (delusion persistence).
More generally, aberrant beliefs form a troubling part of most psychiatric disorders, such as
global negative beliefs about the self and the world that characterise depression (Friston et al.,
2014). The aberrant updating and use of internal models about the world may therefore be
a common computational mechanism that tends towards psychiatric disorder. Suggestions of
common psychopathology factors have been criticised by indicating that, whatever the validity
of current diagnostic systems, the same treatments, particularly psychopharmacological treat-
ments, do not work for all patients (Lawrie et al., 2010). For example, response to lithium is quite
different in someone diagnosed with a bipolar disorder as someone with nonaffective psychosis.
These criticisms are levelled at a model where the common psychopathology factor is the same
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at every level of explanation, which is unlikely. Rather, aberrant beliefs and aberrant inferences,
which might in extremis generate psychotic experiences, may be a point of convergence of many
disorders at the level of information processing. Those computational changes could be under-
pinned by divergent changes to the physical implementation of information-processing, hopefully
distinguishable by neurobiological investigation, and may be caused by divergent genetic and
environmental factors.
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Chapter 7
Psychotic experiences with and without
distress in two cohorts of adolescents
and young adults
Abstract
In this chapter, I investigated whether psychotic experiences (PEs) occurred with and
without distress and risk of mental disorders in the general population of adolescents and
young adults and what environmental factors differentiated PEs with and without distress.
Clusters of participants with self-report PEs and depressive symptoms (DS) were identified
using latent class analysis (LCA). The number of clusters were identified with the bootstrap
likelihood ratio test (BLRT) and AIC/BIC. Data came from two general population cohorts
(ROOTS: N = 1056, age 17; NSPN: N = 2388, age 14-25, split into 3 age bins, a: 14-16,
b: 17-19, c: 20-25). I compared clusters with distress and PEs (DPE), clusters that were
non-distressed with PEs (NDPE) and ‘reference’ clusters without distress or PEs. Lifetime
and current risk of common mental disorders and PEs were verified in ROOTS using inter-
view assessments. Mental health was verified in NSPN using self-report lifetime and current
help-seeking for any mental disorder. The environmental factors investigated were: cannabis
use, childhood adversity, recent social support from friends and family (both cohorts) and
schizotypal personality (NSPN). BLRT favoured 6 clusters in ROOTS and NSPN a & c and 5
clusters in NSPN b. 6-cluster models also performed well on AIC and BIC and were selected
for further analysis. The predicted clusters were identified with similar prevalences in each
LCA (Reference: prevalences = 62.8%, 50.8%, 45.6%, 49.8% of Cohorts 1 & 2a-c, respec-
tively; NDPE: prevalences = 9.4%, 15.3%, 7.5%, 13.1%; DPE: prevalences = 5%, 10%, 8.8%,
4.5%). DPE and NDPE clusters were equally likely to have non-paranoid unusual percep-
tions and beliefs (all samples) and interview-verified hallucinations and bizarre experiences
(ROOTS). DPE clusters had higher paranoid ideation (all samples) and interview-verified
delusions (ROOTS), compared to NDPE. DPE had increased lifetime and current risk of
mental disorders compared to reference and NDPE clusters (all samples). NDPE also had
increased lifetime mental disorders compared to reference in ROOTS & NSPN-c. Childhood
adversity and cannabis use were similarly associated with both PE clusters. Social support
from family and friends was far greater for NDPE than DPE; NDPE had similar social sup-
port to reference (all samples). DPE had more asocial schizotypal traits (NSPN). These
results show PEs occur with high distress and high risk of mental disorders in some young
people, but low distress and low/modest risk of mental disorders in others. PEs without dis-
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tress did not appear to simply be mild/attenuated PEs but tended not to feature paranoia
or delusions. Some environmental factors may predispose similarly to PEs with and without
distress, while social support and social functioning may be critical in determining health
trajectories in young people with PEs.
7.1 Research Questions
• Do PEs always co-occur with other symptoms of psychopathology in young people in the
general population or can they occur without symptoms of distress or functional impair-
ment?
• What factors differentiate between PEs with and without distress?
7.2 Introduction
Psychotic phenomena occurring in the general population are a risk-indicator for psychotic
(Fusar-Poli et al., 2013) and non-psychotic (Fusar-Poli et al., 2014a) illnesses. Interview-measured
psychotic experiences (PEs) and self-report depression-like and anxiety-like symptoms can be well
explained by a bifactor latent variable model, in which a general distress factor explains some
of the variance in all psychosis and distress items (Stochl et al., 2015). When examined using
item response theory analysis, psychotic experiences uniquely measure a more severe range of the
general distress factor, not measured by traditional symptoms of depression and anxiety.
At the same time, PEs have been conceptualised as a normal, potentially benign aspect of
personality (Claridge and Beech, 1995; Mohr and Claridge, 2015). Evidence for benign psychosis-
proneness has been disputed (Lenzenweger, 2015), though a recent study showed that even
persistent psychotic phenomena, phenomenologically similar to symptoms of clinical psychosis,
can occur without need for clinical care (Peters et al., 2016a). Such people tend to have positive
appraisals of their PEs and might consider them beneficial for wellbeing.
I would argue this represents a paradox; how can psychotic phenomena index severe distress as
well as be a benign aspect of experience in some people? Importantly, these two conceptualisa-
tions of psychosis-proneness in the general population motivate quite different courses of action
when PEs are identified. The former suggests that there may be a benefit in screening and even
intervening in the psychosis-prone general population while the latter suggests that PEs in some
people may not require intervention or medicalisation. Recognising that PEs are not necessarily a
disease symptom strengthens the case for modern psychological therapies that facilitate positive
appraisals, normalisation and acceptance of psychotic phenomena (Morrison and Barratt, 2010;
Chadwick, 2014). In Appendix C I replicated, in two cohorts and with different instruments,
that: firstly, a ‘common mental distress’ factor underlies and explains most of the variance in
psychotic phenomena and depressive/anxious symptoms and, secondly, psychotic phenomena
measure more extreme distress than classical depressive/anxious symptoms. However, there was
additional variance in psychotic phenomena orthogonal to distress, raising the possibility that
PEs are associated with varying levels of distress.
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This is supported by existing findings (Peters et al., 2016) but, critically, much of the evidence of
nonclinical or ‘benign’ PEs comes from highly selected adult samples that are not representative
of the general population. The prevalence of benign PEs in the general population is not known,
nor is whether the nonclinical psychosis cluster is robust and replicable. Neither is there strong
evidence of benign PEs of a similar intensity to clinical PEs in adolescents and young adults. This
developmental period is thought to contain the onset of most of psychotic disorders (Kessler et al.,
2007) and may be a critical period for both environmental insults and intervention (Birchwood
et al., 1998), hence why so much effort is directed at predicting and modifying the course of
psychotic illnesses in this age range (McGorry, 2011).
The existence of benign PEs in young people would be important for strategies aimed at early
detection and prevention of psychotic disorders, as it may allow better stratification of risk. For
some, this may avoid unnecessary intervention and investment of resources. However, if PEs
reflect susceptibility to environmental stress or tendency towards atypical belief formation, even
PEs occurring without distress might still be important predictors, perhaps non-specifically, of
lifetime psychiatric risk, given that maladaptive beliefs are a transdiagnostic feature of mental
illnesses (Friston et al., 2014), PEs precede and follow onset of many common mental illnesses
(McGrath et al., 2016) and high-risk criteria for psychosis also predict non-psychotic illnesses
(Fusar-Poli et al., 2012). Comparing benign PEs versus PEs with concurrent distress may reveal
risk and protective factors that could improve prediction of disorder and present potentially
modifiable intervention targets.
In this chapter, I used person-centred, data-driven analyses to cluster these same participants
by depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena, to test whether some PEs manifest without
distress. I then went on to investigate the nature of these clusters in more detail to identify factors
that might explain heterogeneity in health outcomes in psychosis-prone young people.
I focused on the following set of questions. First, do PEs manifest with and without distress
in general population samples of adolescents and young adults and what proportion of the pop-
ulation display these symptom phenotypes? Specifically, I looked for evidence of: i) a ‘dis-
tressed, PE-prone’ cluster (DPE) with high levels of distress and psychotic phenomena; ii) a
‘non-distressed, PE-prone’ cluster (NDPE) with low levels of distress but high levels of psychotic
phenomena and iii) a ‘Reference’ cluster, with low levels of distress and psychotic phenomena,
to serve as a comparison.
Second, is the NDPE phenotype simply a mild or attenuated form of psychosis-proneness, com-
pared to DPE? (David, 2010) Some have argued that nonclinical PEs (or ‘psychosis-like expe-
riences’) are more transient and less severe than true psychotic symptoms (Stanghellini et al.,
2012). While a number of studies have reported on persistent PEs in people without a need for
care (Brett et al., 2007, 2014; Lovatt et al., 2010; Johns et al., 2014; Ward et al., 2014), none
to my knowledge have done so in a representative population cohort of adolescents or young
adults.
Third, what levels of mental disorders or help-seeking for mental illness are displayed by these
different groups? The NDPE group may still be at increased risk of mental illness, relative to
controls, suggesting that PEs tend not to be truly ‘benign’ but are distributed on a spectrum of
associated psychopathology and functional impairment.
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Fourth, are these groups distinguishable by sociodemographic factors, features of childhood and
adolescent/adult social support and adversity, other symptoms, traits & wellbeing, current and
past mental disorders/help-seeking for mental illness and education/employment characteristics?
Comparing these groups may suggest risk and protective factors to use as predictors or interven-
tion targets.
Finally, are patterns of manifestation of psychotic phenomena and distress the same across
adolescence and young adulthood?
7.3 Methods
7.3.1 Data
Data come from the ROOTS and NSPN cohorts. For full information on the cohorts, see Method-
ology.
In the NSPN cohort, due to possible age differences in patterns of PEs and distress, the sample
was split into three age bins: 14-16, 17-19 and 20-25.
7.3.2 Latent class clustering analysis
Latent class analysis is a form of finite mixture model-based analysis in which categorical ob-
served variables are modelled as being caused by a latent (unobservable) categorical variable
with a pre-specified number of classes, where each category is a different latent class (LC). The
model assumes that, after accounting for the LC variable, the observed variables are locally inde-
pendent. LC models were estimated using expectation-maximization (EM) maximum-likelihood.
LC models can converge at local maxima, so each model was estimated 20 times with different
random starting values and the model with the highest likelihood selected.
7.3.3 Instruments used for clustering
Self-report psychotic phenomena
In ROOTS, self-report psychotic phenomena were measured using the Brief Schizotypal Symp-
toms Inventory (BSSI) (Hodgekins et al., 2012), a 20-item self-report instrument measuring
psychotic phenomena in the last two weeks. It measures three domains: Anomalous Experi-
ences and Beliefs (AEB), comprising perceptual abnormalities and magical thinking (8 items);
Paranoid Ideation (PI), comprising suspiciousness and ideas of reference (6 items); and Social
Anxiety (SA, 8 items). One item from PI is redundant with another and was removed. The
AEB and PI scales measure the same underlying psychosis factor as a semi-structured interview
method (Horwood et al., 2008).
Questions were structured as a set of statements or questions. Participants indicated how often
that statement applied to them in the last two weeks on a 5-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occa-
sionally’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’ and ‘All the time’. Due to low endorsement of some categories,
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responses were collapsed into a 3-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occasionally’, ‘Sometimes/Often/All
the time’). SSI scales are likely to be unidimensional (ωH: SA = 0.65, AEB = 0.71, PI =
0.88) and have high internal consistency (ωT: SA = 0.95, AEB = 0.93, PI = 0.93) (Revelle and
Zinbarg, 2009).
In NSPN, self-report psychotic phenomena were measured with the Schizotypal Personality Ques-
tionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991), which comprises 74 dichotomous items intended to measure gen-
eral, trait-like experience of 9 dimensions associated with psychosis-proneness. In Chapter 1, I
showed that, while these 9 dimensions are reliable, a number are likely to be redundant. While
second-order latent variable models suggest three or four variables explain scores on these sub-
scales, they are not reliable when estimated at the item level. Instead, I identified a reliable
6-factor solution without redundantly high correlations among factors. Of relevance for this
study are the dimensions most similar to typical psychotic phenomena: ‘Anomalous Experiences
& Beliefs’ (AEB), comprising 18 items measuring unusual perceptual experiences and magical
thinking and ‘Paranoid Ideation’ (PI), comprising 13 items measuring suspiciousness and ideas
of reference.
Verified psychotic experiences
PEs were measured in ROOTS using the semi-structured Psychotic-Like Symptoms Interview
(Horwood et al., 2008) (PLIKSi). For further detail on the PLIKSi, see Chapter 5. Briefly, a
modified version of the PLIKSi was administered to participants in schools and measured 17
types of PEs. PEs included were those that ‘definitely’, rather than ‘possibly’ occurred and were
not attributable to sleep, illness/fever or substance use. For clustering, I used a binary variable
of any lifetime PEs.
Depressive symptoms
In both cohorts, self-report depressive symptoms were measured with the Mood and Feelings
Questionnaire (MFQ) (Costello and Angold, 1988). The full questionnaire comprises 33 items
on common symptoms of depression and anxiety occurring over the last two weeks. The full
MFQ is likely to be multidimensional (Brodbeck et al., 2011) and has more items than the
AEB and PI scales of both the SPQ and SSI, which may pull any common factors estimated
from combined psychosis and distress items towards measuring traditional distress and result
in numerous specific factors. I therefore used the items that comprise the Short Mood and
Feelings Questionnaire (SMFQ) (Angold et al., 1995), which are contained within the full MFQ.
These items were used previously in identifying a common factor underlying mood, anxiety and
psychotic experiences. The SMFQ is likely to be unidimensional and is able to predict clinical
depression and anxiety with reasonable sensitivity (Messer et al., 1995; Turner et al., 2014).
Nonpsychotic psychiatric disorders/help-seeking
Current and past common mental disorders (a composite of depression, anxiety, eating disor-
ders, obsessive-compulsive disorders and behavioural disorders) were measured in ROOTS at
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age 14 and age 17 using the Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia, Present
and Lifetime version (Kaufman et al., 1997) (KSADS-PL). For clustering, I used a composite
of adolescents who, at any time, definitely met criteria or showed significant, impairing symp-
toms (‘High Clinical Index’) but fell just short of the required threshold (‘any lifetime mental
disorder’).
Summary
In ROOTS, I combined all 8 items from the AEBBSSI scale and 5 non-redundant items from the
6-item PIBSSI scale with the 13 SMFQ items, any lifetime PEs and any lifetime mental disorder,
creating a pool of 28 items.
In NSPN, I combined the 18 items on the AEBSPQ scale and 13 on the PISPQ scale with the 13
SMFQ items, creating a pool of 44 items.
7.3.4 Determining the number of classes
I fit models with varying numbers of classes and used AIC, BIC and the bootstrap likelihood ratio
test (BLRT) to identify the most appropriate number of classes. AIC and BIC are comparative
fit indices based on log-likelihood that trade-off model fit with model parsimony; lower values
indicate better fit. The BLRT simulates, from observed data, a distribution of changes in log-
likelihood that can be expected when one-too-many latent classes are estimated. The BLRT
involved estimating a latent class model for a number of classes, n. I then simulated 500 datasets
with n classes from this model and fit latent class models with n and n + 1 classes to each set. I
calculated the likelihood ratio between the models for each set, constructing a null distribution
of likelihood ratios that could be expected when there was no evidence for a greater number of
classes. I then compared the true likelihood ratio in the observed data to this distribution. I
used an alpha of 0.05 and obtained p-values by estimating the probability of observing the true
likelihood ratio given the distribution of bootstrap likelihood ratios. I performed the BLRT for
increasing numbers of classes until a non-significant result was observed, indicating no evidence
for adding another class.
I examined the item response probabilities per latent class to investigate whether any clusters
were interpretable as NDPE, DPE and Reference clusters.
7.3.5 Cluster comparisons
Clustering on population data was highly likely to return clusters of unequal sizes and distribu-
tions of variables of interest were likely to be of different shapes and variances across clusters. I
therefore used robust statistical comparisons for all comparisons with continuous variables. For
continuous variables, I used heteroskedastic one-way ANOVA on 5% trimmed means for omnibus
tests (function ‘t1way’ ) with post hoc tests performed by Yuen’s t-tests. Omnibus and pairwise
comparisons between categorical variables were performed using χ2 tests.
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7.3.6 Follow-up comparisons of clusters
In each sample and for each clustering method, I compared NDPE, DPE and Reference clusters
on a number of other variables. The number of comparisons made necessitated a ‘classify-analyse’
approach, though this can attenuate relationships between latent classes and other variables by
ignoring uncertainty about classification.
Verified psychotic experiences
From PLIKSi data, I compared clusters in ROOTS on binary presence of any PEs persisting for
at least a year and specific binary hallucinations, delusions and anomalous experiences.
Nonpsychotic psychiatric disorders/help-seeking
In ROOTS, I investigated when disorders occurred across clusters using variables of any current
disorder at age 14 and any current disorder at age 17, measured using the KSADS-PL.
In NSPN, self-report current and past help-seeking for mental illness was measured as part of
the postal questionnaire packs. I compared clusters on binary current help-seeking and lifetime
help-seeking.
Sociodemographic characteristics
I compared clusters on sex, socioeconomic deprivation (estimated from post-codes in both sam-
ples; ROOTS: ACORN category of ‘hard-pressed’
http://www.caci.co.uk; NSPN: z-scored Index of Multiple Deprivation,
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/english-indices-of-deprivation) and non-white eth-
nicity.
Family psychiatric history
I compared clusters on any self-reported history of mental illness in first-degree relatives (‘none’
vs ‘any’).
Cannabis use
I compared clusters on cannabis use in the month prior to assessment (‘none’ vs ‘any), measured
as part of a drugs and alcohol screening instrument.
Childhood adversity and recent social support
I compared clusters in ROOTS on the number of adversities participants were exposed to be-
tween ages 0-14, measured using the Cambridge Early-Experiences Interview (Dunn et al., 2011)
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(CAMEEI), a semi-structured caregiver interview measured at the first time point. In NSPN, ad-
versity between ages 0-16 was measured using the self-report Measures of Parenting Style (Parker
et al., 1997) (MOPS) questionnaire, with subscales of abuse, indifference and overbearingness
measured for mothers and fathers independently. I used the total score of adversities from both
parents.
Current perceived social support from friends was measuring using the Friendship Quality scale of
the Cambridge Friendships Questionnaire (van Harmelen et al., 2016) (CFQ). Current perceived
social support from family members was measured using the General Functioning scale of the
McMasters Family Assessment Device (Epstein and Baldwin, 1983) (FAD).
Education and employment
In ROOTS, I compared clusters on number of secondary school qualifications (GCSEs) obtained,
proportion of people doing higher education (A-levels) at 17 and proportion doing vocational
training or education at 17. In NSPN, I compared clusters on proportions in full-time education,
in full-time employment and proportions unemployed.
7.4 Results
7.4.1 Number of clusters
In ROOTS, AIC and BIC favoured 5 clusters, followed narrowly by 6 clusters. The BLRT
warranted increasing the number of clusters from 5 to 6 (p = 0.04) but not 6 to 7 (p = 0.09). I
therefore considered 6 clusters to be the optimal solution (see Table 7.1).
In NSPN, there was less clear evidence of an optimal number of clusters in each age group. To
maximise comparability with ROOTS, I selected the 6-cluster solutions in all groups for further
investigation. The 6-cluster solution performed well in all age groups (14-16: 3rd BIC, 3rd AIC,
non-significant BLRT; 17-19: 3rd BIC, 3rd AIC, non-significant BLRT; 20-14: 1st BIC, 3rd AIC,
non-significant BLRT, Table 7.1).
119
Table 7.1: Comparison of latent class clusterings with varying numbers of classes
Sample N Clus-
ters
BIC AIC BLRT
p-value
1 38317.46 38317.46 0
2 34471.46 34471.46 0
3 33800.68 33800.68 0.01
ROOTS (17) 4 33545.57 33545.57 0.04
5 33452.9 33452.9 0.04
6 33468.54 33468.54 0.09
7 33583.48 33583.48 NA
8 33779.16 33779.16 NA
1 36808.16 36550.15 0
2 33565.43 33044.89 0
3 33009.45 32226.37 0
NSPN (14-16) 4 32589.28 31543.66 0.034
5 32617.28 31309.12 0.018
6 32736.82 31166.12 0.104
7 32845.21 31011.98 NA
8 33048 30952.23 NA
1 41964.09 41700.29 0
2 37806.96 37274.73 0
3 37322.9 36522.25 0
NSPN (17-19) 4 36992.91 35923.83 0.056
5 36864.27 35526.76 NA
6 36924.59 35318.66 NA
7 37027.14 35152.79 NA
8 37247.95 35105.17 NA
1 49954.16 49678.49 0
2 44798.53 44242.36 0
3 43830.47 42993.8 0
NSPN (20-25) 4 43345 42227.83 0.032
5 43284.09 41886.41 0.044
6 43260.22 41582.04 0.116
7 43350.63 41391.94 NA
8 43509.06 41269.87 NA
Table 7.1: Lower values of AIC and BIC indicate better performance. A significant BLRT
indicates evidence for increasing the number of clusters. In ROOTS, AIC and BIC narrowly
favoured 5 over 6 clusters, while BLRT favoured 6 clusters. In NSPN 14-16 and 20-25, BLRT
favoured 6 clusters but 4 clusters in NSPN 17-19. AIC and BIC favoured different numbers
of clusters though the 6-cluster models performed well. The 6-cluster model was selected as
optimal.
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7.4.2 Identifying and verifying Reference, NDPE and DPE clusters
Figure 7.1: ROOTS Latent class item probabilities probabilities
Figure 7.1: Bar heights indicate response probabilities for each latent class in ROOTS. Dashed
bars separate item of different types. From left to right: depressive symptoms (13), anomalous
experiences & beliefs (8), paranoid ideation (5), interview-verified psychotic experiences and
mental disorders (2)
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Figure 7.2: NSPN 14-16 Latent class item probabilities probabilities
Figure 7.2: Bar heights indicate response probabilities for each latent class in NSPN 14-16.
Dashed bars separate item of different types. From left to right: depressive symptoms (13),
anomalous experiences & beliefs (18), paranoid ideation (13)
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Figure 7.3: NSPN 17-19 Latent class item probabilities probabilities
Figure 7.3: Bar heights indicate response probabilities for each latent class in NSPN 17-19.
Dashed bars separate item of different types. From left to right: depressive symptoms (13),
anomalous experiences & beliefs (18), paranoid ideation (13)
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Figure 7.4: NSPN 20-25 Latent class item probabilities probabilities
Figure 7.4: Bar heights indicate response probabilities for each latent class in NSPN 20-25.
Dashed bars separate item of different types. From left to right: depressive symptoms (13),
anomalous experiences & beliefs (18), paranoid ideation (13)
Item response probability plots for each cluster are shown in Figures 7.2 - 7.4. On inspection of
the response probabilities, it appeared clusters were separated by levels of responses to all items
on an instrument, rather than clusters of items within an instrument, meaning they could be
characterised by total instrument scores.
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In ROOTS, omnibus tests showed significant differences across clusters for these variables (DS:
FF(5, 211.8) = 574.8, p < 0.001; AEB: FF(5, 211.3) = 109.8, p < 0.001; PI: FF(5, 209.5) = 359.2, p <
0.001; lifetime PEs: (χ2 = 112.4, DF = 5, p < 0.001; lifetime mental disorders: : (χ2 = 133.5,
DF = 5, p < 0.001).
In NSPN, omnibus tests for differences in DS, AEB, PI and help-seeking were all significant
(14-16| DS: FF(5, 218.3) = 293.6, p < 0.001; AEB: FF(5, 214.3) = 134.5, p < 0.001; PI: FF(5, 214.3) =
705.1, p < 0.001; Help-seeking: (χ2 = 25.3, DF = 5, p < 0.001| |17-19| DS: FF(5, 226.1) = 449.1,
p < 0.001; AEB: FF(5, 224.9) = 217.0, p < 0.001; PI: FF(5, 223.3) = 446.1, p < 0.001; Help-seeking:
(χ2 = 47.6, DF = 5, p < 0.001| |20-25| DS: FF(5, 229.7) = 531.0, p < 0.001; AEB: FF(5, 204.7) =
219.6, p < 0.001; PI: FF(5, 223.3) = 719.5, p < 0.001; Help-seeking: (χ2 = 93.4, DF = 5, p <
0.001).
In ROOTS, clusters 1 and 2 had extremely low and low levels, respectively, of DS, AEB, PI, PEs
and mental disorders. Cluster 1 was considered the ‘Reference’ cluster (Ref). Cluster 3 had low
DS but high AEB and moderate-high PI, PEs and mental disorders. Cluster 3 was considered
the ‘non-distressed, PE-prone’ cluster (NDPE). Cluster 4 had moderate-high DS and mental
disorders, moderate AEB and PEs and high PI. Cluster 5 had moderate-high DS and mental
disorders but low AEB, PI and PEs. Cluster 6 had very high DS and mental disorders and high
AEB, PI and PEs. Cluster 6 was considered the ‘distressed, PE-prone’ cluster (DPE).
In all NSPN samples, clusters 1, 2, 3 and 6 showed very similar symptom profiles to clusters
found in ROOTS and clusters 1, 3 and 6 were considered the Reference, NDPE and DPE clusters,
respectively. Clusters 4 and 5 were less coherent across all samples.
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Figure 7.5: Bar plots of PEs and psychopathology markers per latent class
Figure 7.5: All omnibus tests showed overall differences. For clarity, horizontal bars marked
’NS’ indicate non-significant differences on pairwise comparisons. Unmarked differences were
significant at alpha of 0.05, Holm corrected.
The differences between clusters on sum scores of instruments used in clustering and on markers
of psychopathology are shown in Figure 7.5. Replicable patterns of differences were found across
each sample, particularly when comparing the Reference (Cluster 1), NDPE (Cluster 3) and
DPE (Cluster 6) clusters.
7.4.3 Lifetime interview-verified PEs
In ROOTS, 32.6% and 53.8% of NDPE and DPE had verified lifetime PEs, respectively. NDPE
and DPE had more lifetime PEs than all other clusters (though corrected p-value for NDPE
> cluster 4 indicated only trend-level difference). There was no significant difference between
NDPE and DPE on lifetime PEs, suggesting similar levels of psychosis-proneness.
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Table 7.2: Cluster sizes from 6-cluster latent class models
Cluster Number ROOTS NSPN 14-16 NSPN 17-19 NSPN 20-25
1 (Reference) 296 (30.7%) 158 (23%) 159 (20.9%) 284 (30.2%)
2 291 (30.2%) 191 (27.8%) 188 (24.7%) 184 (19.6%)
3 (NDPE) 89 (9.2%) 105 (15.3%) 57 (7.5%) 123 (13.1%)
4 145 (15.1%) 91 (13.2%) 167 (21.9%) 147 (15.7%)
5 89 (9.2%) 73 (10.6%) 123 (16.2%) 159 (16.9%)
6 (DPE) 53 (5.5%) 69 (10%) 67 (8.8%) 42 (4.5%)
7.4.4 Lifetime mental disorders or help-seeking for mental illness
In ROOTS, 79.2%, 52.8% and 11.8% of DPE, NDPE and Reference met criteria for one or
more lifetime disorder, respectively. DPE had higher rates of interview-assessed lifetime mental
disorders than all other clusters. NDPE had higher rates than Reference and cluster 2.
In NSPN, DPE had higher rates of help-seeking than Reference in all samples. The difference
in help-seeking between DPE and all other clusters became more pronounced with age, (17.3%,
31.3% and 64.3% of DPE reported help-seeking in those aged 14-16, 17-19 and 20-25, respectively.
This probably reflected increases in overall rates of help-seeking with age (14-16: 5.7%, 17-19:
11.0% and 20-25: 19.3%).
The sizes of each cluster in each sample are shown in Table 7.2. Of each sample, the Reference
cluster comprised 20.9-30.7%, NDPE comprised 7.5-15.3% and DPE comprised 4.5-10%.
7.4.5 Comparison of Reference, NDPE and DPE clusters
Table 7.3: Follow-up comparisons of Reference, NDPE and DPE clusters in ROOTS
Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Male Self-
Report
54.70% 34.80% 26.40% χ2 = 21.4,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref > NDPE,
Ref > DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Non-White
Ethnicity
Self-
Report
4.80% 3.50% 6.10% χ2 = 0.5,
DF = 2, p
= 0.788
-
Low So-
cioeco-
nomic
Status
ACORN
Cate-
gories
11.50% 16.90% 18.90% χ2 = 3.2,
DF = 2, p
= 0.788
-
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Table 7.3 – continued from previous page
Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Family
History
of Mental
Illness
Self-
Report
14.70% 24.10% 30.60% χ2 = 9.2,
DF = 2, p
= 0.061
-
Cannabis
Use
Drugs
and Al-
cohol
Screening
Instru-
ment
6.10% 16.90% 12% χ2 = 10.3,
DF = 2, p
= 0.052
-
Any Cur-
rent Mental
Disorder at
Age 17
KSADS-
PL
3.70% 21.30% 52.80% χ2 = 100.8,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Any Cur-
rent Mental
Disorder at
Age 14
KSADS-
PL
5.10% 15.70% 17% χ2 = 15.1,
DF = 2, p
= 0.006
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Multiple
Lifetime
Mental
Disorders
KSADS-
PL
3.70% 30.30% 54.70% χ2 = 109.7,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Any Life-
time Hallu-
cinations
PLIKSi 2.40% 19.10% 23.10% χ2 = 42.5,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Any
Lifetime
Anomalous
Experi-
ences
PLIKSi 1% 9% 9.60% χ2 = 18.3,
DF = 2, p
= 0.001
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Any Life-
time Delu-
sions
PLIKSi 0.30% 11.20% 30.80% χ2 = 75.6,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Any PEs
persisting
> 1 year
PLIKSi 1.40% 16.90% 17.30% χ2 = 39.1,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Any PEs
in the past
year
PLIKSi 1.70% 22.50% 34.60% χ2 = 74.2,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Anxious
Symptoms
(Age 17)
RCMAS 3.66
(3.9)
13.07
(8.37)
38.24
(7.78)
F(2,83.7) =
493, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
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Table 7.3 – continued from previous page
Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Wellbeing
(Age 17)
WEMWBS-
14
41.51
(6.3)
39.04
(6.54)
29.02
(7.67)
F(2,104.6) =
63.6, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Depressive
Symptoms
(Age 14)
SMFQ 3.63
(3.32)
7.13
(5.37)
10.58
(5.3)
F(2,80.9) =
46.2, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Childhood
Adversities
CAMEEI 1.21
(1.57)
1.82
(1.83)
2.22
(1.75)
F(2,82.9) =
8.1, p =
0.007
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Family
Support
(Age 17)
FAD
(General
Function-
ing)
29.85
(5.29)
27.86
(6.05)
21.63
(6.5)
F(2,95.2) =
35.6, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Friendship
Support
(Age 17)
CFQ
(Friend-
ship
Support)
14.93
(1.99)
14.5
(2.6)
11.37
(4.07)
F(2,87.5) =
16.7, p <
0.001
Ref = NDPE,
Ref > DPE,
NDPE > DPE
Family
Support
(Age 14)
FAD
(General
Function-
ing)
27.47
(5.21)
26.36
(5.01)
21.84
(6.75)
F(2,91.4) =
14.2, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE
(trend), Ref >
DPE, NDPE >
DPE
Friendship
Support
(Age 14)
CFQ
(Friend-
ship
Support)
14.41
(2.54)
13.51
(3.14)
12.32
(3.36)
F(2,86.6) =
10.2, p =
0.001
Ref > NDPE,
Ref > DPE,
NDPE > DPE
(trend)
Number of
Secondary
School
Qualifica-
tions
Self-
Report
8.32
(3.4)
7.61
(3.49)
7.62
(3.73)
F(2,100.3) =
1.7, p =
0.788
-
In Higher
Education
at Age 17
Self-
Report
71.60% 50% 62.30% χ2 = 14.4,
DF = 2, p
= 0.007
Ref > NDPE,
Ref = DPE,
NDPE = DPE
In Vo-
cational
Education
at Age 17
Self-
Report
16.10% 29.50% 20.80% χ2 = 7.9,
DF = 2, p
= 0.097
-
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Table 7.4: Follow-up comparisons of Reference, NDPE and DPE cluster in NSPN 14-16
Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Male Self-
Report
53% 61% 34.80% χ2 = 11.7,
DF = 2, p
= 0.017
Ref = NDPE,
Ref > DPE,
NDPE > DPE
Non-white
Ethnicity
Self-
Report
16.90% 30.50% 33.30% χ2 = 14.9,
DF = 2, p
= 0.004
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Socio-
economic
Status
IMD 0.29
(0.99)
-0.14
(1.09)
-0.23
(1.11)
F(2,128.7) =
9.1, p =
0.002
Ref > NDPE,
Ref > DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Mental
Illness
in First
Degree
Relative
Self-
Report
5.40% 5.70% 14.50% χ2 = 7.8,
DF = 2, p
= 0.104
-
Cannabis
Use
Self-
Report
5.20% 4.80% 10.10% χ2 = 2.9,
DF = 2, p
= 0.474
-
Lifetime
Help-
Seeking
for Mental
Illness
Self-
Report
2.90% 4.80% 17.40% χ2 = 24.9,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref = NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE < DPE
Current
Help-
Seeking
for Mental
Illness
Self-
Report
0.60% 2.90% 14.70% χ2 = 40.1,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE
(trend), Ref <
DPE, NDPE <
DPE
Depressive
Symptoms
SMFQ 3.49
(2.29)
5
(2.63)
16.14
(4.45)
F(2,120.2) =
230.6, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Anxiety
Symptoms
RCMAS 9.92
(7.21)
15.31
(8.69)
37.92
(9.16)
F(2,124.9) =
274.7, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Wellbeing WEMWBS-
14
46.64
(6.38)
45.02
(6.1)
31.62
(8.06)
F(2,129.5) =
105.5, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Asociality SPQ 2.84
(3.21)
4.87
(3.33)
10.68
(4.51)
F(2,120.7) =
84.7, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Social Anx-
iety
SPQ 2.74
(2.26)
4.12
(2.28)
6.03
(2.28)
F(2,130.8)
= 54, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
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Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Eccentricity SPQ 1.3
(1.94)
3.37
(2.33)
5.88
(1.93)
F(2,123.2) =
143.7, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Odd Speech SPQ 1.73
(1.6)
3.11
(1.57)
4.7
(1.38)
F(2,142.5) =
125.2, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Childhood
Adversities
MOPS 4.79
(6.34)
10.34
(9.6)
18.26
(13.85)
F(2,98.4) =
38.3, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Family
Support
FAD 39.3
(5.61)
36.88
(5.91)
29.55
(6.13)
F(2,132.4) =
74.7, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Friendship
Support
CFQ 13.47
(2.4)
13.15
(2.68)
9.75
(3.76)
F(2,120.8) =
28.3, p <
0.001
Ref = NDPE,
Ref > DPE,
NDPE > DPE
In Full-
Time
Education
Self-
Report
68.90% 56.90% 69.20% χ2 = 5.4,
DF = 2, p
= 0.273
-
In Full-
Time
Employ-
ment
Self-
Report
0.30% 0% 1.50% χ2 = 2.6,
DF = 2, p
= 0.474
-
Unemployed Self-
Report
0.30% 1.90% 0% χ2 = 4.2,
DF = 2, p
= 0.374
-
Table 7.5: Follow-up comparisons of Reference, NDPE and DPE cluster in NSPN 17-19
Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Male Self-
Report
49% 49.10% 37.30% χ2 = 3.2,
DF = 2, p
= 1
-
Non-white
Ethnicity
Self-
Report
26.50% 45.60% 28.40% χ2 = 8.7,
DF = 2, p
= 0.104
-
Socio-
economic
Status
IMD 0.02
(1.03)
-0.39
(0.95)
-0.02
(1.01)
F(2,100.9) =
3.8, p =
0.158
-
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Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Mental
Illness
in First
Degree
Relative
Self-
Report
7.50% 3.50% 16.40% χ2 = 7.8,
DF = 2, p
= 0.139
-
Cannabis
Use
Self-
Report
14.70% 14% 19.40% χ2 = 1, DF
= 2, p = 1
-
Lifetime
Help-
Seeking
for Mental
Illness
Self-
Report
6.10% 3.50% 31.30% χ2 = 45,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref = NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE < DPE
Current
Help-
Seeking
for Mental
Illness
Self-
Report
2.30% 0% 21.20% χ2 = 47.3,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref = NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE < DPE
Depressive
Symptoms
SMFQ 3.57
(2.11)
6.36
(2.73)
17.53
(4.3)
F(2,83.7) =
313.8, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Anxiety
Symptoms
RCMAS 10.43
(6.79)
19.33
(9.75)
38.87
(8.6)
F(2,85.9) =
306.4, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Wellbeing WEMWBS-
14
45.68
(6.64)
41.4
(7.58)
31.39
(8.26)
F(2,91.4) =
102.8, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Asociality SPQ 3.22
(3.32)
7
(4.46)
11.09
(4.6)
F(2,83) =
86.6, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Social Anx-
iety
SPQ 3.03
(2.37)
4.13
(2.3)
6.39
(1.81)
F(2,102.4) =
74.5, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Eccentricity SPQ 1.4
(1.94)
3.59
(2.54)
5.19
(2.27)
F(2,83.8) =
79.2, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Odd Speech SPQ 2.01
(1.67)
3.72
(1.54)
4.41
(1.57)
F(2,99.4) =
70, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Childhood
Adversities
MOPS 7.14
(7.56)
12.82
(9.41)
22.31
(15.38)
F(2,71.2) =
33.3, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
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Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Family
Support
FAD 37.87
(5.96)
35.58
(6.68)
29.07
(7.68)
F(2,93.2) =
37.1, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Friendship
Support
CFQ 13.62
(2.57)
12.45
(2.84)
9.76
(3.9)
F(2,85.4) =
27.9, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
In Full-
Time
Education
Self-
Report
75.20% 75.40% 71.40% χ2 = 0.4,
DF = 2, p
= 1
-
In Full-
Time
Employ-
ment
Self-
Report
6.50% 5.30% 7.90% χ2 = 0.4,
DF = 2, p
= 1
-
Unemployed Self-
Report
3.50% 3.50% 6% χ2 = 1, DF
= 2, p = 1
-
Table 7.6: Follow-up comparisons of Reference, NDPE and DPE cluster in NSPN 20-25
Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Male Self-
Report
48.10% 52% 47.60% χ2 = 0.6,
DF = 2, p
= 0.728
-
Non-white
Ethnicity
Self-
Report
15.80% 28.50% 14.30% χ2 = 10.9,
DF = 2, p
= 0.025
Ref < NDPE,
Ref = DPE,
NDPE = DPE
Socio-
economic
Status
IMD 0.11
(0.96)
-0.13
(0.93)
-0.25
(0.88)
F(2,92) =
4.6, p =
0.052
-
Mental
Illness
in First
Degree
Relative
Self-
Report
9.40% 9.80% 40.50% χ2 = 36.9,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref = NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE < DPE
Cannabis
Use
Self-
Report
11.80% 11.40% 28.60% χ2 = 10,
DF = 2, p
= 0.033
Ref = NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE < DPE
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Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
Lifetime
Help-
Seeking
for Mental
Illness
Self-
Report
11.10% 21.10% 64.30% χ2 = 81,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Current
Help-
Seeking
for Mental
Illness
Self-
Report
2.60% 6.60% 47.60% χ2 = 131.7,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Depressive
Symptoms
SMFQ 3.21
(1.96)
8.29
(3.05)
19.74
(4.15)
F(2,79.6) =
401.4, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Anxiety
Symptoms
RCMAS 9.4
(6.94)
21.78
(9.11)
42.03
(7.76)
F(2,85) =
370.9, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Wellbeing WEMWBS-
14
45.94
(6.24)
39.86
(6.5)
28.89
(7.57)
F(2,88.1) =
135, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Asociality SPQ 2.47
(3.29)
7.25
(4.01)
10.14
(4.32)
F(2,79.4) =
117.6, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Social Anx-
iety
SPQ 2.76
(2.21)
4.33
(2.55)
6.35
(2.25)
F(2,85.7) =
51.4, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Eccentricity SPQ 1.22
(1.9)
4.08
(2.55)
5.33
(2.5)
F(2,78.2) =
87, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Odd Speech SPQ 1.71
(1.67)
3.64
(1.64)
4.24
(1.68)
F(2,87.2) =
81.9, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE,
Ref < DPE,
NDPE < DPE
(trend)
Childhood
Adversities
MOPS 6.68
(8.5)
14.83
(12.44)
22.57
(18.01)
F(2,72.1) =
37, p <
0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
Family
Support
FAD 38.88
(5.93)
33.89
(6.75)
30.54
(8.06)
F(2,83.1) =
42, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
Friendship
Support
CFQ 13.72
(2.69)
11.78
(3.04)
8.11
(3.88)
F(2,82.3) =
52.7, p <
0.001
Ref > NDPE >
DPE
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Variable Instrument Reference NDPE DPE Omnibus Pairwise Com-
parisons
In Full-
Time
Education
Self-
Report
49.70% 43.90% 28.60% χ2 = 7.5,
DF = 2, p
= 0.069
-
In Full-
Time
Employ-
ment
Self-
Report
35.80% 30.10% 23.80% χ2 = 3.4,
DF = 2, p
= 0.36
-
Unemployed Self-
Report
3.80% 10.60% 28.60% χ2 = 40.7,
DF = 2, p
< 0.001
Ref < NDPE <
DPE
See Tables 7.3 and 7.4 - 7.6 for comparisons of Reference, NDPE and DPE in ROOTS and NSPN
14-16, 17-19 and 20-25 respectively.
Sociodemographic characteristics, family mental illness and cannabis use
In ROOTS, NDPE and DPE showed no sociodemographic differences. Compared to Reference,
NDPE and DPE were less likely to be male and more likely to have a family history of mental
illness; NDPE showed a trend towards increased cannabis use.
In NSPN, at ages 14-16, NDPE and DPE were more likely to be of non-white ethnicity and
have lower socioeconomic status than Reference. These differences were not clearly replicated
in the older age groups. In those aged 20-25 and at trend-level in those aged 17-19, NDPE and
Reference were less likely than DPE to have mental illness in a first degree relative.
PE characteristics
In ROOTS, NDPE showed some increase in all symptoms compared to Reference, but showed
only a trend-level decrease in wellbeing. Notably, 21.3% of NDPE had a current mental disorder
at 17, compared to 6.5% of Ref and 52.8% of DPE. This suggests that PEs without distress still
confer some risk of mental illness but confirms that some PEs are associated with far greater risk
than others. DPE had higher symptoms of anxiety and lower wellbeing compared to Reference
and DPE in all domains, suggesting this cluster is not psychosis-specific but shows transdiagnostic
markers of psychopathology.
Similar patterns were found in NSPN that became more pronounced as age increased. DPE had
higher lifetime and current help-seeking than Reference and NDPE in all age groups. NDPE
showed higher rates of current and lifetime help-seeking than Reference in those aged 20-25 only,
with a trend-level increase in current help-seeking in those aged 14-16.
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Current and past symptoms and current mental disorders or help-seeking for mental
illness
In ROOTS, NDPE showed some increase in all symptoms compared to Reference, but showed
only a trend-level decrease in wellbeing. Notably, 21.3% of NDPE had a current mental disorder
at 17, compared to 6.5% of Ref and 52.8% of DPE. This suggests that PEs without distress still
confer some risk of mental illness but confirms that some PEs are associated with far greater risk
than others. DPE had higher symptoms of anxiety and lower wellbeing compared to Reference
and DPE in all domains, suggesting this cluster is not psychosis-specific but shows transdiagnostic
markers of psychopathology.
Similar patterns were found in NSPN that became more pronounced as age increased. DPE had
higher lifetime and current help-seeking than Reference and NDPE in all age groups. NDPE
showed higher rates of current and lifetime help-seeking than Reference in those aged 20-25 only,
with a trend-level increase in current help-seeking in those aged 14-16.
Childhood adversity and recent social support
In ROOTS, DPE and NDPE were similarly exposed to childhood adversity and were more
exposed to childhood adversity than Reference, supporting that early-life trauma may generally
predispose to psychotic phenomena. In contrast, Reference and NDPE showed similar levels of
social support from family and friends at ages 14 and 17, and far higher levels of support than
DPE.
In NSPN, DPE experienced more childhood adversity than NDPE, who experienced more ad-
versity than Reference. This difference may be explained by the use of a self-report retrospective
measurement made at the same time of clustering, rather than a caregiver-report instrument
made earlier. The patterns of high levels of social support in Reference and NDPE but not DPE
were replicated in all samples.
Education and employment
There was little evidence of educational impairment in ROOTS, with no differences in secondary
school qualifications across the clusters.
In NSPN, differences only emerged in the age 20-25 sample. DPE were more likely to be unem-
ployed than NDPE, who were more likely to be unemployed than Reference, suggesting increasing
functional impairment.
Schizotypal traits (NSPN)
Schizotypal traits of asociality, social anxiety, eccentricity and odd speech increased from Ref-
erence to NDPE to DPE (trend-level for NDPE < DPE for odd speech), suggesting increasing
proneness to psychosis-associated traits. However, the psychosis-specificity of this pattern should
be interpreted cautiously given the transdiagnostic symptom profile of the DPE clusters.
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7.4.6 Similarity of cluster profiles across adolescence and early adulthood
Figure 7.6: Cross-classification of participants in different age bins in NSPN
Figure 7.6: To compare similarity of clustering solutions across age, participants in each age
bin were re-classified according to the models for the other age bins. The clustering models for
ages 17-19 and 20-25 are fairly similar to one another, while the model for ages 14-16 appears
more distinct. There may be distinct patterns of psychotic phenomena and distress that change
through late adolescence and early adulthood.
When cross-classified according to the latent class probabilities of the other age groups, there
was greater similarity between the 17-19 and 20-25 age groups than for 14-16 and the other
groups, despite the similar symptom profiles and convergent results found for most comparisons
(Figure 7.6). This suggests that psychotic phenomena and depressive symptoms may show
slightly different manifestations in younger adolescents than older adolescents and young adults.
In particular, NDPE was larger in age 14-16 than the other age groups and around half of
the participants were reclassified as NDPE and half as cluster 2 (low scores on all symptoms)
according to the older age models. Similarly, DPE was larger in age 14-16 than the other
age groups and only 74% and 55% of 14-16 DPE reclassified as DPE by the 17-19 and 20-25
models, respectively. In contrast, 97% and 100% of age 17-19 and 20-25 DPE, respectively, were
reclassified as DPE by the age 14-16 model.
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7.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I found evidence that PEs manifested in clusters of young people with extremely
high levels of distress (‘distressed & PE-prone’, DPE) and without high levels of distress (‘non-
distressed & PE-prone’, NDPE) in two cohorts of young people, with one cohort divided into three
age bins and analysed independently. When compared to one another and a ‘Reference’ cluster
without PEs or distress, I found replicable patterns of associations with types of PEs, other
mental health symptoms, diagnoses & help-seeking for mental disorders, childhood adversity
and social support. Importantly, the NDPE phenotype did not appear to be a measurement
artefact or mild psychosis-proneness, with similar levels of interview-verified PEs, including those
persisting for at least a year, in the DPE and NDPE groups.
These results clearly demonstrate that PEs are not necessarily a symptom of psychopathology
and that nonclinical PEs are not simply an attenuated form of psychosis-proneness, a mea-
surement artefact or a highly unusual phenotype that could not be identified in representative
samples. Nonetheless, convergent results from Appendix C and this chapter support that PEs
are a manifestation of extreme distress and that people experiencing the highest levels of dis-
tress were highly likely to experience PEs, as well as being at high risk of other symptoms and
of common, nonpsychotic mental disorders and social dysfunction. These findings support re-
cent shifts in psychosis high-risk research away from focusing solely on positive symptoms and
towards integrating measurements of positive symptoms with social dysfunction and cognitive
impairment (Fusar-Poli et al., 2014b). The clustering results also suggest there may be unmet
health needs in 14-16 year olds, identifiable by self-report symptom measurements.
These findings suggest a number of environmental factors that might either reflect or modify
health and psychosis-proneness trajectories that warrant further investigation. In particular,
childhood adversity and social dispositions/social support appear to have dissociable relation-
ships with health outcomes. Social support from friends and family should be investigated as
either a predictor or modifiable environmental influence on future health in young people prone
to PEs.
Future work will require investigating the longitudinal pathways to PEs with and without dis-
tress. Studies that are better equipped to establish causative relationships, like randomised
controlled trials or Mendelian randomization paradigms could help shed light on whether differ-
ences in social support are symptomatic or causative. Finally, it is necessary to move beyond the
level of symptom description to computational and implementational mechanisms of PEs, which
may help establish whether PEs with and without distress represent the same or fundamentally
different phenomena.
7.5.1 Sociodemographic factors
There were not replicable sociodemographic factors that differentiated the groups. Some observed
differences, such as increased family history of mental illness and lower socioeconomic status in
the psychosis-prone groups were expected but the lack of clear association with cannabis use
was surprising. This may be in part due to the measurement of only recent cannabis use, in the
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month prior to assessment.
7.5.2 Types of PEs
NDPE and DPE had similar levels of interview-verified PEs overall and of hallucinations and
anomalous experiences when types of PE were examined separately. These groups were just as
likely to have PEs that had persisted for at least a year and to have PEs occurring in the last
year. Around 17% of both NDPE and DPE had PEs persisting for at least a year, meaning I
can roughly estimate the population prevalence of non-distressed and distressed adolescents with
persistent PEs at 1.6% and 0.9%, respectively, suggesting that these phenotypes occur with non-
negligible frequencies. Consistent with previous findings (Lovatt et al., 2010; Brett et al., 2014;
Ward et al., 2014), delusions and paranoid ideation were more associated with distress than
hallucinations, anomalous experiences, unusual perceptions and non-paranoid unusual beliefs.
These results suggest that it may not be the occurrence, intensity or even persistence of PEs
that determine clinical relevance as much as a person’s appraisals of them and the extent to
which those PEs reflect distorted, threatening beliefs about the world.
7.5.3 Symptoms, diagnoses and help-seeking for mental illness
Unsurprisingly, the DPE group had very high rates of nonpsychotic mental disorders, particularly
current mental disorders and multiple comorbid disorders over the lifetime. DPE was reliably
associated with lower wellbeing and symptoms of anxiety. DPE was also associated with help-
seeking for mental illness in all NSPN age groups, particularly in the young adults. These results
support that PEs are not a specific feature indicating psychosis risk, but are a transdiagnostic
feature indicating severe distress and general risk of mental illness. The instruments used did
not allow me to measure whether people are distressed by their PEs, or whether PEs are non-
distressing but incidental to high levels of depressive symptoms. This may be a critical feature
in distinguishing people who may be at high-risk for psychotic disorders from those who are at
higher risk of other illnesses like affective disorders.
In ROOTS, the NDPE group had higher rates of mental disorders than expected, with just over
half meeting or having high clinical index of mental illness at some point in their lifetime. The
greater lifetime prevalence than current prevalence and prevalence 3 years prior to clustering
suggest that this group may be at risk of psychopathology at younger ages but could represent a
‘recovered’ group at age 17. NDPE and DPE did appear more similar in terms of current mental
disorders and depressive symptoms at age 14 in ROOTS and it is possible that the NDPE and
DPE groups diverge later in adolescence. If this is true, a critical point that remains unknown is
whether, at earlier ages, these groups form a common pool of psychosis-prone young people with
trajectories that are not fixed and may still differentiate into good or ill health outcomes based
on other factors, or whether those who go on to manifest as distressed and non-distressed are
already distinct and committed to a certain phenotype but without full manifestation of their
symptoms. If these trajectories are not fixed, identifying the determinant risk and protective
factors may enable targeted interventions with the goal of primary prevention. If the trajectories
are fixed, it may require looking earlier in development to identify the factors that determine
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later psychopathology and impairment.
The lower rates of help-seeking in NSPN in those aged 14-16, despite similarly high levels of
depressive and paranoid symptoms in DPE at all age ranges, may indicate unmet healthcare
needs in younger adolescents. Barriers to adequate healthcare may be stigma against mental
illness, poorer availability of health care or inadequate recognition of clinically-relevant symptoms
in this age range.
7.5.4 Childhood adversity
Both NDPE and DPE were associated with childhood adversity, replicating evidence that trauma
in early life predisposes to both clinical and nonclinical PEs (Bebbington et al., 2004; Arseneault
et al., 2011; Daalman et al., 2012; Varese et al., 2012). Self-report parent-focused adversities
were greater in DPE than NDPE in all NSPN age groups, but NDPE and DPE had similar
exposure to adversities measured using a detailed interview with caregivers at an earlier time
point. A possible difference between these measures is that retrospective measurements may
capture some of a person’s response to and appraisals of trauma, such as through biased recall
of highly impactful events or forgetting of events with little impact, supported perhaps by evi-
dence of under-recall of adversities using self-report measurements (Hardt and Rutter, 2004). If
true, the results suggest that exposure to adversities predisposes to PEs but exposure to highly
impactful adversities with negative appraisals tends also towards severe symptoms of distress.
However, there is evidence that retrospective measures of adversity are reliable and not affected
by symptom load in psychosis (Fisher et al., 2011), post-traumatic stress disorder (Goodman et
al., 1999) or depression (Brewin et al., 1993; Gerlsma et al., 1993). Understanding the pathways
from childhood adversities to clinical and nonclinical PEs is likely to require more detailed mea-
surements of adversities and appraisals of them and may be aided by investigation of potential
mediating factors like dissociation and negative affect (Hardy et al., 2016).
7.5.5 Social support
Social support from family and friends was markedly lower in the DPE group than the Reference
group in all samples at time of clustering and 3 years prior to clustering in ROOTS. In contrast,
NDPE showed either similar or slightly lower levels of support compared to Reference and greater
support than DPE at time of clustering in all samples. In ROOTS, NDPE had greater family
support than DPE 3 years prior to clustering but similar levels of friendship support. These
replicable differences in social support suggest that it may be a critical feature distinguishing
people with PEs with and without concurrent distress. Social support comprises social networks,
‘enacted’ support that is actually provided in times of stress and ‘perceived’ support of how
supported a person feels by social relationships.
Explanations for this relationship can broadly be defined in two, not mutually-exclusive ways.
The relationship may be ‘symptomatic’, in that whatever psychopathology tends towards PEs
and distress also tends towards impaired social functioning that makes it difficult to maintain
positive relationships with peers and family members. Consistent with this, psychotic illness is
associated with poor social support, both in chronic (Beels, 1981; Buchanan, 1995; Meesters et
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al., 2010) and early disease stages (Gayer-Anderson and Morgan, 2013). Poor premorbid levels
of functioning and social integration predict later psychosis (Malmberg et al., 1998; Cannon et
al., 2008; Velthorst et al., 2009; Dragt et al., 2011), with progressive impairment leading up to
onset of psychotic disorder (Velthorst et al., 2016).
The relationship may also be ‘causative’, in that good social support protects against distress
while poor support predisposes to it. Social support is thought to be a critical component of
resilience to stress (Cohen and Wills, 1985) and could interact with the proposed psychosis-
promoting mechanisms of adversity. Supportive relationships through friends, family or other
social environments may promote the normalisation and adaptive appraisal of aberrant experi-
ences (Claridge, 1997; Farias et al., 2013; Peters et al., 2016), tend away from negative schema
(Brown et al., 1986) and negative affect (Powers et al., 2009), reduce the stress that aberrant
experiences cause (Brett et al., 2014) and act as a general buffer against stress from all causes.
Importantly, social support may be modifiable and boosting support in people at risk of disor-
der or in their early stages might shift some young people towards the non-distressed, versus
the distressed phenotype. Clinical trials of support-based interventions are rare, but promising
family and friendship-based interventions have shown some success at preventing relapse and
minimising symptoms of psychotic illness (McFarlane et al., 2003; O’Brien et al., 2014; Poulton
et al., 2014; Harrop et al., 2015).
7.5.6 Functional impairment
Clear evidence of impairment in education or employment was only found in young adults in
NSPN, in whom unemployment was higher in DPE than NDPE and in NDPE than in Reference.
This may be that the measurements of proportions in education, training and the numbers of
secondary school qualifications are not sensitive enough to pick up differences in functioning in
younger people. For example, unemployment is unlikely to be a meaningful variable in 14-16
year olds.
7.5.7 Age differences
In NSPN, the clustering models for 17-19 and 20-25 year olds were more similar to one an-
other than they were to the model for 14-16 year olds, evidenced by the high cross-classification
accuracy in the older groups. This suggests that, while very similar symptom profiles were
found across ages, the exact nature of these profiles differs in younger adolescents versus older
adolescents and young adults.
7.5.8 Strengths & limitations
This study has a number of strengths. The greatest strength is replication of key findings across
two cohorts, one representative and one near-representative but balanced for age and sex. Very
similar symptom clusters were identified in four separate data-driven analyses with data collected
using only partially-overlapping instruments, centres and ages. A number of key factors reliably
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distinguished key clusters of interest and a number of these support previous findings obtained
in highly-selected samples.
This study also has limitations. Some clusters were not considered in detail and some clusters
were not as clearly replicated across all groups. The use of a ‘classify-analyse’ approach risked
attenuating relationships between clusters and other variables. The use of mainly self-report
measurement to perform latent class clustering may have introduced measurement error, though
I showed in Chapter 5 that the PLIKSi and BSSI measure the same underlying phenomena.
7.6 Future questions
Based on the results of the previous chapters, I selected a set of questions that could feasibly
be investigated in ROOTS or NSPN or in novel datasets, based around understanding longitu-
dinal development of PEs and their computational mechanisms and focusing particularly on the
relationships between PEs and the social environment.
7.6.1 How do PEs and social dispositions/social relationships influence one
another over time?
Social support and social functioning may be critical determinants of health in people with PEs.
This may be because PEs cause or precede social dysfunction or social dysfunction causes or
precedes PEs. Poor social networks are a risk factor for developing psychosis and disruptions
to social networks, social interactions and societal functioning often precede the onset of PEs
(Jones et al., 1994; Velthorst et al., 2012, 2016; Gayer-Anderson and Morgan, 2013). Collip
et al. (2013) (Collip et al., 2013) showed that interpersonal difficulties in relationships with
family and friends consistently predicted bizarre experiences and paranoid ideation in a general
population sample of adolescents, though with important methodological limitations (see next
chapter). I planned to investigate possible bidirectional longitudinal associations between social
difficulties and dimensions of PEs in NSPN using cross-lagged structural equation modelling,
controlling measurement invariance and covariates and testing whether any effects are mediated
by influences on real-world social support from friends and family.
7.6.2 How are childhood adversity and social support related to one another
and to later manifestation of distress and PEs?
Childhood adversity and social support later in life are rarely considered together in relation
to psychosis (Gayer-Anderson et al., 2015), though both are associated with it (Varese et al.,
2012; Gayer-Anderson and Morgan, 2013). My results, like others, support that childhood
adversity may predispose to both clinically-relevant and nonclinical PEs (Lovatt et al., 2010;
Daalman et al., 2012), while social support, which may be a proxy of social functioning and
negative symptoms, strongly separates them (Sommer et al., 2010; Peters et al., 2016). Two
important questions are how adversity and support relate to one another and how important
social relationships at different stages of development are for later PEs and distress. I planned
to investigate these questions using longitudinal data from both NSPN and ROOTS.
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Chapter 8
Asociality increases positive psychotic
phenomena in adolescents and young
adults by worsening social
relationships
Abstract
Social difficulties are associated with psychotic experiences and may precede and con-
tribute to development of psychosis. Using cross-lagged structural equation modelling in
NSPN, I investigated bidirectional, longitudinal interactions over 12 months between asocial
dispositions (ASO) and two dimensions of positive psychotic phenomena (anomalous expe-
riences and beliefs, AEB; paranoid ideation, PI). These were measured by a novel factorial
structure of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire that out-competed existing structures
on thorough psychometric validation and were invariant over time. I investigated whether
these relationships were mediated by impairing social relationships and whether ASO, AEB
and PI predict later markers of psychopathology. ASO, AEB and PI are relatively stable
over 12 months. ASO predicted future AEB and PI, while neither AEB nor PI predicted
future ASO, suggesting withdrawal from social interaction precedes or promotes psychotic
phenomena. The effects of ASO predicting AEB and PI were fully mediated independently
by detriment to family relationships and friendships. ASO and PI predicted depressive
symptoms and ASO alone predicted psychiatric help-seeking. The social environment may
be important in predicting or modifying psychosis and psychopathology. Poor social re-
lationships may promote psychosis indirectly by reducing stress-resilience and directly by
impairing use of socially-derived information to shape perception and belief updating.
8.1 Research Questions
• How do PEs and social dispositions/social relationships influence one another over time?
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8.2 Introduction
While psychosis is characterised according to the presence of delusions and hallucinations, it typ-
ically involves impairment of social function and withdrawal from social interaction. Moreover,
poor social networks are a risk factor for developing psychosis and disruptions to social networks,
social interactions and societal functioning often precede its onset (Jones et al., 1994; Velthorst
et al., 2012, 2016; Gayer-Anderson and Morgan, 2013).
Similarly, when psychosis-like phenomena occur in the general population as ‘schizotypal’ per-
sonality (Meehl, 1962; Claridge and Beech, 1995) or an ‘extended psychosis phenotype’ (van Os
et al., 2009; van Os and Reininghaus, 2016), social difficulties are common and predict poor
functioning, later subclinical positive psychotic phenomena and clinical psychosis (Dominguez et
al., 2010; Collip et al., 2013). Standardized instruments capture this as ‘interpersonal’ schizo-
typy, characterised by social anhedonia, lack of close relationships and social anxiety (Raine et
al., 1994).
Given these findings, interpersonal difficulties could have a causal role in the development of
psychotic experiences (PEs) or influence health outcomes in people prone to them. Social re-
lationships might influence PEs through various mechanisms. One possibility is that a lack of
social support could exacerbate the effects of stress (Zubin and Spring, 1977; Nuechterlein and
Dawson, 1984). Another is that social involvement and interactions are important information
sources that shape our experience of and inferences about the world. We learn vicariously in
uncertain environments (Toelch et al., 2014) and find value in conforming to the beliefs of others
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2012), which may provide a crucial component of our evaluation
of external reality. Atypical use of socially-derived information, such as poor learning or use of
information from other people in decision making (Cook et al., 2014) or perceptual inference
(Mahmoodi et al., 2013; Hertz et al., 2016), might impair a person’s ability to accurately learn
and predict properties of the environment and other agents, leading to experiences and beliefs
that deviate from social norms. Such a proposal has direct links with current computational
models of the emergence of psychotic experiences. These posit that reality distortion can be
described by false inferences (such as wrongly inferring the causes of sensory inputs, leading to
hallucinations) and false updating of internal models or prior knowledge (leading to aberrant
beliefs about the world, or delusions) (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010; Adams et
al., 2013). Both inappropriate inferences and inappropriate model updating might arise from
atypical integration of prior knowledge with sensory information, a process that depends criti-
cally on the computation and signalling of prediction errors and that guides perception, action
and decision making (Friston, 2005; Den Ouden et al., 2012).
In this study, I sought to explore the relationship between social dispositions and psychosis-
proneness by determining whether interpersonal difficulties promote positive psychotic phenom-
ena over 12 months in a general population sample of adolescents and young adults. I further
sought to determine whether such effects are mediated by changes in quality of friendships or
family relationships. Finally, I compared how different dimensions of the extended psychosis
phenotype are associated with future psychopathology, indexed by psychiatric help-seeking and
depressive symptoms.
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I used cross-lagged structural equation modelling (SEM) to test whether either social difficulties
or positive psychotic phenomena predict themselves (‘autoregressive’ effects) and each other
(‘cross-lagged’ effects) in the future, taking baseline levels and covariance at both times into
account. I used strict modelling constraints to ensure I was measuring the same latent constructs
at different time points (longitudinal measurement invariance).
Collip et al. (2013) showed, using methodologically-similar cross-lagged path analysis, that in-
terpersonal difficulties in relationships with family and friends consistently predicted bizarre
experiences and paranoid ideation in a general population sample of adolescents. I replicate and
extend their findings in a larger sample ensuring measurement invariance over time, minimis-
ing measurement error by estimating latent variables, thoroughly controlling for covariates and
investigating mediation by effects on actual social relationships and social support.
I evaluated the following hypotheses: positive psychotic phenomena and interpersonal difficulties
will be largely stable over 12 months, evidenced by significant autoregressive effects; interpersonal
difficulties at baseline will be informative of positive psychotic phenomena at 12-month follow
up, evidenced by significant cross-lagged effects; cross-lagged effects will be mediated by baseline
social difficulties impairing quality of friendships or family relationships at 12-month follow-up;
interpersonal difficulties will be the best predictor, compared to positive psychotic phenomena,
of future depressive symptoms and psychiatric help-seeking or diagnosis.
8.3 Methods
8.3.1 Data
Data came from the NSPN 2400 cohort. For full information on the NSPN cohort, see Method-
ology.
8.3.2 Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ)
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (Raine, 1991) is a self-report questionnaire comprising
74 true-or-false statements with 9 subscales designed to measure the domains of schizotypal
personality disorder, as of DSM-III (Association, 2013).
These 9 subscales are often summarised by usually 3 (Raine et al., 1994) or 4 (Stefanis et al.,
2004) higher-order factors. However, both the 9 subscales and the higher-order factors may fit
item-level data poorly (Chmielewski and Watson, 2008). In Chapter 6, I showed that 6 factors
can explain item-level responses on the SPQ and outperform the current 3-factor, 4-factor and
9-subscale models.
The 6-factor model provides broad measurements of two dimensions of reality distortion and one
of social difficulties, which were the main focus of this study. ‘Anomalous experiences & beliefs’
(AEB) measures unusual perceptual experiences and magical thinking. ‘Paranoid ideation’ (PI)
measures unusual ideas about connections with other people and others intentions to harm you.
‘Asociality’ (ASO) is a dimension comprising social difficulties, lack of close relationships and
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social anhedonia. Also measured are ‘Eccentricity’, ‘Social Anxiety’ and ‘Odd Speech’. These
dimensions are not considered in this study.
8.3.3 Social support
Social support from peers was measured using the Friendship Quality scale of the Cambridge
Friendships Questionnaire (Memarzia et al., n.d.; Goodyer et al., 1989) (CFQ), which comprised
5 self-report Likert-scale items. Social support from family and family functioning was measured
with the Family Assessment Device – General Functioning scale (Epstein and Baldwin, 1983)
(FAD), which comprised 12 self-report Likert-scale items. Instrument scores were centred and
scaled to unit variance.
8.3.4 Cross-lagged structural equation models
In cross-lagged models, the same latent variables are estimated at multiple time points and
linked by regression paths measuring a form of residualised population-level change. Cross-lagged
models contain ‘autoregressive’ paths of one latent variable to itself at a later time, measuring
that variable’s stability. They also contain ‘cross-lagged’ paths from each latent variable at one
time to other latent variables at later times. These indicate whether a variable is additionally
predictive of another variable, taking baseline levels into account.
A significant cross-lagged path is sometimes considered evidence of a directional causal rela-
tionship. However, I approach causality with extreme caution. Cross-lagged models are usually
observational rather than interventional and I cannot rule out the influence of unmeasured covari-
ates. Nonetheless, cross-lagged models suggest causality and allow construction of hypotheses
that can be tested in interventional designs. I minimised unmeasured influences by adjusting for
potential covariates.
8.3.5 Model estimation
SEMs were fit using the lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) package in R, supplemented by functions from
semTools (semTools Contributors, 2016).
Variables like PI and ordinally-measured item responses were expected to be non-normally dis-
tributed. All models were therefore fit with a robust maximum-likelihood (MLR) estimator with
robust (Huber-White) standard errors and Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistics. Fit was assessed
using CFI & TLI (both > 0.9), the RMSEA (< 0.08) and the SRMR (< 0.06). I calculated the
RMSEA of the null model (with no associations between variables), because when the null model
fits well (RMSEA < 0.158), fit indices based on comparison between the actual model and null
model (CFI & TLI) will be too low and less useful (Kenny, n.d.).
Nonsignificant paths were retained in order to minimise empirical model re-specification. I re-
ported unstandardized and standardized path coefficients, their standard errors and their signif-
icance based on Wald tests. Differences between regression paths of interest were additionally
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tested using the Satorra-Bentler Chi-Squared test, in which a model was estimated with the re-
gression coefficient (β) of the path of interest constrained to be equal to another path coefficient
and fit compared to a model in which those coefficients were freely estimated. A significant
result, meaning that constraining that path coefficient resulted in poorer model fit, confirmed
that two paths were of different sizes.
In previous chapters, I used multiple imputations (MI) with WLSMV estimators, designed for
categorical data, to account for missing data. While MI can provide accurate and unbiased
estimation of associations and standard errors, it can produce misleading results if, for example,
not enough imputations are used, variables relevant to missingness are not included, outcome
variables are omitted from the imputation model or transformations are used in analyses that
were not include in the imputation model. It is also highly computationally demanding. In
contrast, fiML estimation provides equally accurate and unbiased accommodation of missing
data patterns, but is far more computationally efficient, is deterministic (gives the same results
every time) and has fewer researcher degrees of freedom, being estimated from the data alone.
For these reasons, I chose to use full-information MLR estimation for complex SEM investigations
in which item thresholds (obtained through WLSMV estimation) are not of interest, as in this
and the remaining chapters.
8.3.6 Covariates
I included potential covariates in all models, with regression paths from each covariate to each
latent variable or observed structural variable (social support, depressive symptoms, psychi-
atric help-seeking). The covariates I included were: age at baseline (continuous), male sex
(binary), cannabis use reported in the last month at baseline (binary), socioeconomic depriva-
tion (measured by the rank of the England and Wales governmental Index of Multiple Depriva-
tion (IMD), z-scored), urbanicity (measured using the Rural Urban Classification for England
&Wales, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/rural-urban-classification) non-white eth-
nicity (binary), family history of psychiatric illness (binary) and maternal qualifications (0 = no
qualifications, 1 = secondary school qualifications ( age 16), 2 = A-level or equivalent ( age
18), 3 = undergraduate degree or higher).
8.3.7 Missing Data
I handled missing data by estimating models using full-information maximum-likelihood (fiML).
Logistic regressions confirmed that missingness on all variables was predicted by one or more of
the covariates (above).
8.3.8 Longitudinal measurement invariance
I tested longitudinal invariance using multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis. Using time as
a grouping variable, I fit a series measurement models (single latent variables), with covariates
to support fiML missing data estimation, in which I imposed increasingly strict constraints
that model parameters must be equal over time. A decrease in CFI of more than 0.01 of a
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more-constrained model over a less-constrained model indicates that those parameters (loadings,
intercepts or residuals) are not the same over time.
In all cross-lagged models, I aimed to use models as strictly constrained to be equal over time,
with equal loadings and intercepts as minimum. I allowed residual covariance between the same
items measured at different time points.
8.3.9 Mediation
I estimated models with quality of friendships and family relationships (both present in the
each model) as potential mediators. I tested mediation by examining i) whether the direct path
from predictor to outcome (e.g. ASO to AEB) is significant with the mediator included and ii)
whether there is a significant indirect path from the predictor to the mediator to the outcome
(e.g. ASO to poor friendship quality to AEB). When indirect paths were significant, I estimated
percentage of total effect attributable to the mediator by dividing the standardized coefficient
of the indirect path by that of the total path (Iacobucci, 2012). I could not establish temporal
precedence of outcome and social relationship measurements at follow-up, so do not strongly
infer causality.
8.4 Results
8.4.1 Data
Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics of covariates, social support from friends and family and psych-
pathology variables.
Instrument Variable N
Com-
plete
Data
Mean Standard
error
Median Median
Abso-
lute
Devi-
ation
Range
Self-
Report
Male 2388 0.47 0.5 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Socioeconomic de-
privation (IMD)
2376 -0.01 1 0.17 1.24 3.31
Self-
Report
Cannabis use at
baseline
2388 0.12 0.33 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Age (years) 2388 19.08 3.01 18.7 3.51 11.06
Self-
Report
Non-white ethnic-
ity
2388 0.23 0.42 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Any family psychi-
atric history
2388 0.11 0.31 0 0 1
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Table 8.1 – continued from previous page
Instrument Variable N
Com-
plete
Data
Mean Standard
error
Median Median
Abso-
lute
Devi-
ation
Range
Self-
Report
Urban-Rural Indi-
cator
2376 5.47 0.75 5 0 5
Self-
Report
Maternal educa-
tional qualifications
2388 1.73 1.11 2 1.48 3
FAD
(Follow-
up)
Family support 1646 0 1 0 1.16 3.76
CFQ
(Follow-
up)
Friendship support 1667 0 1 0.09 1.01 4.08
Self-
Report
Current psychiatric
help-seeking (Base-
line)
2370 0.06 0.23 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Current psychi-
atric help-seeking
(Follow-up)
1634 0.06 0.23 0 0 1
SMFQ
(Base-
line)
Depressive symp-
toms
2322 7.36 5.49 6 4.45 26
SMFQ
(Follow-
up)
Depressive symp-
toms
1770 6.77 5.53 5 4.45 26
2388 participants returned questionnaire packs at time 1 (aged 14-25) and 1808 returned ques-
tionnaire packs one year later at time 2 (75.7% retention). At baseline, 2106 participants had
complete data on all 74 SPQ items and 2352 had missing data on 5 or fewer items. At follow-
up, 1546 had complete data on all SPQ items and 1668 had missing data on 5 or fewer items.
Descriptive statistics, including number of complete/missing responses on covariates and so-
cial support/psychopathology variables used in latent variable modelling, are shown in Table
8.1.
8.4.2 Longitudinal invariance of psychotic phenomena and asociality
See Table 8.2 for results of longitudinal invariance testing. AEB showed invariant factor loadings
and intercepts, but not residuals. PI and ASO showed invariant factor loadings, intercepts and
residuals. In all cross-lagged models, loadings and intercepts were constrained to be equal over
time.
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Table 8.2: Longitudinal measurement invariance testing through multiple-group latent variable
modelling. Equiv. Structures = no constraints across time. Weak invariance = equal loadings.
Strong invariance = equal loadings and intercepts. Strict invariance = equal loadings, intercepts
& residuals. Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs, Paranoid Ideation and Asociality all showed
at least strong measurement invariance, supporting the use of cross-lagged structural equation
modelling to measure the same construct at different times.
Dimension Equiv.
Struc-
tures
Weak ∆CFI
Weak
Strong ∆CFI
Strong
Strict ∆CFI
Strict
Anomalous
Experi-
ences &
Beliefs
(AEB)
0.969 0.968 -0.002 0.962 -0.006 0.952 -0.01
Paranoid
Ideation
(PI)
0.991 0.99 -0.001 0.989 -0.002 0.981 -0.008
Asociality
(ASO)
0.99 0.989 -0.001 0.989 0 0.988 -0.001
Table 8.2
8.4.3 The longitudinal interactions of psychotic phenomena and asociality
Figures 8.1a-c show SEM diagrams with model fit, unstandardized and standardized path co-
efficients and fit indices. See Appendix B for full parameters and results of Wald significance
testing. All models showed adequate fit to the data.
AEB, PI and ASO were stable over 12 months in all models, indicated by significant autore-
gressive paths with large standardized coefficients. In the AEB/ASO model, ASO at baseline
predicted higher AEB at follow-up (standardized estimate = 0.05, z = 2.00, p = 0.046), but
baseline AEB did not predict follow-up ASO. The cross-lagged path from ASO to AEB was
larger than the path from AEB to ASO (βAEB-BL -> ASO-FU = βASO-BL -> AEB-FU: ∆χ2 = 4.52,
∆DF = 1, p = 0.03).
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Figure 8.1: Cross-lagged structural equation models of PEs and asociality
Baseline (BL)
12-Month 
Follow-Up (FU)
Anom. Exp. 
& Beliefs
(AEB)
Anom. Exp. 
& Beliefs
(AEB)
Asociality
(ASO)
Asociality
(ASO)
B
Paranoid 
Ideation
(PI)
Asociality
(ASO)
Paranoid 
Ideation
(PI)
Asociality
(ASO)
Variable AEB-BL AEB-FU ASO-BL ASO-FU
Covariates Age**, IMD**, Cannabis-
BL*, Ethnic Minority*, 
Psych. History ***, 
Urbanicity*, Mat. Edu***
Male*, 
Cannabis-
BL***, Mat. 
Edu. **
Male**, IMD*,
Ethnic Minority**, 
Psych. History***,
Mat. Edu. ***
Mat.
Edu*
0.63 (0.70)***
0.04 (0.05)*
0.84 (0.83)***
0.06 (0.45) ***0.14 (0.37)***
Anom. Exp. 
& Beliefs
(AEB)
Paranoid 
Ideation
(PI)
Anom. Exp. 
& Beliefs
(AEB)
Paranoid 
Ideation
(PI)
0.64 (0.64)***
0.10 (0.09)**
0.84 (0.82)***
0.14 (0.6) ***0.31 (0.59)***
0.61 (0.68)***
0.65 (0.65)***
0.12 (0.63) ***0.27 (0.62)***
Variable PI-BL PI-FU ASO-BL ASO-FU
Covariates Male*, Age**, IMD**, 
Cannabis-BL*, Psych. 
History ***, Mat. 
Edu***
IMD**, 
Urbanicity*, 
Mat. Edu.**
Male**, IMD*,
Ethnic Minority**, 
Psych. History**, 
Mat. Edu.***
Mat.
Edu.*
Variable AEB-BL AEB-FU PI-BL PI-FU
Covariates IMD**, Cannabis-BL**, 
Age**, Ethnic 
Minority**, Psych. 
History **, Mat. Edu***
Cannabis-
BL***, Mat. 
Edu.**
Male*, IMD*, 
Cannabis-BL*, 
Age***, Mat. 
Edu.***
IMD**, 
Mat. 
Edu.**
A
0.10 (0.07)*
C
0.04 (0.07)·
Figure 8.1: Structural equation model diagrams showing cross-lagged effects and significant
covariates in final models. Numbers outside of brackets are unstandardized coefficients; stan-
dardized coefficients are in brackets. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p< 0.001
In the PI/ASO model, baseline ASO predicted higher PI at follow-up (standardized estimate =
0.09, z = 2.92, p = 0.004), but baseline PI did not predict follow-up ASO. The cross-lagged path
151
from ASO to PI was larger than the path from PI to ASO (βPI-BL -> ASO-FU = βASO-BL -> PI-FU:
∆χ2 = 6.13, ∆DF = 1, p = 0.01).
In the PI/AEB model, baseline AEB predicted higher PI at follow-up (standardized estimate
= 0.07, z = 2.00, p = 0.045) and baseline PI showed a trend towards higher AEB at follow-up
(standardized estimate = 0.07, z = 1.84, p = 0.07). However, the cross-lagged paths from AEB
to PI and from PI to AEB did not differ (βPI-BL -> AEB-FU = βAEB-BL -> PI-FU: ∆χ2 = 0.87,
∆DF = 1, p = 0.87). For this reason, I did not consider the relationships between PI and AEB
in mediation analyses.
8.4.4 Mediation analysis
Model diagrams of mediation analyses are shown in Figure 8.2A-B. Fit indices for all models
exceeded criteria for good fit. Full model parameter estimates and results of Wald significance
tests are given in Appendix B.
The associations between ASO and follow-up AEB and PI were fully mediated by ASO impair-
ing friendships and family relationships. This was indicated by no remaining significant direct
ASO -> AEB or ASO -> PI paths and significant indirect paths via the social relationship
variables.
Of the total ASO -> AEB effect, 76.3% was explained by ASO impairing friendships and 67.0%
was explained by ASO impairing family relationships (indirect path βASO-BL -> Friendship Support -> AEB-FU
= 0.03, standardized estimate = 0.04, z = 4.29, p < 0.001; indirect path βASO-BL -> Family Support -> AEB-FU
= 0.03, standardized estimate = 0.03, z = 3.81, p < 0.001; total path βASO-BL -> AEB-FU = 0.04,
standardized estimate = 0.05, z = 2.00, p = 0.046)
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Figure 8.2: Mediation of effects of asociality by impacts on relationships with
friends and family
Anom. Exp. 
& Beliefs
(AEB)
Asociality
(ASO)
Asociality
(ASO)
Varia
ble
AEB-BL AEB-FU ASO-BL ASO-FU Friendship 
Quality
Family 
Relationship 
Quality
C
o
va
ri
at
es
IMD**, Cannabis-BL**, 
Age**, Ethnic Minority**, 
Psych. History**, 
Urbanicity*, Mat.Edu.***
Ethnic 
Minority*, 
Mat.Edu.**, 
Cannabis-BL***
Male**, IMD*, 
Ethnic Minority**, 
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Figure 8.2: Structural equation model diagrams showing mediation effects and significant covari-
ates. Numbers outside of brackets are unstandardized coefficients; standardized coefficients are
in brackets. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p< 0.001
Of the total ASO -> PI effect, 62.0% was explained by ASO impairing friendships and 40.3% was
explained by ASO impairing family relationships (indirect path βASO-BL->Friendship Support-> PI-FU
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= 0.06, standardized estimate = 0.05, z = 5.52, p < 0.001; indirect path βASO-BL->Family Support->PI-FU
= 0.04, standardized estimate = 0.03, z = 4.24, p < 0.001; total path βASO-BL -> PI-FU = 0.10,
standardized estimate = 0.09, z = 2.67, p = 0.01).
Direct autoregressive paths remained significant in all mediation models, indicating that detri-
ment to friendships and family relationships does not fully mediate the stability of PE dimen-
sions.
8.4.5 Prediction of depressive symptoms and psychiatric help-seeking
ASO, AEB and PI at baseline showed residual covariance with depressive symptoms (Figure
8.3a). ASO and PI, but not AEB, predicted follow-up depressive symptoms, taking baseline
symptoms into account. There was no evidence of either ASO or PI being more predictive
of depressive symptoms, shown by a non-significant Satorra-Bentler chi-squared test in which
the paths from ASO and PI to follow-up depressive symptoms were constrained to be equal
(βASO-BL -> Depressive Symptoms-FU = βPI-BL -> Depressive Symptoms-FU: ∆χ2 = 0.15, ∆DF = 1, p =
0.70). See Appendix B for model parameter estimates.
ASO, PI and AEB were higher in those reporting current psychiatric help-seeking at baseline
(Figure 8.3b). ASO alone, in addition to baseline psychiatric help-seeking, was predictive of
being help-seeking at follow-up.
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Figure 8.3: Prediction of future psychopathology by PEs and asociality
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Figure 8.3: Structural equation model diagrams showing prediction of psychopathology by the
aspects of the psychosis phenotype. Numbers outside of brackets are unstandardized coefficients;
standardized coefficients are in brackets. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p< 0.001
8.5 Discussion
Using cross-lagged structural equation modelling in a large, community sample of adolescents and
young adults, I showed that anomalous experiences and beliefs (AEB), paranoid ideation (PI)
and asociality (ASO), while being relatively stable, interact during development. ASO in young
people predicts greater positive psychotic phenomena (AEB and PI) twelve months later, but
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neither AEB nor PI predict future ASO. These effects are fully mediated by detrimental effects
of ASO on quality of friendships and family relationships. ASO and PI are both associated
with future depressive symptoms, while ASO is associated with future psychiatric help-seeking.
AEB, controlling for ASO and PI, was not associated with future depressive symptoms or help-
seeking. These results support a temporal precedence in which asociality precedes emergence
or increase of positive psychotic phenomena. Building on the results of clustering analyses in
Chapter 7, these results support that asocial dispositions, poor quality of social relationships and
paranoid thoughts and beliefs are detrimental to mental health and are so to a greater extent
than non-paranoid unusual perceptions and beliefs.
The study was strengthened by use of a large, epidemiologically-principled cohort sample of
adolescents and young adults. Inference was greatly strengthened by ensuring the same latent
variables were measured over time (measurement invariance), an improvement on previous work
on this question (Collip et al., 2013). While the effect of poorer social functioning predicting
psychotic phenomena has previously been shown, it has not been subjected to mediation analyses
to show that this effect is explained by impairments to both friendships and family relationships.
I also controlled for a number of relevant confounders including psychiatric help-seeking and drug
use.
This study also has limitations. The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire, measures additional
dimensions that I did not use in this study, including odd perceptions of one’s self and social
anxiety, that may be important aspects of a broader psychosis phenotype. With data from only
two waves of data collection, I was not able to establish temporal precedence in mediation and
so our results should be replicated in a sample with better temporal resolution. Cross-lagged
modelling estimates a single population trajectory so it will be necessary to examine different
trajectories in sub-populations.
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Chapter 9
Different longitudinal relationships
between childhood adversity,
adolescent/adult social support and
dimensions of depressive and psychotic
symptoms in two general population
cohorts
Abstract
Childhood adversity and poor social support are implicated in the development of psy-
chosis but have rarely been investigated together. This study investigated longitudinal re-
lationships in adolescents and young adults between childhood adversity, adolescent/adult
social support and later dimensions of depressive symptoms (DS) and psychotic experi-
ences, measured as paranoid ideation (PI) and non-paranoid anomalous experiences & beliefs
(AEB). Data came from two longitudinal general population cohorts (ROOTS: N = 1238,
assessed at age 14 (baseline) & 17; NSPN: N = 1919, age 16-25, assessed at baseline and
one-year follow-up). Self-report DS, AEB and PI were measured at age 17 in ROOTS and
at follow-up in NSPN. Childhood adversity was measured retrospectively at baseline with
a structured interview with caregivers in ROOTS and a self-report questionnaire in NSPN.
Self-report social support from friends and family were measured at baseline in both cohorts.
Longitudinal relationships were tested by estimating structural equation models with robust
full-information maximum likelihood. The models had direct paths from childhood adver-
sity to DS, PI & AEB, from childhood adversity to social support and from social support
to symptom outcomes. Sex, non-white ethnicity, age (NSPN), socioeconomic deprivation,
cannabis use, family history of mental disorder and maternal years of education were included
as covariates. Childhood adversity had direct effects promoting all symptom outcomes, even
when considering its effects on later social support and the effects of support on symptoms.
Childhood adversity impaired later support from family in ROOTS and support from family
and friends in NSPN. Social support from family and friends reduced depressive symptoms
and paranoid ideation in both cohorts. AEB was less affected by social support; social sup-
port from friends reduced AEB in NSPN but with a smaller effect size than for DS and PI.
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No other social support variables affected AEB. Parts of the effects of childhood adversity on
symptoms were mediated by poorer family support in ROOTS (mediated by family support:
DS = 16.5%, PI = 14.2%) and by poorer family and friendship support in NSPN (mediated
by family support: DS = 29.5%, PI = 14.7%; mediated by friendship support: DS = 15.4%,
PI = 20%, AEB = 10.8%). Childhood adversity may have long-lasting effects predisposing
to some unusual experiences & beliefs that may not be greatly modifiable by positive social
relationships in later life, while paranoid ideation and depressive symptoms may be more
affected by recent social support. Some of the detrimental effects of childhood adversity on
mental health may be attributed to poorer quality of relationships later in life. Good social
support might not eliminate all psychotic experiences but may lower paranoia and distress,
mitigating some effects of early-life adversity.
9.1 Research Questions
• How are childhood adversity and recent social support related to one another and to later
manifestation of distress and PEs?
9.2 Introduction
Childhood adversity is a risk factor for psychotic experiences (PEs) and psychotic disorders
(Varese et al., 2012). Childhood adversity is potentially associated with both potentially ‘benign’
PEs in people with no need for clinical care (Brett et al., 2007; Daalman et al., 2012) as well as
‘maladaptive’ PEs that occur in psychotic disorders.
Childhood adversity may cause PEs via a number of proposed mechanisms, including post-
traumatic dissociation (Morrison, 2001; Kilcommons and Morrison, 2005), attachment difficulties
(Berry et al., 2007), induction of negative schema and cognitive biases (Garety and Kuipers, 2001;
Smith et al., 2006) and increased sensitivity to stress (Zubin and Spring, 1977; Nuechterlein and
Dawson, 1984).
Poor social support in later life is also implicated in the aetiology and course of PEs and psy-
chotic disorder (Gayer-Anderson and Morgan, 2013). Social support comprises social networks,
‘enacted’ support that is actually provided in times of stress and ‘perceived’ support of how
supported a person feels by social relationships. Psychotic illness is associated with poor social
support, both in chronic (Beels, 1981; Buchanan, 1995; Meesters et al., 2010) and early disease
stages (Gayer-Anderson and Morgan, 2013). Poor premorbid levels of functioning and social
integration predict later psychosis (Malmberg et al., 1998; Cannon et al., 2008; Velthorst et al.,
2009; Dragt et al., 2011), with progressive impairment leading up to onset of psychotic disorder
(Velthorst et al., 2016).
Social support is thought to be a critical component of resilience to stress (Cohen and Wills, 1985)
and could interact with the proposed psychosis-promoting mechanisms of adversity. Supportive
relationships through friends, family or other social environments may promote the normalisation
and adaptive appraisal of aberrant experiences (Claridge, 1997; Farias et al., 2013; Peters et
al., 2016), tend away from negative schema (Brown et al., 1986) and negative affect (Powers
et al., 2009), reduce the stress that aberrant experiences cause (Brett et al., 2014) and act
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as a general buffer against stress from all causes. However, relatively little is known about
the relationships between PEs/psychotic disorders, adversity in childhood and social support in
later life. In Chapter 5, I reported that a non-distressed, PE-prone phenotype (NDPE), identified
using two clustering methods in both NSPN and ROOTS, two cohorts of adolescents and young
adults, was similarly associated with childhood adversity when compared to a distressed, PE-
prone phenotype (DPE), who were at greater psychiatric risk. The groups also showed different
profiles of PEs, with NDPE and DPE having similar levels of self-report non-paranoid anomalous
experiences and beliefs (AEB) and interview-verified hallucinations and anomalous experiences,
but the NDPE had lower self-report paranoid ideation (PI) and interview-verified delusions.
On investigating features of their social environment, these phenotypes had similar exposure to
childhood adversity, but strikingly different perceived social support from family and friends, with
far better support in the NDPE phenotype in all samples. In ROOTS, this pattern of differences
in support was present at age 14, 3 years prior to the time of clustering at age 17.
The different profiles of PE dimensions and distress across the NDPE and DPE phenotypes,
may indicate that childhood adversity and later social support have different associations with
symptom outcomes in adolescents and young adults. Specifically, high AEB co-occurred with
childhood adversity but with both good and poor support, while high PI and high depressive
symptoms were associated with both adversity and poor support. We might hypothesise that
social support particularly minimises paranoia and distress but does not necessarily affect other
non-paranoid unusual perceptions or beliefs. Childhood adversity could predispose to all dimen-
sions or principally to AEB.
To understand these associations, we need to disentangle the pathways between childhood ad-
versities and later social support. Unfortunately, family-focused adversities, including severe
adversities like physical abuse and sexual abuse, tend to cluster together and be stable over
childhood and adolescence (Dunn et al., 2011). Family-focused adversity in childhood predicts
poorer quality of family relationships later in life, and peer-focused adversity, like bullying, pre-
dicts poorer quality of friendships (van Harmelen et al., 2016). Progress on this question is
limited by reliance usually on retrospective and cross-sectional measurements and the fact that
social support and childhood adversity have rarely been considered together (Gayer-Anderson
et al., 2015). Associations between childhood adversity and PEs might be partly or wholly
driven by early adversity impairing later social support, which promotes PEs. Alternatively,
childhood adversity and later social support may be independent risk/protective factors for PEs,
with the effects of adversity being mitigated by good social support and exacerbated by poor
support.
In this chapter, I designed analyses to investigate whether outcomes of AEB, PI and DS were
differently affected by childhood adversity and later social support and whether any of the es-
tablished association between childhood adversity and PEs may be driven by impairments of
support in later life. To do this, I used structural equation modelling (SEM), an extension of
latent variable modelling, in NSPN and ROOTS. The SEM framework allowed me to estimate
all relationships between these variables simultaneously while controlling for a number of poten-
tially relevant covariates and appropriately accounting for missing data. I planned first to confirm
that I could adequately measure symptom outcomes (AEB, PI and DS) by simultaneously es-
timating latent variables for each. I extended this model to firstly investigate how symptom
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outcomes were affected by childhood adversity and then secondly investigate how these associa-
tions changed when recent social support as incorporated. Using model comparison, I planned to
test whether associations in these pathways were non-zero and differed from one another. Using
mediation analyses, I planned to test whether the effects of childhood adversity on symptom
outcomes could partly or fully be explained by impairing support later in life.
9.3 Methods
9.3.1 Data
Data come from ROOTS and NSPN. For full information, see Methodology. In NSPN, the
questionnaire measuring childhood adversity (see below) measured adversity between ages of 0-
16, while some participants were aged 14-15. For these analyses, I therefore used only participants
aged 16 or older from NSPN.
9.3.2 Instruments
Psychotic phenomena (Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs, Paranoid Ideation)
In ROOTS, positive psychotic phenomena were measured using two subscales from the Brief
Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory (BSSI), a 20-item self-report instrument measuring psychotic
phenomena in the last two weeks. The AEB subscale comprises perceptual abnormalities and
magical thinking (8 items). The PI subscale comprises suspiciousness and ideas of reference (6
items, of which one is redundant). I showed in chapter 3 that the AEB and PI scales measure
the same underlying psychosis factor as a semi-structured interview method (Horwood et al.,
2008) with high measurement precision over a broad range of PE intensity.
Questions were structured as a set of statements or questions. Participants indicated how often
that statement applied to them in the last two weeks on a 5-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occa-
sionally’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’ and ‘All the time’. Due to low endorsement of some categories,
responses were collapsed into a 3-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occasionally’, ‘Sometimes/Often/All
the time’). SSI scales are likely to be unidimensional (ωH: = AEB = 0.71, PI = 0.88) and have
high internal consistency (ωT: AEB = 0.93, PI = 0.93) (Revelle and Zinbarg, 2009). For further
information, see chapter 2.
In NSPN, self-report psychotic phenomena were measured with the Schizotypal Personality Ques-
tionnaire (SPQ), which comprises 74 dichotomous items intended to measure general, trait-like
experience of 9 dimensions associated with psychosis-proneness. In Chapter 2, I showed that,
while these 9 dimensions are reliable, a number are likely to be redundant. While second-order
latent variable models suggest three or four variables explain scores on these subscales, they
are not reliable when estimated at the item level. Instead, I identified a reliable 6-factor solu-
tion without redundantly high correlations among factors. Of relevance for this study are the
dimensions most similar to typical psychotic phenomena: ‘Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs’
(AEBSPQ), comprising 18 items measuring unusual perceptual experiences and magical think-
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ing and ‘Paranoid Ideation’ (PISPQ), comprising 13 items measuring suspiciousness and ideas of
reference. For further information, see chapter 2.
Depressive symptoms
In both cohorts, self-report DS were measured with the Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (MFQ)
(Costello and Angold, 1988). The full questionnaire comprises 33 items on common symptoms
of depression and anxiety occurring over the last two weeks. The full MFQ is likely to be
multidimensional (Brodbeck et al., 2011) and has a fairly large number of items, which is com-
putationally demanding when fitting latent variable models. I therefore used the items that
comprise the Short Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (SMFQ), which are contained within the
full MFQ. These items were used previously in identifying a common factor underlying mood,
anxiety and psychotic experiences. The SMFQ is likely to be unidimensional and is able to
predict clinical depression and anxiety with reasonable sensitivity (Messer et al., 1995; Turner
et al., 2014).
Family-focused childhood adversity
I compared phenotypes in ROOTS on childhood adversity, measured using the Cambridge Early-
Experiences Interview (Dunn et al., 2011), a semi-structured caregiver interview measured at
the first time point (proband age 14). I used a sum score of any family loss, moderate/severe
family discord, abuse (physical/sexual/emotional), family criminality, financial problems and
unemployment, maternal psychiatric illness, paternal psychiatric illness, aberrant parenting styles
(either parent) and lack of maternal affection/engagement.
In NSPN, adversity between ages 0-16 was measured using the self-report Measures of Parenting
Style (MOPS) questionnaire (Parker et al., 1997), with subscales of abuse, indifference and
overbearingness measured for mothers and fathers independently. I used a sum score of all
subscales for both parents.
Social support
Perceived social support from friends was measuring using the Friendship Quality scale of the
Cambridge Friendships Questionnaire (van Harmelen et al., 2016). Perceived social support from
family members was measured using the General Functioning scale of the McMasters Family
Assessment Device (Epstein and Baldwin, 1983).
Covariates
Covariates included were: sex, non-white ethnicity, age (in NSPN), socioeconomic deprivation
(estimated from post-codes; ROOTS: ACORN category of ‘hard-pressed’, http://www.caci.co.uk;
NSPN: socioeconomic deprivation (overall country ranking), https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/english-
indices-of-deprivation), family history of psychiatric illness, cannabis use and maternal years of
education (ROOTS) or maternal qualifications (NSPN).
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9.3.3 Viability of sum scores and internal consistency
I assessed the psychometric properties of the instruments measuring CA, family support (FAD-
GF) and friendship support (CFQ-FQ) using bifactor modelling of each scale (see Empirical
Chapter 1 for methods). Sum scores were used if a bifactor model (with a general factor and
three specific factors) could be fit to the observed data and the proportion of variance explained
by the general factor (‘general factor saturation’, (ωH) exceeded 0.5 (Revelle and Zinbarg, 2009).
I report the variance explained by the general factor and all specific factors (ωT) as an indicator
of internal consistency (Revelle and Zinbarg, 2009). I estimated bifactor models from polychoric
correlations to account for ordinal data on the CAMEEI, FAD-GF and CFQ-FQ and Pearson
correlations for the subscale scores on the MOPS.
9.3.4 Structural equation models
To ensure that the models adequately explained observed data on symptom outcomes, ‘measure-
ment’ models of the three latent outcome variables (AEB, PI and SMFQ) were first estimated,
with covariates included by adding regression paths to each latent outcome variable. To test
the effects of the social environment, measurement models were then extended to ‘structural’
models (Figure 9.1). Childhood adversity and social support were included by regression paths
from them to latent symptom outcomes. Covariates were included by adding regression paths
to latent symptom outcomes and to adversity and support variables, where present. ‘Adversity’
structural models tested the effects of childhood adversity alone with regression paths from CA
to the outcome variables. ‘Adversity & support’ structural models simultaneously tested effects
of adversity, support and their inter-relationships. These models included regression paths from
CA to symptom outcome variables, testing the ‘direct paths’ from CA to symptoms. These mod-
els also included regression paths from CA to social support variables, then from social support
variables to the outcomes. The latter paths tested the effects of social support on outcomes and,
when combined with the former, make up the multi-step ‘indirect paths’ from CA to symptoms
via effects on social support.
Regression coefficients and standard errors for indirect paths and ‘total paths’ (combined direct
and indirect) were quantitatively estimated using the delta method. I estimated the size of me-
diation effects by comparing the standardized coefficients of indirect paths with the standardized
coefficient of the total paths (Iacobucci, 2012).
Variables like CA and social support and ordinally-measured item responses were expected to be
non-normally distributed. All models were therefore fit with a robust maximum-likelihood (MLR)
estimator with robust (Huber-White) standard errors and Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistics.
Fit was assessed using CFI & TLI (both > 0.9), the RMSEA (< 0.08) and the SRMR (< 0.06). I
calculated the RMSEA of the null model (with no associations between variables), because when
the null model fits well (RMSEA < 0.158), fit indices based on comparison between the actual
model and null model (CFI & TLI) will be too low and less useful (Kenny, n.d.). Missing data
were estimated using full-information maximum likelihood.
Nonsignificant paths were retained in order to minimise empirical re-specification of models. I
reported unstandardized and standardized path coefficients, their standard errors and their sig-
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nificance based on Wald tests. Significance and difference between regression paths of interest
were additionally tested using the Satorra-Bentler Chi-Squared test, in which a model was es-
timated with the regression coefficient (β) of the path of interest constrained to 0 or equal to
another path coefficient and fit compared to a model in which the path coefficient was freely es-
timated. A significant result, meaning that constraining that path coefficient resulted in poorer
model fit, confirmed that a path is non-zero or is different to another path.
SEMs were fit using the lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) package in R, supplemented by functions from
semTools (semTools Contributors, 2016).
9.4 Results
9.4.1 Data
Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics.
Instrument Variable N
Com-
plete
Data
Mean Standard
error
Median Median
Abso-
lute
Devi-
ation
Range
Self-
Report
Male 2388 0.47 0.5 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Socioeconomic de-
privation (IMD)
2376 -0.01 1 0.17 1.24 3.31
Self-
Report
Cannabis use at
baseline
2388 0.12 0.33 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Age (years) 2388 19.08 3.01 18.7 3.51 11.06
Self-
Report
Non-white ethnic-
ity
2388 0.23 0.42 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Any family psychi-
atric history
2388 0.11 0.31 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Urban-Rural Indi-
cator
2376 5.47 0.75 5 0 5
Self-
Report
Maternal educa-
tional qualifications
2388 1.73 1.11 2 1.48 3
FAD
(Follow-
up)
Family support 1646 0 1 0 1.16 3.76
CFQ
(Follow-
up)
Friendship support 1667 0 1 0.09 1.01 4.08
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Table 9.1 – continued from previous page
Instrument Variable N
Com-
plete
Data
Mean Standard
error
Median Median
Abso-
lute
Devi-
ation
Range
Self-
Report
Current psychiatric
help-seeking (Base-
line)
2370 0.06 0.23 0 0 1
Self-
Report
Current psychi-
atric help-seeking
(Follow-up)
1634 0.06 0.23 0 0 1
SMFQ
(Base-
line)
Depressive symp-
toms
2322 7.36 5.49 6 4.45 26
SMFQ
(Follow-
up)
Depressive symp-
toms
1770 6.77 5.53 5 4.45 26
Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics of covariates, social support from friends and family and psych-
pathology variables.
In ROOTS, 1238 participants took part at time 1 (age 14) and 1074 took part at time 3 (age
17, 86.8% retention). In NSPN, 2388 participants returned questionnaire packs at time 1, with
1919 between the ages of 16-25 included in this study. 1808 of the 2388 returned questionnaire
packs one year later at time 2 (75.7% retention). Measures of CA (CAMEEI in ROOTS, MOPS
in NSPN), family support (FAD-GF) and friendship support (CFQ-FQ) showed adequate uni-
dimensionality (ωH) and good internal consistency (ωT) in ROOTS (CA: (ωH = 0.77, (ωT =
0.92; family support: (ωH = 0.79; (ωT = 0.94; friendship support: (ωH = 0.68; (ωT = 0.92) and
in NSPN (CA: (ωH = 0.57; (ωT = 0.89; family support: (ωH = 0.84; (ωT = 0.96; friendship
support: (ωH = 0.73; (ωT = 0.91)
2388 participants returned questionnaire packs at time 1 (aged 14-25) and 1808 returned ques-
tionnaire packs one year later at time 2 (75.7% retention). At baseline, 2106 participants had
complete data on all 74 SPQ items and 2352 had missing data on 5 or fewer items. At follow-
up, 1546 had complete data on all SPQ items and 1668 had missing data on 5 or fewer items.
Descriptive statistics, including number of complete/missing responses on covariates and so-
cial support/psychopathology variables used in latent variable modelling, are shown in Table
9.1.
Multivariate logistic regressions showed that missingness on each variable was predicted by one
or more of sex, non-white ethnicity, socioeconomic deprivation, level of maternal education,
cannabis use or age (in NSPN), supporting that data meet missing-at-random (MAR) assump-
tions required for fiML estimation. All continuous observed variables were mean-centred and
scaled to unit variance.
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9.4.2 Fit of measurement models for symptom outcomes
The measurement model of AEB, PI and DS fit well in both ROOTS (χ2 = 1380.035, DF = 434,
p < 0.001, RMSEA (95% CI) = 0.042 (0.040 – 0.044), SRMR = 0.050, RMSEANULL = 0.126,
CFI* = 0.872, TLI* = 0.858) and in NSPN (χ2 = 4532.695, DF = 1186, p < 0.001, RMSEA
(95% CI) = 0.034 (0.033 – 0.035), SRMR = 0.048, RMSEANULL = 0.094, CFI* = 0.838, TLI*
= 0.828; * = null RMSEA too low for CFI/TLI to be meaningful).
9.4.3 Childhood adversity is associated with depressive symptoms, anoma-
lous experiences & beliefs and paranoid ideation
Table 9.2: Results of Wald tests of regression parameters being equal or zero in longitudinal
structural equation models of childhood adversity predicting later depressive symptoms and
psychotic phenomena.
Model β χ2 ∆DF P-
value
ROOTS βCA -> DS = 0 19.7 1 <0.001
βCA -> AEB = 0 6.56 1 0.01
βCA -> PI = 0 7.16 1 0.007
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB = βCA -> PI 0.08 2 0.96
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB 0.07 1 0.795
βCA -> DS = βCA -> PI <0.001 1 0.962
βCA -> PI = βCA -> AEB 0.06 1 0.802
NSPN βCA -> DS = 0 124.2 1 <0.001
βCA -> AEB = 0 72.66 1 <0.001
βCA -> PI = 0 116.74 1 <0.001
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB = βCA -> PI 41.44 2 <0.001
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB 30.85 1 <0.001
βCA -> DS = βCA -> PI 0.49 1 0.483
βCA -> PI = βCA -> AEB 31.31 1 <0.001
Table 9.2: CA = Childhood adversity. DS = depressive symptoms. AEB = Anomalous Experi-
ences & Beliefs. PI = Paranoid Ideation.
The adversity structural model fit well in ROOTS and NSPN (see Figure 9.2). For full model
parameter estimates, see Appendix B. For results of path testing, see Table 9.2. CA was asso-
ciated with DS, AEB and PI in both cohorts. In ROOTS, these associations did not differ. In
NSPN, the associations between CA and DS and PI were equal and greater than the association
between CA and AEB.
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9.4.4 Childhood adversity has direct effects with social support considered.
Social support lowers depressive symptoms and paranoid ideation more
than anomalous experiences & beliefs
Table 9.3: Results of Wald tests of regression parameters being equal or zero in longitudinal
structural equation models relationships between childhood adversity, social support, depressive
symptoms and psychotic phenomena.
Cohort β χ2 ∆DF P-
value
ROOTS βCA -> DS = 0 13.86 1 <0.001
βCA -> AEB = 0 5.24 1 0.022
βCA -> PI = 0 4.3 1 0.038
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB = βCA -> PI 0.06 2 0.971
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB 0.05 1 0.817
βCA -> DS = βCA -> PI 0.02 1 0.881
βCA -> PI = βCA -> AEB 0.05 1 0.82
βCA -> Family = 0 18.15 1 <0.001
βCA -> Friendship = 0 1.52 1 0.218
βCA -> Family = βCA -> Friendship 4.27 1 0.039
βFamily -> DS = 0 25.24 1 <0.001
βFamily -> AEB = 0 3.38 1 0.066
βFamily -> PI = 0 17.61 1 <0.001
βFamily -> DS = βFamily -> AEB = βFamily -> PI 5.92 2 0.052
βFamily -> DS = βFamily -> AEB 5.63 1 0.018
βFamily -> DS = βFamily -> PI 2.28 1 0.131
βFamily -> PI = βFamily -> AEB 2.09 1 0.148
βFriendships -> DS = 0 10.28 1 0.001
βFriendships -> AEB = 0 0.06 1 0.801
βFriendships -> PI = 0 9.36 1 0.002
βFriendships -> DS = βFriendships -> AEB = βFriendships -> PI 6.95 2 0.031
βFriendships -> DS = βFriendships -> AEB 8.04 1 0.005
βFriendships -> DS = βFriendships -> PI 1.73 1 0.188
βFriendships -> PI = βFriendships -> AEB 10.5 1 0.001
NSPN βCA -> DS = 0 27.64 1 <0.001
βCA -> AEB = 0 29.94 1 <0.001
βCA -> PI = 0 35.41 1 <0.001
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Table 9.3 – continued from previous page
Cohort β χ2 ∆DF P-
value
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB = βCA -> PI 6.17 2 0.046
βCA -> DS = βCA -> AEB 5.71 1 0.017
βCA -> DS = βCA -> PI 0.14 1 0.703
βCA -> PI = βCA -> AEB 2.84 1 0.092
βCA -> Family = 0 486.02 1 <0.001
βCA -> Friendship = 0 133.6 1 <0.001
βCA -> Family = βCA -> Friendship 61.9 1 <0.001
βFamily -> DS = 0 40.15 1 <0.001
βFamily -> AEB = 0 <0.001 1 0.952
βFamily -> PI = 0 8.35 1 0.004
βFamily -> DS = βFamily -> AEB = βFamily -> PI 38.65 2 <0.001
βFamily -> DS = βFamily -> AEB 10.25 1 0.001
βFamily -> DS = βFamily -> PI 9.37 1 0.002
βFamily -> PI = βFamily -> AEB 41.08 1 <0.001
βFriendships -> DS = 0 34.81 1 <0.001
βFriendships -> AEB = 0 15.35 1 <0.001
βFriendships -> PI = 0 55.45 1 <0.001
βFriendships -> DS = βFriendships -> AEB = βFriendships -> PI 30.16 2 <0.001
βFriendships -> DS = βFriendships -> AEB 31.2 1 <0.001
βFriendships -> DS = βFriendships -> PI 2.21 1 0.138
βFriendships -> PI = βFriendships -> AEB 10.39 1 0.001
Table 9.3: CA = Childhood adversity. DS = depressive symptoms. AEB = Anomalous Experi-
ences & Beliefs. PI = Paranoid Ideation.
The adversity & support model fit well in ROOTS (Figure 9.3) and NSPN (Figure 9.4). For full
model parameters, see Appendix B. For results of path testing, see Table 9.3.
In ROOTS, with social support at 14 included in the model, CA was still directly associated
with DS and AEB, and there was a trend-level association with PI. The size of these direct
CA associations did not differ. In NSPN, CA was still directly associated with DS, AEB and
PI. These direct CA associations differed overall and the association between CA and DS was
stronger than that between CA and AEB.
In ROOTS, social support from family and from friends was associated with lower DS and PI,
but not AEB. The sets of associations between both types of social support and DS, AEB and
PI differed overall. In both cases, the only pair-wise difference was that social support was more
strongly associated with lower DS than lower AEB. There was a trend towards social support
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from family being associated with lower PI than lower AEB.
In NSPN, social support from family was associated with lower DS and PI, but not AEB. Family
support lowered DS more strongly than PI, and lowered both more than AEB, supported by sig-
nificant differences between all three paths. Social support from friendships was associated with
lower DS, PI and AEB. Friendship support lowered DS and PI equally and lowered both more
than it did AEB, supported by an overall difference and pair-wise differences in all associations
apart from between friendship support and DS and PI.
9.4.5 Mediation analyses
Table 9.4: Results of Wald tests of regression parameters being equal or zero in longitudinal
structural equation models of childhood adversity predicting later depressive symptoms and
psychotic phenomena.
Cohort Path Unstd.
es-
ti-
mate
Std.
er-
ror
z P-value Std.
es-
ti-
mate
%
me-
di-
ated
ROOTS CA -> Family support -> DS 0.01 0 3.26 0.001 0.03 16.5
CA -> Friendship support -> DS 0 0 1.11 0.269 0.01 -
Total ->DS 0.06 0.01 4.33 < 0.001 0.17 -
CA -> Family support -> AEB 0 0 1.63 0.102 0.01 -
CA -> Friendship support -> AEB 0 0 0.2 0.843 0 -
Total -> AEB 0.06 0.02 2.63 0.008 0.11 -
CA -> Family support -> PI 0.01 0 3.08 0.002 0.02 14.2
CA -> Friendship support -> PI 0 0 1.13 0.258 0.01 -
Total -> PI 0.06 0.02 2.7 0.007 0.12 -
NSPN CA -> Family support -> DS 0.03 0.01 5.89 < 0.001 0.1 29.5
CA -> Friendship support -> DS 0.02 0 5.11 < 0.001 0.05 15.4
Total ->DS 0.11 0.01 10.18 < 0.001 0.34 -
CA -> Family support -> AEB 0 0 0.06 0.952 0 -
CA -> Friendship support -> AEB 0.01 0 3.62 < 0.001 0.04 10.8
Total -> AEB 0.04 0.01 6.37 < 0.001 0.25 -
CA -> Family support -> PI 0.02 0.01 2.83 0.005 0.05 14.7
CA -> Friendship support -> PI 0.02 0 6.32 < 0.001 0.07 20
Total -> PI 0.1 0.01 10.67 < 0.001 0.32 -
Table 9.4: CA = Childhood adversity. DS = depressive symptoms. AEB = Anomalous Experi-
ences & Beliefs. PI = Paranoid Ideation.
See Table 9.4 for results of indirect path estimation and mediation analyses. In ROOTS, the
effect of CA promoting DS and PI, but not AEB, was partially mediated by worsening social
support from family (16.5% CA->DS mediated, 14.6% CA->PI mediated).
In NSPN, the effects of CA promoting DS and PI was partly mediated by worsening support from
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family (29.5% CA->DS mediated, 14.7% CA->PI mediated) and the effects of CA promoting
DS, PI and AEB were partly mediated by worsening support from friendships (15.4% CA->DS
mediated, 10.8% CA->AEB mediated, 20% CA->PI mediated).
9.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I showed that family-focused childhood adversity (CA) was associated with de-
pressive/anxious symptoms (DS), anomalous experiences & beliefs (AEB) and paranoid ideation
(PI), independently of any effects of recent social support and the relationships between CA and
social support. Support from family and friends was a protective factor for DS and PI, but had
less effect, if any, on AEB, suggesting dimensions of psychotic phenomena and distress are differ-
entially sensitive to a positive recent social environment. In both cohorts, the association between
CA and DS and PI were partly mediated by impairing perceived support from family later in life.
In one cohort, CA was also associated with poorer support from friendships, which partly medi-
ated the association between CA and all outcomes. A larger proportion of the CA associations
with DS and PI were mediated by recent social support than the CA associations with AEB.
Overall, these results suggest CA induces a long-lasting and potentially not-easily-modifiable
predisposition towards unusual perceptual experiences and magical thinking. Compared to such
phenomena, the manifestation of paranoia and depressive/anxious symptoms may be more in-
fluenced by the recent social environment. The implications of these results will be discussed in
full in the next chapter.
This work has a number of strengths. These results were obtained, in-part, using prospective
measurements and the substantive pattern replicated in two large general population cohorts of
adolescents and young adults. Similar effects were observed whether CA was measured using a
detailed care-giver interview or a self-report measure. Results were controlled for a large number
of potential covariates.
This work is limited by retrospective assessment of CA, though this was partly mitigated in
ROOTS by a detailed semi-structured interview method with timelines of adversities (Dunn et
al., 2011). I considered CA broadly and did not investigate dissociable effects of specific types
of adversities, such as indifference and abuse. Some adversities, such as sexual abuse, may
predispose more strongly to psychosis than others, though findings in the literature are not fully
consistent. It is therefore possible that the effects I found here could be driven by exposure to
specific adversities and other effects of specific adversities could be obscured. Furthermore, abuse
of any kind was fairly rare in the ROOTS cohort (Dunn et al., 2011). However, adversities tend to
cluster (Dunn et al., 2011) so it may be ecologically valid to consider a general index of adversity
severity. Further work might consider whether these effects are driven by specific adversity
types. I considered only family-focused CA and did not include peer-focused adversities such as
bullying, which are also associated with psychotic phenomena, psychopathology, and impaired
social support. Further work will need to investigate peer-focused adversities in conjunction with
family-focused adversities and social support. Though included as covariates, it is possible that
there are age and/or sex differences in these pathways, such that overall effects were driven by
heterogeneous effects across age or sex groups.
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Chapter 10
Discussion: The social environment,
psychotic experiences and
psychopathology
10.1 Summary of findings
10.1.1 Question 4: How do PEs and social dispositions/social relationships
influence one another over time?
In Chapter 8, I found that quality of recent social support and/or asocial dispositions discrim-
inated phenotypes of PEs occurring with and without distress in young people (respectively:
‘distressed, PE-prone’, DPE; ‘non-distressed, PE-prone’, NDPE). These results could not speak
to whether the association between the social environment and PEs was causal, in that social
support might protect against distress or modify PEs, or whether the it was symptomatic, in
that the underlying mechanisms driving PEs and distress would also impair social functioning.
In this study, I made a step towards answering this question by investigating possible bidirec-
tional longitudinal associations between social dispositions and dimensions of PEs in the NSPN
cohort. Using cross-lagged structural equation modelling, I was able to infer that asociality uni-
directionally predicted greater paranoid ideation (PI) and non-paranoid anomalous experiences
and beliefs (AEB) one year later, with no evidence that either dimension of PEs predicted fu-
ture asociality. This supported a temporal precedence in that social difficulties may precede or
promote PEs. The effects of asociality on future PEs were mediated by effects on social support
from family and friends, suggesting that asocial dispositions at one time predict later impair-
ments in real world relationships that are associated with PEs. When I investigated associations
between asociality and PE dimensions at one time with future markers of general mental health,
I found that asociality and PI were predictive of depressive symptoms while asociality alone pre-
dicted future help-seeking for mental illness. Complementing the findings of clustering analyses,
these results support a temporal precedence in which asociality precedes emergence or increase
of positive psychotic phenomena.
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10.1.2 Question 5: How are childhood adversity and social support related
to one another and to later manifestation of distress and PEs?
In Chapter 8, I showed that the DPE and NDPE phenotypes were both associated with in-
creased exposure to childhood adversity but were strongly differentiated by recent social support
from family and friends. This raised the possibility that childhood adversity could predispose
to some forms of PEs but paranoia and distress would be more strongly determined (or at least
predicted by) recent social relationships and dispositions. Following the cluster analysis results
in Chapter 7 and the association between the social environment and PEs evident in Chapter
9, I investigated longitudinal effects of childhood adversity and recent social support on later
depressive symptoms and dimensions of PEs in both NSPN and ROOTS. Using structural equa-
tion modelling, I investigated, firstly, whether outcomes of depressive symptoms, AEB and PI
were differentially influenced by childhood adversity or recent social support, as was suggested
by the clustering analyses. Secondly, I tested whether any of the effects of childhood adver-
sity on symptoms were mediated by impairing quality of supportive relationships later in life.
Consistent with the symptom phenotypes returned by clustering, I found that childhood adver-
sity, when considered without social support, predisposed to depressive symptoms, AEB and PI.
These relationships remained with recent support from family and friends included in the model
(though the association between adversity and PI in ROOTS fell to trend-level). In ROOTS,
social support from family and friends both lowered depressive symptoms and PI, but not AEB.
In NSPN, social support from family lowered depressive symptoms and PI, but not AEB, while
support from friends lowered all three outcomes. In all cases, there was evidence that support
lowered AEB less than it did PI or depressive symptoms. Mediation analyses showed that some,
but not all of the effects of childhood adversity on depressive symptoms and PI was mediated
by worsening later social support. In contrast, the effects of adversity on AEB were either not
mediated or had smaller proportions mediated by social support. This was fully consistent with
the results of clustering analyses, in that the NDPE group and DPE groups, who did not differ in
terms of AEB but did in terms of depressive symptoms and PI, had similar exposure to childhood
adversity but dramatically different levels of social support.
10.2 Discussion
10.2.1 Associations between the social environment, social functioning and
psychosis: correlation or causality?
Together, these studies support the now well-evidenced association between childhood adversity
and psychosis (Varese et al., 2012) and previous suggestions that adversity in early life predis-
poses to nonclinical as well as clinical PEs (Bebbington et al., 2004; Arseneault et al., 2011;
Daalman et al., 2012). These studies also support the association between impaired social func-
tioning/relationships and psychosis-proneness, further supporting that social difficulties precede
onset or increase of psychotic phenomena (Jones et al., 1994; Monte et al., 2008; Strauss et al.,
2012; Collip et al., 2013; Velthorst et al., 2016). My results further suggest some specificity of
the associations between social support and dimensions of psychosis-proneness, in that positive
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social relationships have greater protective effects against paranoid ideation than non-paranoid
unusual perceptions and beliefs.
A key question to consider that arises from both of these studies is whether social difficulties are
a cause or a correlate of the processes underlying positive psychotic phenomena. If both have
a common underlying cause, the patterns observed here and elsewhere (Collip et al., 2013) of
asociality promoting PEs and social support reducing paranoid ideation and depressive symptoms
might reflect unfolding of a developmental process in which social behaviours are affected before
subjective distortion of reality and associated distress.
Indeed, social impairments are well-known to precede and predict onset of clinical psychosis, being
present both in children who go on to develop schizophrenia in adulthood (Jones et al., 1994;
Malmberg et al., 1998) and becoming prominent before a first psychotic episode (Velthorst et
al., 2016). My results show the same pattern occurring in subclinical variation in phenotypically
similar traits. Social functioning may, therefore, be a valuable predictor of emerging psychotic
experiences. Furthermore, social difficulties are far from specific to psychosis (Millan et al., 2012)
and may transdiagnostically index risk and poor functioning (Caspi et al., 1996; Abbott et al.,
2008).
My results, being observational, cannot distinguish between causality or common cause. If social
difficulties have a causal role in promoting psychosis, then social networks and social dispositions
may be suitable targets for reducing psychosis-proneness. Indeed, family and friendship-based
interventions have shown some success at preventing relapse and minimising symptoms of psy-
chotic illness (McFarlane et al., 2003; O’Brien et al., 2014; Poulton et al., 2014; Harrop et al.,
2015). If impaired social functioning is an early manifestation of the psychopathological pro-
cesses that later generate PEs, targeting social relationships themselves may not be effective but
social functioning might still be a useful predictor of health trajectories.
Even if these associations were causal, I cannot infer whether these effects, namely asociality
promoting PEs and social support reducing paranoid ideation and distress, are sufficient to dras-
tically change someone’s trajectories in terms of health and functioning. For example, improving
social support may improve but not eliminate symptoms, or lessen the severity of first-episode
psychosis but not prevent its occurrence.
10.2.2 Mechanisms by which the social environment may predispose to or
protect against PEs and distress
At this point, I will discuss mechanisms by which the social environment may predispose to or
protect against PEs and distress.
In Chapter 2, I described Marr’s levels of analysis framework for investigations of information-
processing functions (Marr, 1982). I described PEs in Marr’s computational terms (the inputs,
outputs and purpose of the computations performed) and introduced the predictive processing
framework (Helmholtz, 1860; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2005) that can be used to model
them in algorithmic terms (fully describing the informational quantities and operations performed
on them in order to achieve the process described at the computational level). In discussing
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mechanisms of PEs and how the social environment may influence them, I will again appeal to
this predictive processing framework (for further information, see Chapter 2).
Briefly, perception can be described as inferring properties of the environment (including bodily
states) by integrating incoming sensory information, which is inherently ambiguous, with pre-
dictions from prior knowledge (Helmholtz, 1860). Prior knowledge can be modelled as a set
of internal models that capture statistical regularities in the environment. These models track
regularities over various spatiotemporal scales and across modalities and can be considered ar-
ranged in a hierarchy, ascending from low-level, unimodal sensory inputs to high-level, abstract
beliefs (Mumford, 1992). In algorithmic terms, the most popular model of how inference can be
achieved is by minimising the mismatch between predictions from internal models and incom-
ing sensory input, which are termed prediction errors (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005).
Within this model, predictions can be considered ‘hypotheses’ over the causes of sensory informa-
tion and inference can be cast as testing hypotheses against reality (Gregory, 1980). Predictions
will sometimes fail to match inputs because no internal models accurately capture the statistical
properties of the environment that gave rise to those inputs. In these cases, prediction errors
can be used to update internal models (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Pearce and Hall, 1980),
changing the predictions they generate and thus learning about properties of the environment.
Critically, the contribution of information sources (predictions & prediction errors) to inference
and the degree to which they drive model updating should be weighted by their reliability (Knill
and Pouget, 2004), so as to avoid learning inappropriately from unreliable evidence or wrongly
inferring properties of the environment. Atypicalities in integration of stored prior knowledge
with sensory information might cause aberrant inferences and learning, tending towards reality
distortion (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013; Jardri and Deneve, 2013).
Within this scheme, aetiological factors might predispose to or protect against PEs by disturbing
the reliability-weighting of information sources, tending towards aberrant inferences and learning.
In the remainder of this discussion, I aim to use this framework to map out possible pathways by
which the social environment may influence PEs and by which different PEs may have different
health implications. In doing so, I will discuss mechanisms proposed in the literature and attempt
to expand on them by considering them in common computational terms. I consider the following
non-exhaustive list of existing mechanisms by which the social environment (early life adversity
and supportive social relationships) is theorised to influence PEs; the induction of negative
affect, induction of cognitive biases (attentional biases and attributional biases), induction of
maladaptive appraisals of experiences, attachment difficulties and dysregulation of the stress
response. I also consider one more novel proposal; that the social environment influences the
availability and use of information derived from other people in inference and learning.
Negative affect
Childhood adversity and poor social networks may predispose to PEs by induction of negative
affect. Poor social support may also impair a normal buffer against stress and negative affect
(Cohen and Wills, 1985). Affective dysregulation and negative affect commonly co-occur with
psychotic symptoms and PEs, evident in the co-morbidity between emotional and psychotic
disorders (Buckley et al., 2009) and the concurrence of depressive symptoms, anxious symptoms
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and PEs in the general population (Stochl et al., 2015; van Nierop et al., 2015) (further supported
in Chapter 7). In experience-sampling studies, increase in momentary negative affect preceded
paranoid ideation (Kramer et al., 2014) and increase in anxiety or decrease in self-esteem preceded
onset of paranoid episodes (Thewissen et al., 2011). The precise mechanisms by which negative
affect might promote PEs are unclear. Emotional dysregulation may alter appraisals of the
environment and experiences (Gross, 2002; Kramer et al., 2014) or may tend towards construction
of negative schema and cognitive biases (Garety and Kuipers, 2001; Smith et al., 2006; Bentall
and Fernyhough, 2008) (see below).
These mechanisms are difficult to model in computational terms because of limited understand-
ing of the information-processing that underlies affect and how this relates to processes like
perception. It could be that environmental influences like childhood adversity predispose to
common computational changes manifesting as both emotional dysregulation and aberrant per-
cepts/beliefs, or that one set of changes leads to the other. Negative affect may also be a
correlate (even if temporally precedent) but not a cause of PEs or could be generated by PEs
themselves.
Cognitive biases
Social environmental influences may predispose to PEs by promoting ‘cognitive biases’ (Bentall
et al., 2001; Garety and Kuipers, 2001), a diverse set of phenomena denoting patterns of changes
in information-processing.
Childhood adversity is associated with attentional biases towards threatening or emotional in-
formation, manifesting as rapid or preferential processing of threat-related or emotional stimuli
in experimental tasks (Cisler et al., 2011; Wingenfeld et al., 2011), with similar biases evident
in clinical psychosis (Besnier et al., 2011; Bendall et al., 2013) psychosis high-risk (Nieman et
al., 2014) and PEs in the general population (Marks et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2014). The
effects of social support on attentional biases have, to my knowledge, not been investigated.
These biases may be described in computational terms as effectively increasing the influence
of emotionally-salient information on inference and learning. This could arise by increasing its
availability through improved detection or increasing the weight afforded to it within a predictive
processing scheme.
Childhood adversity is also associated with attributional biases, also referred to as attributional
styles and closely related to theories on locus of control (Rotter, 1966). Psychosis is associated
with an ‘external’ attributional style, in that events or experiences are more likely to be at-
tributed to an external cause than an internal or self-generated one (Frenkel et al., 1995; Bentall
and Fernyhough, 2008; Cooper et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 2011, 2013) and may mediate
the association between childhood adversity and psychosis (Fisher et al., 2013). In computa-
tional terms, these attributional biases could be described themselves as internal models that
act as priors for inference and learning, tending towards inferring external, rather than internal
causes. This may result in incorrectly inferring causes of sensory data, tending towards unusual
perceptions or interpretations of events.
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Changes in the availability or use of socially-derived information
Information derived from others is critical to human success (Baldwin, 2000; Boyd et al., 2011),
modulating learning even from infancy (Birch et al., 2008, 2010). Traditional learning models
have tended to focus on information gained only from personal experience. However, information
gained from observing and interacting with others alters our experience and beliefs about the
world, ranging from low-level perceptual information (Sorkin et al., 2001; Bahrami et al., 2010;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2012) to complex, high-level knowledge, like intentions and mental
states (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Kilner et al., 2007; Kilner and Frith, 2008).
Asociality and impaired social relationships might cause aberrant or reduced use of socially-
derived information, from implicit cues to explicit exchanges. Aberrantly interpreting socially-
derived information may directly promote false inferences and inappropriate belief updating,
like wrongly inferring the intentions of others. Under-using socially-derived information might
allow aberrant beliefs to flourish by impairing a key mechanism of rejecting erroneous inferences:
the guidance and opinions of others. This is especially important in the interpretation of social
signals which are inherently uncertain, with this uncertainty only being resolvable through direct
and cooperative interactions. Delusions are often about the intentions of others and the absence
of a supportive social framework may rob the sufferer of an important information source.
Dysregulation of the stress response
The stress response comprises a set of physical and behavioural changes to allow an organism to
meet environmental challenges or threats (McEwen, 2007; Koolhaas et al., 2011). The physiolog-
ical parameters of the acute stress response are tightly tuned to environmental uncertainty and
optimise learning when faced with uncertain threats (de Berker et al., 2016). This suggests that
the stress response itself is determined by computation of environmental threat, with uncertain
threats producing the greatest response.
The acute stress response then modulates inference and learning, with the goal, simplistically,
being ‘fight or flight’. Stress can directly influence perception (Simoens et al., 2007; Hoskin et al.,
2014a, 2014b), favouring ‘liberal’ detection of signals (Hoskin et al., 2014a) (more detections at
the cost of more false-positives), which might be adaptive when trying to detect threats. Stress
modulates learning (Bogdan et al., 2011; Cavanagh et al., 2011; Radenbach et al., 2015), memory
formation (Henckens et al., 2009; Schwabe and Wolf, 2010; Schwabe et al., 2012) and memory
retrieval (Vedhara et al., 2000; Joëls et al., 2006), changing the way that internal models are
updated and the information that might be accessed when next faced with a stressor. Stress may
also lead to biased appraisals of events and information and over-generalization of learning about
threats (Grillon et al., 2002; Lissek and Grillon, 2010), leading possibly to tenacious negative
beliefs about the self, other people and the world (Garety and Kuipers, 2001; Smith et al.,
2006; Fowler et al., 2012; Garety et al., 2013). It follows that acute stress precipitates PEs and
depressive symptoms, by predisposing to false inferences (hallucinations), aberrant updating of
internal models (formation of delusions or negative schema) and favouring using certain internal
models to make sense of events (delusional or depressive appraisals).
Exposure to stressors and adversities early in life may predispose to PEs and depressive symp-
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toms in adolescence and adulthood because they induce long-lasting dysregulation of the stress
response, causing hyper-reactivity to stress and stress-related adaptations even in safe, pre-
dictable environments. Given that the physiological parameters of the stress response seems
to be tuned to environmental uncertainty about negative outcomes (de Berker et al., 2016),
dysregulation of the stress response might be considered dysregulation of the computation of
uncertainty or the downstream effects of those computations. Failing to adapt to environmental
uncertainty, such as by overestimating environmental volatility in preparedness for changes in
contingencies, may result in aberrant inference and learning.
Disturbance to the computation of environmental threats could manifest physiologically, such
as aberrant function of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, and psychologically, such as
increased affective response to negative events. Neurobiologically, the increased stress reactivity
that is evident in clinical psychosis and the extended psychosis phenotype, both psychologically
(Myin-Germeys et al., 2001; Myin-Germeys and van Os, 2007) and physiologically (Aiello et
al., 2012; Borges et al., 2013), could perturb brain processes underlying precise and accurate
inferences about the world. Notably, dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary axis may lead
to aberrant prediction error signalling through dysregulation of dopaminergic neurons (Lodge
and Grace, 2011; Grace, 2012).
Disturbance to computations of environmental uncertainty might arise from tonic exposure to
uncertain, stressful environments. Importantly, volatility or inconsistency is a feature of adverse
family environments (Goodyer et al., 2010). In a later chapter, I was able to directly investigate
the influence of the social environment on associative learning and the modulation of behaviour
by environmental volatility, testing whether there were any common computational correlates of
the social environment and dimensions of PEs and distress.
Maladaptive appraisals of and responses to anomalous experiences
Returning to other mechanisms by which the social environment might influence PEs, the final
mechanism I consider is that childhood adversity or social support may influence the appraisals of
unusual experiences. Maladaptive appraisals and response styles are negative interpretations and
behavioural responses to aberrant, psychotic-like experiences, such as forming a delusional belief
about the origin of a hallucination. Maladaptive appraisals and response styles are considered
central in cognitive models of the positive symptoms of psychosis (Chadwick and Birchwood,
1994; Garety and Kuipers, 2001; Morrison, 2001). The forming of maladaptive beliefs and be-
haviours around psychotic-like phenomena may be a critical factor that distinguishes clinical
from nonclinical PEs. When compared to clinical PEs, nonclinical PEs are more associated with
normalising appraisals that consider them within the realms of normative experience, less as-
sociated with externalising appraisals that infer them arising from an external cause (Brett et
al., 2007; Lovatt et al., 2010; Peters et al., 2012) and less preoccupying and distressing (Lincoln,
2007; Sisti et al., 2012). More recently, the importance of appraisals has been supported by stud-
ies investigating how they shape the impact of experimentally-induced anomalous experiences,
finding that adaptive appraisals reduce the distress of phenomena that model some aspects of
PEs (Taylor et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2014; Underwood et al., 2016). This is consistent with
theoretical work arguing that delusions ‘complicate’ perceptual dysfunction (Maher, 1974) and
180
further supported by epidemiological evidence that PEs may progress towards clinical relevance
as anomalous perceptions become compounded by anomalous, delusion-like beliefs (Smeets et
al., 2012a, 2012b, 2014).
Childhood adversity and poor social support may both tend towards maladaptive appraisals.
This could be through an ‘affective route’, by inducing negative affect or predisposing to negative
beliefs about the self, others and the world that supply content for the formation of maladaptive
appraisals (Garety and Kuipers, 2001). Both could also disturb the computations that underlie
the appraisals of experiences in a mechanism, potentially independent of affect, that tends to-
wards bizarre or unusual appraisals. Given that appraisals and PEs themselves can be considered
as arising from similar disturbances within a predictive processing hierarchy, bizarre appraisals
may arise from the same mechanisms that generate bizarre experiences. Social support may
have a greater influence on paranoia than other PEs by acting on the appraisals of psychotic
phenomena, rather than their occurrence.
Theoretical and empirical work on maladaptive appraisals suggests that anomalous beliefs may
be more maladaptive than anomalous perceptions (supported by results of clustering analyses
in Chapter 7) and that reality distortion in clinical psychosis may arise as delusions are formed
around anomalous experiences. Critically, both anomalous perceptions and beliefs can be consid-
ered in terms of atypicalities in information-processing within a predictive processing framework.
Despite their above-chance co-occurrence (Smeets et al., 2012b), the differential clinical impli-
cations and aetiological associations (supported by Chapter 9) of anomalous perceptions and
anomalous beliefs suggests they may have partly distinct computational mechanisms.
10.3 Further Questions
Based on the results from previous chapters, I devised two final questions that centred on the
computational mechanisms of PEs.
10.3.1 Are PEs in adolescents associated with reduced modulation of be-
haviour by confidence? Could this be induced by exposure to child-
hood adversity early in life?
The early development of psychosis is sometimes characterised by a pervasive sense of uncertainty
and the feeling that the world has changed. This might arise from disruption to how confidence
modulates behaviour and experience. In a recent study, Vinkcier et al. (2016) reported that
subanaesthetic administration of ketamine, a pharmacological model of psychosis, impaired the
ability of healthy volunteers to use confidence in knowledge about the environment to shape
their behaviour. I planned to investigate whether a similar reduction in the modulation of
behaviour by confidence was associated with PEs in adolescents, using computational modelling
of behavioural data from the ROOTS cognition sub-study (see Methodology). This might shed
light on computational mechanisms by which PEs arise, complementing and extending the results
of Vinckier et al. (2016).
Atypicalities in how confidence is used to modulate behaviour might arise as a result of chronic
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exposure to volatile, unpredictable and hazardous environments. Volatility is a common compo-
nent of adverse family-environments (Dunn et al., 2011). It is therefore plausible that exposure
to childhood adversity might cause long-lasting changes in the use of confidence that predispose
to PEs. If so, this would represent rare evidence of the computational mechanisms by which an
environmental risk factor might cause PEs. I thus also investigated whether childhood adversity
was associated with atypical modulation of behaviour by confidence.
10.3.2 What are the computational mechanisms by which anomalous percep-
tions and beliefs arise?
PEs might arise from aberrant integration of sensory evidence and prior knowledge in perceptual
inference and belief updating (Fletcher and Frith, 2009) (see Review II). However, there is
suggestion of over-reliance on predictions (Behrendt, 1998; Aleman et al., 2003; Corlett et al.,
2009; Teufel et al., 2015) or weak prediction errors (Horga et al., 2014), deficits generating or
using predictions (Hong et al., 2005, 2008; Shergill et al., 2005; Umbricht and Krljes, 2005) and
complex hierarchical interactions between changes in reliability of sensory evidence and higher
beliefs (Schmack et al., 2013). This is complicated by lack of translation of findings across clinical
psychosis and nonclinical PEs. Teufel et al (2015) (Teufel et al., 2015) found increased ability to
use prior knowledge in perceptual inference in both psychosis high-risk and psychosis-proneness
in healthy volunteers. I planned to replicate and extend their findings in a nonclinical sample
by investigating whether the reliance and the information content of predictions in perceptual
inference varied with psychosis-proneness, using a novel experimental task with computational
modelling of reaction times.
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Chapter 11
Psychotic experiences in adolescents
are associated with a reduction in the
modulation of learning by confidence
Abstract
Psychosis might arise from impairments in weighting the reliability of information sources.
This could generate pathological uncertainty, or a lack of confidence in knowledge of the
world, rendering a person susceptible to distortion of reality. Over-estimation of environ-
mental uncertainty might arise from exposure to volatile, unpredictable environments, such
as can characterise childhood adversity, a known risk factor for psychosis. Using a reinforce-
ment learning task, I investigated whether psychotic experiences and childhood adversity
were associated with reduced modulation of behaviour by confidence in learned environmen-
tal contingencies. Data came from a sub-set of 250 participants from a general population
sample of adolescents (ROOTS). Around half the participants had experienced a form of
childhood adversity. The task required participants to learn about and choose between stim-
uli. Uncertainty was modulated on two levels: feedback was sometimes unreliable and the
reward contingencies reversed half-way through. Bayesian model selection of a family of
computational models fit to trial-by-trial behaviour confirmed that participants modulated
learning according to confidence in learned contingencies, an adaptive mechanism that pre-
vented learning from contradictory feedback when the environment was stable. Increases in
the severity of non-paranoid unusual perceptions and beliefs correlated with lower modula-
tion of learning by confidence. In simulations, reducing this modulation parameter allowed
quicker adaptation of behaviour to contingency reversal, suggesting it may be an adapta-
tion to volatile environment, but came at the cost of increased switching of responses when
contingencies should be well-known. This was very similar to recent findings on the com-
putational effects of ketamine in healthy volunteers, suggesting convergent mechanisms with
a pharmacological model of early psychosis. However, there were no associations between
behaviour in the task and childhood adversity. While its aetiology remains unclear, atypical-
ities in how confidence is used to guide behaviour may be a critical step in the development
of psychosis.
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11.1 Research Questions
• Are PEs in adolescents associated with reduced modulation of behaviour by confidence?
• Could this be induced by exposure to childhood adversity early in life?
11.2 Introduction
Early clinical psychosis often features a pervasive sense of uncertainty and the feeling that the
world, or one’s perception of it, has changed or become strange (Cutting and Dunne, 1989; Kapur,
2003). This is sometimes associated with motivation to understand what has changed and why,
leading possibly to bizarre behaviours, finding meaning in meaningless events or forming bizarre,
unfounded beliefs. As Peter Chadwick writes about his own psychotic episode, accompanying
the disturbances to his thoughts and perceptions was the sense that he “[had] to see where all
this leads.” (Chadwick, 2007).
Uncertainty in knowledge about the world may be a manifestation of the atypicalities in information-
processing that cause early psychotic experiences (PEs). Current models based on the predictive
processing framework posit that PEs might arise from atypicalities in the estimation of reliabil-
ity of information sources in perceptual inference and belief-updating (Fletcher and Frith, 2009;
Adams et al., 2013). In deriving properties of the environment and learning from unreliable
evidence, perceptions and beliefs might diverge from consensus reality.
The predictive processing framework posits that the brain derives properties of the environment
and determines behaviour by integrating prior knowledge with current inputs collected via the
senses (for review, see Clark, 2013). Prior knowledge may be encoded as a set of internal genera-
tive models that describe statistical regularities in the environment. Internal models can specify
statistical regularities in different types of information and over different spatial and temporal
scales. Internal models are arranged in a hierarchy, increasing in complexity and in abstraction
from sensory input through to abstract, high-level beliefs (Mumford, 1992). Predictions from
these models, akin to hypotheses (Gregory, 1980), are compared to inputs and any mismatch
between them is termed prediction error. By finding predictions that minimise prediction er-
rors, the brain can optimally derive properties of the environment (Helmholtz, 1860; Lee and
Mumford, 2003). Sometimes, prediction errors reflect that models do not optimally capture en-
vironmental regularities. In these cases, predictions can drive learning: the updating of internal
models (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Pearce and Hall, 1980). This may form a kind of canonical
computation used by the brain (Friston, 2005). Critically, the brain must differentiate prediction
errors that signal when an internal model poorly represents the environment and needs updating
versus those that are meaningless, such as arising from randomness. It may do this by weighting
its information sources (internal models and incoming information) by their reliabilities (Knill
and Pouget, 2004), such that mismatch between inputs and predictions is ignored when internal
models are highly reliable or current inputs are unreliable. Conversely, when predictions are
unreliable or current inputs very reliable, internal models may be readily updated. Reliability
itself is something that the brain must estimate and encode.
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Atypicalities in the estimation or signalling of reliability might cause aberrant model updating
and inference, tending towards distortion of beliefs and percepts (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams
et al., 2013). It might also manifest subjectively as a pervasive uncertainty or loss of confidence
(here treated simplistically as the inverse of uncertainty) in knowledge of the world. Confidence
might be intrinsically related to estimations of the reliability of internal models, or how well they
can predict the environment. We can frame this in tractable computational terms by thinking
of how high and low confidence in models of the world might shape behaviour. Vinckier et al.,
(2016) describe a computational treatise of confidence as a form of ‘meta-learning’ that tracks
the reliability of internal models and shapes behaviour in two possible ways. Firstly, confidence
might modulate model updating to update less from contradictory evidence and update more
from confirmatory evidence, as a kind of computational implementation of ‘confirmation bias’.
Secondly, confidence might change how informational values are transformed into behaviour by
making actions more deterministic, rather than exploratory, allowing people to exploit learned
contingencies. Failure to utilise confidence in the first sense might lead to model updating
from contradictory evidence even when contingencies are stable, rendering beliefs inappropriately
malleable even when well-supported and a feeling that the world is strange or unfamiliar. Failure
to utilise confidence in the second sense might cause odd or bizarre behaviours that make little
sense to observers or perhaps even the actor themselves.
By formalising this theory of confidence in a generative mathematical model, Vinckier and col-
league showed that this model better explained the behaviour of participants in a behavioural
task in which uncertainty was experimentally manipulated, compared to simpler models without
any meta-learning confidence features. The authors then showed that administering subanaes-
thetic ketamine, a pharmacological agent thought to mimic some features of early psychosis,
reduced the modulation of learning and of action selection by confidence in healthy volunteers,
supporting atypicalities in the estimation or utilisation of confidence being associated with PEs.
The authors also mapped this onto specific neural substrates. In this chapter, I set out to extend
these findings by testing whether psychotic experiences (PEs) in adolescents were associated with
a similar reduction in confidence modulation using computational modelling of behaviour. If so,
this would provide evidence for a common computational mechanism underlying both PEs in
the general population without psychotic disorders and a pharmacological model that can induce
psychotic-like phenomena.
Estimating one’s confidence in internal models might itself be a process that is influenced by
experience. Exposure to volatile and unpredictable adverse environments during critical devel-
opmental periods like childhood and adolescence may cause persistent expectations of volatile en-
vironments in the future and low confidence in internal models, effectively impairing the tuning of
confidence to environmental stability. Volatility in childhood environments, such as through un-
reliable relationships or attachments, can be harmful, forming a component of childhood trauma
(Dunn et al., 2011). People exposed to childhood adversity (CA) may modulate their behaviour
by confidence less, as an adaptation to be ready for sudden environmental changes. CA predis-
poses to psychosis (Varese et al., 2012), supported by results in earlier chapters of this thesis.
Reduction in the confidence-modulation of behaviour could therefore be a mechanism by which
CA causes PEs. Accordingly, I also investigated whether exposure to childhood adversity was
associated with reduced modulation of behaviour by confidence.
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11.3 Methods
11.3.1 Data
A subset of 277 ROOTS participants performed a contingency learning task as part of a battery
of cognitive tasks during an additional in-unit assessment. The study took place between time 2
and time 3 of the ROOTS study. The sample was recruited using opportunistic sampling within
the larger ROOTS cohort, enriched for exposure to CA and for variants of the 5-HTTPLR
(Owens et al., 2012), the main focuses of the original study. Complete trial-by-trial data was
available for 250 participants.
11.3.2 Psychotic experiences
Dimensional symptom phenotypes were measured at age 17. The self-report Brief Schizoty-
pal Symptoms Inventory (BSSI) measured state PEs occurring over the previous two weeks in
two dimensions: Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs (AEB), comprising unusual perceptual ex-
periences and magical thinking, and Paranoid Ideation (PI), comprising ideas of reference and
suspiciousness. 198 participants had complete data on the task and the BSSI instruments.
11.3.3 Childhood adversity between ages 0-14
CA was measured between ages 0-14. Childhood adversity between 0-14 years was measured
using a detailed caregiver interview, the Cambridge Early Experiences Interview (CAMEEI),
at age 14. The CAMEEI was mostly performed with biological mothers (96%). Inter-rater
reliability on a subset of interviews was high, with kappa ranging between 0.7-0.9. I calculated a
sum score of the number of adversities (family death/separation, moderate/severe family discord,
abuse (physical/sexual/emotional), family criminality, financial problems and unemployment,
maternal psychiatric illness, paternal psychiatric illness, aberrant parenting styles (either parent)
and lack of maternal affection/engagement) experienced in this period. 193 of the participants
had complete data on the task and the CAMEEI.
11.3.4 Contingency learning task
The contingency learning task required participants to choose between two stimuli, one of which
was correct and one incorrect. The task comprised 80 trials. On every trial, participants chose
one stimulus by touching it. They received probabilistic feedback after every choice. The correct
stimulus was reinforced with an 80:20 positive/negative feedback ratio, respectively. The incor-
rect stimulus was reinforced with a 20:80 positive/negative feedback ratio, respectively. After 40
trials, the identities and feedback ratios of the correct and incorrect stimuli reversed. Participants
were not informed that there would be a reversal.
Instructions to participants were:
“On each go, the same two patterns will be presented. One of the patterns is correct and the other
pattern is wrong and you have to choose the correct pattern on each go. However, on some goes,
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Figure 11.1: Response switching and perseverative errors
Trial 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
‘CORRECT’: 80%, 
‘WRONG’: 20%
‘CORRECT’: 20%, 
‘WRONG’: 80%
First stimulus 
chosen becomes 
correct stimulus
‘CORRECT’: 20%, 
‘WRONG’: 80%
‘CORRECT’: 80%, 
‘WRONG’: 20%
Contingency 
reversal after 40 
trials
A
B
Figure 11.1: A) Example of task screen. Participants chose between two stimuli on every trial by
touching them on a tablet computer. B) The first stimulus chosen became the ’correct’ stimulus
for the first half of the experiment. Uncertainty was introduced at one level by sometimes
giving misleading feedback: the correct stimulus was followed by a ’correct’ message 80% of
the time and a ’wrong’ message 20% of the time. The ’incorrect’ stimulus had the opposite
reward contingences. Further uncertainty was introduced after 40 trials when these contingencies
reversed.
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the computer will tell you that you were wrong even if you chose the correct pattern. Your task
is to stick to the pattern that is usually correct. So in other words always choose the pattern that
is correct more often than the other pattern.”
The first stimulus that the participant chose became the correct stimulus for the first block. Stim-
uli consisted of four red or four green horizontal lines. The task was performed on a touchscreen
tablet and participants chose stimuli by touching them.
11.3.5 Model-free behavioural analyses
I investigated two model-free behavioural measures of performance: switches and perseverative
errors after reversal. Switches were defined as choosing a different stimulus to the previous trial.
Perseverative errors were defined as choosing the poor stimulus on two consecutive trials. I calcu-
lated these performance measures over sets of 20 trials, to capture early pre-reversal behaviour,
late pre-reversal behaviour, early post-reversal behaviour and late post-reversal behaviour. Re-
lationships between PEs, CA and behaviour were tested using Kendall’s tau correlations.
11.3.6 Computational model-based analyses
I also fit reinforcement learning computational models to the trial-by-trial data. Following the
analysis by Vinckier et al., (2016), I fit simple Q-learning models (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
as a baseline and progressively extended them with parameters representing confidence and its
influence on behaviour.
In all models, the value of a cue (c) for a given trial, t, according to the delta rule:
Qc(t+ 1) = Qc(t) + αδ(t)
where α is a free ‘learning rate’ parameter (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) that determines the degree of Q-
value updating and δ(t) is the prediction error, or the difference between actual and expected
outcome:
δ(t) = Rc(t)−Qc(t)
where R(t) is the actual reward. Feedback was either ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, so R was either 1
or -1.
The probability of choosing a particular stimulus was estimated from the expected value of the
stimulus according to the softmax rule:
Pc(t) =
1
1 + e
Qc(t)
β
where β is a free parameter of ‘choice temperature’ (β>0). β modulates the degree of exploration
of choices, as opposed to exploitation of the learned value.
In the simplest model, the Q-value for a stimulus was only updated if that stimulus was chosen,
so the model treated the Q-values as independent. In a second variant, the Q-values for each
stimulus (1 or 2) were updated symmetrically, such that:
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Q1(t) = −Q2(t)
In a third variant a single prediction error value was calculated, depending on the action chosen,
and the Q-values updated by the same amount in opposite directions, such that if stimulus 1
were chosen (and vice versa for stimulus 2):
δ(t) = R1(t)−Q1(t)
Q1(t+ 1) = Q1(t) + αδ(t)
Q2(t+ 1) = Q2(t)− αδ(t)
The initial Q-values were fit as free parameters that were allowed to differ. The third model
variants preserved initial differences between Q-values.
In a further set of models, an additional parameter that tracked trial-by-trial confidence was
added that could modulate the learning rate and choice temperature parameters. Traditional
reinforcement learning models treat parameters as constant over all trials, limiting optimisation
of behaviour when participants have good knowledge of contingencies. Modulating parameters
using confidence allowed optimisation of behaviour in late pre-reversal and late post-reversal
trials, when values should be well-established and participants would be able to exploit learned
contingencies.
Confidence (C) was updated using a delta rule:
C(t+ 1) = C(t) + γ(O(t)− C(t)
where γ is a confidence learning rate parameter (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) and O(t) is the outcome (either
correct feedback, 1, or incorrect feedback, -1).
There were four variants on how confidence modulated reinforcement learning: confidence could
modulate learning rate, choice temperature, learning rate and choice temperature with different
weights, or learning rate and choice temperature with equal weights.
Learning rate was modulated differently for confirmatory outcomes, when observed outcomes
were of the sign predicted by Q-values, and contradictory outcomes, when observed outcomes
were in the opposite sign to predictions from Q-values.
For confirmatory outcomes, modulated learning rate (αm) was calculated as follows:
αm(t) =
α0 + kαC(t)
1 + +kαC(t)
where α0 is the initial learning rate and kα is the modulation weight for learning rate.
For contradictory outcomes, learning rate was modulated as follows:
αm(t) =
α0
1 + +kαC(t)
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Learning rate therefore became closer to 1 for confirmatory outcomes and closer to 0 for contra-
dictory outcomes.
Choice temperature was modulated (βm) as follows:
αm(t) =
β0
1 + +kβC(t)
where β0 is the initial choice temperature and kβ is the modulation weight for choice temper-
ature. As confidence increased, choice temperature reduced such that behaviour became more
deterministic, allowing participants to exploit learned contingencies.
The full model space comprised 15 models: all combinations of 3 variants of Q-value updat-
ing:
• single value updated
• symmetrical update with no initial difference
• symmetrical update with free initial difference
and 5 variants of using confidence to modulate behaviour:
• no modulation
• modulates α
• modulates β
• modulates α & β with different weights
• modulates α & β with equal weights
11.3.7 Model fitting
All models were fit using the VBA toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014), which inverts models using
a variational Bayes approach under the Laplace approximation, which inverts nonlinear models
and estimates their ’evidence’: a trade-off between goodness of fit and complexity (Stephan et
al., 2009). I used random-effects Bayesian model selection to identify the best fitting model
overall, indicated by the model log-evidence and exceedance probability (Rigoux et al., 2014).
Finally, I used family-wise analyses to test whether particular modifications changed model
performance.
Parameter estimates from the winning model were calculated for each subject. Associations were
tested between model parameters and dimensions of the social environment and symptom pheno-
types that showed associations with task performance in model-free analyses. The distributions
of social environment and symptom phenotype scores were likely to be highly skewed and feature
tied-values, so I tested associations using Kendall’s tau correlations.
Model parameters are not meaningful when a model poorly explains subject behaviour. I tested
whether the winning model performed above chance for each participant by comparing the log-
evidences of the winning model and a model that made random choices. A difference in log-
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Figure 11.2: Response switching and perseverative errors
Figure 11.2: Response switching, defined as changing response from the previous choice, and
perseverative errors, defined as two consecutive choices of the poor stimulus after contingency
reversal. Reversal occurred at trial 40. Thick line = median. Hinges = interquartile range.
Whisker = 1.5x interquartile range from hinge.
evidence of 3 (approximately equal to a Bayes Factor of 20) indicates better-than-chance per-
formance. I also calculated predictive validity of the models, in terms of behavioural variability
explained (r2). Finally, I tested whether any effects could be driven by model fit systematically
changing with social/symptom variables by testing their correlation with r2.
11.4 Results
11.4.1 Model-free behavioural analyses
Participants made different numbers of switches across the blocks (Figure 11.2), confirmed by het-
eroskedastic one-way ANOVA for 20% trimmed means (F(3, 327.87) = 30.54, p < 0.001). Pairwise
comparisons showed the mean number of switches varied across all sets of trials (pHolm<0.001)
other than the second and fourth sets, consistent with participants making few switches once
contingencies have been stable for some time.
Participants made more perseverative errors in the first 20 post-reversal trials than the second
20 post-reversal trials, confirmed by Yuen’s t-test for 20% trimmed means (t = 19.17, df = 149,
p < 0.001).
AEB were associated with increased response switching in the first and last sets of 20 trials (Trials
1-20: τ = 0.14, p = 0.02; Trials 61-80: τ = 0.13, p = 0.04), which might reflect failure to adapt
to stable contingencies. AEB were also associated with making more perseverative errors in the
first 20 post-reversal trials (τ = 0.12, p = 0.03) but not the second set, suggesting difficulty
detecting the change in contingencies. Neither PI nor CA were associated with switching or
perseverative errors in any set of trials. Given their lack of behavioural associations, I did not
investigate associations between CA and PI in model-based analyses.
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11.4.2 Computational model selection
Bayesian model selection confirmed that the best fitting model was the model with dual updating
of Q-values by a single prediction error in which confidence modulated learning rate (Figure 11.3,
exceedance probability for winning model = 1). Family-wise analyses supported use of both of
these features: symmetrical updating of Q-values with no difference in initial Q-values other
Q-value updating variants (exceedance probability = 1) and confidence modulation of alpha
outperformed other confidence modulation variants (exceedance probability = 1). The model
fit better than chance in 235 out of 250 participants. Variability in behavioural choices was
well-explained by the model (r2: median = 0.96, mad = 0.90 – 0.99).
11.4.3 Association of model parameters with PEs
I calculated parameter estimates for the 235 participants whose behaviour was well-explained
by the model. In keeping with my hypothesis, confidence modulation weight (κ) correlated
negatively with AEB (τ = -0.16, p = 0.001).
In post-hoc analyses, I tested associations between AEB and other parameters of the model. AEB
was associated with higher base learning rate (τ = 0.15, p = 0.003) and higher choice temperature
(τ = 0.11, p = 0.03). AEB was therefore associated with increased learning rate, more exploratory
behaviour and reduced modulation of learning rate for contradictory and confirmatory evidence
when contingencies were well-known.
To test whether reduced modulation of learning rate by confidence could account for any of
the behavioural atypicalities associated with AEB, I used the model to simulate responses with
varying modulation weight but holding other parameters constant. Modulation weight took 5
possible values (the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th sample percentiles) while all other parameters
were fixed to the median. The same reward schedule as the main task was used. 200 datasets
with 80 trials were simulated per level of confidence modulation, generating 1000 datasets in
total.
Reduced modulation of learning rate by confidence predicted more switching in trials 61-80 (τ
= 0.05, p < 0.001), replicating behavioural changes associated with AEB. It did not predict
switching in the first set of 20 trials but predicted more switching in trials 21-40 (τ = 0.02,
p = 0.01) and trials 41-60 (τ = 0.06, p < 0.001). In contrast to the associations with AEB,
reduced modulation of learning rate by confidence was associated with fewer perseverative errors
in the trials 41-60 (τ = -0.09, p < 0.001) and 61-80 (τ = -0.05, p < 0.001). Reducing the
modulation of learning by confidence thus reproduced one aspect of the behavioural associations
of AEB but had more complex effects on other aspects of behaviour. Interestingly, reduced
modulation of learning tended towards greater switching through most of the task but led to fewer
perseverative errors, suggesting it may be adaptive in volatile environments but maladaptive in
stable environments. Varying this parameter alone therefore did not reproduce all behavioural
associations of AEB.
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Figure 11.3: Bayesian model comparison
Figure 11.3: Bayesian model comparison favoured a model with symmetrical updating on every
trial and with no initial difference in Q-values (marked with *). The exceedance probability of
this model was 1.
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11.5 Discussion
In this chapter, using data from a sub-set of 250 participants from ROOTS, I investigated
whether PEs were associated with reduced modulation of behaviour by confidence in knowledge
of the environment and whether this might arise as a result of exposure to volatile, adverse
environments in childhood. Around half the participants had experienced a form of childhood
adversity. The task required participants to learn about and choose between stimuli using unre-
liable feedback and reward contingencies reversed half-way through. Bayesian model selection of
a family of computational models fit to trial-by-trial behaviour confirmed that participants mod-
ulated learning according to confidence in learned contingencies, an adaptive mechanism that
prevented learning from contradictory feedback when the environment was stable. Increases in
the severity of non-paranoid unusual perceptions and beliefs correlated with lower modulation
of learning by confidence. In simulations, reducing this modulation parameter allowed quicker
adaptation of behaviour to contingency reversal, suggesting it may be an adaptation to volatile
environment, but came at the cost of increased switching of responses when contingencies should
be well-known. However, there were no associations between behaviour in the task and childhood
adversity. While its aetiology remains unclear, atypicalities in how confidence is used to guide
behaviour may be a critical step in the development of psychosis.
Failing to down-weight learning from prediction errors when environmental contingencies are
stable and well-known could effectively induce persistent uncertainty about learned associations
(Vinckier et al., 2016) and induce inappropriate learning from events. In this task, that took the
form of greater updating of the expected values of stimuli, even when those values were well-
known and feedback was sometimes unreliable. In ecological conditions, this may tend towards
an excessive influence of prediction errors, even those arising from predictions from internal
models that can reliably predict the environment. The result may be destabilisation of internal
models and the predictions they make. This could subjectively manifest in the pervasive sense of
uncertainty that often accompanies early psychotic symptoms (Kapur, 2003; Micoulaud-Franchi
et al., 2012). In a previous study, modulation of learning parameters by confidence was shown
to be reduced by ketamine administration in healthy volunteers using a similar learning task
(Vinckier et al., 2016). This is therefore evidence for a common computational mechanism that
links variation in a specific dimension of psychosis-proneness and a pharmacological model of
psychosis. Based on the results of this study and of Vinckier et al. (2016), I argue that reduction
in the modulation of learning by confidence could therefore be a causal mechanism for some
PEs.
It is important to emphasise that most participants in this study were not developing the early
stages of clinical psychosis. Indeed, none of them might have gone on to have a psychotic disorder.
These results therefore suggest that reduced modulation of learning by confidence is associated
with nonclinical PEs distributed in the general population and, while these findings generate
hypotheses about clinical psychosis, they tell us nothing about it directly. Furthermore, we do
not have direct measurements of a pervasive sense of uncertainty.
I also note that the concept of pathological uncertainty driving development of psychosis might
seem at odds with the fact that clinical psychosis is associated with fixed, bizarre and over-
valued ideas and beliefs, like delusions. If people prone to PEs do not modulate their learning
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by confidence, why then do these anomalous beliefs persist, as opposed to being continuously
updated? We might shed some light on this problem by appealing to the hierarchical nature
of predictive processing (Mumford, 1992). Reduction in how confidence shapes behaviour at
one level of the hierarchy may coincide with, or even drive, opposing increases in confidence in
internal models at other levels. Specifically, uncertainty at lower-hierarchical levels may tend
towards over-relying on high-level internal models encoding abstract beliefs. A recent study
showed experimental support for this in a general population sample. Schmack et al. (2013)
tested hierarchical influences of expectations on perceptual inference and found that delusional
ideation was associated with instability of low-level percepts but a greater ability to stabilise
percepts using abstract beliefs. Psychosis and PEs may therefore not represent single, unitary
deficits such as ‘impaired ability to use confidence to shape behaviour’ but probably arise from
complex interactions of and compensations for perturbations to information-processing.
In particular, thinking about psychosis in this way might let us speculate on the mechanisms
of the transition from early stages of psychotic symptoms to full-blown psychotic illness. I pre-
dicted that PEs, like ketamine, would be associated with a reduction in how confidence shaped
behaviour. Reduced confidence-modulation might then allow beliefs to be updated from evi-
dence that would otherwise be ignored, rendering internal models overly malleable. However,
the transition to clinical psychosis may be associated with a shift in the opposite direction, such
that confidence in some internal models is estimated as inappropriately high. Excess confidence
may bestow predictions with undue influence on behaviour and experience and negate any con-
tradictory evidence against the models that generated them. This effect may not be general for
all predictions: when repeating the paradigm of Schmack et al. (2013) in patients with chronic
schizophrenia, Schmack et al (2017) found that the influence of beliefs on perception was lower
than a healthy control group, but the influence of beliefs within the patient group correlated with
positive symptoms. The authors interpreted this as a weaker acquisition of externally-generated
beliefs and a compensatory increase in the influence of predictions on perception (Schmack et
al., 2017). This might be consistent with the entrenchment and over-weighting of a subset of
maladaptive internal models that suppress prediction error, inhibiting acquisition of new beliefs
but strengthening the influence of beliefs once acquired.
Returning to Chadwick’s first-hand account of a psychotic episode, he writes: “Another way of
putting things was that confirmation bias was massively amplified, everything confirmed and
fitted the delusion, nothing discredited it. Indeed, the very capacity to notice and think of refu-
tatory data and ideas was completely gone. Confirmation bias was as if “galloping . . . ,” and I
could not stop it.” (Chadwick, 2007). Chadwick’s experience might be cast as a progressive shift
from a state of uncertainty populated with odd experiences and ideas without any overarching
delusional framework to the strengthening of a few of these beliefs into full-blown delusions whose
reliabilities are greatly over-estimated. If early psychosis is associated with a barrage of infor-
mation that cannot be ignored because the modulation of behaviour and learning by confidence
is perturbed, adopting a few beliefs with pathological certainty might be an effective strategy to
explain that information away. However, those beliefs are also likely to cause significant distress
and functional impairment, such as Chadwick’s eventual belief that he had to throw himself
under a bus to drive Satan from his body (Chadwick, 1993). As I will expand upon in the final
discussion, thinking about the development of nonclinical PEs and clinical psychosis within a
195
computational framework might allow us to sketch out possible mechanistic pathways by which
PEs and psychopathology develop that can be tested in further studies.
This work has a number of strengths. Utilising computational modelling made explicit all the
informational quantities and their transformations that could generate task behaviour. It also
allowed close comparison with the investigation of Vinckier & colleagues into the computational
effects of ketamine. Finally, I utilised a large sample drawn from a representative general popu-
lation cohort. The study also has limitations. Some data was missing on all variables, but this
is offset by use of a large, epidemiologically-principled sample. The task employed is simple and
may not be optimal to measure the modulation of behaviour by confidence. While the winning
model fit every participant better than chance, there was variation in model fit that could reflect
unmeasured computational atypicalities that could be relevant for understanding aberrant men-
tal states. To limit the number of comparisons made, I did not consider possible confounding
aetiological factors like cannabis use or IQ. Psychotic phenomena and the task behaviour were
not measured at the same time points, with the task data collected around 6 months prior to the
time 3 assessments at age 17. The relevance of this task for behaviour in real-world environments
is not known but the use of this simple associative task has allowed precise manipulation and
modelling of environmental regularities and this provides a basis for extending the framework to
more naturalistic observations.
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Chapter 12
Anomalous perceptions and beliefs are
associated with shifts towards different
types of prior knowledge in perceptual
inference
Abstract
Psychotic phenomena manifest in healthy and clinical populations as complex patterns of
aberrant perceptions (hallucinations) and tenacious, irrational beliefs (delusions). According
to predictive processing accounts, hallucinations and delusions arise from atypicalities in the
integration of prior knowledge with incoming sensory information. However, the compu-
tational details of these atypicalities and their specific phenomenological manifestations are
not well characterised. I tested the hypothesis that psychosis-proneness arises from increased
reliance on overly-general application of prior knowledge in perceptual inference, generating
percepts that readily capture the gist of the environment but inaccurately render its de-
tails. I separately probed the use of prior knowledge to perceive the gist versus the details
of ambiguous images in a healthy population with varying degrees of hallucination- and
delusion-proneness. I found that the use of prior knowledge varied with both the severity
of hallucination-proneness and the composition of psychotic phenomena in terms of aber-
rant percepts versus aberrant beliefs. In contrast to my original predictions, predominant
hallucination-proneness conferred an advantage perceiving image details and image gist,
consistent with reliance on highly-detailed perceptual knowledge. Predominant delusion-
proneness conferred a large disadvantage perceiving image details without disadvantaging
perception gist, consistent with reliance on abstract, belief-like knowledge. These findings
suggest that phenomenological variability in psychotic experiences may be driven by vari-
ability in the type of knowledge observers rely upon to resolve perceptual ambiguity.
12.1 Research Questions
• Are nonclinical psychotic experiences associated with changes in how percepts are generated
from ambiguous sensory information using prior knowledge, reflecting over-reliance of prior
knowledge?
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• Does over-reliance on prior knowledge in perceptual inference make percepts in psychosis-
prone people overly-general or inaccurate?
• Is this more associated with proneness to hallucinations and anomalous perceptions, versus
proneness to delusions and anomalous beliefs?
12.2 Introduction
Hallucinations and delusions can be modelled within a hierarchical predictive processing frame-
work, in which perceptions and beliefs represent the brain’s best inference about the causes of
its sensory inputs (Helmholtz, 1860; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2005). The general idea
of these conceptualisations is that sensation is inherently ambiguous; the brain must combine
sensory measurements with prior knowledge of the environment in order to effectively infer what
caused those sensations. How much weight is given to sensory evidence and prior knowledge
in this combination is determined by their reliabilities (Knill and Pouget, 2004): when sensory
information is unreliable, predictions from prior knowledge should be weighted more strongly,
and vice versa. The reliabilities of sensory information and prior knowledge also shape learn-
ing. When predictions and sensory inputs disagree, this generates ‘prediction errors’. Prediction
errors might reflect meaningful changes in environmental states, in which case they should be
accommodated by learning, i.e., by changing one’s predictions through updating internal models.
Importantly, however, learning should be scaled to the reliability of information sources, with
large changes in internal models taking place only when prediction errors are reliable.
Positive psychotic symptoms may arise when reliability-weighting of information sources goes
awry, causing perceptions and beliefs to diverge from objective (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams
et al., 2013). Within this framework, hallucinations can be modelled as false inferences, caused
by over-weighting the reliability of predictions (Behrendt, 1998; Aleman et al., 2003; Corlett et
al., 2009). Delusions may be considered internal models that misrepresent statistical regularities
in the environment and could arise through inappropriate learning from unreliable prediction
errors (Kapur, 2003). Such models of psychotic phenomena in patients and psychosis-prone
people have been tested by manipulating both prior knowledge and sensory input (Schmack
et al., 2013; Teufel et al., 2015). In a previous study, in which the authors kept sensory input
constant while manipulating prior knowledge, individuals at high-risk of clinical psychosis showed
a shift towards greater influence of prior knowledge. This shift was measured as an advantage
in discriminating ambiguous images that contained an embedded figure, the perception of which
was facilitated by experimentally-provided prior knowledge (Teufel et al., 2015). The advantage
was also present in healthy individuals scoring highly on scales of psychosis-proneness. Here, it
was particularly related to aberrant perceptions rather than aberrant beliefs.
While this specificity is in line with previous suggestions that hallucinations are a consequence
of an increased influence of prior knowledge on perception (Behrendt, 1998; Aleman et al., 2003;
Corlett et al., 2009), it provides no further detail about the computational mechanisms bringing
about this effect. In the current study, I sought to shed light on the computational principles
underlying the psychosis-associated shift towards over-using prior knowledge in perceptual in-
ference. Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that this shift could be computationally explained
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by more flexible fitting of predictions to sensory data, causing a strong but imprecise influence
of prior knowledge on perception in psychosis-prone observers. This imprecise influence should
in turn lead to imprecise, gist-like percepts whenever the perceptual situation demands the use
of prior knowledge to resolve ambiguity. I tested this hypothesis with ambiguous images that
contained embedded objects, the perception of which required prior knowledge. Holding sensory
information constant, I measured how precise observers’ percepts of the embedded objects was
before and after experimentally providing prior knowledge. I predicted that high hallucination-
proneness would be associated with the previously-observed shift towards an undue reliance on
prior knowledge but that this would lead to imprecise, gist-like percepts.
12.3 Methods
12.3.1 A model of generating percepts using prior knowledge
To measure the influence of prior knowledge on perception, I investigated observers’ perception of
figures (humans or other animals) in ‘two-tone images’, which were generated by binarising nat-
ural images around luminance thresholds. Two-tone images were designed to be near-impossible
to disambiguate without having prior knowledge of image content. However, by providing prior
knowledge through exposure to the natural image from which a two-tone image was generated
(labelled the ‘template image’), observers are typically readily able to perceive the figure(s)
embedded in it (see Figure 12.1b for an example two-tone image).
I model the generation of a coherent percept of such figures as the competitive matching of pre-
dictions to sensory evidence (Trapp and Bar, 2015). In this context, the competing predictions
are based on memory representations of the template stored as prior knowledge, while sensory
evidence is derived from the two-tone image. Subjective percepts might be generated when suf-
ficient sensory information is explained by the winning prediction, analogous to ‘accepting’ a
perceptual hypothesis (Gregory, 1980). Without prior knowledge, the possible hypothesis-space
is too large to find a sufficiently well-fitting prediction, thus no figure percept is generated. Prior
knowledge of template images greatly narrows this hypothesis-space, for example via semantic
image content and sensory properties of illumination and viewpoint (Bar, 2003). More flexible
fitting of predictions could be modelled as generating percepts when predictions explain less evi-
dence, so there is greater residual sensory prediction error (Figure 12.1a). In other words, flexible
fitting of predictions can be understood as ‘accepting’ the perceptual hypothesis as adequate on
the basis of a weaker fit between hypothesis and data.
Such a change in the cut-off point for what constitutes an acceptable perceptual hypothesis could,
under some circumstances, maintain stable percepts even when sensory evidence is unreliable.
It could also come with the cost of tolerating greater mismatch between prior knowledge and
sensory evidence, predisposing to inaccurate percepts. In extremis, I consider this a model of
hallucinations - percepts markedly dissociated from sensory evidence.
199
F
ig
u
re
12
.1
:
S
ch
em
at
ic
of
h
ow
p
er
ce
p
ts
m
ay
b
e
ge
n
er
at
ed
fr
om
am
b
ig
u
ou
s
tw
o-
to
n
e
im
ag
es
F
ig
ur
e
12
.1
:
a)
A
si
m
pl
is
ti
c
th
eo
re
ti
ca
lf
un
ct
io
n
th
at
tr
an
sf
or
m
s
se
ns
or
y
ev
id
en
ce
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
by
a
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
in
to
th
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
ge
ne
ra
ti
ng
a
co
he
re
nt
pe
rc
ep
t
of
a
fig
ur
e.
T
he
am
ou
nt
of
se
ns
or
y
ev
id
en
ce
th
at
is
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
by
th
e
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
is
in
su
ffi
ci
en
t
to
pr
od
uc
e
a
m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l
pe
rc
ep
t
w
he
n
vi
ew
in
g
a
tw
o-
to
ne
im
ag
e
w
it
h
an
em
be
dd
ed
fig
ur
e
bu
t
w
it
h
no
pr
io
r
kn
ow
le
dg
e
ab
ou
t
it
(i
).
W
he
n
vi
ew
in
g
th
e
no
n-
de
gr
ad
ed
te
m
pl
at
e
im
ag
e
(i
ii)
,
m
uc
h
of
th
e
se
ns
or
y
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
is
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
an
d
th
e
fig
ur
e
is
pe
rc
ei
ve
d.
W
he
n
vi
ew
in
g
a
tw
o-
to
ne
im
ag
e
co
nt
ai
ni
ng
an
em
be
dd
ed
fig
ur
e
w
it
h
pr
io
r
kn
ow
le
dg
e
ab
ou
t
im
ag
e
co
nt
en
t,
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
s
ca
n
be
ge
ne
ra
te
d
th
at
ex
pl
ai
n
m
or
e
se
ns
or
y
ev
id
en
ce
(i
i)
.
H
ow
ev
er
,
no
t
al
l
ev
id
en
ce
is
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
du
e
to
th
e
lo
ss
of
vi
su
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
in
th
e
tw
o-
to
ne
im
ag
e
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
e
te
m
pl
at
e.
G
en
er
at
in
g
a
pe
rc
ep
t
w
he
n
a
lo
w
er
le
ve
lo
f
ev
id
en
ce
is
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
by
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
s,
w
hi
ch
w
e
hy
po
th
es
is
m
ay
oc
cu
r
in
ea
rl
y
ps
yc
ho
si
s
an
d
he
al
th
y
ps
yc
ho
si
s-
pr
on
en
es
s,
w
ou
ld
re
su
lt
in
m
or
e
fig
ur
es
be
in
g
ge
ne
ra
te
d,
bu
t
m
ay
co
m
e
at
th
e
co
st
of
th
os
e
pe
rc
ep
ts
m
is
re
pr
es
en
ti
ng
th
e
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t,
gi
vi
ng
ri
se
to
an
om
al
ou
s
pe
rc
ep
ti
on
s.
b)
A
n
ex
am
pl
e
of
a
tw
o-
to
ne
im
ag
e
(s
ee
ne
xt
F
ig
ur
e
fo
r
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
te
m
pl
at
e
im
ag
e)
.
200
12.3.2 Task design
In the current study, I designed a task with two conditions using two-tone stimuli. The ‘Global’
condition was designed such that flexible fitting of predictions to sensory data would confer an
advantage and performance would be largely insensitive to the accuracy of the resultant percept.
This meant that participants needed only to generate percepts that accurately reflected global
image properties, or ‘gist’, without high levels of detail. The ‘Local’ condition was designed
to penalise inaccurate percepts, meaning participants needed to generate detailed percepts that
reflected precise local image properties.
These two conditions were embedded in a novel visual discrimination task in which observers
had to make a two-alternative forced choice response as to whether a small red dot, presented
somewhere on a two-tone image, was on or off an embedded figure. For each two-tone image
in each condition (Global/Local), a pair of dot locations were chosen, one on and one off any
embedded figure(s). In the Global condition, paired dot locations were chosen such that they
were equidistant from the centre of the image, assuming observers would expect figures to be
central. Locations were chosen far from the edges of any figures and, where possible, separated
by patches or segments demarcating figure edges, to make the on-figure/off-figure discrimination
possible even if generating inaccurate or coarse percepts.
In the Local condition, paired dot locations were chosen equidistant from a figure contour that
was present in the template image but invisible in the corresponding two-tone, identified using a
fuzzy logic edge-detection algorithm. Dots were placed very close to either side of this invisible
contour, so the discrimination required percepts with precise local detail.
Observers made the same set of discriminations before and after gaining prior knowledge by
viewing their corresponding template images on ‘template trials’ (‘Pre-Template’ and ‘Post-
Template’, respectively). Identical pre-template and post-template trials allowed me to isolate
the effects of prior knowledge on perception by examining within-subject change in performance
measures after seeing the template image.
12.3.3 Hypotheses
If the stronger influence of prior knowledge that is observed in psychosis is due to a more flexible
fitting of predictions to sensory evidence, I would expect that psychosis-proneness, particularly
hallucination-proneness, in healthy observers would confer an advantage in the Global condition
and disadvantage in the Local condition. This prediction follows because flexible application of
prior knowledge would lead to observers generating percepts readily but imprecisely, allowing
them to outperform observers who are less likely to generate a percept in the Global condition,
in which only gist-like information is necessary to complete the task. In turn, the generation of
imprecise percepts should impair performance in the Local condition, in which local information
on fine image details is necessary.
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12.3.4 Stimuli: Two-tone and Template Images
Stimuli were two-tones (binarised black and white images) and templates (the natural pho-
tographs from which two-tones were made, see figures 1b and 2c for an example). To naïve
observers who have not seen the corresponding template images, most two-tone images appeared
meaningless and were near impossible to disambiguate, even with extended viewing. However,
after gaining prior knowledge through viewing the corresponding template image, observers could
usually generate percepts of the embedded figure(s). This produces an often striking change in
subjective experience, despite identical sensory information. Similar to illusory contours in stim-
uli such as the Kanizsa triangle (Kanizsa, 1976), observers sometimes even report perceiving the
contours of figures in two-tone images, despite those contours not actually being present.
The stimulus set was generated by combining stimuli from Teufel et al. (2015) and novel two-tone
stimuli, then piloting and validating images with 4 observers who did not take part in the main
experiment. Observers viewed a set of two-tone images, reported what they could see and rated
the image for clarity from 1-5, before and after viewing the corresponding template images. 73
suitable images with low clarity ratings before and high clarity ratings after viewing the template
images were used as stimuli for the main experiment.
12.3.5 Image Screening
Before the main task, observers were presented with the set of two-tone stimuli and asked to
freely report whatever they could see in the image, if anything. In the case that observers thought
they could see but not fully recognise a figure, they were encouraged to report where in the image
they thought it was. Stimuli in which observers recognised any figure or its approximate location
were excluded and the 30 experimental stimuli chosen randomly from the remaining pool.
12.3.6 Trial structure
There were two trial types in this experiment: two-tone trials, in which participants made
decisions about dots being on or off figures in two-tone images, and template trials, in which
participants acquired prior knowledge about two-tone images by viewing their natural image
counterparts (Figure 12.2). Two-tone trials began with a fixation cross on a grey background,
then a two-tone image was ramped up in contrast over 200ms. When the two-tone reached
full contrast, the dot appeared. After 100ms, the dot flashed off and on for one frame to help
observers localise it. The two-tone and dot were presented at full contrast for 700ms then ramped
down in contrast over a further 200ms to be replaced with a text prompting observer to respond.
Observers had no time limit on making their decision but were instructed to respond as quickly
and as accurately as possible.
On each template trial, a two-tone image was first shown for 100ms. Its template image was
superimposed and ramped up in contrast over 800ms to give the appearance of smoothly transi-
tioning from two-tone to template. This aided disambiguation and strengthened the subjective
percepts of embedded figures. The template image was displayed at maximum contrast for
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1500ms then ramped down in contrast over 800ms to reveal the two-tone image, which was then
ramped down over 100ms.
Stimuli were presented using Matlab (Mathworks) and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007). Two-tone and template stimuli were 7:5 rectangular and
presented on a 15.6” laptop screen with a 60 Hz refresh rate at a distance of approximately 60cm,
subtending approximately 17.5° by 12.6°.
12.3.7 Experimental Structure
The experiment was structured into blocks of two-tone trials and template trials (see Figure
12.2b). A two-tone block comprised 6 different two-tone images, each used on 4 trials (two
Global trials, one on- and one off-figure; two Local trials, one on- and one off-figure) for a total
of 24 trials per block. Prior to every two-tone block, observers were exposed to templates for 3
two-tone images. Thus, pre-template and post-template two-tones were interleaved.
The order of trial types (on-/off-figure) and conditions (Global/Local) was counterbalanced for
within-sequence effects and the images randomly sorted into that sequence, with the requirement
that the same two-tone image was not shown more than twice in succession. Two-tone blocks
alternated with template blocks. In a template block, 3 templates were shown, each on two tem-
plate trials, for a total of 6 template trials. 30 different two-tone and template images were used
in each main experiment, giving 120 two-tone trials before and 120 two-tone trials after template
exposure, each with 60 trials in the Global condition and 60 in the Local condition.
12.3.8 Observers
40 healthy individuals (age range (years) = 18-27, mean age = 22.3, SD = 2.14, 25 female) were
recruited via online advertisement and student email lists at the University of Cambridge. I
required that observers had not previously seen any of the experimental stimuli, had normal or
corrected-normal vision, were not colour-blind and had no history of psychiatric or neurological
illness. Observers were reimbursed £8 for their time and gave written informed consent after
explanation of all experimental procedures and potential consequences. The study was approved
by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Reference PRE.2013.31). I collected
all primary data for this study (see Appendix D for participant information sheet and consent
form).
12.3.9 Measuring Psychosis-Proneness
I measured two dimensions of proneness to positive psychotic experiences with self-report ques-
tionnaires. Delusion-like ideation was measured with the Peters Delusions Inventory (Brief)
(Peters et al., 2004), a 21-item questionnaire comprising statements about unusual beliefs. Each
item is endorsed as a dichotomous ‘yes’/ ‘no’ answer. Endorsed items are rated on three subscales:
‘distress’, ‘preoccupation’ and ‘conviction’. The sum score of the subscales was used as the score
for each participant. Items that were not endorsed were treated as 0 on the subscales.
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Hallucination-like experiences were measured with the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale
(CAPS) (Bell et al., 2006), a 32-item questionnaire comprising a set of statements about unusual
perceptual experiences and hallucinations. The format and scoring are the same as for the PDI,
though the additional subscales were ‘distress’, ‘frequency’ and ‘intrusiveness’.
12.3.10 Outcome variables
Perceptual Performance
My primary outcome variable was the observers’ ability to discriminate between on-figure and off-
figure trials as indexed by d’. This index, an objective measure of ability to perform a perceptual
discrimination derived from signal detection theory, was calculated for each participant and Dot
Condition * Template Exposure combination.
d’ was calculated using the following equation:
d’ = Z(HitRate)− Z(FalseAlarmRate)
where Z is the inverse cumulative standard normal distribution function, Hit Rate is the pro-
portion of trials where the dot was correctly identified as on-figure and False Alarm Rate is the
proportion of trials where the dot was incorrectly identified as on-figure.
12.3.11 Reaction Times
An increase in d’ after seeing template images indicates that the observer has access to more
evidence relevant to their decision in post- versus pre-template trials. One explanation for
such a change might be that higher-quality information is extracted from the two-tone images
after template exposure because of the use of prior knowledge to disambiguate the stimuli.
Alternatively, observers might take longer to make a decision and thereby accumulate more
evidence, which might not necessarily be related to the use of prior knowledge.
To distinguish these possibilities, I conjointly examined reaction times (RTs) and accuracy using
a drift-diffusion model (DDM). The DDM is a widely used mathematical model of information
processing that represents evidence accumulation on a single trial as a stochastic random-walk
process, where a response is emitted when a certain evidence threshold is reached. Access
to higher-quality information is modelled as more rapid accumulation of evidence towards a
correct decision and parameterised as ‘drift rate’ (v). Increasing drift rate speeds reaction times
and increases accuracy. By contrast, requiring more evidence before making a decision can be
parameterised as a change in the ‘decision threshold’, the distance between evidence thresholds.
Increasing decision threshold increases accuracy but slows reaction times.
A hierarchical DDM was fit to RT data using the ‘HDDM’ package (Wiecki et al., 2013). In
the hierarchical DDM, model parameters for each subject are treated as random effects drawn
from group-level distribution (all participants). Hierarchical Bayesian estimation was used to
simultaneously estimate group- and subject-level parameters.
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I estimated a DDM in which each boundary reflected a decision that the dot was on or off a
figure. The parameters of the model were drift rate, decision threshold, non-decision time and a
bias parameter, indicating tendency to favour one decision for each observer and condition. The
DDM converged appropriately, assessed by Geweke statistics being less than 2, visual inspection
of chain posteriors and prediction of reaction time distributions for each subject.
12.3.12 Statistical analyses
First, I tested whether the task conditions and exposure to the template image had the intended
effects on d’, drift rate and decision threshold by entering values on each outcome into 2x2
factorial ANOVAs with factors Template Exposure (pre-Template / post-Template) and Dot
Condition (Global / Local). Follow-up comparisons were performed with paired Welch’s t-
tests.
I next tested whether the effects of seeing the template on d’ were attributable to changes in
evidence extraction (parameterised by drift rate, v) or in evidence needed to make a decision
(parameterised by decision threshold, a). I calculated within-subject change (post-Template –
pre-Template) in the Global and Local conditions in d’, drift rate and decision threshold (∆d’,
∆v, ∆a respectively). I then tested Pearson correlations of ∆d’ with ∆v and ∆a.
Finally, I tested relationships between dimensions of psychosis-proneness and within-subject
change in each outcome variable in the Global and Local conditions, as well as the difference
in change between the Global and Local conditions. Therefore, there were three variables per
subject for each outcome measure (e.g. for d’, these were ∆d’Global, ∆d’Detail and (∆d’Global -
∆d’Detail).
In order to investigate effects of absolute levels of psychosis-proneness, I entered hallucination-
proneness (as estimated by the anomalous perception score) and delusion-proneness (as estimated
by the anomalous belief score) into separate univariate regressions predicting each outcome. I
next investigated effects of the composition of psychotic phenomena in terms of the balance
between anomalous perceptions and anomalous beliefs by entering both hallucination-proneness
and delusion-proneness into multivariate regressions predicting each outcome. Therefore, I ran
the following regressions for each outcome variable:
∆ycondition = β0 + β1Hallucination− proneness+ 
∆ycondition = β0 + β1Delusion− proneness+ 
∆ycondition = β0 + β1Hallucination− proneness+ β2Delusion− proneness+ 
No interactions between hallucination-proneness and delusion-proneness were considered, due
to collinearity. In multivariate regressions, I assessed collinearity by checking that results were
constant when predictors were re-ordered and that the variance inflation factor was below 4.
Unless otherwise reported, there was no evidence of collinearity.
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12.4 Results
2 observers were excluded from the analysis: one for having seen the stimuli in a previous study;
another for misunderstanding the instructions, evident upon debriefing.
12.4.1 Psychosis-Proneness
The CAPS and PDI measures showed positive skew that was corrected by square-root transforma-
tion (Shapiro-Wilk test, CAPS: W = 0.96, p = 0.25, PDI: W = 0.97, p = 0.33). Following trans-
formation, there were no outliers. As expected, hallucination-proneness and delusion-proneness
were correlated (Pearson r = 0.67, t = 5.42, df = 36, p < 0.001).
12.4.2 Perceptual performance
In the Global condition, 3 observers had a perfect hit rate and 1 participant made no false alarms.
To adjust for this and calculate d’, hit rates of 1 were replaced with 1 – 1/60 and the false alarm
rate of 0 were replaced with 1/60 (60 being the number of trials per condition) (Macmillan
and Creelman, 2004). Removing these observers from analyses did not change any substantive
conclusions.
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Figure 12.3: Effects of prior knowledge on perceptual inference
Figure 12.3: a)Effects of task conditions on performance in terms of discriminability index (d’,
mean ± SEM), rate of evidence accumulation towards a decision (drift rate, from diffusion drift
model) and evidence needed to make a decision (decision threshold, from diffusion drift model).
Both d’ and drift rate increased in both conditions after gaining prior knowledge from template
images and increased more in the Global condition than the Local condition. Decision threshold
reduced after gaining prior knowledge, indicating that participants required less evidence to
make a decision. The reduction was greater for the Local condition than the Global condition.
Prior knowledge therefore allowed participants to extract evidence faster and make perceptual
decisions based on less evidence. b) Change in d’ and drift rate were highly correlated in both the
Global and Local conditions, while there were no correlations between change in d’ and decision
threshold (not shown). This supports that prior knowledge improved performance by enhancing
extraction of information from two-tone images.
As expected, prior knowledge facilitated perception of figures embedded in two-tone images
(12.3a). This facilitation was indicated by a difference in d’ between before and after seeing the
template (main effect of Template Exposure: F1, 40.66) = 138.64, p < 0.001) and follow-up t-tests,
which revealed better performance after having seen the template in both conditions (Global: t
= 6.43, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 2.11; Local: t = 8.44, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 2.77). The
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Global condition, which required less detailed information, was easier to perform, indicated by
an overall main effect of Condition (F1, 35.31) = 120.39, p < 0.001) and higher d’ in the Global
condition than the Local condition both pre- and post-template (Pre-Template: t = 6.43, df =
37, p < 0.001, D = 2.11; Post-Template: t = 15.68, df = 37 p < 0.001, D = 5.16). Furthermore,
the magnitude of improvement was greater in the Global condition than the Local condition,
indicated by a Template Exposure * Dot Condition interaction (F1, 8.18) = 27.89 p < 0.001) and
confirmed by follow-up t-test (t = 8.66, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 2.85).
12.4.3 Prior knowledge facilitates perceptual discrimination by improving
evidence extraction
Drift diffusion modelling indicated that that prior knowledge facilitated extraction of high-quality
evidence from two-tone images rather than observers acquiring more information by waiting
longer to respond (12.3a). Drift rate changed as a result of seeing the template, as evidenced by
a significant main effect of Template Exposure (F1, 148) = 430.5, p < 0.001) and was higher after
seeing the template than before in both conditions (Global: t = 19.302, df = 37, p < 0.001, D
= 6.35; Local: t = 20.982, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 6.90).
With respect to a difference between the two conditions, the modelling indicated that evidence
was acquired more rapidly about the gist of an embedded figure than about its precise details.
Drift rate was different across the Global and Local conditions, indicated by a significant effect
of Dot Condition (F1, 148) = 477.0, p < 0.001) and was higher in the Global condition both
before and after template exposure (Pre-Template: t = 11.64, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 3.83;
Post-Template: t = 18.29, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 6.02). Importantly, this main effect was
qualified by a significant Template Exposure * Dot Condition interaction (F1, 148) = 104.8, p <
0.001). Together with posthoc tests, which indicated significantly higher increase in drift rate in
the Global condition (t = 14.11, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 4.63), this finding suggests that the
impact of prior knowledge was stronger for the perception of the gist of a stimulus than its fine
details.
In addition to evidence suggesting that prior knowledge facilitated more rapid extraction of evi-
dence from two-tone images, my results suggest that top-down modulation also caused observers
to make decisions based on less evidence. This interpretation is suggested by analyses of the
decision threshold parameter, which was lower after than before template exposure (F1, 148) =
22.490, p < 0.001). There were no effects of Dot Condition or interaction effects. Posthoc tests
confirmed that decision threshold reduced in both conditions (Global: t = 5.124, df = 37, p <
0.001, D = 1.68; Local: t = 7.85, df = 37, p < 0.001, D = 2.58).
The prediction that prior knowledge would improve perception of figures embedded in two-
tone images mainly by facilitating extraction of information was further supported by a direct
comparison between the index of the change in discriminatory performance (∆d’ ) due to prior
knowledge and model parameter estimates (12.3b). I found a significant Pearson correlation
between change in d’ (∆d’ ) in both the Global (r = 0.85, t = 9.56, df = 36, p < 0.001) and
Local (r = 0.76, t = 57.04, df = 36, p < 0.001) conditions with a change in drift rate (∆v) but
no relation with change in decision threshold (∆a) (Global condition: r = -0.03, t = -0.21, df =
36, p = 0.83; Local condition: r = -0.12, t = -0.69, df = 36, p = 0.491).
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12.4.4 Effects of hallucination-proneness and delusion-proneness on percep-
tual performance
Univariate analyses of hallucination-proneness and delusion-proneness considered
independently
As predicted, and consistent with previous work, hallucination-proneness (total CAPS score)
was associated with an advantage in using prior experience to perceive the gist of the figures
in two-tone images. This was indicated by association between CAPS and ∆d’ in the Global
condition (Figure 4a – dashed line, t = 2.382, p = 0.023, D = 0.79, requiv. = 0.37) but was
not reflected in ∆v (Figure 4b – dashed line). Contrary to predictions, hallucination-proneness
did not predict a disadvantage in perceiving image details, (though neither did it predict an
advantage), shown by lack of relationship with ∆d’ or ∆v in the Local condition (Figures 4a &
4b – solid lines). This suggested that hallucination-prone healthy observers’ enhanced ability to
readily generate template-derived percepts of two-tone images (as evidenced by their advantage
in the Global condition) did not come at the cost of an inability to perceive detailed aspects of
the images.
There was some (non-significant) evidence that the advantage to perception associated with
hallucination-proneness was specific to gist perception, indicated by a trend towards a difference
between ∆v in the Global and Local conditions (t = 1.853, p = 0.072, D = 0.62, requiv. = 0.3).
This effect was not apparent in ∆d’.
In contrast to hallucination-proneness, I found no relationship between delusion-proneness (total
PDI score) and experience-dependent perception of the gist of figures, indicated by an absence
of association with ∆d’ or ∆v in the Global condition (Figures 4c & 4d – dashed lines). This
suggested that the advantage in generating percepts of figures, based upon experience of the
templates, could be specific to anomalous perceptions, rather than anomalous beliefs. Interest-
ingly, I found evidence that the predicted psychosis-associated disadvantage in perceiving image
details was associated with delusional ideation. In the Local condition, delusion-proneness (total
PDI score) predicted smaller ∆v (Figure 4d – solid line, t = -2.278, p = 0.029, D = 0.76, requiv.
= -0.35) and trend-predicted smaller ∆d’ (Figure 4c – solid line, t = -1.83, p = 0.076, D = -0.61,
requiv. = -0.29). Higher PDI scores also predicted larger differences in discrimination of image
gist and details, indicated by difference in ∆d’ across conditions (t = 2.32, p = 0.026, requiv. =
0.36, D = 0.77).
Multivariate analyses of hallucination-proneness and delusion-proneness considered
together
My prediction of hallucinations-associated advantage in perceiving the gist of embedded figures
was therefore borne out by the data but I found only weak evidence of a disadvantage in per-
ceiving image detail. This was associated with proneness to delusions (PDI scores), rather than
hallucinations (CAPS scores). However, I observed striking and opposing effects of hallucination-
and delusion-proneness when the balance between these dimensions of positive psychotic phe-
nomena was considered by entering both into multivariate linear regressions. Being excessively
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or predominantly hallucination-prone, for a given level of delusion-proneness, conferred moder-
ate advantage using prior knowledge to perceive image gist, shown by greater ∆d’ in the Global
condition (Figure 4e – dashed line, t = 2.17, p = 0.037, D = 0.72, requiv. = 0.34), further asso-
ciating greater readiness to generate percepts with hallucination-like experiences. However, this
association was not reflected in ∆v (Figure 4f – dashed line, t = 1.61, p = 0.117, D = 0.54, requiv.
= 0.26).
Importantly, predominant hallucination-proneness also predicted a large advantage using prior
knowledge to perceive image details, shown by greater ∆d’ and ∆v in the Local condition (∆d’ :
Figure 4e – solid line, t = 4.23, p < 0.001, D = 1.41, requiv. = 0.58; ∆v : Figure 4f – solid line,
t = 2.43 p = 0.02, D = 0.81, requiv. = 0.38), reflecting generation of detailed percepts that were
highly faithful to the template information. This advantage was not strongly specific to one
condition, shown by absence of an association with difference in ∆d’ or ∆v across the Global
and Local conditions. Observers who were more strongly prone to anomalous perceptions than
delusional ideation therefore more readily generated percepts of figures embedded in two-tone
images with a high degree of accurate image detail.
In contrast, being predominantly delusion-prone, for a given level of hallucination-proneness,
did not predict an advantage or disadvantage in perceiving gist, but the details were perceived
aberrantly with respect to the optimal template-derived percepts. This was indicated by an
absence of a relationship between predominant delusion-proneness and ∆d’ or ∆v in the Global
condition (Figures 4g & 4h – dashed lines), but a large disadvantage in the Local condition
(∆d’ : Figure 4g – solid line, t = -4.48, p < 0.001, D = -1.51, requiv. = -0.60, ∆v : Figure 4h
– solid line, t = -3.43, p = 0.002, D = -1.14, requiv. = -0.5). There was weak evidence that
delusion-predominance conferred different effects on discrimination of gist and details, shown
by a trend towards greater difference in ∆d’ across the conditions (t = 1.72, p = 0.093, D =
0.57, requiv. = 0.28), though this was not evident in drift rate. Observers who were more strongly
prone to delusional ideation than anomalous perceptions were therefore able to generate percepts
of embedded figures, but their perception of those figures’ details differed from the information
provided by the template images.
Critically, there were no associations between change in decision threshold with Template ex-
posure and either hallucination-proneness or delusion-proneness, in univariate or multivariate
regressions. This supports an assertion that the observed changes in perceptual performance,
indexed by d’, were unlikely to be caused by a change in the amount of evidence needed to
make decisions, which might have reflected strategy more than a change in the extraction of
information from visual percepts.
12.5 Discussion
In the current study, I sought to understand psychosis-proneness more fully by exploring mech-
anisms of the integration of sensory evidence with prior knowledge across different levels of
hallucination and delusion-proneness. Specifically, I used ambiguous images containing embed-
ded figures, the perception of which was aided by prior knowledge, to test the hypothesis that
hallucination-proneness is related to a tendency to generate percepts despite a poor fit between
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actual sensation and predictions derived from prior knowledge. According to this hypothe-
sis, hallucination-proneness should be related to better extraction of image gist in perceptual
situations that heavily rely on prior knowledge, but an impairment in extracting fine image
detail.
Though partly borne out, my results demand a more complex explanation. First, in keeping
with my prediction and with previous results (Teufel et al., 2015) I showed that hallucination-
proneness was associated with a greater ability to use prior knowledge to generate percepts,
which is consistent with the idea that anomalous perceptions arise from a changed integration of
sensory evidence with top-down predictions (Corlett et al., 2009, 2010; Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
However, hallucination-proneness did not predict inaccurate perception of image details. Indeed,
when I considered within-individual balance between hallucination- and delusion-proneness, I
found that higher levels of aberrant perception in the context of lower levels of aberrant beliefs
was associated with better perception of both image gist and fine details. Critically, diffusion-
drift modelling showed that this improvement was not due to strategy differences as might
have been indicated by changes in decision threshold but was driven by more efficient visual
extraction of evidence. While supporting the idea that hallucinations arise from over-reliance on
top-down predictions, this shows that, contrary to my expectations, prior knowledge supports
visual extraction of highly-detailed perceptual information in hallucination-prone observers who
lack anomalous beliefs. Conversely, observers with higher levels of aberrant belief in the context
of lower levels of aberrant perception were relatively disadvantaged when using prior knowledge
to perceive local details of embedded figures. This disadvantage was driven by less efficient
evidence extraction, rather than changing decision thresholds. However, predominantly delusion-
prone observers showed intact perception of image gist. Thus delusion-proneness specifically was
associated with using prior knowledge to visually extract information pertaining to the images’
broad meanings but poorly extracting information about their precise details.
I suggest that these findings, though complex, may actually be explicable by considering a pro-
cessing hierarchy ascending from concrete, unimodal sensory inputs to more abstract, belief-like
levels (Mumford, 1992; Friston et al., 2006). Within this framework, the advantage held by
hallucination-prone and the disadvantage befalling delusion-prone observers could both be con-
ceived of in terms of a computational shift towards over-reliance on prior knowledge in perceptual
inference. Critically, the different performance capabilities of delusion-prone and hallucination-
prone observers could arise from shifts towards relying on prior knowledge originating from
different levels of the processing hierarchy.
Predominantly hallucination-prone observers might largely encode and use prior knowledge
gained from the template images as perceptual information, conferring an advantage in the task
condition that specifically probed knowledge of precise perceptual details. While advantageous
in the context of the current experiment, under natural viewing conditions this may result in a
tendency to interpret ambiguous sensory information using perceptual hypotheses, predisposing
to aberrant generation of percepts and, in extremis, hallucinations.
Conversely, predominantly delusion-prone observers might largely encode template prior knowl-
edge as more abstract, belief like information at high hierarchical levels. Template knowledge
encoded or used at these levels would have sufficient information to broadly infer the coarse gist
of two-tone images but be of limited use when inferring specific details, as low-level features of
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the template would be summarised at the higher level without being specifically encoded. The
details of resultant percepts may therefore be volatile or subtly inaccurate. This would explain
preserved performance in the gist condition and poor performance in the detail condition. I
suggest two possible manifestations of this computational shift in natural viewing conditions.
Firstly, observers may tend to interpret ambiguous sensory information by invoking higher-level
beliefs, manifesting bizarre or delusional appraisals of events. Secondly, observers may be insen-
sitive to fine perceptual details, particularly when they are not consistent with high-level beliefs.
Percepts would effectively be sculpted to conform to expectations, which could manifest as false
inferences e.g. wrongly inferring intentions of others from subtle facial expressions.
Central to the account presented here is that psychotic phenomena are associated with unrelia-
bility in signalling of low-level sensory information in the visual system. Support for this can be
found in the large body of evidence showing dysfunction of early visual processing in psychotic
disorders (for review, see Javitt, 2009) and a smaller body of evidence showing similar visual
impairments associated with schizotypal personality (for review, see Ettinger et al., 2015). These
deficits in early stages of processing may result in the outputs of early processing being nois-
ier and less well-structured, causing ambiguity in perceptual inference and prompting adaptive
reliance on top-down predictions from prior knowledge.
These findings provide a starting point for understanding the considerable heterogeneity of pos-
itive psychotic phenomena, a heterogeneity that is observed both in clinical samples and the
general population but that is poorly addressed by current theoretical models. Isolated anoma-
lous perceptions or beliefs may represent compensatory changes in use of prior knowledge at a
single locus of a processing hierarchy, e.g., aberrant use of perceptual or abstract knowledge.
Concurrence of both phenomena may occur when adaptation at a single level is not sufficient
to resolve unreliability in sensory inputs and the early outputs of sensory processing, leading to
a propagation of atypicalities in the use of prior knowledge throughout the processing hierar-
chy. Indeed, epidemiological evidence suggests that psychotic phenomena may become clinically
relevant as anomalous perceptions are complicated by anomalous beliefs (Smeets et al., 2012).
Using a nonclinical sample limited my ability to generalise these findings to psychotic disorders,
though I can make readily testable predictions about the computational mechanisms of clinical
psychotic symptoms. Mapping out computational changes and their neurobiological implemen-
tations in early psychosis in relation to changes in health and functional outcomes may therefore
allow better prediction of risk based on underlying mechanisms and could suggest new targets
and timeframes for pharmacological or psychological intervention.
There is a potential paradox here: while my findings seem to suggest a psychosis-associated
advantage in perceptual organisation, there are well-established findings of deficits in perceptual
organisation in schizophrenia (for review, see Silverstein & Keane, 2011), and some evidence of
abnormal perceptual organisation in schizotypy (Uhlhaas and Silverstein, 2005). These studies
tended to find failure in Gestalt perception of stimuli similar to two-tone images, like Mooney
faces, and the favouring of local details over global percepts, in contrast with my findings.
Psychotic disorders and schizotypy are also associated with deficits, rather than advantages,
using predictions in visual perception (Schmack et al., 2015), eye movements (Spering et al.,
2013) and predicting consequences of self-made actions (Shergill et al., 2005; Teufel et al., 2010).
While this may seem to contradict my findings, the pattern of psychosis-associated predictive
214
and organisational deficits in the literature is consistent with noisy, overly-influential sensory
information, which is at the core of my interpretation of my findings. I suggest that organisational
and predictive deficits arise when higher-level knowledge is not available and predictions must
be generated ‘endogenously’. Noise in the early stages of processing may cause difficulty in
selecting or accessing appropriate prior knowledge, but the provision of hypotheses that explain
sensory input, as is the case with the template images here, allows reliance on those hypotheses,
translating into a task advantage.
To conclude, my results shed light on the emergence and persistence of two seemingly very dif-
ferent atypical experiences, anomalous perceptions and anomalous beliefs, with transdiagnostic
relevance for emerging mental disorders. These phenomena may arise from a common computa-
tional mechanism, the over-reliance on prior knowledge in the generation of percepts, expressed
at different levels of the information processing hierarchy.
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Chapter 13
General Discussion
In this thesis, I investigated PEs in young people in the general population in terms of their mea-
surement, association with distress and health implications, their relationship to the social envi-
ronment and their mechanisms in terms of atypical information-processing. Below, I discuss the
overall implications of these studies and make recommendations for future investigations.
13.1 The measurement of psychotic experiences
Further investigation is required into the measurement properties of PEs by different instru-
ments, with the aim of rigorous comparison of instruments and synthesis of different approaches
to the study of psychosis, namely the high-risk and schizotypy fields. My results are promis-
ing for the integration of work in these different frameworks in that a self-report instrument
of current ‘schizotypal’ phenomena measured the same factor as an interview for discrete life-
time PEs that may be more comparable to clinical instruments. However, there are likely to
be significant limitations with even widely-used instruments, making more thorough validation
necessary. I found significant problems with the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (Raine,
1991) that were largely overcome through re-specification of its dimensional structure. The as-
sessment pathway laid out in Chapter 6 is a reasonable and tractable set of analyses that provide
far more information than standard psychometric validation procedures, which are often limited
to reporting Cronbach’s coefficient alpha or test-retest reliability. This pathway could be stan-
dardised and applied to other instruments, so as to obtain more directly comparable information
about different instruments measuring PEs. In particular, a critical advance in measurement of
PEs would be better understanding of what severity ranges of PEs are measured by different
instruments. As in Chapter 5, this might allow us to infer whether ‘false-positive’ PEs detected
by self-report instruments but not verified by interview instruments are actually reflecting PEs
at a lower level of severity than an interview is able to measure. The pathway I used is far
from exhaustive, and other measures can provide complementary information, depending on the
goals of psychometric analysis, such as equipercentile-linking for instruments that should be very
directly comparable (Kolen and Brennan, 2006; Fusar-Poli et al., 2016).
An important advance for the field, and for psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience, would be more
readily rejecting the use of instruments that show inadequate measurement precision or, at least,
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down-weighting the contributions made to the field by studies that use them. Doing so would
require direct comparison of multiple instruments but may enable standardisation across differ-
ent conceptual approaches (schizotypy, high-risk, broader investigations into psychiatry) and a
concerted effort to modulate the impact of studies where conclusions are strongly confounded by
measurement error. This process might be aided by the construction of standardized validation
procedures and extensive simulation of how measurement precision affects the conclusions of
empirical research.
13.2 The health implications of psychotic experiences
Psychotic experiences are heterogeneously associated with distress but some PEs index trans-
diagnostic risk of mental disorders. The results of latent variable modelling and latent class
clustering in Appendix C and Chapter 7 support that some but not all PEs are associated with
psychopathology, consistent with evidence from the schizotypy field (Mohr and Claridge, 2015),
from investigations into selected samples of adults (Brett et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2010; Peters
et al., 2016) and population-based cohort studies (Kaymaz et al., 2012; Kelleher et al., 2012b;
van Nierop et al., 2012; Zammit et al., 2013). Between 4.5% and 10% of young people were
prone to PEs alongside depressive symptoms, anxious symptoms, social anxiety, poor wellbeing
and greatly increased risk of non-psychotic mental disorders. This suggests some PEs commonly
occur in young people who are severely distressed (Stochl et al., 2015) and is consistent with
comorbidity of PEs in common non-psychotic mental disorders (Kelleher et al., 2012b; Wigman
et al., 2012; Fusar-Poli et al., 2014a), evidence that PEs become more likely with increasing
severity of non-psychotic psychopathology (Guloksuz et al., 2015) and evidence that psychotic
and non-psychotic psychopathologies share environmental (Wigman et al., 2012; van Nierop et
al., 2015; Guloksuz et al., 2016) and genetic risk factors (Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric
Genomics Consortium et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016; Zavos et al., 2016).
In contrast, between 7.5% and 15.3% of young people were prone to PEs, including those oc-
curring persistently for over a year, but had low levels of depressive and anxious symptoms and
high perceived wellbeing. Arguably, I found little evidence of a completely ‘benign’ psychosis-
prone phenotype, in that the non-distressed, PE-prone cluster in each sample were more likely
to have symptoms in other domains or meet criteria or be help-seeking for non-psychotic disor-
ders than young people with neither PEs nor distress. Nonetheless, those young people had far
more favourable current mental health than those with PEs and distress and are likely to have
far more favourable future health trajectories, though longitudinal work is necessary to confirm
this.
Clearly, PEs have heterogeneous health implications, ranging from being relatively benign to
indicating either high levels of sub-clinical psychopathology or full-blown mental illness. The
specific nature of the PEs young people are prone to and other features, like their social func-
tioning or environmental risk factors, may determine health outcomes.
Different types of PEs appeared to be differently associated with psychopathology and need for
clinical care, with paranoid ideation and delusions being more maladaptive than non-paranoid
unusual perceptions and beliefs. This is consistent with evidence that clinical psychosis may
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develop as delusions and maladaptive appraisals complicate unusual perceptions (Ford, 1995;
Smeets et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2015) and that some perceptual PEs and ‘magical thinking’ can
occur relatively benignly (Sommer et al., 2010; Tabak et al., 2013; Brett et al., 2014; Daalman
et al., 2016; Peters et al., 2016). I found that young people prone to PEs and distress were more
likely to have high levels of paranoia, while those with PEs and low distress had low levels of
paranoia. Similarly, paranoid ideation, but not unusual perceptions and beliefs, predicted higher
distress one year later in Chapter 8.
Other factors predicted and might cause different health outcomes in young people to PEs. In
particular, I found strong evidence for the involvement of a person’s early and recent social
environment in predicting and possibly shaping health outcomes in people with PEs.
13.3 The social environment may be critical in determining psy-
chotic experiences and psychopathology
A person’s social environment may be critical for predicting and/or determining the occurrence
and health impact of PEs. Focusing on childhood adversity and recent social support, I found
evidence that particular features of social relationships during different developmental periods
have different effects on dimensions of PEs and psychopathology in later life.
Childhood adversity predisposed to non-paranoid PEs, paranoid ideation and depressive symp-
toms and was associated with PEs occurring both with and without high levels of distress. This
is consistent with existing literature linking PEs to clinical psychosis (Varese et al., 2012) and
to nonclinical PEs (Lovatt et al., 2010; Daalman et al., 2012). I discussed a number of proposed
mechanisms by which early life adversity may predispose to PEs in computational terms by ap-
pealing to the predictive processing framework and tested one such mechanism directly in an
experimental study, though found no evidence that childhood adversity predisposes to PEs by
perturbing the modulation of behaviour by confidence.
The quality of recent relationships and social support from family and friends showed different
patterns of association with PEs and psychopathology, when compared to childhood adversity.
Recent social support clearly separated the distressed and non-distressed PE-prone phenotypes.
In longitudinal studies in both the NSPN and ROOTS cohorts, supportive recent relationships
reduced depressive symptoms and paranoid ideation but had less effect on non-paranoid unusual
perceptions and beliefs. Furthermore, over one year, asocial dispositions promoted PEs and
distress, mediated by impairment of social support, suggesting social difficulties are temporally
precedent to increases in PEs. Given that childhood adversity was associated with both PE-
prone phenotypes, this raises the possibility that adversity in early life may induce shifts in
information-processing that tend towards PEs, but that the more recent social environment
shapes their content and the implications they have on mental health. This adds to existing
work showing that decline in social functioning precedes the onset of psychosis (Velthorst et al.,
2016) and that atypicalities in social functioning are present in young people who go on to develop
adult schizophrenia (Jones et al., 1994; Malmberg et al., 1998). The recent social environment
may therefore be a critical feature in determining health trajectories and, importantly, may
represent an under-utilised intervention target to promote positive mental health.
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A key remaining question is whether impairments to social functioning and social relationships
are symptomatic of the same disease processes that cause PEs or are actually a causal factor in
their aetiology, such as through the mechanisms I elaborated on in computational terms. The
former would still support their use as predictors, but the latter would suggest they may be
valuable therapeutic targets. It is also possible that social deficits may be somewhere between
symptomatic and causal. Impairments to social functioning or impoverishment of social relation-
ships may generate a positive feedback cycle, where valuable socially-derived information is lost
and the stress-buffering effects of social support are diminished, leading to the acceleration of
psychopathology and destabilisation of reality. Causality cannot be inferred from my work alone,
but interventions targeting quality of social relationships and networks have shown promising
early results (McFarlane et al., 2003; O’Brien et al., 2014; Poulton et al., 2014; Harrop et al.,
2015). In future work, it will be important to directly test the proposed mechanisms and map
out the pathways by which the social environment influences PEs and psychopathology in terms
of information-processing and its neurobiological implementation.
13.4 The mechanisms of psychotic experiences
13.4.1 PEs in adolescents and a pharmacological model of psychosis share a
common computational association: a reduction in the modulation of
learning by confidence
Current models based on predictive processing posit that the central computational atypicality in
psychosis is a perturbation to how the brain signals the reliability of information sources, whether
predictions from internal models or incoming evidence collected via the senses. I investigated
whether this might be mathematically modelled as a reduction in how people use confidence in
their knowledge of the world to modulate their behaviour in an experimental task in a large
sample of adolescents. I found that young people did modulate their behaviour according to a
parameter that represented confidence and that non-paranoid anomalous experiences and beliefs
were associated with a set of changes in information-processing, including reduced modulation
of learning by confidence. This is very similar to the findings of a recent study showing that
ketamine, a pharmacological model of psychosis, impairs the use of confidence to modulate
behaviour in healthy volunteers. These findings therefore support that PEs are associated with
atypicalities in how the reliability of internal models shapes learning, and suggest investigation
of atypicalities in NDMA receptor function as a potential neurobiological implementation.
13.4.2 The specific content of psychotic experiences may arise from the influ-
ence of different types of prior knowledge on perceptual inference
The heterogeneity of PEs in terms of aberrant perceptions and aberrant beliefs might be explained
by a common mechanism of aberrant integration of prior knowledge and incoming information,
with different manifestations depending on what form in which prior knowledge is encoded. PEs
are associated with a greater influence of prior knowledge on perception of ambiguous images
(Teufel et al., 2015). I tested a theory that was conceptually similar to the theory elaborated
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earlier that adversity and PEs were associated with adaptations to information-processing to
mitigate unreliable information about the environment. I hypothesised that PEs, and anomalous
perceptions in particular, would be associated with tendency to generate percepts in perceptual
inference from a lower level of match between predictions from internal models and actual sensory
evidence, as a result of the outputs of early stages of visual processing being less well-structured
and less reliable. This would tend towards stabilising perception despite unreliable information,
but may come at the cost of generating gist-like or inappropriate percepts, lacking in accurate
details and misrepresenting the world. In extremis, this might generate hallucinations and overtly
anomalous perceptions.
While I found evidence that increasing proneness to anomalous perceptions predicted greater
reliance on prior knowledge to perceive the gist of ambiguous images, I found that the bal-
ance between PEs manifesting as anomalous perceptions and beliefs had distinct patterns of
association with use of prior knowledge to perceive image detail. Predominance of anomalous
perceptions, over anomalous beliefs, predicted far greater ability to perceive details of ambiguous
images, driven by more efficient visual extraction of information. This would be consistent with
preferential encoding and/or use of prior knowledge as a perceptual code in perceptual inference.
In ecological conditions, this may result in inappropriate use of perceptual knowledge to explain
ambiguous sensory information, generating false or aberrant percepts.
In contrast, predominance of anomalous beliefs over anomalous perceptions was associated with
far worse ability to perceive details of ambiguous images, driven by less efficient visual extrac-
tion of information. This would be consistent with preferential encoding/use of prior of prior
knowledge in a more abstract, belief-like code that allowed perception of coarse image gist but
contained only overly-general or volatile information about image details. This might be a mech-
anism by which delusion-prone people are largely able to navigate the world but may experience
it subtly differently, shaped to conform to expectations and beliefs. This could tend towards
delusional appraisals of experiences and also to the persistence of aberrant beliefs by failing to
learn from contradictory information.
These results represent early evidence of how probing information-processing using principles
and methods from computational neuroscience may further our understanding of behaviours or
subjective experiences. In particular, these results provide a starting point to understand the
considerable heterogeneity of the content of PEs in mechanistic terms.
13.5 Future directions
13.5.1 Utilising heterogeneity: Mapping computational pathways to psy-
chosis and psychopathology
Heterogeneity has been a recurrent theme in this thesis, and the considerable diversity of PEs
and the people who experience them, even within single categories, like those meeting crite-
ria for high psychosis-risk, have been highlighted in recent reviews (Murray and Jones, 2012;
Fusar-Poli et al., 2014c; Yung and Lin, 2016). Heterogeneity in pathophysiological mechanisms
underlying PEs and mental illness is almost certainly not reflected by current psychiatric nosol-
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ogy, despite their reliability and considerable utility. Understanding this heterogeneity might
enable psychiatry to move towards ‘precision-medicine’ (Disease, 2011; Insel, 2014), predicting
and tailoring interventions based on underlying disease mechanisms. The hope is that this would
enable primary prevention of mental illnesses, maximise intervention efficacy and see the end of
time-consuming trial-and-error approaches to therapeutic choices that can leave disease processes
running unhindered for long periods.
In future work, it will be critical to take a broad perspective on the development of PEs and
psychopathology, considering diverse trajectories towards good and poor health outcomes and
psychotic and non-psychotic disorders. From these and other results, I have sketched out crude
mechanistic pathways to different health outcomes in young people prone to PEs (Figure 13.1)
that could form the basis of further investigations. I do not claim that this model offers much in
terms of unique insights into psychosis or its various health outcomes; it fairly closely resembles
Meehl’s ground-breaking conceptualisation of schizotypy (Meehl, 1962, 1990). Rather, it is an
attempt to link epidemiological observations to potential computational mechanisms. I have
attempted to take a developmental perspective, so the model shows how PEs might develop
across time from a common starting point and three branch-points determining progression
towards different health outcomes in people prone to PEs. At the branch points, arrows show
that genetic and environmental influences may be critical in determining trajectories.
Perturbations to the signalling of reliability of information is at the core of this model and the
earliest atypicality (13.1, A). The results of this perturbation may be that the system is exposed
to an excess of information without a well-tuned signal of its reliability. I would suggest that
this stage is likely to span childhood or early adolescence and may be associated with transient
anomalies in perception and experience but likely without great distress or functional impairment.
Due to the complex computations involved in social behaviour, more extreme perturbations might
manifest as subtle social abnormalities (Jones et al., 1994).
The first branch-point in the model (13.1, 1) describes whether the perturbation to reliability
signalling might subside on its own (B), perhaps through normal development or removal of some
driving influence, or whether it drives changes to information-processing (C). If the former, then
PEs are likely to subside without negative consequences for health or functioning. In the latter
case, exposure to excessive unreliable information may lead to updates to internal models as an
attempt to incorporate the new information, tending towards forming beliefs that diverge from
the social consensus. It may also drive compensatory over-weighting of some predictions from
internal models as an attempt to ignore or explain-away the incoming signals, a consequence
of which might be false inferences and aberrant perceptions (Aleman et al., 2003; Teufel et al.,
2015).
The second branch-point (13.1, 2) describes whether the early compensatory changes tend to-
wards adjustments that are maladaptive and harmful (D) or adaptive and less harmful (E).
Maladaptive adjustments might include developing beliefs that explain unreliable information
but are themselves distressing or impairing, such as persecutory beliefs or negative beliefs about
the self or the world. These might confer risk of developing mental disorders, particularly non-
psychotic disorders like depression, anxiety or substance dependence. I suggest that individuals
meeting criteria for high-risk for psychosis would be at this stage of the pathway, as would at
least some of the young people belonging to the ‘distressed and PE-prone’ clusters in the NSPN
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and ROOTS cohorts.
Adaptive adjustments might include developing beliefs that explain unreliable information but
are not distressing, such as spiritual appraisals (Farias et al., 2013; Brett et al., 2014). The
compensation described here need not be at the ‘macro-scale’ of someone developing explanations
for why they had a hallucination, but could instead describe small adjustments to internal models
and their reliability-weighting with subtle manifestations in behaviour and personality. With
adaptive adjustments, unreliable information might be compensated for and depending on how
internal models and their reliabilities were updated, PEs might subside or persist without distress
or impairment. I suggest that people manifesting persistent PEs without need for care (Peters
et al., 2016), ‘healthy schizotypy’ (Tabak et al., 2013) and some of the young people belonging
to the ‘non-distressed, PE-prone’ phenotype in NSPN and ROOTS would be at this stage of the
pathway.
What factors might determine trajectories from this branch-point? The updating of internal
models might depend critically on the information present in the environment. The results of
clustering analyses and longitudinal modelling in this thesis suggest that a supportive social
environment might be a key determining feature, via various mechanisms discussed previously
(though I cannot infer causality from my findings). Causality is supported by early evidence
that interventions targeting family and peer relationships are beneficial in clinical psychosis
(McFarlane et al., 2003; O’Brien et al., 2014; Poulton et al., 2014; Harrop et al., 2015) but it
remains to be seen whether improving social support at a far earlier stage in the development of
psychopathology might be a protective and preventative factor for mental disorders.
The third branch-point describes health trajectories in people who have already made maladap-
tive adjustments to internal models and their reliabilities. Assuming this state corresponds to
people at high-risk for psychosis, we can estimate that roughly one third of people will transition
to psychosis (Kaymaz et al., 2012), one third will recover fully and one third will continue to
have symptoms and functional impairment without transition to psychosis (Schlosser et al., 2012;
Simon et al., 2013).
In those who transition to psychosis (path F), I suggest that compensatory changes at stage D will
have failed to explain away unreliable information, perhaps because of more severe perturbation
to reliability-signalling. The result might be a more dramatic shift in internal models such that
they greatly diverge from social consensus and their predictions are ever-increasingly relied upon.
The result might effectively be a switch from a state of pervasive uncertainty to pathological
certainty in a few aberrant beliefs that cannot be challenged or disproven: Chadwick’s ‘galloping
confirmation bias (Chadwick, 2007), as discussed in Chapter 9. If even these extreme adjustments
fail to resolve unreliable prediction error, the result might be an eventual exhaustion of the
brain’s capacity to adjust. I tentatively suggest that this ‘decompensation’ might manifest as
extreme negative symptoms and catatonia, as the system comes to experience the environment
as essentially impossible to predict and all functions that might depend on predictions, like
perception and movement (Friston et al., 2010), are fundamentally impaired.
For those who do not transition to psychosis but have continued symptoms and impairment (path
F), the system may have managed to mostly stabilise itself in the face of unreliable prediction
error, preventing catastrophic distortion of reality, but at a significant cost. The brain’s internal
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models might now represent the world as a distressing or threatening place and impair things
like social interaction as well as confer general risk of mental disorders. However, some will make
a full recovery (path H), suggesting they have managed to resolve unreliable prediction error
signals but without maintaining maladaptive internal models. Again, the trajectories at branch-
point 3 are likely to be influenced by various genetic and environmental factors, like access to
clinical interventions or a supportive social environment.
It is important to note what this model does not capture. It neglects negative symptoms and re-
duces the development of highly complex disorders like depression into a few general statements.
It may also be that people at any one stage of the model who are indistinguishable by symptom
or computational phenotypes are fully separable at other levels of explanation, such as neurobi-
ological implementation or environmental exposures. It may also be that some individuals are
committed to a certain outcome from very early on, such as from a risk factor with a large effect
size like 22q11.2 deletion syndrome, so their pathway may feature fewer or different branch-points.
Branch-points and a plurality of health outcomes might be an artefact of mixing populations
with similar phenotypes but totally different computational or neurobiological mechanisms or
aetiologies. People who have made adaptive adjustments to account for unreliable prediction
error signalling might still develop maladaptive adjustments and psychopathology, particularly if
exposed to environmental risk factors. The ’stages’ and ’branch-points’ are obviously simplifica-
tions; adaptive versus maladaptive adaptation is likely to form a distribution rather than divide
into two distinct groups.
Future work might focus on mapping out these pathways in greater detail and testing the compu-
tational changes responsible for development of different phenotypes. Critically, studies should
seek further evidence of atypicalities in reliability-signalling of information and its association
with PEs in the general population, ideally seeking convergent evidence from computational
modelling of behaviour and brain function. Beyond this, there may be different sets of environ-
mental risk/protective factors for each branch-point, some of which might be suitable intervention
targets. Understanding computational phenotypes for each stage might also allow targeted in-
terventions, such as working to promote adaptive appraisals at branch-point 2 but also working
to undo maladaptive adjustments and re-learn healthy models of the world at branch-point 3.
Understanding neurobiological implementations at each stage might allow for precision medicine
and principled selection of pharmacological or psychological therapy. Longitudinal work in both
general population and clinical samples of young people at high-risk for psychosis and mixed-
disorder samples will be critical for identifying putative intervention targets and mechanistically-
distinct subgroups, which might then form the basis of randomised trials to test causality/clinical
effectiveness.
13.5.2 Computational methods offer precision, rigour and explanatory power
to bridge the gaps between brain and behaviour
I argue that advances in understanding of psychosis and psychopathology would be facilitated
by adopting computational approaches to psychiatry, which equip us with powerful techniques
to investigate heterogeneity (Huys et al., 2016), act as a bridge between physical and mental
states (Montague et al., 2012; Corlett and Fletcher, 2014; Friston et al., 2014) and encourage
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a higher standard of theoretical and methodological rigour (Teufel and Fletcher, 2016). That
said, computational methods and frameworks are not without their drawbacks, often appearing
opaque to general audiences and being overly flexible, to the point of not being useful (Teufel
and Fletcher, 2016). Computational psychiatry is an emerging field and will have to address
these issues. Computational approaches might best be considered an adjunct to, rather than a
replacement of existing fields, acting as a common language to translate between psychological
and neurobiological theories of mental illness.
Computational approaches might be at their most powerful when integrated with epidemiolog-
ical principles of investigation and inference. The study in Chapter 11 is an example of how
a study on information-processing mechanisms can be strengthened by using epidemiologically-
principled sampling and utilising longstanding epidemiological frameworks to guide inferences of
causality. Identifying whether a computational change is the causal mechanism underlying an
association is complicated by the gaps in current understanding of how physical states generate
mental states. Some of these problems can be overcome by well-designed interventions. Firstly,
mental states may be underpinned by multiple independent sets of computations, so compu-
tational changes may not be necessary nor sufficient to produce behavioural changes. Testing
this requires high-powered studies that investigate heterogeneity of mechanisms and can identify
subgroups of people with similar behavioural phenotypes but distinct computational phenotypes.
Secondly, the computational mechanisms by which a person develops and recovers from an atyp-
ical mental state may be independent. Testing this requires longitudinal studies that investigate
the computational changes accompanying development and recovery from mental disorders. Fi-
nally, the same computations may have different physical implementations. Similar to the first
point, testing this requires investigations that utilise, rather than ignore, heterogeneity in neu-
robiology.
13.5.3 Looking beyond positive psychotic phenomena
If our aim is to understand clinical psychosis and its development, my results also support
more recent shifts in opinion that it is time to look beyond ‘positive’ psychotic phenomena to
other domains like negative symptoms, affective symptoms and social impairments, and indeed
to more holistic investigations of mental health in young people, rather than ‘siloed’ thinking
about specific disorders (Fusar-Poli et al., 2014b). Bebbington (2015) argues that current con-
ceptualisations of psychosis, with positive symptoms at the core and other symptoms, like mood
disturbance and social and cognitive impairments as ‘ancillary’ symptoms, are inadequate be-
cause the core of psychotic symptoms is poorly-defined and non-specific (Bebbington, 2015).
This is likely to be particularly true when looking not at established disorder but at subclinical
expression of apparently disorder-like phenomena, such as PEs in the general population.
However, given that psychotic phenomena manifest in clustering patterns that cut across tradi-
tional diagnostic boundaries and are comorbid in non-psychotic disorders, it may be appropriate
to investigate them in the context of broader, transdiagnostic approaches to the early manifes-
tations of mental illness, such as empirical staging models based on disease severity (McGorry
et al., 2014). Such approaches could be clinically useful and could enable unbiased investigation
and refinement of disorder constructs based on unfolding disease processes. For example, the
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model sketched out in 13.1 might represent a way to establish stages based on both symptom
and computational phenotypes, but even that is likely to be too focused on PEs. This endeavour
would be aided by better characterisation of the computational and neurobiological pathophys-
iology that underlie symptoms and syndromes across disorders and symptom domains and how
they are influenced by genetic and environmental factors.
13.6 Conclusion
Psychotic experiences are some of the most puzzling and fascinating phenomena studied in clin-
ical neuroscience. Furthering our understanding of psychotic phenomena might shed light on
the development of disorders that impose a heavy burden of suffering on individuals and their
loved ones and great demands on health services, but might also help us answer fundamental
questions about how our subjective experience of the world is generated from physical states in
the body and why it differs from person to person. In this thesis, I attempted to comprehensively
investigate psychotic experiences in young people in the general population, from their measure-
ment to their health implications and computational mechanisms. My work suggests that, while
there are issues with their measurement, different conceptual approaches to studying psychotic
experiences might well be synthesised with the hope of seeding collaboration and conversation
across different lines of enquiry. Psychotic experiences in young people, while not entirely benign,
are heterogeneously associated with psychopathology. Importantly, they characterise a minority
of the general population who are at very high transdiagnostic risk of mental illness. Health
outcomes in young people with psychotic experiences are predicted and potentially modified by
the social environment, signifying potential for novel strategies for risk stratification and inter-
vention. Psychotic experiences and even their phenomenological manifestation as anomalous
perceptions versus anomalous beliefs might be understandable in computational terms as disrup-
tions to the signalling of reliability of information and consequent adaptations. The application
of computational approaches to psychiatry might yield greater understanding of the mechanisms
and aetiology of psychotic phenomena and, indeed, all psychiatric disorders by bridging the ex-
planatory gap between physical and mental states. In doing so, we might revolutionise the way
that we conceptualise, identify and manage mental illness for the better of those who experience
it.
226
Bibliography
Abbott RA, Croudace TJ, Ploubidis GB, Kuh D, Richards M, Huppert FA (2008) The relationship between
early personality and midlife psychological well-being: evidence from a UK birth cohort study. Soc Psychiatry
Psychiatr Epidemiol 43:679–687.
Abboud R, Roiser JP, Khalifeh H, Ali S, Harrison I, Killaspy HT, Joyce EM (2016) Are persistent delusions in
schizophrenia associated with aberrant salience? Schizophr Res Cogn 4:32–38.
Adams R a, Stephan KE, Brown HR, Frith CD, Friston KJ (2013) The Computational Anatomy of Psychosis.
Front Psychiatry 4:47.
Addington J, Cornblatt BA, Cadenhead KS, Cannon TD, McGlashan TH, Perkins DO, Seidman LJ, Tsuang MT,
Walker EF, Woods SW, Heinssen R (2011) At clinical high risk for psychosis: outcome for nonconverters. Am J
Psychiatry 168:800–805.
Addington J, Penn D, Woods SW, Addington D, Perkins DO (2008) Social functioning in individuals at clinical
high risk for psychosis. Schizophr Res 99:119–124.
Aiello G, Horowitz M, Hepgul N, Pariante CM, Mondelli V (2012) Stress abnormalities in individuals at risk for
psychosis: a review of studies in subjects with familial risk or with “at risk” mental state. Psychoneuroendocrinol-
ogy 37:1600–1613.
Aleman A, Böcker KB., Hijman R, de Haan EH., Kahn RS (2003) Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophre-
nia: role of top-down information processing. Schizophr Res 64:175–185.
Angold A, Costello EJ, Messer SC, Pickles A, Winder F, Silver D (1995) Development of a short question-
naire for use in epidemiological studies of depression in children and adolescents. Int J Methods Psychiatr Res
5:237–249.
Arseneault L, Cannon M, Fisher HL, Polanczyk G, Moffitt TE, Caspi A (2011) Childhood Trauma and Chil-
dren’s Emerging Psychotic Symptoms: A Genetically Sensitive Longitudinal Cohort Study. Am J Psychiatry
168:65–72.
Association D-5 AP (2013) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM III). Am Psychiatr
Assoc.
Atkinson RJ, Michie PT, Schall U (2012) Duration Mismatch Negativity and P3a in First-Episode Psychosis and
Individuals at Ultra-High Risk of Psychosis. Biol Psychiatry 71:98–104.
Azar M, Pruessner M, Baer LH, Iyer S, Malla AK, Lepage M (2016) A study on negative and depressive symptom
prevalence in individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis. Early Interv Psychiatry.
Badcock JJC, Hugdahl K (2012) Cognitive mechanisms of auditory verbal hallucinations in psychotic and non-
psychotic groups. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 36:431–438.
Badoud D, Chanal J, Van Der Linden M, Eliez S, Debbané M (2011) Validation de la version française du ques-
tionnaire de personnalité schizotypique de Raine dans la population adolescente: étude de la structure factorielle.
Encephale 37:299–307.
Bahrami B, Olsen K, Latham PE, Roepstorff A, Rees G, Frith CD (2010) Optimally interacting minds. Science
329:1081–1085.
227
Bak M, Delespaul P, Hanssen M, de Graaf R, Vollebergh W, van Os J (2003) How are “false” positive psychotic
symptoms?
Baldwin DA (2000) Interpersonal Understanding Fuels Knowledge Acquisition. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 9:40–45.
Bamber D, Tamplin A, Park R, Ktye Z, Gioodyer IM (2002) Development of a Short Leyton Obsessional Inventory
for Children and Adolescents. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 41:1246–1252.
Bar M (2003) A cortical mechanism for triggering top-down facilitation in visual object recognition. J Cogn
Neurosci 15:600–609.
Barlow HB (1997) The knowledge used in vision and where it comes from. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
352:1141–1147.
Barron D, Swami V, Towell T, Hutchinson G, Morgan KD (2015) Examination of the Factor Structure of the
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire among British and Trinidadian Adults. Biomed Res Int 2015:258275.
Bayes T, Price R (1763) An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philos Trans:370–418.
Beards S, Gayer-Anderson C, Borges S, Dewey ME, Fisher HL, Morgan C (2013) Life events and psychosis: a
review and meta-analysis. Schizophr Bull 39:740–747.
Bebbington P (2015) Unravelling psychosis: psychosocial epidemiology, mechanism, and meaning. Shanghai Arch
psychiatry 27:70–81.
Bebbington PE, Bhugra D, Brugha T, Singleton N, Farrell M, Jenkins R, Lewis G, Meltzer H (2004) Psychosis,
victimisation and childhood disadvantage: evidence from the second British National Survey of Psychiatric Mor-
bidity. Br J Psychiatry 185:220–226.
Beels CC (1981) Social support and schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull 7:58–72.
Behrendt R (1998) Underconstrained perception: A theoretical approach to the nature and function of verbal
hallucinations. Compr Psychiatry.
Bell V, Halligan PW, Ellis HD (2006) The Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS): A new validated measure
of anomalous perceptual experience. Schizophr Bull 32:366–377.
Bendall S, Hulbert CA, Alvarez-Jimenez M, Allott K, McGorry PD, Jackson HJ, Bendall S, Hulbert CA, Alvarez-
jimenez ÞM, Allott K, McGorry PD, Jackson HJ (2013) Testing a model of the relationship between childhood
sexual abuse and psychosis in a first-episode psychosis group. J Nerv Ment Dis 201:941–947.
Bentall RP, Corcoran R, Howard R, Blackwood N, Kinderman P (2001) Persecutory delusions: a review and
theoretical integration. Clin Psychol Rev 21:1143–1192.
Bentall RP, Fernyhough C (2008) Social predictors of psychotic experiences: specificity and psychological mech-
anisms. Schizophr Bull 34:1012–1020.
Bergman AJ, Harvey PD, Mitropoulou V, Aronson A, Marder D, Silverman J, Trestman R, Siever LJ (1996) The
factor structure of schizotypal symptoms in a clinical population. Schizophr Bull 22:501–509.
Berry K, Barrowclough C, Wearden A (2007) A review of the role of adult attachment style in psychosis: unex-
plored issues and questions for further research. Clin Psychol Rev 27:458–475.
Besnier N, Kaladjian A, Mazzola-Pomietto P, Adida M, Fakra E, Jeanningros R, Azorin J-M (2011) Differ-
ential Responses to Emotional Interference in Paranoid Schizophrenia and Bipolar Mania. Psychopathology
44:1–11.
Birch SAJ, Akmal N, Frampton KL (2010) Two-year-olds are vigilant of others’ non-verbal cues to credibility.
Dev Sci 13:363–369.
Birch SAJ, Vauthier SA, Bloom P (2008) Three- and four-year-olds spontaneously use others’ past performance
to guide their learning. Cognition 107:1018–1034.
228
Birchwood M, Connor C, Lester H, Patterson P, Freemantle N, Marshall M, Fowler D, Lewis S, Jones P, Amos
T, Everard L, Singh SP (2013) Reducing duration of untreated psychosis: Care pathways to early intervention in
psychosis services. [References]. Br J Psychiatry 203:58–64.
Birchwood M, Todd P, Jackson C (1998) Early intervention in psychosis. The critical period hypothesis. Br J
Psychiatry Suppl 172:53–59.
Blakemore S-J (2012) Development of the social brain in adolescence. J R Soc Med 105:111–116.
Blakemore SJ, Smith J, Steel R, Johnstone CE, Frith CD (2000) The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli
in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring.
Psychol Med 30:1131–1139.
Bleuler E (1911) Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias.
Bleuler E (1917) Mendelismus bei Psychosen, speziell bei der Schizophrenie. Schweiz Arch Neurol Psychi-
atr.
Bleuler E, Jung C (1908) Komplexe und Krankheitsursachen bei Dementia praecox. Zentralblatt fur Nervenheilkd
und Psychiatr.
Bodatsch M, Ruhrmann S, Wagner M, Müller R, Schultze-Lutter F, Frommann I, Brinkmeyer J, Gaebel W, Maier
W, Klosterkötter J, Brockhaus-Dumke A (2011) Prediction of Psychosis by Mismatch Negativity. Biol Psychiatry
69:959–966.
Bogdan R, Santesso DL, Fagerness J, Perlis RH, Pizzagalli DA (2011) Corticotropin-releasing hormone receptor
type 1 (CRHR1) genetic variation and stress interact to influence reward learning. J Neurosci 31:13246–13254.
Bogren M, Mattisson C, Tambs K, Horstmann V, Munk-Jørgensen P, Nettelbladt P (2010) Predictors of psychosis:
a 50-year follow-up of the Lundby population. Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 260:113–125.
Boonstra N, Klaassen R, Sytema S, Marshall M, De Haan L, Wunderink L, Wiersma D (2012) Duration of
untreated psychosis and negative symptoms — A systematic review and meta-analysis of individual patient data.
Schizophr Res 142:12–19.
Borges S, Gayer-Anderson C, Mondelli V (2013) A systematic review of the activity of the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal
axis in first episode psychosis. Psychoneuroendocrinology 38:603–611.
Boyd R, Richerson PJ, Henrich J (2011) The cultural niche: why social learning is essential for human adaptation.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 108 Suppl:10918–10925.
Brainard DH (1997) The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spat Vis 10:433–436.
Bramon E, Croft RJ, McDonald C, Virdi GK, Gruzelier JG, Baldeweg T, Sham PC, Frangou S, Murray RM
(2004) Mismatch negativity in schizophrenia: a family study. Schizophr Res 67:1–10.
Breetvelt EJ, Boks MPM, Numans ME, Selten J-P, Sommer IEC, Grobbee DE, Kahn RS, Geerlings MI (2010)
Schizophrenia risk factors constitute general risk factors for psychiatric symptoms in the population. Schizophr
Res 120:184–190.
Bressan P, Kramer P (2013) The relation between cognitive-perceptual schizotypal traits and the Ebbinghaus
size-illusion is mediated by judgment time. Front Psychol 4:343.
Brett C, Heriot-Maitland C, McGuire P, Peters E (2014a) Predictors of distress associated with psychotic-like
anomalous experiences in clinical and non-clinical populations. Br J Clin Psychol 53:213–227.
Brett CMC, Peters EP, Johns LC, Tabraham P, Valmaggia LR, McGuire P (2007) Appraisals of Anomalous
Experiences Interview (AANEX): A multidimensional measure of psychological responses to anomalies associated
with psychosis. Br J Psychiatry 191:s23-30.
Brett CMC, Peters ER, McGuire PK (2014b) Which psychotic experiences are associated with a need for clinical
care? Eur Psychiatry 30:648–654.
229
Brewin CR, Andrews B, Gotlib IH (1993) Psychopathology and early experience: a reappraisal of retrospective
reports. Psychol Bull 113:82–98.
Brockhaus-Dumke A, Tendolkar I, Pukrop R, Schultze-Lutter F, Klosterkötter J, Ruhrmann S (2005) Impaired
mismatch negativity generation in prodromal subjects and patients with schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 73:297–310.
Brodbeck J, Abbott R a, Goodyer IM, Croudace TJ (2011) General and specific components of depression and
anxiety in an adolescent population. BMC Psychiatry 11:191.
Brown GW, Andrews B, Harris T, Adler Z, Bridge L (1986) Social support, self-esteem and depression. Psychol
Med 16:813–831.
Brown H, Friston K, Bestmann S (2011) Active inference, attention, and motor preparation. Front Psychol
2:1–10.
Broyd SJ, Michie PT, Bruggemann J, van Hell HH, Greenwood L, Croft RJ, Todd J, Lenroot R, Solowij N
(2016) Schizotypy and auditory mismatch negativity in a non-clinical sample of young adults. Psychiatry Res
Neuroimaging 254:83–91.
Bruggemann JM, Stockill H V., Lenroot RK, Laurens KR (2013) Mismatch negativity (MMN) and sensory
auditory processing in children aged 9–12years presenting with putative antecedents of schizophrenia. Int J
Psychophysiol 89:374–380.
Buchanan J (1995) Social support and schizophrenia: A review of the literature. Arch Psychiatr Nurs 9:68–76.
Buckley PF, Miller BJ, Lehrer DS, Castle DJ (2009) Psychiatric comorbidities and schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull
35:383–402.
Butler PD, Martinez A, Foxe JJ, Kim D, Zemon V, Silipo G, Mahoney J, Shpaner M, Jalbrzikowski M, Javitt DC
(2007) Subcortical visual dysfunction in schizophrenia drives secondary cortical impairments. Brain 130:417–430.
Butler PD, Silverstein SM, Dakin SC (2008) Visual Perception and Its Impairment in Schizophrenia. Biol Psy-
chiatry 64:40–47.
Butler PD, Zemon V, Schechter I, Saperstein AM, Hoptman MJ, Lim KO, Revheim N, Silipo G, Javitt DC
(2005) Early-stage visual processing and cortical amplification deficits in schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry
62:495–504.
Calderone DJ, Hoptman MJ, Martínez A, Nair-Collins S, Mauro CJ, Bar M, Javitt DC, Butler PD (2013) Con-
tributions of low and high spatial frequency processing to impaired object recognition circuitry in schizophrenia.
Cereb Cortex 23:1849–1858.
Campbell-Meiklejohn DK, Kanai R, Bahrami B, Bach DR, Dolan RJ, Roepstorff A, Frith CD (2012) Structure
of orbitofrontal cortex predicts social influence. Curr Biol 22:R123-4.
Cannon M, Caspi A, Moffitt TE, Harrington H, Taylor A, Murray RM, Poulton R (2002) Evidence for early-
childhood, pan-developmental impairment specific to schizophreniform disorder: results from a longitudinal birth
cohort. Arch Gen Psychiatry 59:449–456.
Cannon TD, Cadenhead K, Cornblatt B, Woods SW, Addington J, Walker E, Seidman LJ, Perkins D, Tsuang M,
McGlashan T, Heinssen R (2008) Prediction of psychosis in youth at high clinical risk: a multisite longitudinal
study in North America. Arch Gen Psychiatry 65:28–37.
Cantor-Graae E, Selten J-P (2005) Schizophrenia and migration: a meta-analysis and review. Am J Psychiatry
162:12–24.
Carpenter WT, Van Os J (2011) Should attenuated psychosis syndrome be a DSM-5 diagnosis? Am J Psychiatry
168:460–463.
Caspi A, Houts RM, Belsky DW, Goldman-Mellor SJ, Harrington H, Israel S, Meier MH, Ramrakha S, Shalev I,
Poulton R, Moffitt TE (2014) The p Factor: One General Psychopathology Factor in the Structure of Psychiatric
Disorders? Clin Psychol Sci a J Assoc Psychol Sci 2:119–137.
230
Caspi A, Moffitt TE, Newman DL, Silva PA (1996) Behavioral Observations at Age 3 Years Predict Adult
Psychiatric Disorders. Ar 53:1033–1039.
Cavanagh JF, Frank MJ, Allen JJB (2011) Social stress reactivity alters reward and punishment learning. Soc
Cogn Affect Neurosci 6:311–320.
Cella M et al. (2013) Schizotypal traits in adolescents: Links to family history of psychosis and psychological
distress. Eur Psychiatry 28:247–253.
Chadwick P (2014) Mindfulness for psychosis. Br J Psychiatry 204:333–334.
Chadwick P, Birchwood M (1994) The omnipotence of voices. A cognitive approach to auditory hallucinations.
Br J Psychiatry 164:190–201.
Chadwick PK (1993) The stepladder to the impossible: A first hand phenomenological account of a schizoaffective
psychotic crisis. J Ment Heal 2:239–250.
Chadwick PK (2007) Peer-professional first-person account: schizophrenia from the inside–phenomenology and
the integration of causes and meanings. Schizophr Bull 33:166–173.
Chalmers R (2012) mirt: A multidimensional item response theory package for the R environment. J Stat
Softw.
Chapman LJ, Chapman JP, Kwapil TR, Eckblad M, Zinser MC (1994) Putatively psychosis-prone subjects 10
years later. J Abnorm Psychol 103:171–183.
Chen WJ, Hsiao CK, Lin CC (1997) Schizotypy in community samples: the three-factor structure and correlation
with sustained attention. J Abnorm Psychol 106:649–654.
Chmielewski M, Watson D (2008) The heterogeneous structure of schizotypal personality disorder: item-level
factors of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire and their associations with obsessive-compulsive disorder
symptoms, dissociative tendencies, and normal personality. J Abnorm Psychol 117:364–376.
Choudhury S, Blakemore S-JJ, Charman T (2006) Social cognitive development during adolescence. Soc Cogn
Affect Neurosci 1:165–174.
Cicero DC, Martin EA, Becker TM, Docherty AR, Kerns JG (2014) Correspondence between psychometric and
clinical high risk for psychosis in an undergraduate population. Psychol Assess 26:901–915.
Cisler JM, Wolitzky-Taylor KB, Adams TG, Babson KA, Badour CL, Willems JL (2011) The emotional Stroop
task and posttraumatic stress disorder: A meta-analysis. Clin Psychol Rev 31:817–828.
Claridge G (1997) Schizotypy: Implications for illness and health.
Claridge G, Beech T (1995) Fully and quasi-dimensional constructions of schizotypy. Schizotypal Personal:192–216.
Clark A, Andy Clark, Clark A (2013) Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.
Behav Brain Sci 36:181–204.
Cocchi L, Schenk F, Volken H, Bovet P, Parnas J, Vianin P (2007) Visuo-spatial processing in a dynamic and a
static working memory paradigm in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res 152:129–142.
Coffman BA, Haigh SM, Murphy TK, Salisbury DF (2016) Event-related potentials demonstrate deficits in acous-
tic segmentation in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 173:109–115.
Cohen AS, Mohr C, Ettinger U, Chan RCK, Park S (2015) Schizotypy as an organizing framework for social and
affective sciences. Schizophr Bull 41:S427–S435.
Cohen S, Wills TA (1985) Stress, social support, and the buffering hypothesis. Psychol Bull 98:310–357.
Coleman J, Hendry L (1999) The Nature of Adolescence.
Collins AGE, Brown JK, Gold JM, Waltz JA, Frank MJ (2014) Working memory contributions to reinforcement
learning impairments in schizophrenia. J Neurosci 34:13747–13756.
231
Collip D, Wigman JTW, Lin A, Nelson B, Oorschot M, Vollebergh WAM, Ryan J, Baksheev G, Wichers M, Van Os
J, Myin-Germeys I, Yung AR (2013) Dynamic association between interpersonal functioning and positive symptom
dimensions of psychosis over time: A longitudinal study of healthy adolescents. Schizophr Bull 39:179–185.
Compton MT, Goulding SM, Bakeman R, McClure-Tone EB (2009) Confirmation of a four-factor structure of
the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire among undergraduate students. Schizophr Res 111:46–52.
Cook JL, Den Ouden HEM, Heyes CM, Cools R (2014) The social dominance paradox. Curr Biol 24:2812–2816.
Cooper F, Morgan C, Morgan K, Dazzan P, Doody G, Hutchinson G, Jones P, Murray R, Fearon P (2008) LOCUS
OF CONTROL AND PSYCHOTIC-LIKE SYMPTOMS IN THE AESOP STUDY. Schizophr Res 102.
Corcoran CM, First MB, Cornblatt B (2010) The psychosis risk syndrome and its proposed inclusion in the
DSM-V: A risk–benefit analysis. Schizophr Res 120:16–22.
Corlett PR, Fletcher PC (2014) Computational psychiatry: A Rosetta Stone linking the brain to mental illness.
The Lancet Psychiatry 1:399–402.
Corlett PR, Frith CD, Fletcher PC (2009) From drugs to deprivation: A Bayesian framework for understanding
models of psychosis. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 206:515–530.
Corlett PR, Honey GD, Fletcher PC (2016) Prediction error, ketamine and psychosis: An updated model. J
Psychopharmacol:269881116650087.
Corlett PR, Taylor JR, Wang XJ, Fletcher PC, Krystal JH (2010) Toward a neurobiology of delusions. Prog
Neurobiol 92:345–369.
Cornblatt BA, Carrion RE, Addington J, Seidman L, Walker EF, Cannon TD, Cadenhead KS, McGlashan TH,
Perkins DO, Tsuang MT, Woods SW, Heinssen R, Lencz T (2012) Risk Factors for Psychosis: Impaired Social
and Role Functioning. Schizophr Bull 38:1247–1257.
Cornblatt BA, Carrión RE, Auther A, McLaughlin D, Olsen RH, John M, Correll CU (2015) Psychosis Preven-
tion: A Modified Clinical High Risk Perspective From the Recognition and Prevention (RAP) Program. Am J
Psychiatry 172:986–994.
Costello EJ, Angold a (1988) Scales to assess child and adolescent depression: checklists, screens, and nets. J Am
Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 27:726–737.
Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium et al. (2013) Genetic relationship between five
psychiatric disorders estimated from genome-wide SNPs. Nat Genet 45:984–994.
Csillag C, Nordentoft M, Mizuno M, Jones PB, Killackey E, Taylor M, Chen E, Kane J, McDaid D (2016) Early in-
tervention services in psychosis: from evidence to wide implementation. Early Interv Psychiatry 10:540–546.
Csukly G, Stefanics G, Komlósi S, Czigler I, Czobor P (2013) Emotion-Related Visual Mismatch Responses in
Schizophrenia: Impairments and Correlations with Emotion Recognition Koenig T, ed. PLoS One 8:e75444.
Culbreth AJ, Westbrook A, Daw ND, Botvinick M, Barch DM (2016) Reduced model-based decision-making in
schizophrenia. J Abnorm Psychol 125:777–787.
Cutting J, Dunne F (1989) Subjective experience of schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull 15:217–231.
Daalman K, Diederen KMJ, Derks EM, van Lutterveld R, Kahn RS, Sommer IEC (2012) Childhood trauma and
auditory verbal hallucinations. Psychol Med 42:2475–2484.
Daalman K, Diederen KMJ, Hoekema L, van Lutterveld R, Sommer IEC (2016) Five year follow-up of non-
psychotic adults with frequent auditory verbal hallucinations: are they still healthy? Psychol Med 46:1897–1907.
Daalman K, Sommer IEC, Derks EM, Peters ER (2013) Cognitive biases and auditory verbal hallucinations in
healthy and clinical individuals. Psychol Med 43:2339–2347.
Daunizeau J et al. (2014) VBA: A Probabilistic Treatment of Nonlinear Models for Neurobiological and Be-
havioural Data Prlic A, ed. PLoS Comput Biol 10:e1003441.
232
David AS (2010) Why we need more debate on whether psychotic symptoms lie on a continuum with normality.
Psychol Med 40:1935–1942.
Dayan P, Hinton GE, Neal RM, Zemel RS (1995) The Helmholtz machine. Neural Comput 7:889–904.
de Berker AO, Rutledge RB, Mathys C, Marshall L, Cross GF, Dolan RJ, Bestmann S (2016) Computations of
uncertainty mediate acute stress responses in humans. Nat Commun 7:10996.
de Wit S, Schothorst PF, Oranje B, Ziermans TB, Durston S, Kahn RS (2014) Adolescents at ultra-high risk
for psychosis: long-term outcome of individuals who recover from their at-risk state. Eur Neuropsychopharmacol
24:865–873.
Debbané M, Eliez S, Badoud D, Conus P, Flückiger R, Schultze-Lutter F, Debban?? M, Eliez S, Badoud D, Conus
P, Fl??ckiger R, Schultze-Lutter F (2015) Developing psychosis and its risk states through the lens of schizotypy.
Schizophr Bull 41:S396–S407.
Den Ouden HEM, Kok P, de Lange FP (2012) How prediction errors shape perception, attention, and motivation.
Front Psychol 3:548.
Dias EC, Butler PD, Hoptman MJ, Javitt DC (2011) Early Sensory Contributions to Contextual Encoding Deficits
in Schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry 68:654.
Diederich NJ, Fénelon G, Stebbins G, Goetz CG (2009) Hallucinations in Parkinson disease. Nat Rev Neurol
5:331–342.
Dima D, Roiser JP, Dietrich DE, Bonnemann C, Lanfermann H, Emrich HM, Dillo W (2009) Understanding why
patients with schizophrenia do not perceive the hollow-mask illusion using dynamic causal modelling. Neuroimage
46:1180–1186.
Disease NRC (US) C on AF for D a NT of (2011) Toward Precision Medicine. National Academies Press
(US).
Dominguez M-G, Saka MC, can Saka M, Lieb R, Wittchen H-U, van Os J (2010) Early expression of nega-
tive/disorganized symptoms predicting psychotic experiences and subsequent clinical psychosis: a 10-year study.
Am J Psychiatry 167:1075–1082.
Dominguez MDG, Wichers M, Lieb R, Wittchen H-UU, Van Os J (2011) Evidence that onset of clinical psychosis is
an outcome of progressively more persistent subclinical psychotic experiences: An 8-year cohort study. Schizophr
Bull 37:84–93.
Dragt S, Nieman DH, Veltman D, Becker HE, van de Fliert R, de Haan L, Linszen DH (2011) Environmental
factors and social adjustment as predictors of a first psychosis in subjects at ultra high risk. Schizophr Res
125:69–76.
Drake RJ, Lewis SW (2010) Valuing prodromal psychosis: What do we get and what is the price? Schizophr Res
120:38–41.
Dunn VJ, Abbott RA, Croudace TJ, Wilkinson P, Jones PB, Herbert J, Goodyer IM (2011) Profiles of family-
focused adverse experiences through childhood and early adolescence: the ROOTS project a community investi-
gation of adolescent mental health. BMC Psychiatry 11:109.
Ebel H, Gross G, Klosterkötter J, Huber G (1989) Basic symptoms in schizophrenic and affective psychoses.
Psychopathology.
Epstein N, Baldwin L (1983) The McMaster family assessment device. Marital Fam . . . .
Ericson M, Tuvblad C, Raine A, Young-Wolff K, Baker LA (2011) Heritability and longitudinal stability of
schizotypal traits during adolescence. Behav Genet 41:499–511.
Ettinger U et al. (2015) Cognition and brain function in schizotypy: A selective review. Schizophr Bull
41:S417–S426.
Farias M, Underwood R, Claridge G (2013) Unusual but sound minds: mental health indicators in spiritual
individuals. Br J Psychol 104:364–381.
233
Farkas K, Stefanics G, Marosi C, Csukly G (2015) Elementary sensory deficits in schizophrenia indexed by impaired
visual mismatch negativity. Schizophr Res 166:164–170.
Farrer C, Franck N, Frith CD, Decety J, Georgieff N, d’Amato T, Jeannerod M (2004) Neural correlates of action
attribution in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res Neuroimaging 131:31–44.
Fénelon G, Mahieux F, Huon R, Ziégler M (2000) Hallucinations in Parkinson’s disease: prevalence, phenomenol-
ogy and risk factors. Brain:733–745.
Fisher HL, Craig TK, Fearon P, Morgan K, Dazzan P, Lappin J, Hutchinson G, Doody GA, Jones PB, McGuffin P,
Murray RM, Leff J, Morgan C (2011) Reliability and Comparability of Psychosis Patients’ Retrospective Reports
of Childhood Abuse. Schizophr Bull 37:546–553.
Fisher HL, Schreier A, Zammit S, Maughan B, Munafo MR, Lewis G, Wolke D (2013) Pathways between childhood
victimization and psychosis-like symptoms in the ALSPAC birth cohort. Schizophr Bull 39:1045–1055.
Fisher JE, Miller GA, Sass SM, Silton RL, Edgar JC, Stewart JL, Zhou J, Heller W (2014) Neural correlates
of suspiciousness and interactions with anxiety during emotional and neutral word processing. Front Psychol
5:596.
Fletcher PC, Frith CD (2009) Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms
of schizophrenia. Nat Rev Neurosci 10:48–58.
Fonseca-Pedrero E, Fumero A, Paino M, de Miguel A, Ortuño-Sierra J, Lemos-Giráldez S, Muñiz J (2014)
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire: New sources of validity evidence in college students. Psychiatry Res
219:214–220.
Fonseca-Pedrero E, Gooding DC, Ortuño-Sierra J, Pflum M, Paino M, Muñiz J (2016) Classifying risk sta-
tus of non-clinical adolescents using psychometric indicators for psychosis spectrum disorders. Psychiatry Res
243:246–254.
Ford I (1995) Commentary and opinion: III. Some nonontological and functionally unconnected views on current
issues in the analysis of PET datasets. J Cereb Blood Flow Metab 15:371–377.
Fossati A, Raine A, Carretta I, Leonardi B, Maffei C (2003) The three-factor model of schizotypal personality:
invariance across age and gender. Pers Individ Dif 35:1007–1019.
Foulds GA, Bedford A (1975) Hierarchy of classes of personal illness. Psychol Med 5:181–192.
Fowler D, Hodgekins J, Garety P, Freeman D, Kuipers E, Dunn G, Smith B, Bebbington PE (2012) Negative
cognition, depressed mood, and paranoia: a longitudinal pathway analysis using structural equation modeling.
Schizophr Bull 38:1063–1073.
Frenkel E, Kugelmass S, Nathan M, Ingraham LJ (1995) Locus of control and mental health in adolescence and
adulthood. Schizophr Bull 21:219–226.
Friston K (2003) Learning and inference in the brain. Neural Networks 16:1325–1352.
Friston K (2005) A theory of cortical responses. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 360:815–836.
Friston K (2010) The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nat Rev Neurosci 11:127–138.
Friston K (2013) Life as we know it. J R Soc Interface 10:20130475.
Friston K, Kilner J, Harrison L (2006) A free energy principle for the brain. J Physiol Paris 100:70–87.
Friston KJ, Daunizeau J, Kilner J, Kiebel SJ (2010) Action and behavior: A free-energy formulation. Biol Cybern
102:227–260.
Friston KJ, Stephan KE, Montague R, Dolan RJ (2014) Computational psychiatry: The brain as a phantastic
organ. The Lancet Psychiatry 1:148–158.
Fusar-Poli P et al. (2013) The psychosis high-risk state: a comprehensive state-of-the-art review. JAMA psychi-
atry 70:107–120.
234
Fusar-Poli P, Bonoldi I, Yung AR, Borgwardt S, Kempton MJ, Valmaggia L, Barale F, Caverzasi E, McGuire P
(2012) Predicting psychosis: meta-analysis of transition outcomes in individuals at high clinical risk. Arch Gen
Psychiatry 69:220–229.
Fusar-Poli P, Byrne M, Valmaggia L, Day F, Tabraham P, Johns L, McGuire P, OASIS Team (2010) Social
dysfunction predicts two years clinical outcome in people at ultra high risk for psychosis. J Psychiatr Res
44:294–301.
Fusar-Poli P, Cappucciati M, Rutigliano G, Lee TY, Beverly Q, Bonoldi I, Lelli J, Kaar SJ, Gago E, Rocchetti
M, Patel R, Bhavsar V, Tognin S, Badger S, Calem M, Lim K, Kwon JS, Perez J, McGuire P (2016) Towards
a Standard Psychometric Diagnostic Interview for Subjects at Ultra High Risk of Psychosis: CAARMS versus
SIPS. Psychiatry J 2016:7146341.
Fusar-Poli P, Nelson B, Valmaggia L, Yung AR, McGuire PK (2014a) Comorbid depressive and anxiety disorders
in 509 individuals with an at-risk mental state: impact on psychopathology and transition to psychosis. Schizophr
Bull 40:120–131.
Fusar-Poli P, Yung AR, McGorry P, van Os J (2014b) Lessons learned from the psychosis high-risk state: towards
a general staging model of prodromal intervention. Psychol Med 44:17–24.
Garety PA, Gittins M, Jolley S, Bebbington P, Dunn G, Kuipers E, Fowler D, Freeman D (2013) Differences in cog-
nitive and emotional processes between persecutory and grandiose delusions. Schizophr Bull 39:629–639.
Garety PA, Kuipers E, Fowler D, Freeman D, Bebbington PE (2001) A cognitive model of the positive symptoms
of psychosis. Psychol Med 31:189–195.
Garrido MI, Kilner JM, Stephan KE, Friston KJ (2009) The mismatch negativity: A review of underlying mech-
anisms. Clin Neurophysiol 120:453–463.
Gayer-Anderson C, Fisher HL, Fearon P, Hutchinson G, Morgan K, Dazzan P, Boydell J, Doody GA, Jones PB,
Murray RM, Craig TK, Morgan C (2015) Gender differences in the association between childhood physical and
sexual abuse, social support and psychosis. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 50:1489–1500.
Gayer-Anderson C, Morgan C (2013) Social networks, support and early psychosis: a systematic review. Epidemiol
Psychiatr Sci 22:131–146.
Gee DG, Cannon TD (2011) Prediction of conversion to psychosis: review and future directions. Rev Bras
Psiquiatr (Sao Paulo, Brazil 1999) 33 Suppl 2:s129-42.
Gerlsma C, Das J, Emmelkamp PM (1993) Depressed patients’ parental representations: stability across changes
in depressed mood and specificity across diagnoses. J Affect Disord 27:173–181.
Gold JM, Waltz JA, Matveeva TM, Kasanova Z, Strauss GP, Herbener ES, Collins AGE, Frank MJ (2012a) Neg-
ative symptoms and the failure to represent the expected reward value of actions: behavioral and computational
modeling evidence. Arch Gen Psychiatry 69:129–138.
Gold JM, Waltz JA, Prentice KJ, Morris SE, Heerey EA (2008) Reward processing in schizophrenia: A deficit in
the representation of value. Schizophr Bull 34:835–847.
Gold R, Butler P, Revheim N, Leitman DI, Hansen JA, Gur RC, Kantrowitz JT, Laukka P, Juslin PN, Silipo GS,
Javitt DC (2012b) Auditory emotion recognition impairments in schizophrenia: Relationship to acoustic features
and cognition. Am J Psychiatry 169:424–432.
Goldman-Rakic P (1994) Working memory dysfunction in schizophrenia. J neuropsychiatry Clin.
Goodarzi MA, Wykes T, Hemsley DR (2000) Cerebral lateralization of global–local processing in people with
schizotypy. Schizophr Res 45:115–121.
Gooding DC, Tallent KA, Matts CW (2005) Clinical Status of At-Risk Individuals 5 Years Later: Further Vali-
dation of the Psychometric High-Risk Strategy. J Abnorm Psychol 114:170–175.
Goodman LA, Thompson KM, Weinfurt K, Corl S, Acker P, Mueser KT, Rosenberg SD (1999) Reliability of
reports of violent victimization and posttraumatic stress disorder among men and women with serious mental
235
illness. J Trauma Stress 12:587–599.
Goodyer IM, Croudace T, Dunn V, Herbert J, Jones PB (2010) Cohort Profile: Risk patterns and processes for
psychopathology emerging during adolescence: The ROOTS project. Int J Epidemiol 39:361–369.
Goodyer IM, Wright C, Altham PM (1989) Recent friendships in anxious and depressed school age children.
Psychol Med 19:165–174.
Goulding A (2005) Healthy schizotypy in a population of paranormal believers and experients. Pers Individ Dif
38:1069–1083.
Goulding A, Ödéhn N (2009) Schizotypy and mental health in the general population: A pilot study. Personal
Ment Health 3:193–202.
Grace AA (2012) Dopamine system dysregulation by the hippocampus: Implications for the pathophysiology and
treatment of schizophrenia. Neuropharmacology 62:1342–1348.
Gradin VB, Kumar P, Waiter G, Ahearn T, Stickle C, Milders M, Reid I, Hall J, Steele JD (2011) Expected value
and prediction error abnormalities in depression and schizophrenia. Brain 134:1751–1764.
Granholm E, Cadenhead K, Shafer KM, Filoteo JV (2002) Lateralized perceptual organization deficits on the
global-local task in schizotypal personality disorder. J Abnorm Psychol 111:42–52.
Gregory RL (1980) Perceptions as hypotheses. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 290:181–197.
Grillon C et al. (2002) Startle reactivity and anxiety disorders: aversive conditioning, context, and neurobiology.
Biol Psychiatry 52:958–975.
Gross JJ (2002) Emotion regulation: affective, cognitive, and social consequences. Psychophysiology 39:281–291.
Guloksuz S, Nierop M Van, Lieb R, Winkel R Van, Wittchen H, Os J Van (2015a) Evidence that the presence
of psychosis in non- psychotic disorder is environment-dependent and mediated by severity of non-psychotic
psychopathology. Psychol Med 45:1–13.
Guloksuz S, van Nierop M, Bak M, de Graaf R, Ten Have M, van Dorsselaer S, Gunther N, Lieb R, van Winkel
R, Wittchen H-U, van Os J (2016) Exposure to environmental factors increases connectivity between symptom
domains in the psychopathology network. BMC Psychiatry 16:223.
Guloksuz S, van Nierop M, Lieb R, van Winkel R, Wittchen H-U, van Os J (2015b) Evidence that the pres-
ence of psychosis in non-psychotic disorder is environment-dependent and mediated by severity of non-psychotic
psychopathology. Psychol Med 45:2389–2401.
Hfner H (2014) The concept of schizophrenia: from unity to diversity. Adv Psychiatry 2014:1–109.
Häfner H, Maurer K, Löﬄer W, Riecher-Rössler A (1993) The influence of age and sex on the onset and early
course of schizophrenia. Br J Psychiatry 162:80–86.
Haigh SM, Coffman BA, Murphy TK, Butera CD, Salisbury DF (2016) Abnormal auditory pattern perception in
schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 176:473–479.
Hanssen M, Bak M, Bijl R (2005) The incidence and outcome of subclinical psychotic experiences in the general
population. Br J.
Hanssen M, Peeters F, Krabbendam L, Radstake S, Verdoux H, van Os J (2003) How psychotic are individuals
with non-psychotic disorders? Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 38:149–154.
Hardt J, Rutter M (2004) Validity of adult retrospective reports of adverse childhood experiences: review of the
evidence. J Child Psychol Psychiatry 45:260–273.
Hardy A, Emsley R, Freeman D, Bebbington P, Garety PA, Kuipers EE, Dunn G, Fowler D (2016) Psycholog-
ical Mechanisms Mediating Effects Between Trauma and Psychotic Symptoms: The Role of Affect Regulation,
Intrusive Trauma Memory, Beliefs, and Depression. Schizophr Bull 42:S34–S43.
Haroun N, Dunn L, Haroun A, Cadenhead KS (2006) Risk and protection in prodromal schizophrenia: Ethical
implications for clinical practice and future research. Schizophr Bull 32:166–178.
236
Harrop C, Ellett L, Brand R, Lobban F (2015) Friends interventions in psychosis: a narrative review and call to
action. Early Interv Psychiatry 9:269–278.
Helmholtz H von (1860) Handbuch der physiologischen Optik [Handbook of physiological optics].
Henckens MJAG, Hermans EJ, Pu Z, Joëls M, Fernández G (2009) Stressed memories: how acute stress affects
memory formation in humans. J Neurosci 29:10111–10119.
Hertz U, Romand-Monnier M, Kyriakopoulou K, Bahrami B (2016) Social influence protects collective decision
making from equality bias. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 42:164–172.
Hill K, Varese F, Jackson M, Linden DEJ (2012) The relationship between metacognitive beliefs, auditory
hallucinations, and hallucination-related distress in clinical and non-clinical voice-hearers. Br J Clin Psychol
51:434–447.
Hodgekins J, Coker S, Freeman D, Ray-Glover K, Bebbington P, Garety P, Kuipers E, Dunn G, Fowler D,
Jo Hodgekins (a) SC (a), DF (b), KR-GPB (d), PG (e), EK (e), GD (f), DF (a) (2012) Assessing levels of
subthreshold psychotic symptoms in the recovery phase: The Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory (SSI). J Exp
Psychopathol 3:582–593.
Hommes J, Krabbendam L, Versmissen D, Kircher T, van Os J, van Winkel R (2012) Self-monitoring as a familial
vulnerability marker for psychosis: an analysis of patients, unaffected siblings and healthy controls. Psychol Med
42:235–245.
Hong LE, Avila MT, Thaker GK (2005) Response to unexpected target changes during sustained visual tracking
in schizophrenic patients. Exp Brain Res 165:125–131.
Hong LE, Turano KA, O’Neill H, Hao L, Wonodi I, McMahon RP, Elliott A, Thaker GK (2008) Refining the
Predictive Pursuit Endophenotype in Schizophrenia. Biol Psychiatry 63:458–464.
Horga G, Schatz KC, Abi-Dargham A, Peterson BS (2014) Deficits in predictive coding underlie hallucinations
in schizophrenia. J Neurosci 34:8072–8082.
Horwood J, Salvi G, Thomas K, Duffy L, Gunnell D, Hollis C, Lewis G, Menezes P, Thompson A, Wolke D,
Zammit S, Harrison G (2008) IQ and non-clinical psychotic symptoms in 12-year-olds: Results from the ALSPAC
birth cohort. Br J Psychiatry 193:185–191.
Hoskin R, Hunter MD, Woodruff PWR (2014a) The effect of psychological stress and expectation on auditory
perception: A signal detection analysis. Br J Psychol 105:524–546.
Hoskin R, Hunter MD, Woodruff PWR (2014b) Stress improves selective attention towards emotionally neutral
left ear stimuli. Acta Psychol (Amst) 151:214–221.
Hur Y-M, Cherny SS, Sham PC (2012) Heritability of hallucinations in adolescent twins. Psychiatry Res
199:98–101.
Huys QJM, Maia T V, Frank MJ (2016) Computational psychiatry as a bridge from neuroscience to clinical
applications. Nat Neurosci 19:404–413.
Iacobucci D (2012) Mediation analysis and categorical variables: The final frontier. J Consum Psychol 22:582–594.
Insel T, Cuthbert B, Garvey M, Heinssen R, Pine DS, Quinn K, Sanislow C, Wang P (2010) Research Domain
Criteria (RDoC): Toward a new classification framework for research on mental disorders. Am J Psychiatry
167:748–751.
Insel T, Fenton W (2005) Psychiatric epidemiology: it’s not just about counting anymore. Arch Gen Psychia-
try.
Insel TR (2014) The NIMH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project: Precision Medicine for Psychiatry. Am
J Psychiatry 171:395–397.
Jääskeläinen E et al. (2015) Twenty Years of Schizophrenia Research in the Northern Finland Birth Cohort 1966:
A Systematic Review. Schizophr Res Treatment 2015:524875.
237
Jardri R, Den??ve S (2013) Circular inferences in schizophrenia. Brain 136:3227–3241.
Jaspers K (1963) General psychopathology.
Javitt DC (2009) When doors of perception close: bottom-up models of disrupted cognition in schizophrenia.
Annu Rev Clin Psychol 5:249–275.
Javitt DC, Strous RD, Grochowski S, Ritter W, Cowan N (1997) Impaired precision, but normal retention, of
auditory sensory (“echoic”) memory information in schizophrenia. J Abnorm Psychol 106:315–324.
Joëls M, Pu Z, Wiegert O, Oitzl MS, Krugers HJ (2006) Learning under stress: how does it work? Trends Cogn
Sci 10:152–158.
Johns LC, Allen P, Valli I, Winton-Brown T, Broome M, Woolley J, Tabraham P, Day F, Howes O, Wykes
T, McGuire P (2010) Impaired verbal self-monitoring in individuals at high risk of psychosis. Psychol Med
40:1433–1442.
Johns LC, Nazroo JY, Bebbington P, Kuipers E (2002) Occurrence of hallucinatory experiences in a community
sample and ethnic variations. Br J Psychiatry 180:174–178.
Johns LLC, Kompus K, Connell M, Humpston C, Lincoln TM, Longden E, Preti A, Alderson-Day B, Badcock
JC, Cella M, Fernyhough C, McCarthy-Jones S, Peters E, Raballo A, Scott J, Siddi S, Sommer IE, Larøi F,
Laroi F (2014) Auditory verbal hallucinations in persons with and without a need for care. Schizophr Bull
40:S255-64.
Jones H, Stergiakouli E, Tansey K, Hubbard L, Heron J, Cannon M, Holmans P, Lewis G, Linden D, Jones P,
Davey Smith G, O’Donovan M, Owen M, Walters J, Zammit S (2016) Phenotypic Manifestation of Genetic Risk
for Schizophrenia During Adolescence in the General Population. JAMA Psychiatry , 73 pp 221-228 .
Jones P, Murray R, Jones P, Rodgers B, Marmot M (1994) Child developmental risk factors for adult schizophrenia
in the British 1946 birth cohort. Lancet 344:1398–1402.
Kanizsa G (1976) Subjective contours. Sci Am 234:48–52.
Kantrowitz JT, Hoptman MJ, Leitman DI, Silipo G, Javitt DC (2014) The 5 percent difference: early sensory pro-
cessing predicts sarcasm perception in schizophrenia and schizo-affective disorder. Psychol Med 44:25–36.
Kantrowitz JT, Leitman DI, Lehrfeld JM, Laukka P, Juslin PN, Butler PD, Silipo G, Javitt DC (2013) Reduction
in tonal discriminations predicts receptive emotion processing deficits in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder.
Schizophr Bull 39:86–93.
Kapur S (2003) Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: A framework linking biology, phenomenology, and
pharmacology in schizophrenia. Am J Psychiatry 160:13–23.
Kaufman J, Birmaher B, Brent D, Rao U, Flynn C, Moreci P, Williamson D, Ryan ND (1997) Schedule for
Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School-Age Children-Present and Lifetime Version (K-SADS-PL): initial
reliability and validity data. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 36:980–988.
Kaymaz N, Drukker M, Lieb R, Wittchen H-U, Werbeloff N, Weiser M, Lataster T, van Os J (2012) Do subthresh-
old psychotic experiences predict clinical outcomes in unselected non-help-seeking population-based samples? A
systematic review and meta-analysis, enriched with new results. Psychol Med 42:2239–2253.
Kaymaz N, van Os J (2010) Extended psychosis phenotype – yes: single continuum – unlikely. Psychol Med
40:1963–1966.
Keane BP, Silverstein SM, Wang Y, Papathomas T V (2013) Reduced depth inversion illusions in schizophrenia are
state-specific and occur for multiple object types and viewing conditions. J Abnorm Psychol 122:506–512.
Kelleher I, Connor D, Clarke MC, Devlin N, Harley M, Cannon M (2012a) Prevalence of psychotic symptoms
in childhood and adolescence: a systematic review and meta-analysis of population-based studies. Psychol Med
42:1857–1863.
238
Kelleher I, Harley M, Murtagh A, Cannon M (2011) Are screening instruments valid for psychotic-like experiences?
A validation study of screening questions for psychotic-like experiences using in-depth clinical interview. Schizophr
Bull 37:362–369.
Kelleher I, Keeley H, Corcoran P, Lynch F, Fitzpatrick C, Devlin N, Molloy C, Roddy S, Clarke MC, Harley M,
Arseneault L, Wasserman C, Carli V, Sarchiapone M, Hoven C, Wasserman D, Cannon M (2012b) Clinicopatho-
logical significance of psychotic experiences in non-psychotic young people: Evidence from four population-based
studies. Br J Psychiatry 201:26–32.
Kelleher I, Murtagh A, Molloy C, Roddy S, Clarke MC, Harley M, Cannon M (2012c) Identification and char-
acterization of prodromal risk syndromes in young adolescents in the community: A population-based clinical
interview study. Schizophr Bull 38:239–246.
Kelley H, Stahelski A (1970) Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. J
Personal Soc . . . .
Kenny D (n.d.) Measuring Model Fit. davidakenny.net.
Kéri S, Antal A, Szekeres G, Benedek G, Janka Z (2002) Spatiotemporal Visual Processing in Schizophrenia. J
Neuropsychiatry Clin Neurosci 14:190–196.
Kéri S, Benedek G (2007) Visual contrast sensitivity alterations in inferred magnocellular pathways and anomalous
perceptual experiences in people at high-risk for psychosis. Vis Neurosci 24:183–189.
Kessler R, Berglund P, Demler O (2005) Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders
in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication. Arch.
Kessler RC, Amminger GP, Aguilar-Gaxiola S, Alonso J, Lee S, Ustün TB (2007) Age of onset of mental disorders:
a review of recent literature. Curr Opin Psychiatry 20:359–364.
Kilcommons AM, Morrison AP (2005) Relationships between trauma and psychosis: an exploration of cognitive
and dissociative factors. Acta Psychiatr Scand 112:351–359.
Kilner JJM, Friston KKJ, Frith CDC (2007) Predictive coding: An account of the mirror neuron system. Cogn
Process 8:159–166.
Kilner JM, Frith CD (2008) Action observation: inferring intentions without mirror neurons. Curr Biol 18:R32-
3.
King DJ, Hodgekins J, Chouinard PA, Chouinard V-A, Sperandio I (2016) A review of abnormalities in the
perception of visual illusions in schizophrenia. Psychon Bull Rev:1–18.
Kleiner M, Brainard D, Pelli D, Ingling A, Murray R (2007) What’s new in Psychtoolbox-3. Perception.
Kline E, Wilson C, Ereshefsky S, Tsuji T, Schiffman J, Pitts S, Reeves G (2012) Convergent and discriminant
validity of attenuated psychosis screening tools. Schizophr Res 134:49–53.
Klosterkötter J, Hellmich M, Steinmeyer EM, Schultze-Lutter F (2001) Diagnosing schizophrenia in the initial
prodromal phase. Arch Gen Psychiatry 58:158–164.
Knill DC, Pouget A (2004) The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation. Trends
Neurosci 27:712–719.
Koch K, Schachtzabel C, Wagner G, Schikora J, Schultz C, Reichenbach JR, Sauer H, Schlösser RGM (2010)
Altered activation in association with reward-related trial-and-error learning in patients with schizophrenia. Neu-
roimage 50:223–232.
Koethe D, Gerth CW, Neatby MA, Haensel A, Thies M, Schneider U, Emrich HM, Klosterkötter J, Schultze-Lutter
F, Leweke FM (2006) Disturbances of visual information processing in early states of psychosis and experimental
delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol altered states of consciousness. Schizophr Res 88:142–150.
Koethe D, Kranaster L, Hoyer C, Gross S, Neatby MA, Schultze-Lutter F, Ruhrmann S, Klosterkötter J, Hellmich
M, Leweke FM (2009) Binocular depth inversion as a paradigm of reduced visual information processing in prodro-
mal state, antipsychotic-naïve and treated schizophrenia. Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 259:195–202.
239
Kolen MJ, Brennan RL (2006) Test equating, scaling, and linking. Methods and practices.
Kompus K, Loberg EM, Posserud M-BB, Lundervold AJ, Løberg E-M, Posserud M-BB, Lundervold AJ (2015)
Prevalence of auditory hallucinations in Norwegian adolescents: results from a population-based study. Scand J
Psychol 56:391–396.
Koolhaas JM, Bartolomucci A, Buwalda B, de Boer SF, Flügge G, Korte SM, Meerlo P, Murison R, Olivier B,
Palanza P, Richter-Levin G, Sgoifo A, Steimer T, Stiedl O, van Dijk G, Wöhr M, Fuchs E (2011) Stress revisited:
a critical evaluation of the stress concept. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 35:1291–1301.
Kounali D, Zammit S, Wiles N, Sullivan S, Cannon M, Stochl J, Jones P, Mahedy L, Gage SH, Heron J, Lewis
G (2014) Common versus psychopathology-specific risk factors for psychotic experiences and depression during
adolescence. Psychol Med 44:2557–2566.
Krabbendam L, Myin-Germeys I, De Graaf R, Vollebergh W, Nolen WA, Iedema J, Van Os J (2004) Dimensions
of depression, mania and psychosis in the general population. Psychol Med 34:1177–1186.
Kraepelin E (1921) Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia. J Nerv Ment Dis 54:384.
Kramer I, Simons CJP, Wigman JTW, Collip D, Jacobs N, Derom C, Thiery E, Van Os J, Myin-Germeys I,
Wichers M (2014) Time-lagged moment-to-moment interplay between negative affect and paranoia: New insights
in the affective pathway to psychosis. Schizophr Bull 40:278–286.
Kretschmer E (1921) Körperbau und Charakter. Untersuchungen zum Konstitutions-Problem und zur Lehre von
den Temperamenten. Springer, Berlin.
Kuepper R, van Os J, Lieb R, Wittchen H-U, Henquet C (2011a) Do cannabis and urbanicity co-participate in
causing psychosis? Evidence from a 10-year follow-up cohort study. Psychol Med 41:2121–2129.
Kuepper R, van Os J, Lieb R, Wittchen H-U, Höfler M, Henquet C (2011b) Continued cannabis use and risk of
incidence and persistence of psychotic symptoms: 10 year follow-up cohort study. BMJ 342:d738.
Kurylo DD, Pasternak R, Silipo G, Javitt DC, Butler PD (2007) Perceptual organization by proximity and
similarity in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 95:205–214.
Kwapil TR (1998) Social anhedonia as a predictor of the development of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. J
Abnorm Psychol 107:558–565.
Kwapil TR, Barrantes-Vidal N, Silvia PJ (2008) The dimensional structure of the wisconsin schizotypy scales:
Factor identification and construct validity. Schizophr Bull 34:444–457.
Kwapil TR, Gross GM, Silvia PJ, Barrantes-Vidal N (2013) Prediction of psychopathology and functional im-
pairment by positive and negative schizotypy in the Chapmans’ ten-year longitudinal study. J Abnorm Psychol
122:807–815.
Kwapil TR, Miller MB, Zinser MC, Chapman LJ, Chapman J, Eckblad M (2000) A longitudinal study of high
scorers on the hypomanic personality scale. J Abnorm Psychol 109:222–226.
Lawrie SM (2016) Whether &quot;psychosis&quot; is best conceptualized as a continuum or in categories is an
empirical, practical and political question. World Psychiatry 15:125–126.
Lawrie SM, Hall J, McIntosh AM, Owens DGC, Johnstone EC (2010) The “continuum of psychosis”: Scientifically
unproven and clinically impractical. Br J Psychiatry 197:423–425.
Lee J, Park S (2005) Working memory impairments in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. J Abnorm Psychol.
Lee TS, Mumford D (2003) Hierarchical Bayesian inference in the visual cortex. J Opt Soc Am A Opt Image Sci
Vis 20:1434–1448.
Lemos-Giráldez S, Vallina-Fernández O, Fernández-Iglesias P, Vallejo-Seco G, Fonseca-Pedrero E, Paíno-Piñeiro
M, Sierra-Baigrie S, García-Pelayo P, Pedrejón-Molino C, Alonso-Bada S, Gutiérrez-Pérez A, Ortega-Ferrández
JA (2009) Symptomatic and functional outcome in youth at ultra-high risk for psychosis: A longitudinal study.
Schizophr Res 115:121–129.
240
Lenzenweger M (2011) Schizotypy and schizophrenia: The view from experimental psychopathology.
Lenzenweger MF (2015) Thinking clearly about schizotypy: hewing to the schizophrenia liability core, considering
interesting tangents, and avoiding conceptual quicksand. Schizophr Bull 41 Suppl 2:S483-91.
Lerner R, Steinberg L (2009) Handbook of Adolescent Psychology, Volume 1: Individual Bases of Adolescent
Development.
Lewis G, Jones PB, Goodyer IM (2016) The ROOTS study: a 10-year review of findings on adolescent depression,
and recommendations for future longitudinal research. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 51:161–170.
Lim J et al. (2015) Impact of psychiatric comorbidity in individuals at Ultra High Risk of psychosis - Findings
from the Longitudinal Youth at Risk Study (LYRIKS). Schizophr Res 164:8–14.
Lincoln TM (2007) Relevant dimensions of delusions: Continuing the continuum versus category debate. Schizophr
Res 93:211–220.
Lindner A, Thier P, Kircher TTJJ, Haarmeier T, Leube DT (2005) Disorders of agency in schizophrenia correlate
with an inability to compensate for the sensory consequences of actions. Curr Biol 15:1119–1124.
Linscott RJ, Os J van, van Os J (2010) Systematic Reviews of Categorical Versus Continuum Models in Psychosis:
Evidence for Discontinuous Subpopulations Underlying a Psychometric Continuum. Implications for DSM-V,
DSM-VI, and DSM-VII. Annu Rev Clin Psychol 6:391–419.
Linscott RJ, van Os J (2013) An updated and conservative systematic review and meta-analysis of epidemiological
evidence on psychotic experiences in children and adults: on the pathway from proneness to persistence to
dimensional expression across mental disorders. Psychol Med 43:1133–1149.
Lissek S, Grillon C (2010) Overgeneralization of Conditioned Fear in the Anxiety Disorders. Zeitschrift für Psychol
/ J Psychol 218:146–148.
Lodge DJ, Grace AA (2011) Developmental pathology, dopamine, stress and schizophrenia. Int J Dev Neurosci
29:207–213.
Loughland CM, Williams LM (1997) A cluster analytic study of schizotypal trait dimensions. Pers Individ Dif
23:877–883.
Lovatt A, Mason O, Brett C, Peters E (2010) Psychotic-like experiences, appraisals, and trauma. J Nerv Ment
Dis 198:813–819.
MacKay DM (1956) The epistemological problem for automata. Automata Studies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Macmillan N, Creelman C (2004) Detection theory: A user’s guide.
Magno E, Yeap S, Thakore JH, Garavan H, De Sanctis P, Foxe JJ, Foxe JJ (2008) Are auditory-evoked fre-
quency and duration mismatch negativity deficits endophenotypic for schizophrenia? High-density electrical
mapping in clinically unaffected first-degree relatives and first-episode and chronic schizophrenia. Biol Psychiatry
64:385–391.
Maher B a (1974) Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder. J Individ Psychol 30:98–113.
Mahmoodi A, Bang D, Ahmadabadi MN, Bahrami B (2013) Learning to make collective decisions: the impact of
confidence escalation. PLoS One 8:e81195.
Maia T V, Frank MJ (2011) From reinforcement learning models to psychiatric and neurological disorders. Nat
Publ Gr 14:154–162.
Malmberg A, Lewis G, David A, Allebeck P (1998) Premorbid adjustment and personality in people with
schizophrenia. Br J Psychiatry 172:308-13-5.
March L, Cienfuegos A, Goldbloom L, Ritter W, Cowan N, Javitt DC (1999) Normal time course of auditory
recognition in schizophrenia, despite impaired precision of the auditory sensory (“echoic”) memory code. J Abnorm
Psychol 108:69–75.
241
Marks EM, Steel C, Peters ER (2012) Intrusions in trauma and psychosis: information processing and phe-
nomenology. Psychol Med 42:2313–2323.
Marr D (1982) Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual
information.
Martínez A, Gaspar PA, Hillyard SA, Bickel S, Lakatos P, Dias EC, Javitt DC (2015) Neural oscillatory deficits
in schizophrenia predict behavioral and neurocognitive impairments. Front Hum Neurosci 9.
Martínez A, Revheim N, Butler PD, Guilfoyle DN, Dias EC, Javitt DC (2013) Impaired magnocellular/dorsal
stream activation predicts impaired reading ability in schizophrenia. NeuroImage Clin 2:8–16.
Mason O, Claridge G (2006) The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE): further
description and extended norms. Schizophr Res 82:203–211.
McAusland L, Buchy L, Cadenhead KS, Cannon TD, Cornblatt BA, Heinssen R, McGlashan TH, Perkins DO,
Seidman LJ, Tsuang MT, Walker EF, Woods SW, Bearden CE, Mathalon DH, Addington J (2015) Anxiety in
youth at clinical high risk for psychosis. Early Interv Psychiatry.
McEwen BS (2007) Physiology and neurobiology of stress and adaptation: central role of the brain. Physiol Rev
87:873–904.
McFarlane WR, Dixon L, Lukens E, Lucksted A (2003) Family psychoeducation and schizophrenia: a review of
the literature. J Marital Fam Ther 29:223–245.
McGhie A, Chapman J (1961) Disorders of attention and perception in early schizophrenia. Br J Med Psychol
34:103–116.
McGorry P (2011) Transition to Adulthood: The Critical Period for Pre-emptive, Disease-modifying Care for
Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Schizophr Bull 37:524–530.
McGorry P, Keshavan M, Goldstone S, Amminger P, Allott K, Berk M, Lavoie S, Pantelis C, Yung A, Wood S,
Hickie I (2014) Biomarkers and clinical staging in psychiatry. World Psychiatry 13:211–223.
McGorry P, van Os J (2013) Redeeming diagnosis in psychiatry: timing versus specificity. Lancet 381:343–345.
McGorry PD, Yung AR (2003) Early intervention in psychosis: An overdue reform. Aust N Z J Psychiatry
37:393–398.
McGrath J, Saha S, Welham J, El Saadi O, MacCauley C, Chant D (2004) A systematic review of the incidence
of schizophrenia: the distribution of rates and the influence of sex, urbanicity, migrant status and methodology.
BMC Med 2:13.
McGrath JJ et al. (2015) Psychotic Experiences in the General Population: A Cross-National Analysis Based on
31,261 Respondents From 18 Countries. JAMA psychiatry 72:697–705.
McGrath JJ et al. (2016a) The Bidirectional Associations Between Psychotic Experiences and DSM-IV Mental
Disorders. Am J Psychiatry:appiajp201615101293.
McGrath JJ et al. (2016b) Age of Onset and Lifetime Projected Risk of Psychotic Experiences: Cross-National
Data From the World Mental Health Survey. Schizophr Bull 42:933–941.
Meehl P (1962) Schizotaxia, schizotypy, schizophrenia. Am Psychol.
Meehl PE (1990) Toward an Integrated Theory of Schizotaxia, Schizotypy, and Schizophrenia. J Pers Disord
4:1–99.
Meesters PD, Stek ML, Comijs HC, de Haan L, Patterson TL, Eikelenboom P, Beekman ATF (2010) Social
functioning among older community-dwelling patients with schizophrenia: a review. Am J Geriatr Psychiatry
18:862–878.
Memarzia J, st. Clair M, Owens M, Van Harmelen, Anne Laura, Brodbeck, Jeannette, Goodyer IM (n.d.) The
friendship questionnaire; measurement and scalar invariance over time.
242
Messer SC, Angold A, Costello EJ, Loeber R, MESSER’PhD S (1995) Development of a short questionnaire for
use in epidemiological studies of depression in children and adolescents: Factor composition and structure across.
Int J Methods Psychiatr Res 5:251–262.
Mesulam MM (1998) From sensation to cognition. Brain 121.
Micoulaud-Franchi J-A, Aramaki M, Merer A, Cermolacce M, Ystad S, Kronland-Martinet R, Naudin J, Vion-
Dury J (2012) Toward an exploration of feeling of strangeness in schizophrenia: Perspectives on acousmatic and
everyday listening. J Abnorm Psychol 121:628–640.
Miettunen J, Veijola J, Isohanni M, Paunio T, Freimer N, Jääskeläinen E, Taanila A, Ekelund J, Järvelin M-R,
Peltonen L, Joukamaa M, Lichtermann D (2011) Identifying schizophrenia and other psychoses with psychological
scales in the general population. J Nerv Ment Dis 199:230–238.
Millan MJ et al. (2012) Cognitive dysfunction in psychiatric disorders: characteristics, causes and the quest for
improved therapy. Nat Rev Drug Discov 11:141–168.
Miller TJ, McGlashan TH, Rosen JL, Cadenhead K, Cannon T, Ventura J, McFarlane W, Perkins DO, Pearlson
GD, Woods SW (2003) Prodromal assessment with the structured interview for prodromal syndromes and the
scale of prodromal symptoms: predictive validity, interrater reliability, and training to reliability. Schizophr Bull
29:703–715.
Miller TJ, Mcglashan TH, Rosen JL, Somjee L, Markovich PJ, Stein K, Woods SW, Ph D, Mcglashan TH, Rosen
JL, Psy D, Somjee L, Ph D, Markovich PJ, Stein K, Ph D, Woods SW (1999) Prospective Diagnosis of the Initial
Prodrome for Schizophrenia Based on the Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes: Preliminary Evidence
of Interrater Reliability and Predictive Validity. http://dx.doi.org/101176/appi.ajp1595863 19:863–865.
Mohr C, Claridge G (2015) Schizotypy - Do not worry, it is not all worrisome. Schizophr Bull 41:S436–S443.
Montague PR et al. (2012) Computational psychiatry. Trends Cogn Sci 16:72–80.
Monte RC, Goulding SM, Compton MT (2008) Premorbid functioning of patients with first-episode nonaffective
psychosis: A comparison of deterioration in academic and social performance, and clinical correlates of Premorbid
Adjustment Scale scores. Schizophr Res 104:206–213.
Moore TH, Zammit S, Lingford-Hughes A, Barnes TR, Jones PB, Burke M, Lewis G (2007) Cannabis use and
risk of psychotic or affective mental health outcomes: a systematic review. Lancet 370:319–328.
Morgan C, Fisher H, Hutchinson G, Kirkbride J, Craig TK, Morgan K, Dazzan P, Boydell J, Doody GA, Jones
PB, Murray RM, Leff J, Fearon P (2009) Ethnicity, social disadvantage and psychotic-like experiences in a healthy
population based sample. Acta Psychiatr Scand 119:226–235.
Morrison A (2001a) The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative cognitive approach to hallucina-
tions and delusions. Behav Cogn Psychother.
Morrison AP (2001b) THE INTERPRETATION OF INTRUSIONS IN PSYCHOSIS: AN INTEGRATIVE COG-
NITIVE APPROACH TO HALLUCINATIONS AND DELUSIONS. Behav Cogn Psychother 29.
Morrison AP, Barratt S (2010) What are the components of CBT for psychosis? A Delphi study. Schizophr Bull
36:136–142.
Mumford D (1992) On the computational architecture of the neocortex. II. The role of cortico-cortical loops. Biol
Cybern 66:241–251.
Murphy JR, Rawdon C, Kelleher I, Twomey D, Markey PS, Cannon M, Roche RA (2013) Reduced duration
mismatch negativity in adolescents with psychotic symptoms: further evidence for mismatch negativity as a
possible biomarker for vulnerability to psychosis. BMC Psychiatry 13:45.
Murray GK, Cheng F, Clark L, Barnett JH, Blackwell AD, Fletcher PC, Robbins TW, Bullmore ET, Jones PB
(2008a) Reinforcement and reversal learning in first-episode psychosis. Schizophr Bull 34:848–855.
Murray GK, Corlett PR, Clark L, Pessiglione M, Blackwell AD, Honey G, Jones PB, Bullmore ET, Robbins TW,
Fletcher PC (2008b) Substantia nigra/ventral tegmental reward prediction error disruption in psychosis. Mol
243
Psychiatry 13:239, 267–276.
Murray GK, Jones PB (2012) Psychotic symptoms in young people without psychotic illness: Mechanisms and
meaning. Br J Psychiatry 201:4–6.
Myin-Germeys I, van Os J (2007) Stress-reactivity in psychosis: Evidence for an affective pathway to psychosis.
Clin Psychol Rev 27:409–424.
Myin-Germeys I, Van Os J, Schwartz JE, Stone AA, Delespaul PA (2001) Emotional reactivity to daily life stress
in psychosis. Arch Gen Psychiatry 58:1137–1144.
Neisser U (1976) Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of cognitive psychology.
Nelson B, Yuen HP, Wood SJ, Lin A, Spiliotacopoulos D, Bruxner A, Broussard C, Simmons M, Foley DL,
Brewer WJ, Francey SM, Amminger GP, Thompson A, McGorry PD, Yung AR (2013a) Long-term follow-up
of a group at ultra high risk (&quot;prodromal&quot;) for psychosis: the PACE 400 study. JAMA psychiatry
70:793–802.
Nelson MT, Seal ML, Pantelis C, Phillips LJ (2013b) Evidence of a dimensional relationship between schizotypy
and schizophrenia: A systematic review. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 37:317–327.
Neuhaus AH, Brandt ESL, Goldberg TE, Bates JA, Malhotra AK (2013) Evidence for impaired visual prediction
error in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 147:326–330.
Nieman DH, Ruhrmann S, Dragt S, Soen F, van Tricht MJ, Koelman JHT. M, Bour LJ, Velthorst E, Becker
HE, Weiser M, Linszen DH, de Haan L (2014) Psychosis Prediction: Stratification of Risk Estimation With
Information-Processing and Premorbid Functioning Variables. Schizophr Bull 40:1482–1490.
Notredame C-E, Pins D, Deneve S, Jardri R (2014) What visual illusions teach us about schizophrenia. Front
Integr Neurosci 8:1–16.
Nuechterlein KH, Dawson MEM (1984) A heuristic vulnerability/stress model of schizophrenic episodes. Schizophr
Bull 10:300–312.
O’Brien MP, Miklowitz DJ, Candan KA, Marshall C, Domingues I, Walsh BC, Zinberg JL, De Silva SD, Wood-
berry KA, Cannon TD (2014) A randomized trial of family focused therapy with populations at clinical high risk
for psychosis: effects on interactional behavior. J Consult Clin Psychol 82:90–101.
O’Driscoll GA, Callahan BL (2008) Smooth pursuit in schizophrenia: A meta-analytic review of research since
1993. Brain Cogn 68:359–370.
Oestreich LKLL, Mifsud NG, Ford JM, Roach BJ, Mathalon DH, Whitford TJ (2015) Subnormal sensory atten-
uation to self-generated speech in schizotypy: Electrophysiological evidence for a “continuum of psychosis”. Int J
Psychophysiol 97:131–138.
Olfson M, Lewis-Fernández R, Weissman MM, Feder A, Gameroff MJ, Pilowsky D, Fuentes M (2002) Psychotic
symptoms in an urban general medicine practice. Am J Psychiatry 159:1412–1419.
Owens M et al. (2012) 5-HTTLPR and Early Childhood Adversities Moderate Cognitive and Emotional Processing
in Adolescence Kemp AH, ed. PLoS One 7:e48482.
Pankow A, Katthagen T, Diner S, Deserno L, Boehme R, Kathmann N, Gleich T, Gaebler M, Walter H, Heinz
A, Schlagenhauf F (2016) Aberrant Salience Is Related to Dysfunctional Self-Referential Processing in Psychosis.
Schizophr Bull 42:67–76.
Panton KR, Badcock DR, Badcock JC (2016) A Metaanalysis of Perceptual Organization in Schizophrenia,
Schizotypy, and Other High-Risk Groups Based on Variants of the Embedded Figures Task. Front Psychol
7:237.
Parker G, Roussos J, Hadzi-Pavlovic D, Mitchell P, Wilhelm K, Austin MP (1997) The development of a refined
measure of dysfunctional parenting and assessment of its relevance in patients with affective disorders. Psychol
Med 27:1193–1203.
244
Pearce JM, Hall G (1980) A model for Pavlovian learning: variations in the effectiveness of conditioned but not
of unconditioned stimuli. Psychol Rev 87:532–552.
Pearlson GD, Folley BS (2008) Schizophrenia, psychiatric genetics, and Darwinian psychiatry: an evolutionary
framework. Schizophr Bull 34:722–733.
Peirce C (1974) Collected papers of charles sanders peirce.
Pelli DG (1997) The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: transforming numbers into movies. Spat
Vis 10:437–442.
Pelosi AJ, Birchwood M (2003) Is early intervention for psychosis a waste of valuable resources? Br J Psychiatry
182.
Penttilä M et al. (2014) Duration of untreated psychosis as predictor of long-term outcome in schizophrenia:
systematic review and meta-analysis. Br J Psychiatry 205:88–94.
Perkins DO, Gu H, Boteva K, Lieberman JA (2005) Relationship between duration of untreated psychosis and out-
come in first-episode schizophrenia: a critical review and meta-analysis. Am J Psychiatry 162:1785–1804.
Peters E, Joseph S, Day S, Garety P (2004) Measuring Delusional Ideation: The 21-Item Peters et al. Delusions
Inventor...: Joshua. Schizophr Bull 30:1005–1022.
Peters E, Ward T, Jackson M, Morgan C, Charalambides M, McGuire P, Woodruff P, Jacobsen P, Chadwick
P, Garety PA (2016) Clinical, socio-demographic and psychological characteristics in individuals with persistent
psychotic experiences with and without a “need for care”. World Psychiatry 15:41–52.
Peters ER, Williams SL, Cooke MA, Kuipers E (2012) It’s not what you hear, it’s the way you think about it:
appraisals as determinants of affect and behaviour in voice hearers. Psychol Med 42:1507–1514.
Polanczyk G, Moffitt TE, Arseneault L, Cannon M, Ambler A, Keefe RSE, Houts R, Odgers CL, Caspi A
(2010) Etiological and clinical features of childhood psychotic symptoms: results from a birth cohort. Arch Gen
Psychiatry 67:328–338.
Poulton R et al. (2000) Children’s Self-Reported Psychotic Symptoms and Adult Schizophreniform Disorder.
Arch Gen Psychiatry 57:1053.
Poulton R, Van Ryzin MJ, Harold GT, Chamberlain P, Fowler D, Cannon M, Arseneault L, Leve LD (2014)
Effects of multidimensional treatment foster care on psychotic symptoms in girls. J Am Acad Child Adolesc
Psychiatry 53:1279–1287.
Powers A, Ressler KJ, Bradley RG (2009) The protective role of friendship on the effects of childhood abuse and
depression. Depress Anxiety 26:46–53.
Rabinowicz EF, Silipo G, Goldman R, Javitt DC (2000) Auditory sensory dysfunction in schizophrenia: impreci-
sion or distractibility? Arch Gen Psychiatry 57:1149–1155.
R Core Team (2016) R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing.
Radenbach C, Reiter AMF, Engert V, Sjoerds Z, Villringer A, Heinze H-J, Deserno L, Schlagenhauf F (2015)
The interaction of acute and chronic stress impairs model-based behavioral control. Psychoneuroendocrinology
53:268–280.
Rado S (1960) Theory and therapy: The theory of schizotypal organization and its application to the treatment
of decompensated schizotypal behavior. outpatient Treat Schizophr.
Raine A (1991) The SPQ: a scale for the assessment of schizotypal personality based on DSM-III-R criteria.
Schizophr Bull 17:555–564.
Raine A, Reynolds C, Lencz T, Scerbo A, Triphon N, Kim D (1994) Cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal, and
disorganized features of schizotypal personality. Schizophr Bull 20:191–201.
Ramage EM, Weintraub DM, Allen DN, Snyder JS (2012) Evidence for stimulus-general impairments on auditory
stream segregation tasks in schizophrenia. J Psychiatr Res 46:1540–1545.
245
Rao RPN, Ballard DH (1999) Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional interpretation of some extra-
classical receptive-field effects. Nat Neurosci 2:79–87.
Ray I (1863) Mental Hygiene. Ticknor and Fields.
Rescorla RA, Wagner AR (1972) A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the effectiveness of reinforce-
ment and nonreinforcement. Class Cond II Curr Res Theory 21:64–99.
Revelle W (2014) psych: Procedures for psychological, psychometric, and personality research. Northwest Univ
Evanston, Illinois.
Revelle W, Zinbarg RE (2009) Coefficients alpha, beta, omega, and the glb: Comments on sijtsma. Psychometrika
74:145–154.
Reynolds CA, Raine A, Mellingen K, Venables PH, Mednick SA (2000) Three-factor model of schizotypal per-
sonality: invariance across culture, gender, religious affiliation, family adversity, and psychopathology. Schizophr
Bull 26:603–618.
Reynolds C, Richmond B (1978) What I think and feel: A revised measure of children’s manifest anxiety. J
Abnorm Child Psychol.
Riecher-Rössler A, Gschwandtner U, Aston J, Borgwardt S, Drewe M, Fuhr P, Pflüger M, Radü W, Schindler C,
Stieglitz R-D (2007) The Basel early-detection-of-psychosis (FEPSY)-study–design and preliminary results. Acta
Psychiatr Scand 115:114–125.
Riecher-Rössler A, Pflueger MO, Aston J, Borgwardt SJ, Brewer WJ, Gschwandtner U, Stieglitz R-D (2009) Effi-
cacy of Using Cognitive Status in Predicting Psychosis: A 7-Year Follow-Up. Biol Psychiatry 66:1023–1030.
Rigoux L, Stephan KEE, Friston KJJ, Daunizeau J (2014) Bayesian model selection for group studies - Revisited.
Neuroimage 84:971–985.
Robinson BL, McAlpine D (2009) Gain control mechanisms in the auditory pathway. Curr Opin Neurobiol
19:402–407.
Robol V, Tibber MS, Anderson EJ, Bobin T, Carlin P, Shergill SS, Dakin SC (2013) Reduced Crowding and Poor
Contour Detection in Schizophrenia Are Consistent with Weak Surround Inhibition Hamed S Ben, ed. PLoS One
8:e60951.
Roché MW, Fowler ML, Lenzenweger MF (2015) Deeper into schizotypy and motor performance: Investigating
the nature of motor control in a non-psychiatric sample. Psychiatry Res 228:20–25.
Roiser JP, Howes OD, Chaddock CA, Joyce EM, McGuire P (2013) Neural and behavioral correlates of aberrant
salience in individuals at risk for psychosis. Schizophr Bull 39:1328–1336.
Roiser JP, Stephan KE, den Ouden HEM, Barnes TRE, Friston KJ, Joyce EM (2009) Do patients with schizophre-
nia exhibit aberrant salience? Psychol Med 39:199–209.
Rosen JL, Miller TJ, D’Andrea JT, McGlashan TH, Woods SW (2006) Comorbid diagnoses in patients meeting
criteria for the schizophrenia prodrome. Schizophr Res 85:124–131.
Rosseel Y (2012a) lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling. Journal of Statistical Software. J
Stat Softw 48:1–36.
Rosseel Y (2012b) lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. J Stat Softw.
Rössler W, Ajdacic-Gross V, Müller M, Rodgers S, Haker H, Hengartner MP (2015) Assessing sub-clinical psy-
chosis phenotypes in the general population–a multidimensional approach. Schizophr Res 161:194–201.
Rössler W, Hengartner MP, Ajdacic-Gross V, Haker H, Gamma A, Angst J (2011) Sub-clinical psychosis symptoms
in young adults are risk factors for subsequent common mental disorders. Schizophr Res 131:18–23.
Rotter JB (1966) Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychol Monogr
80:1–28.
246
Ruhrmann S, Schultze-Lutter F (2010) Prediction of psychosis in adolescents and young adults at high risk: results
from the prospective European prediction of psychosis study. Arch.
Ruzich E, Allison C, Smith P, Watson P, Auyeung B, Ring H, Baron-Cohen S (2015) Measuring autistic traits in
the general population: a systematic review of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) in a nonclinical population
sample of 6,900 typical adult males and females. Mol Autism 6:2.
Schallmo M-P, Sponheim SR, Olman CA (2013) Abnormal contextual modulation of visual contour detection in
patients with schizophrenia. Herzog MH, ed. PLoS One 8:e68090.
Schallmo M-PM-P, Sponheim SR, Olman CA (2015) Reduced contextual effects on visual contrast perception in
schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorder. Psychol Med 45:3527–3537.
Schenkel LS, Spaulding WD, Silverstein SM (2005) Poor premorbid social functioning and theory of mind deficit
in schizophrenia: Evidence of reduced context processing? J Psychiatr Res 39:499–508.
Schennach R, Riedel M, Musil R, Möller H-J (2012) Treatment Response in First-episode Schizophrenia. Clin
Psychopharmacol Neurosci 10:78–87.
Schlosser DA, Jacobson S, Chen Q, Sugar CA, Niendam TA, Li G, Bearden CE, Cannon TD (2012) Recovery from
an at-risk state: Clinical and functional outcomes of putatively prodromal youth who do not develop psychosis.
Schizophr Bull 38:1225–1233.
Schmack K, Gòmez-Carrillo de Castro A, Rothkirch M, Sekutowicz M, Rössler H, Haynes J-D, Heinz A, Petrovic
P, Sterzer P (2013) Delusions and the role of beliefs in perceptual inference. J Neurosci 33:13701–13712.
Schmack K, Rothkirch M, Priller J, Sterzer P (2017) Enhanced predictive signalling in schizophrenia. Hum Brain
Mapp 38:1767–1779.
Schmack K, Schnack A, Priller J, Sterzer P (2015) Perceptual instability in schizophrenia: Probing predictive
coding accounts of delusions with ambiguous stimuli. Schizophr Res Cogn 2:72–77.
Schneider K (1925) Wesen und erfassung des schizophrenen. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurol und Psychi-
atr.
Schneider K (1959) Clinical psychopathology.(Trans. by MW Hamilton).
Schneider U, Borsutzky M, Seifert J, Leweke FM, Huber TJ, Rollnik JD, Emrich HM (2002) Reduced binocular
depth inversion in schizophrenic patients. Schizophr Res 53:101–108.
Schreier A, Wolke D, Thomas K, Horwood J, Hollis C, Gunnell D, Lewis G, Thompson A, Zammit S, Duffy L,
Salvi G, Harrison G (2009) Prospective study of peer victimization in childhood and psychotic symptoms in a
nonclinical population at age 12 years. Arch Gen Psychiatry 66:527–536.
Schultze-Lutter F, Klosterkötter J (2002) Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms-Prediction list
(BSABS-P). Univ Col Col.
Schultze-Lutter F, Ruhrmann S, Berning J, Maier W, Klosterkötter J (2010) Basic symptoms and ultrahigh risk
criteria: Symptom development in the initial prodromal state. Schizophr Bull 36:182–191.
Schwabe L, Joëls M, Roozendaal B, Wolf OT, Oitzl MS (2012) Stress effects on memory: an update and integra-
tion. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 36:1740–1749.
Schwabe L, Wolf OT (2010) Learning under stress impairs memory formation. Neurobiol Learn Mem 93:183–188.
Sehatpour P, Dias EC, Butler PD, Revheim N, Guilfoyle DN, Foxe JJ, Javitt DC (2010) Impaired visual object
processing across an occipital-frontal-hippocampal brain network in schizophrenia: an integrated neuroimaging
study. Arch Gen Psychiatry 67:772–782.
Selemon LD, Zecevic N (2015) Schizophrenia: a tale of two critical periods for prefrontal cortical development.
Transl Psychiatry 5:e623.
semTools Contributors (2016) Useful Tools for Structural Equation Modeling [R package semTools version 0.4-
12].
247
Serrano-Pedraza I, Romero-Ferreiro V, Read JCA, DiÃ©guez-Risco T, Bagney A, Caballero-GonzÃ¡lez M,
RodrÃguez-Torresano J, Rodriguez-Jimenez R (2014) Reduced visual surround suppression in schizophrenia shown
by measuring contrast detection thresholds. Front Psychol 5.
Seymour K, Stein T, Sanders LLO, Guggenmos M, Theophil I, Sterzer P (2013) Altered Contextual Modulation
of Primary Visual Cortex Responses in Schizophrenia. Neuropsychopharmacology 38:2607–2612.
Shaikh M, Valmaggia L, Broome MR, Dutt A, Lappin J, Day F, Woolley J, Tabraham P, Walshe M, Johns L,
Fusar-Poli P, Howes O, Murray RM, McGuire P, Bramon E (2012) Reduced mismatch negativity predates the
onset of psychosis. Schizophr Res 134:42–48.
Shergill SS, Samson G, Bays PM, Frith CD, Wolpert DM (2005) Evidence for sensory prediction deficits in
schizophrenia. Am J Psychiatry 162:2384–2386.
Silverstein SM, Berten S, Essex B, Kovács I, Susmaras T, Little DM (2009) An fMRI examination of visual
integration in schizophrenia. J Integr Neurosci 8:175–202.
Silverstein SM, Hatashita-Wong M, Schenkel LS, Wilkniss S, Kovács I, Fehér A, Smith T, Goicochea C, Uhlhaas
P, Carpiniello K, Savitz A (2006) Reduced top-down influences in contour detection in schizophrenia. Cogn
Neuropsychiatry 11:112–132.
Silverstein SM, Keane BP (2011) Perceptual organization impairment in schizophrenia and associated brain
mechanisms: Review of research from 2005 to 2010. Schizophr Bull 37:690–699.
Simoens VL, Istók E, Hyttinen S, Hirvonen A, Näätänen R, Tervaniemi M (2007) Psychosocial stress attenuates
general sound processing and duration change detection. Psychophysiology 44:30–38.
Simon AE et al. (2011) Ultra high-risk state for psychosis and non-transition: a systematic review. Schizophr
Res 132:8–17.
Simon AE et al. (2013) Moving beyond transition outcomes: meta-analysis of remission rates in individuals at
high clinical risk for psychosis. Psychiatry Res 209:266–272.
Simon AE, Umbricht D (2010) High remission rates from an initial ultra-high risk state for psychosis. Schizophr
Res 116:168–172.
Sisti D, Rocchi MBL, Siddi S, Mura T, Manca S, Preti A, Petretto DR (2012) Preoccupation and distress are
relevant dimensions in delusional beliefs. Compr Psychiatry 53:1039–1043.
Slaghuis WL (1998) Contrast sensitivity for stationary and drifting spatial frequency gratings in positive- and
negative-symptom schizophrenia. J Abnorm Psychol 107:49–62.
Smeets F, Lataster T, Dominguez M-GDG, Hommes J, Lieb R, Wittchen H-UU, Van Os J (2012a) Evidence that
onset of psychosis in the population reflects early hallucinatory experiences that through environmental risks and
affective dysregulation become complicated by delusions. Schizophr Bull 38:531–542.
Smeets F, Lataster T, van Winkel R, de Graaf R, ten Have M, van Os J (2012b) Testing the hypothesis that
psychotic illness begins when subthreshold hallucinations combine with delusional ideation. Acta Psychiatr Scand
127:34–47.
Smeets F, Lataster T, Viechtbauer W, Delespaul P, G.R.O.U.P (2014) Evidence That Environmental and Genetic
Risks for Psychotic Disorder May Operate by Impacting on Connections Between Core Symptoms of Perceptual
Alteration and Delusional Ideation. Schizophr Bull 41:1–11.
Smith B, Fowler DG, Freeman D, Bebbington P, Bashforth H, Garety P, Dunn G, Kuipers E (2006) Emotion
and psychosis: links between depression, self-esteem, negative schematic beliefs and delusions and hallucinations.
Schizophr Res 86:181–188.
Sommer IEC, Daalman K, Rietkerk T, Diederen KM, Bakker S, Wijkstra J, Boks MPM (2010) Healthy individuals
with auditory verbal hallucinations; Who are they? psychiatric assessments of a selected sample of 103 subjects.
Schizophr Bull 36:633–641.
Sorkin RD, Hays CJ, West R (2001) Signal-detection analysis of group decision making. Psychol Rev 108:183–203.
248
Spering M, Dias EC, Sanchez JL, Schütz AC, Javitt DC (2013) Efference copy failure during smooth pursuit eye
movements in schizophrenia. J Neurosci 33:11779–11787.
Srinivasan M V, Laughlin SB, Dubs A (1982) Predictive coding: a fresh view of inhibition in the retina. Proc R
Soc London Ser B, Biol Sci 216:427–459.
Stanghellini G, Langer AI, Ambrosini A, Cangas AJ (2012) Quality of hallucinatory experiences: differences
between a clinical and a non-clinical sample. World Psychiatry 11:110–113.
Stefanis NC, Smyrnis N, Avramopoulos D, Evdokimidis I, Ntzoufras I, Stefanis CN (2004) Factorial Compo-
sition of Self-Rated Schizotypal Traits Among Young Males Undergoing Military Training. Schizophr Bull
30:335–350.
Stephan KE, Mathys C (2014) Computational approaches to psychiatry. Curr Opin Neurobiol 25:85–92.
Stephan KE, Penny WD, Daunizeau J, Moran RJ, Friston KJ (2009) Bayesian model selection for group studies.
Neuroimage 46:1004–1017.
Stochl J, Khandaker GM, Lewis G, Perez J, Goodyer IM, Zammit S, Sullivan S, Croudace TJ, Jones PB
(2015) Mood, anxiety and psychotic phenomena measure a common psychopathological factor. Psychol Med
45:1–11.
Strauss GP, Allen DN, Miski P, Buchanan RW, Kirkpatrick B, Carpenter WT (2012) Differential patterns of pre-
morbid social and academic deterioration in deficit and nondeficit schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 135:134–138.
Strauss GP, Frank MJ, Waltz JA, Kasanova Z, Herbener ES, Gold JM (2011) Deficits in positive reinforce-
ment learning and uncertainty-driven exploration are associated with distinct aspects of negative symptoms in
schizophrenia. Biol Psychiatry 69:424–431.
Strauss JS (1969) Hallicinations and delusions as point on continua function. Arch Gen Psychiatry 21:581–586.
Strous RD, Cowan N, Ritter W, Javitt DC (1995) Auditory sensory (“echoic”) memory dysfunction in schizophre-
nia. Am J Psychiatry 152:1517–1519.
Sturt E (1981) Hierarchical patterns in the distribution of psychiatric symptoms. PsycholMed 11:783–792.
Sutton R, Barto A (1998) Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
Tabak NT et al. (2013) Latent profile analysis of healthy schizotypy within the extended psychosis phenotype.
Psychiatry Res 210:1008–1013.
Tandon N, Shah J, Keshavan MS, Tandon R (2012) Attenuated psychosis and the schizophrenia prodrome: current
status of risk identification and psychosis prevention. Neuropsychiatry (London) 2:345–353.
Taylor HE, Parker S, Mansell W, Morrison AP (2013) Effects of Appraisals of Anomalous Experience on Distress
in People at Risk of Psychosis. Behav Cogn Psychother 41:24–33.
Tennant R et al. (2007) The Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS): development and UK
validation. Health Qual Life Outcomes 5:63.
Teufel C, Fletcher PC (2016) The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and
psychiatric disorders. Brain 139:2600–2608.
Teufel C, Kingdon A, Ingram JN, Wolpert DM, Fletcher PC (2010) Deficits in sensory prediction are related to
delusional ideation in healthy individuals. Neuropsychologia 48:4169–4172.
Teufel C, Subramaniam N, Dobler V, Perez J, Finnemann J, Mehta PR, Goodyer IM, Fletcher PC (2015) Shift
toward prior knowledge confers a perceptual advantage in early psychosis and psychosis-prone healthy individuals.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 112:13401–13406.
Thewissen V, Bentall RP, Oorschot M, à Campo J, van Lierop T, van Os J, Myin-Germeys I (2011) Emotions,
self-esteem, and paranoid episodes: An experience sampling study. Br J Clin Psychol 50:178–195.
Thompson A, Papas A, Bartholomeusz C, Nelson B, Yung A (2013) Externalized attributional bias in the Ultra
High Risk (UHR) for psychosis population. Psychiatry Res 206:200–205.
249
Thompson A, Sullivan S, Lewis G, Zammit S, Heron J, Horwood J, Thomas K, Gunnell D, Hollis C, Wolke D,
Harrison G (2011) Association between locus of control in childhood and psychotic symptoms in early adolescence:
Results from a large birth cohort. Cogn Neuropsychiatry 16:385–402.
Tibber MS, Anderson EJ, Bobin T, Antonova E, Seabright A, Wright B, Carlin P, Shergill SS, Dakin SC (2013)
Visual surround suppression in schizophrenia. Front Psychol 4:88.
Toelch U, Bruce MJ, Newson L, Richerson PJ, Reader SM (2014) Individual consistency and flexibility in human
social information use. Proc Biol Sci 281:20132864.
Trapp S, Bar M (2015) Prediction, context, and competition in visual recognition. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1339:190–198.
Tschacher W, Dubouloz P, Meier R, Junghan U (2008) Altered perception of apparent motion in schizophrenia
spectrum disorder. Psychiatry Res 159:290–299.
Tsuang MT, Van Os J, Tandon R, Barch DM, Bustillo J, Gaebel W, Gur RE, Heckers S, Malaspina D, Owen
MJ, Schultz S, Carpenter W (2013) Attenuated psychosis syndrome in DSM-5. Schizophr Res 150:31–35.
Turner N, Joinson C, Peters TJ, Wiles N, Lewis G (2014) Validity of the Short Mood and Feelings Questionnaire
in late adolescence. Psychol Assess 26:752–762.
Uhlhaas PJ, Phillips WA, Mitchell G, Silverstein SM (2006) Perceptual grouping in disorganized schizophrenia.
Psychiatry Res 145:105–117.
Uhlhaas PJ, Silverstein SM (2005) Perceptual organization in schizophrenia spectrum disorders: empirical research
and theoretical implications. Psychol Bull 131:618–632.
Uhlhaas PJ, Silverstein SM, Phillips WA, Lovell PG (2004) Evidence for impaired visual context processing in
schizotypy with thought disorder. Schizophr Res 68:249–260.
Umbricht D, Krljes S (2005) Mismatch negativity in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. Schizophr Res 76:1–23.
Underwood R, Kumari V, Peters E (2016) Appraisals of psychotic experiences: an experimental investigation of
symptomatic, remitted and non-need-for-care individuals. Psychol Med 46:1249–1263.
Urban A, Kremláček J, Masopust J, Libiger J (2008) Visual mismatch negativity among patients with schizophre-
nia. Schizophr Res 102:320–328.
van Harmelen A-L et al. (2016) Friendships and Family Support Reduce Subsequent Depressive Symptoms in
At-Risk Adolescents Alway SE, ed. PLoS One 11:e0153715.
van Nierop M, Lataster T, Smeets F, Gunther N, van Zelst C, de Graaf R, ten Have M, van Dorsselaer S, Bak M,
Myin-Germeys I, Viechtbauer W, van Os J, vanWinkel R (2014) Psychopathological mechanisms linking childhood
traumatic experiences to risk of psychotic symptoms: analysis of a large, representative population-based sample.
Schizophr Bull 40 Suppl 2:S123-30.
van Nierop M, Van Os J, Gunther N, Myin-Germeys I, de Graaf R, ten Have M, van Dorsselaer S, Bak M, van
Winkel R (2012) Phenotypically continuous with clinical psychosis, discontinuous in need for care: Evidence for
an extended psychosis phenotype. Schizophr Bull 38:231–238.
van Nierop M, Viechtbauer W, Gunther N, van Zelst C, de Graaf R, Ten Have M, van Dorsselaer S, Bak M, Genetic
Risk and OUtcome of Psychosis investigators, van Winkel R, Genetic Risk and OUtcome of Psychosis (GROUP)
investigators, van Winkel R (2015) Childhood trauma is associated with a specific admixture of affective, anxiety,
and psychosis symptoms cutting across traditional diagnostic boundaries. Psychol Med 45:1277–1288.
van Os J et al. (2001) Prevalence of Psychotic Disorder and Community Level of Psychotic Symptoms. Arch Gen
Psychiatry 58:663.
van Os J, Linscott RJ (2012) Introduction: The extended psychosis phenotype–relationship with schizophrenia
and with ultrahigh risk status for psychosis. Schizophr Bull 38:227–230.
van Os J, Linscott RJ, Myin-Germeys I, Delespaul P, Krabbendam L (2009) A systematic review and meta-
analysis of the psychosis continuum: evidence for a psychosis proneness-persistence-impairment model of psychotic
disorder. Psychol Med 39:179–195.
250
van Os J, Reininghaus U (2016) Psychosis as a transdiagnostic and extended phenotype in the general population.
World Psychiatry 15:118–124.
van Winkel R et al. (2015) Aetiological stratification as a conceptual framework for gene-by-environment inter-
action research in psychiatry. Epidemiol Psychiatr Sci 24:6–11.
Varese F, Smeets F, Drukker M, Lieverse R, Lataster T, Viechtbauer W, Read J, Van Os J, Bentall RP (2012)
Childhood adversities increase the risk of psychosis: A meta-analysis of patient-control, prospective-and cross-
sectional cohort studies. Schizophr Bull 38:661–671.
Vassos E, Pedersen CB, Murray RM, Collier DA, Lewis CM (2012) Meta-analysis of the association of urbanicity
with schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull 38:1118–1123.
Vedhara K, Hyde J, Gilchrist ID, Tytherleigh M, Plummer S (2000) Acute stress, memory, attention and cortisol.
Psychoneuroendocrinology 25:535–549.
Veling W, Hoek HW, Wiersma D, Mackenbach JP (2010) Ethnic identity and the risk of schizophrenia in ethnic
minorities: a case-control study. Schizophr Bull 36:1149–1156.
Velthorst E, Meijer C, Kahn RS, Linszen DH, vanOs J, Wiersm D, Bruggeman R, Cahn W, de Haan L, Krabben-
dam L, Myin-Germeys I (2012) The association between social anhedonia, withdrawal and psychotic experiences
in general and high-risk populations. Schizophr Res 138:290–294.
Velthorst E, Nieman DH, Becker HE, van de Fliert R, Dingemans PM, Klaassen R, de Haan L, van Amelsvoort
T, Linszen DH (2009) Baseline differences in clinical symptomatology between ultra high risk subjects with and
without a transition to psychosis. Schizophr Res 109:60–65.
Velthorst E, Nieman DH, Klaassen RMC, Becker HE, Dingemans PM, Linszen DH, De Haan L (2011) Three-year
course of clinical symptomatology in young people at ultra high risk for transition to psychosis. Acta Psychiatr
Scand 123:36–42.
Velthorst E, Nieman DH, Linszen D, Becker H, De Haan L, Dingemans PM, Birchwood M, Patterson P, Salokangas
RKR, Heinimaa M, Heinz A, Juckel G, Von Reventlow HG, French P, Stevens H, Schultze-Lutter F, Klosterk??tter
J, Ruhrmann S (2010) Disability in people clinically at high risk of psychosis. Br J Psychiatry 197:278–284.
Velthorst E, Reichenberg A, Kapara O, Goldberg S, Fromer M, Fruchter E, Ginat K, de Haan L, Davidson
M, Weiser M (2016) Developmental Trajectories of Impaired Community Functioning in Schizophrenia. JAMA
psychiatry 73:48–55.
Vinckier F, Gaillard R, Palminteri S, Rigoux L, Salvador A, Fornito A, Adapa R, Krebs MO, Pessiglione M,
Fletcher PC (2016) Confidence and psychosis: a neuro-computational account of contingency learning disruption
by NMDA blockade. Mol Psychiatry 21:946–955.
Vollema MG, Hoijtink H (2000) The multidimensionality of self-report schizotypy in a psychiatric population: an
analysis using multidimensional Rasch models. Schizophr Bull 26:565–575.
Vollmer-Larsen A, Handest P, Parnas J (2007) Reliability of measuring anomalous experience: the Bonn Scale
for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms. Psychopathology.
Wahlbeck K (2015) Public mental health: the time is ripe for translation of evidence into practice. World
Psychiatry 14:36–42.
Waltz JA, Frank MJ, Wiecki T V, Gold JM (2011) Altered probabilistic learning and response biases in schizophre-
nia: behavioral evidence and neurocomputational modeling. Neuropsychology 25:86–97.
Wang XJ, Krystal JH (2014) Computational psychiatry. Neuron 84:638–654.
Ward TA, Gaynor KJ, Hunter MD, Woodruff PWR, Garety PA, Peters ER (2014) Appraisals and responses to
experimental symptom analogues in clinical and nonclinical individuals with psychotic experiences. Schizophr
Bull 40:845–855.
Weintraub DM, Ramage EM, Sutton G, Ringdahl E, Boren A, Pasinski AC, Thaler N, Haderlie M, Allen DN, Sny-
der JS (2012) Auditory stream segregation impairments in schizophrenia. Psychophysiology 49:1372–1383.
251
Welham J, Scott J, Williams G, Najman J, Bor W, O’Callaghan M, McGrath J (2009) Emotional and behavioural
antecedents of young adults who screen positive for non-affective psychosis: a 21-year birth cohort study. Psychol
Med 39:625–634.
Werbeloff N et al. (2012) Self-reported Attenuated Psychotic Symptoms as Forerunners of Severe Mental Disorders
Later in Life. Arch Gen Psychiatry 69:467–475.
Wiecki T V, Sofer I, Frank MJ (2013) HDDM: Hierarchical Bayesian estimation of the Drift-Diffusion Model in
Python. Front Neuroinform 7:14.
Wigman JTW, van Nierop M, Vollebergh WAM, Lieb R, Beesdo-Baum K, Wittchen H-UU, Van Os J (2012)
Evidence that psychotic symptoms are prevalent in disorders of anxiety and depression, impacting on illness onset,
risk, and severity - Implications for diagnosis and ultra-high risk research. Schizophr Bull 38:247–257.
Wigman JTW, Vollebergh WAM, Raaijmakers QAW, Iedema J, Van Dorsselaer S, Ormel J, Verhulst FC, Van
Os J (2011) The structure of the extended psychosis phenotype in early adolescence - A cross-sample replication.
Schizophr Bull 37:850–860.
Wingenfeld K, Riedesel K, Petrovic Z, Philippsen C, Meyer B, Rose M, Grabe HJ, Barnow S, Löwe B, Spitzer
C (2011) Impact of childhood trauma, alexithymia, dissociation, and emotion suppression on emotional Stroop
task. J Psychosom Res 70:53–58.
Woods A, Jones N, Alderson-Day B, Callard F, Fernyhough C (2015) Experiences of hearing voices: analysis of
a novel phenomenological survey. The lancet Psychiatry 2:323–331.
Woods SW, Addington J, Cadenhead KS, Cannon TD, Cornblatt BA, Heinssen R, Perkins DO, Seidman LJ,
Tsuang MT, Walker EF, McGlashan TH (2009) Validity of the prodromal risk syndrome for first psychosis:
Findings from the north american prodrome longitudinal study. Schizophr Bull 35:894–908.
Woods SW, Walsh BC, Saksa JR, McGlashan TH (2010) The case for including Attenuated Psychotic Symptoms
Syndrome in DSM-5 as a psychosis risk syndrome. Schizophr Res 123:199–207.
Wuthrich VM, Bates TC (2006) Confirmatory factor analysis of the three-factor structure of the schizotypal
personality questionnaire and Chapman schizotypy scales. J Pers Assess 87:292–304.
Xu MK, Gaysina D, Barnett JH, Scoriels L, van de Lagemaat LN, Wong a, Richards M, Croudace TJ, Jones
PB (2015) Psychometric precision in phenotype definition is a useful step in molecular genetic investigation of
psychiatric disorders. Transl Psychiatry 5:e593.
Yang E, Tadin D, Glasser DM, Hong SW, Blake R, Park S (2013) Visual Context Processing in Schizophrenia.
Clin Psychol Sci 1:5–15.
Yazdani P, Serrano-Pedraza I, Whittaker RG, Trevelyan A, Read JCA (2015) Two common psychophysical mea-
sures of surround suppression reflect independent neuronal mechanisms. J Vis 15:21.
Yuille A, Kersten D (2006) Vision as Bayesian inference: analysis by synthesis? Trends Cogn Sci.
Yung AR et al. (2012) Whither the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome? Schizophr Bull 38:1130–1134.
Yung AR, Buckby JA, Cotton SM, Cosgrave EM, Killackey EJ, Stanford C, Godfrey K, McGorry PD (2006a)
Psychotic-like experiences in nonpsychotic help-seekers: associations with distress, depression, and disability.
Schizophr Bull 32:352–359.
Yung AR, Lin A (2016) Psychotic experiences and their significance. World Psychiatry 15:130–131.
Yung AR, Phillips LJ, Yuen HP, Francey SM, McFarlane CA, Hallgren M, McGorry PD (2003) Psychosis predic-
tion: 12-month follow up of a high-risk (“prodromal”) group. Schizophr Res 60:21–32.
Yung AR, Stanford C, Cosgrave E, Killackey E, Phillips L, Nelson B, McGorry PD (2006b) Testing the Ultra
High Risk (prodromal) criteria for the prediction of psychosis in a clinical sample of young people. Schizophr Res
84:57–66.
252
Yung AR, Yuen HP, McGorry PD, Phillips LJ, Kelly D, Dell’Olio M, Francey SM, Cosgrave EM, Killackey E,
Stanford C, Godfrey K, Buckby J (2005) Mapping the onset of psychosis: The Comprehensive Assessment of
At-Risk Mental States. Aust N Z J Psychiatry 39:964–971.
Zammit S, Kounali D, Cannon M, David AS, Gunnell D, Heron J, Jones PB, Lewis S, Sullivan S, Wolke D, Lewis
G (2013) Psychotic experiences and psychotic disorders at age 18 in relation to psychotic experiences at age 12
in a longitudinal population-based cohort study. Am J . . . 170:742–750.
Zammit S, Odd D, Horwood J, Thompson A, Thomas K, Menezes P, Gunnell D, Hollis C, Wolke D, Lewis G,
Harrison G (2009) Investigating whether adverse prenatal and perinatal events are associated with non-clinical
psychotic symptoms at age 12 years in the ALSPAC birth cohort. Psychol Med 39:1457–1467.
Zavos HMS, Eley TC, McGuire P, Plomin R, Cardno AG, Freeman D, Ronald A (2016) Shared Etiology
of Psychotic Experiences and Depressive Symptoms in Adolescence: A Longitudinal Twin Study. Schizophr
Bull:sbw021.
Zavos HMS, Freeman D, Haworth CMA, McGuire P, Plomin R, Cardno AG, Ronald A (2014) Consistent etiology
of severe, frequent psychotic experiences and milder, less frequent manifestations: a twin study of specific psychotic
experiences in adolescence. JAMA psychiatry 71:1049–1057.
Ziermans TTBTB et al. (2011) Transition and remission in adolescents at ultra-high risk for psychosis. Schizophr
Res 126:58–64.
Zubin J, Spring B (1977) Vulnerability: a new view of schizophrenia. J Abnorm Psychol.
253
Appendices
254
Appendix A
The neurobiological implementation of
typical and atypical predictive
processing
A.1 The neurobiological implementation of predictive process-
ing
Predictive coding could be plausibly implemented by neurobiological circuits (Rao and Ballard, 1999). Predictive
processing only requires representing a few informational quantities and their ‘intrinsic’ connections within each
level of processing and their ‘extrinsic’ connections to other levels of processing. The architecture at each level
can be repeated in layers above and below. In this way, it may be possible to describe a ‘canonical microcircuit’
as a general unit of neuronal organisation that could serve as the basic unit of computations (Douglas et al.,
1989; Douglas and Martin, 1991). The canonical microcircuit would need to represent bottom-up sensory evi-
dence/prediction error, either from sensory detectors or unexplained information from the level below. It would
need to represent descending predictions of incoming inputs, derived from stored internal models. It would need to
represent lateral connections within each level that guide selection of predictions. It would also need to represent
the precision of each signal (Bastos et al., 2012).
Regarding algorithms, it would need to compare the prediction with the sensory evidence and compute a prediction
error within a level and, based on their precision, update the predictions it makes of lower levels and pass prediction
error upwards to the higher level with a certain precision (Friston, 2010).
Recent work has mapped these quantities and algorithms onto the activity of certain neuronal populations and
their connections (Bastos et al., 2012). The neocortex has a columnar structure (Mountcastle, 1997) with 6 layers
and is considered hierarchically arranged (Felleman and Van Essen, n.d.). The architecture of connections in a
cortical column is well-suited to implement predictive coding (Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Haeusler
and Maass, 2007), potentially forming a canonical microcircuit.
Ascending prediction error may be signalled by excitatory superficial pyramidal cells in layers 2-3 (L2/3), also
called ‘supragranular’ layers because they are above the granular layer (L4) (Bastos et al., 2012). Descending
predictions may be conveyed by excitatory deep pyramidal cells in layer 5 (L5), also called ‘infragranular’ layers
because they are below L4 (Bastos et al., 2012). Predictions of inputs could be conveyed by deep pyramidal cells
that project to superficial cortical layers at the level below (Felleman and Van Essen, n.d.). These projections may
be conveyed to interneurons rather than pyramidal cells directly. These connections might be driven primarily
by glutamatergic signalling via NDMA receptors (Self et al., 2012).
L4 serves as the input layer for ascending prediction error, receiving projections from L2-3 at the level below,
possibly primarily driven by glutamatergic signalling via AMPA receptors (Self et al., 2012). From L4, prediction
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errors could be conveyed by intrinsic connections to the superficial pyramidal cells at that level. In those superficial
cortical layers, excitatory and inhibitory interneurons convey predictions from deep cortical layers and enable
comparison of predictions and inputs to generate prediction errors (Bastos et al., 2012).
Prediction errors could then be conveyed by intrinsic connections to deep pyramidal cells in layer 5 (L5), allowing
the changing of predictions. L5 pyramidal cells could then pass new predictions both to L4 at the same level by
intrinsic connections, allowing iterative attempts to minimise prediction error (Bastos et al., 2012). L5 pyramidal
cells could also project to superficial layers at the level below, via extrinsic feedback connections (Felleman and
Van Essen, n.d.), attempting to explain incoming evidence at the lower level with updated predictions.
The structural properties of cortical layers, such as their relative thicknesses, change across brain areas but patterns
of intrinsic and extrinsic connectivity remain similar (Weiler et al., 2008; Lefort et al., 2009), though specific
proportions of feedforward & feedback connections change (Barone et al., 2000), perhaps reflecting tuning to
specific information types and precisions of informational quantities. The dynamics of these properties suggest that
different spectral properties of neuronal firing, such as power in specific frequency bands, should be asymmetrical
in superficial and deep cortical layers (Wang, 2010). Specifically, prediction errors should be conveyed by high-
frequency gamma-band neural oscillations. Predictions should be conveyed by lower-frequency (alpha/beta-band)
oscillations. Recent principled investigations support these spectral asymmetries (Bosman et al., 2012; Bastos
et al., 2015; Michalareas et al., 2016). Advances in neuroimaging have enabled investigation of layer-specific
neural signalling in humans that support predictive coding (Petro et al., 2014; Muckli et al., 2015; Morgan et al.,
2016).
Precision-weighting may be conveyed by slower neuromodulators or neuronal synchrony. In particular, tonic
dopamine firing is thought to convey the precision of prediction errors (Friston et al., 2009), which determines
the extent of model updating that they drive. This is consistent with evidence that tonic dopamine firing encodes
uncertainty or violation of expectations (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2006). This is in contrast to
the phasic firing of dopamine that signals reward prediction error (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997).
Precision-weighting may also rely on intact functioning of excitation and inhibition within the canonical microcir-
cuit: in particular, the modulation of synchronisation and of synaptic gain by inhibitory GABAergic interneurons
and the forwards and backwards message-passing driven by excitatory AMPA and NMDA glutamatergic signalling
(Bastos et al., 2012).
A.2 Mapping abnormalities in information-processing on to neu-
robiological implementation
How well does disrupted predictive processing explain the atypical neurobiology associated with clinical psychosis
and nonclinical PEs? I briefly cover four major neurobiological alterations implicated in schizophrenia: abnor-
malities in the neurotransmitters dopamine, glutamate and GABA, and disrupted neural connectivity.
A.2.1 Dopamine
Schizophrenia is associated with increased presynaptic dopaminergic signalling, with increase in dopamine syn-
thesis capacity, baseline synaptic dopamine and dopamine release, evident on brain imaging (Howes et al., 2012),
supported by post-mortem studies (Owen et al., 1978; Mackay et al., 1982; Kaalund et al., 2014) and genetic
associations (Schizophrenia Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium et al., 2014). Successful
antipsychotic medications all antagonise D2 dopamine receptors (though also affect other dopamine receptors
and other neuromodulator systems). Meta-analysis supports a small but heterogeneous effect of increased D2/3
receptor availability in schizophrenia (Howes et al., 2012), which may be an upregulation in response to anti-
dopaminergic medication (Howes et al., 2015). In people at high-risk for psychosis, there is evidence of increased
dopamine synthesis capacity (Howes et al., 2009, 2011; Mizrahi et al., 2012) but also studies reporting no difference
(Bloemen et al., 2013; Suridjan et al., 2013). In otherwise healthy people with auditory PEs, the only study to
date has shown no increase in dopamine synthesis capacity (Howes et al., 2013). Increased presynaptic dopamine
may be a state marker of clinically relevant psychotic symptoms. This would fit with the proposed computational
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role of dopamine as signalling the precision of prediction errors, implemented by modulating synaptic gain on
superficial pyramidal cells. Inappropriate release of dopamine may therefore result in over-weighting the precision
of prediction errors and inappropriate attribution of salience (Winton-Brown et al., 2014), causing aberrant infer-
ence and model updating. However, it is not known why nonclinical PEs would not be associated with increased
presynaptic dopamine. Nonclinical PEs may have different neurobiological implementation, but further studies
are necessary to establish this.
A.2.2 Glutamate
Evidence supports dysfunction of NDMA glutamate receptors in schizophrenia from post-mortem studies (Humphries
et al., 1996; Sokolov, 1998), in-vivo imaging (Marsman et al., 2013; Poels et al., 2014) and genetic loci associated
with the disease (Schizophrenia Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium et al., 2014). Results in
high-risk groups are inconclusive (Howes et al., 2015). Further suggestion of NMDA dysfunction comes from the
use of NMDA receptor antagonists, like ketamine and phencyclidine (PCP), which induce psychotic symptoms
and psychosis-like cognitive disturbances (Krystal et al., 1994; Javitt, 2007). NMDA receptor dysfunction may
impair passing of top-down predictions from internal models to be compared with sensory inputs (Corlett et al.,
2007), perturbing the computation and use of prediction errors. Specifically, NMDA dysfunction might result
in sensory activity that is not explained away by predictions, leading to a pervasive sense of uncertainty and
inappropriate learning of associations from aberrant prediction errors (Corlett et al., 2009). A recent study tested
the computational effects of ketamine administration on reinforcement learning in healthy volunteers. Ketamine
disrupted the influence of a parameter akin to confidence (that increased with correct choices and decreased
with incorrect choices) on learning and behaviour, supporting that ketamine may induce uncertainty by reducing
capitalisation on learned contingencies (Vinckier et al., 2016), which could predispose to aberrant learning of
associations.
A.2.3 GABA
GABA is the major inhibitory neurotransmitter in the brain, expressed mainly in interneurons that regulate spike
timing, neuronal oscillatory rhythms and synchronisation, playing a critical role in regulating the behaviour of
neuronal circuits (Möhler, 2007). Dysfunction in GABAergic signalling and interneuron function are implicated
in schizophrenia (Lewis et al., 2005; Nakazawa et al., 2012; Gonzalez-Burgos et al., 2015) and may explain
neurophysiological abnormalities like reductions in gamma-band oscillations (Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010). In high-
risk groups, one study has shown increased levels of GABA in the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex (de la
Fuente-Sandoval et al., 2016), while another showed reduced binding potential of striatal GABA receptors (Kang
et al., 2014). Given the ubiquity of GABAergic signalling, the precise computational implications of GABAergic
dysfunction are not well-known, though alterations in GABA signalling are associated with abnormalities in
surround-suppression in early visual processing in schizophrenia (Yoon et al., 2010).
A.2.4 Dysconnectivity
The ‘disconnection hypothesis’ of schizophrenia posits that the key pathology is in modulation of neuronal plastic-
ity and causes impairments in communication across distributed neuronal populations (Friston, 1998). Advances
in network science and methods like connectomics have enabled the mapping of structural and functional brain
connectivity with unprecedented detail. Schizophrenia is associated with deficits in short-range and long-range
neural synchronisation (Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010) and abnormal organisation of brain networks (van den Heuvel
and Fornito, 2014). One study has examined structural brain networks in psychosis high-risk groups and found
similar changes in network organisation as those observed in schizophrenia (Schmidt et al., 2016). Dysconnectiv-
ity might arise as a result of abnormal maturation processes (Uhlhaas and Singer, 2011), such as consolidation
of brain network hubs that occurs in adolescence and is influenced by expression of schizophrenia risk genes
(Whitaker et al., 2016). Dysconnectivity is likely to be a complex phenotype that arises from distributed molec-
ular or cellular pathology, such as the abnormalities in the neuromodulator systems discussed above. Mapping
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whole brain networks on to specific computations is immensely challenging and the influences of dysconnectivity
on information-processing are not well-understood.
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Appendix B
Parameter estimates from latent
variable models
B.1 Parameter estimates of models from Chapter 4
Table B.1: Pooled parameter estimates from Raine’s (1991) 9-factor SPQ model, fit to 25 im-
puted datasets with a robust weighted-least-squares (WLSMV) estimator. Unstd. estimate
u¯nstandardised estimate. Std. estimate s¯tandardised estimate.
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading IOR 1 1 0 NA NA 0.35
Loading IOR 10 1.67 0.15 11.39 <0.001 0.58
Loading IOR 19 2.11 0.18 11.75 <0.001 0.74
Loading IOR 28 1.78 0.15 11.77 <0.001 0.62
Loading IOR 37 1.77 0.15 11.63 <0.001 0.62
Loading IOR 45 2.02 0.17 11.69 <0.001 0.71
Loading IOR 53 2.24 0.19 11.9 <0.001 0.78
Loading IOR 60 2.38 0.2 11.88 <0.001 0.83
Loading IOR 63 2.37 0.2 11.96 <0.001 0.83
Loading SA 2 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading SA 11 1.06 0.03 30.26 <0.001 0.81
Loading SA 20 0.71 0.04 18.92 <0.001 0.54
Loading SA 29 1.03 0.03 31.02 <0.001 0.79
Loading SA 38 1.09 0.03 31.78 <0.001 0.84
Loading SA 46 1.21 0.03 36.14 <0.001 0.93
Loading SA 54 0.57 0.04 13.94 <0.001 0.44
Loading SA 71 1.19 0.03 34.92 <0.001 0.91
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading MT 3 1 0 NA NA 0.68
Loading MT 12 1.04 0.07 15.42 <0.001 0.71
Loading MT 21 1.11 0.08 14.62 <0.001 0.76
Loading MT 30 0.96 0.06 15.05 <0.001 0.65
Loading MT 39 1.07 0.08 13.11 <0.001 0.73
Loading MT 47 1.09 0.07 15.5 <0.001 0.74
Loading MT 55 1.14 0.08 14.54 <0.001 0.77
Loading UPE 4 1 0 NA NA 0.63
Loading UPE 13 0.99 0.05 20.58 <0.001 0.62
Loading UPE 22 1.01 0.07 14.27 <0.001 0.63
Loading UPE 31 1.04 0.05 19.69 <0.001 0.65
Loading UPE 40 1.16 0.06 17.95 <0.001 0.73
Loading UPE 48 1.21 0.06 18.76 <0.001 0.76
Loading UPE 56 0.94 0.05 17.18 <0.001 0.59
Loading UPE 61 1.22 0.05 23.51 <0.001 0.77
Loading UPE 64 1.22 0.05 22.96 <0.001 0.77
Loading OB 5 1 0 NA NA 0.83
Loading OB 14 0.92 0.03 32.93 <0.001 0.77
Loading OB 23 1.07 0.02 44.06 <0.001 0.9
Loading OB 32 1.04 0.03 40.37 <0.001 0.87
Loading OB 67 1.11 0.03 44.38 <0.001 0.93
Loading OB 70 0.93 0.03 35.98 <0.001 0.78
Loading OB 74 0.92 0.04 22.16 <0.001 0.77
Loading NCF 6 1 0 NA NA 0.59
Loading NCF 15 1.31 0.07 18.64 <0.001 0.77
Loading NCF 24 1.25 0.07 18.47 <0.001 0.73
Loading NCF 33 1.3 0.07 18.48 <0.001 0.76
Loading NCF 41 1.22 0.07 17.4 <0.001 0.71
Loading NCF 49 0.73 0.06 12.74 <0.001 0.43
Loading NCF 57 1.33 0.07 18.97 <0.001 0.78
Loading NCF 62 0.97 0.07 14.25 <0.001 0.57
Loading NCF 66 1.41 0.07 18.87 <0.001 0.83
Loading OS 7 1 0 NA NA 0.73
Loading OS 16 0.79 0.04 20.36 <0.001 0.58
Loading OS 25 0.82 0.04 20.81 <0.001 0.6
Loading OS 34 0.8 0.04 20.61 <0.001 0.59
Loading OS 42 1.05 0.04 25.94 <0.001 0.77
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading OS 50 0.92 0.04 24.18 <0.001 0.67
Loading OS 58 0.96 0.04 24.95 <0.001 0.7
Loading OS 69 1.11 0.04 30.13 <0.001 0.81
Loading OS 72 1 0.04 25.53 <0.001 0.73
Loading CA 8 1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading CA 17 0.97 0.03 29.34 <0.001 0.73
Loading CA 26 1.01 0.05 22.19 <0.001 0.76
Loading CA 35 0.92 0.04 23.63 <0.001 0.69
Loading CA 43 1.01 0.04 28.87 <0.001 0.76
Loading CA 51 0.91 0.04 25.44 <0.001 0.68
Loading CA 68 0.81 0.04 22.53 <0.001 0.6
Loading CA 73 0.97 0.03 28.23 <0.001 0.73
Loading SUS 9 1 0 NA NA 0.76
Loading SUS 27 0.84 0.03 27.13 <0.001 0.64
Loading SUS 36 1.09 0.03 34.32 <0.001 0.84
Loading SUS 44 0.93 0.03 29.58 <0.001 0.71
Loading SUS 52 0.98 0.03 30.23 <0.001 0.75
Loading SUS 59 1.06 0.03 31.23 <0.001 0.81
Loading SUS 65 0.9 0.03 27.9 <0.001 0.69
Intercept 0 -> 1 1 0.24 0.03 9.31 <0.001 0.24
Intercept 0 -> 1 10 0.18 0.03 7.13 <0.001 0.18
Intercept 0 -> 1 19 0.6 0.03 21.83 <0.001 0.6
Intercept 0 -> 1 28 0.81 0.03 27.94 <0.001 0.81
Intercept 0 -> 1 37 1.17 0.03 35.24 <0.001 1.17
Intercept 0 -> 1 45 0.4 0.03 15.03 <0.001 0.4
Intercept 0 -> 1 53 0.37 0.03 14.01 <0.001 0.37
Intercept 0 -> 1 60 0.39 0.03 14.7 <0.001 0.39
Intercept 0 -> 1 63 0.16 0.03 6.2 <0.001 0.16
Intercept 0 -> 1 2 0.39 0.03 14.68 <0.001 0.39
Intercept 0 -> 1 11 0.56 0.03 20.5 <0.001 0.56
Intercept 0 -> 1 20 -0.06 0.03 -2.45 0.01 -0.06
Intercept 0 -> 1 29 -0.2 0.03 -7.87 <0.001 -0.2
Intercept 0 -> 1 38 -0.33 0.03 -12.6 <0.001 -0.33
Intercept 0 -> 1 46 0.27 0.03 10.45 <0.001 0.27
Intercept 0 -> 1 54 -0.55 0.03 -20.31 <0.001 -0.55
Intercept 0 -> 1 71 0.32 0.03 12.12 <0.001 0.32
Intercept 0 -> 1 3 1.12 0.03 34.37 <0.001 1.12
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Intercept 0 -> 1 12 1.11 0.03 34.17 <0.001 1.11
Intercept 0 -> 1 21 0.77 0.03 26.89 <0.001 0.77
Intercept 0 -> 1 30 1.02 0.03 32.52 <0.001 1.02
Intercept 0 -> 1 39 1.5 0.04 37.85 <0.001 1.5
Intercept 0 -> 1 47 1.33 0.04 36.97 <0.001 1.33
Intercept 0 -> 1 55 1.45 0.04 37.76 <0.001 1.45
Intercept 0 -> 1 4 0.15 0.03 5.73 <0.001 0.15
Intercept 0 -> 1 13 0.51 0.03 18.9 <0.001 0.51
Intercept 0 -> 1 22 1.49 0.04 37.86 <0.001 1.49
Intercept 0 -> 1 31 0.99 0.03 32.16 <0.001 0.99
Intercept 0 -> 1 40 1.39 0.04 37.33 <0.001 1.39
Intercept 0 -> 1 48 1.37 0.04 37.22 <0.001 1.37
Intercept 0 -> 1 56 0.79 0.03 27.33 <0.001 0.79
Intercept 0 -> 1 61 0.49 0.03 18.39 <0.001 0.49
Intercept 0 -> 1 64 0.66 0.03 23.67 <0.001 0.66
Intercept 0 -> 1 5 0.28 0.03 10.68 <0.001 0.28
Intercept 0 -> 1 14 0.47 0.03 17.45 <0.001 0.47
Intercept 0 -> 1 23 0.05 0.03 1.94 0.015 0.05
Intercept 0 -> 1 32 0.8 0.03 27.53 <0.001 0.8
Intercept 0 -> 1 67 0.6 0.03 21.82 <0.001 0.6
Intercept 0 -> 1 70 0.43 0.03 16.17 <0.001 0.43
Intercept 0 -> 1 74 1.36 0.04 37.22 <0.001 1.36
Intercept 0 -> 1 6 1.05 0.03 33.13 <0.001 1.05
Intercept 0 -> 1 15 0.12 0.03 4.77 <0.001 0.12
Intercept 0 -> 1 24 0.51 0.03 19.03 <0.001 0.51
Intercept 0 -> 1 33 0.46 0.03 17.08 <0.001 0.46
Intercept 0 -> 1 41 0.83 0.03 28.33 <0.001 0.83
Intercept 0 -> 1 49 0.43 0.03 16.28 <0.001 0.43
Intercept 0 -> 1 57 0.33 0.03 12.42 <0.001 0.33
Intercept 0 -> 1 62 1.35 0.04 37.09 <0.001 1.35
Intercept 0 -> 1 66 0.76 0.03 26.66 <0.001 0.76
Intercept 0 -> 1 7 0.45 0.03 16.73 <0.001 0.45
Intercept 0 -> 1 16 -0.12 0.03 -4.82 <0.001 -0.12
Intercept 0 -> 1 25 -0.27 0.03 -10.22 <0.001 -0.27
Intercept 0 -> 1 34 0.08 0.03 3.09 <0.001 0.08
Intercept 0 -> 1 42 0.91 0.03 30.23 <0.001 0.91
Intercept 0 -> 1 50 0.34 0.03 13.09 <0.001 0.34
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Intercept 0 -> 1 58 0.18 0.03 7.04 <0.001 0.18
Intercept 0 -> 1 69 0.66 0.03 23.84 <0.001 0.66
Intercept 0 -> 1 72 0.9 0.03 30.2 <0.001 0.9
Intercept 0 -> 1 8 0.53 0.03 19.64 <0.001 0.53
Intercept 0 -> 1 17 0.15 0.03 5.81 <0.001 0.15
Intercept 0 -> 1 26 1.5 0.04 37.79 <0.001 1.5
Intercept 0 -> 1 35 1.12 0.03 34.37 <0.001 1.12
Intercept 0 -> 1 43 0.98 0.03 31.9 <0.001 0.98
Intercept 0 -> 1 51 0.7 0.03 24.93 <0.001 0.7
Intercept 0 -> 1 68 0.85 0.03 28.96 <0.001 0.85
Intercept 0 -> 1 73 -0.23 0.03 -9.03 <0.001 -0.23
Intercept 0 -> 1 9 0.25 0.03 9.77 <0.001 0.25
Intercept 0 -> 1 27 -0.05 0.03 -2.12 0.013 -0.05
Intercept 0 -> 1 36 0.62 0.03 22.51 <0.001 0.62
Intercept 0 -> 1 44 0.56 0.03 20.52 <0.001 0.56
Intercept 0 -> 1 52 -0.03 0.03 -1.01 0.031 -0.03
Intercept 0 -> 1 59 1.03 0.03 32.89 <0.001 1.03
Intercept 0 -> 1 65 0.57 0.03 20.99 <0.001 0.57
Residual 1 0.88 0 774.55 <0.001 0.88
Residual 10 0.66 0 337.8 <0.001 0.66
Residual 19 0.46 0 148.23 <0.001 0.46
Residual 28 0.61 0 229.61 <0.001 0.61
Residual 37 0.62 0 156.29 <0.001 0.62
Residual 45 0.5 0 142.4 <0.001 0.5
Residual 53 0.39 0 150.21 <0.001 0.39
Residual 60 0.3 0 142.3 <0.001 0.3
Residual 63 0.31 0 108.17 <0.001 0.31
Residual 2 0.41 0 184.83 <0.001 0.41
Residual 11 0.34 0 115.16 <0.001 0.34
Residual 20 0.7 0 323.87 <0.001 0.7
Residual 29 0.37 0 137.81 <0.001 0.37
Residual 38 0.29 0 122.23 <0.001 0.29
Residual 46 0.14 0 55.22 <0.001 0.14
Residual 54 0.81 0 420.38 <0.001 0.81
Residual 71 0.16 0 62.82 <0.001 0.16
Residual 3 0.54 0 115.47 <0.001 0.54
Residual 12 0.5 0.01 93.21 <0.001 0.5
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual 21 0.43 0 113.66 <0.001 0.43
Residual 30 0.57 0 118.65 <0.001 0.57
Residual 39 0.47 0.01 66.36 <0.001 0.47
Residual 47 0.45 0 120.45 <0.001 0.45
Residual 55 0.4 0.01 68.39 <0.001 0.4
Residual 4 0.61 0 248.88 <0.001 0.61
Residual 13 0.61 0 262.15 <0.001 0.61
Residual 22 0.6 0 155.62 <0.001 0.6
Residual 31 0.58 0 146.33 <0.001 0.58
Residual 40 0.47 0.01 86.96 <0.001 0.47
Residual 48 0.42 0 90.21 <0.001 0.42
Residual 56 0.65 0 341.96 <0.001 0.65
Residual 61 0.41 0 186.35 <0.001 0.41
Residual 64 0.41 0 187.03 <0.001 0.41
Residual 5 0.3 0 100.35 <0.001 0.3
Residual 14 0.41 0 175.99 <0.001 0.41
Residual 23 0.2 0 88.12 <0.001 0.2
Residual 32 0.24 0 65.61 <0.001 0.24
Residual 67 0.13 0 49.7 <0.001 0.13
Residual 70 0.4 0 126.57 <0.001 0.4
Residual 74 0.41 0.01 67.66 <0.001 0.41
Residual 6 0.66 0.01 123.17 <0.001 0.66
Residual 15 0.41 0 125.71 <0.001 0.41
Residual 24 0.47 0 199.68 <0.001 0.47
Residual 33 0.42 0 164.12 <0.001 0.42
Residual 41 0.49 0 105.3 <0.001 0.49
Residual 49 0.81 0 275.09 <0.001 0.81
Residual 57 0.39 0 130.96 <0.001 0.39
Residual 62 0.68 0.01 126.78 <0.001 0.68
Residual 66 0.32 0 90.72 <0.001 0.32
Residual 7 0.46 0 180.43 <0.001 0.46
Residual 16 0.66 0 335.74 <0.001 0.66
Residual 25 0.64 0 224.88 <0.001 0.64
Residual 34 0.66 0 260.46 <0.001 0.66
Residual 42 0.4 0 122.08 <0.001 0.4
Residual 50 0.54 0 181.24 <0.001 0.54
Residual 58 0.51 0 223.93 <0.001 0.51
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual 69 0.34 0 113.47 <0.001 0.34
Residual 72 0.46 0 208.03 <0.001 0.46
Residual 8 0.44 0 191.55 <0.001 0.44
Residual 17 0.47 0 324.11 <0.001 0.47
Residual 26 0.43 0 110.25 <0.001 0.43
Residual 35 0.52 0 146.6 <0.001 0.52
Residual 43 0.42 0 87.42 <0.001 0.42
Residual 51 0.54 0 192.3 <0.001 0.54
Residual 68 0.64 0 246.38 <0.001 0.64
Residual 73 0.47 0 186.24 <0.001 0.47
Residual 9 0.42 0 171.71 <0.001 0.42
Residual 27 0.59 0 182.38 <0.001 0.59
Residual 36 0.3 0 71.22 <0.001 0.3
Residual 44 0.5 0 193.55 <0.001 0.5
Residual 52 0.44 0 142.06 <0.001 0.44
Residual 59 0.35 0 97.8 <0.001 0.35
Residual 65 0.52 0 244.49 <0.001 0.52
Variance IOR IOR 0.12 0.02 6.15 <0.001 1
Variance SA SA 0.59 0.03 19.61 <0.001 1
Variance MT MT 0.46 0.05 10.13 <0.001 1
Variance UPE UPE 0.39 0.03 13.77 <0.001 1
Variance OB OB 0.7 0.02 28.67 <0.001 1
Variance NCF NCF 0.34 0.03 10.13 <0.001 1
Variance OS OS 0.54 0.03 18.37 <0.001 1
Variance CA CA 0.56 0.03 19.93 <0.001 1
Variance SUS SUS 0.58 0.03 22.58 <0.001 1
Covariance IOR SA 0.13 0.01 10.47 <0.001 0.5
Covariance IOR MT 0.15 0.02 9.38 <0.001 0.63
Covariance IOR UPE 0.17 0.02 10.46 <0.001 0.76
Covariance IOR OB 0.16 0.01 10.72 <0.001 0.53
Covariance IOR NCF 0.1 0.01 9.3 <0.001 0.48
Covariance IOR OS 0.15 0.01 10.73 <0.001 0.6
Covariance IOR CA 0.14 0.01 10.47 <0.001 0.52
Covariance IOR SUS 0.23 0.02 11.63 <0.001 0.86
Covariance SA MT 0.11 0.02 6.81 <0.001 0.22
Covariance SA UPE 0.21 0.02 13.33 <0.001 0.43
Covariance SA OB 0.25 0.02 14.49 <0.001 0.4
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Covariance SA NCF 0.35 0.02 16.3 <0.001 0.77
Covariance SA OS 0.28 0.02 17.11 <0.001 0.5
Covariance SA CA 0.42 0.02 22.4 <0.001 0.73
Covariance SA SUS 0.34 0.02 19.76 <0.001 0.57
Covariance MT UPE 0.34 0.02 14.55 <0.001 0.8
Covariance MT OB 0.24 0.02 11.36 <0.001 0.42
Covariance MT NCF 0.09 0.01 6.43 <0.001 0.23
Covariance MT OS 0.22 0.02 11.51 <0.001 0.44
Covariance MT CA 0.15 0.02 7.99 <0.001 0.3
Covariance MT SUS 0.27 0.02 12.99 <0.001 0.52
Covariance UPE OB 0.33 0.02 18.4 <0.001 0.62
Covariance UPE NCF 0.17 0.01 11.63 <0.001 0.45
Covariance UPE OS 0.32 0.02 18.15 <0.001 0.69
Covariance UPE CA 0.26 0.02 15.89 <0.001 0.56
Covariance UPE SUS 0.34 0.02 19.06 <0.001 0.7
Covariance OB NCF 0.25 0.02 14.32 <0.001 0.51
Covariance OB OS 0.44 0.02 23.12 <0.001 0.73
Covariance OB CA 0.38 0.02 20.78 <0.001 0.61
Covariance OB SUS 0.37 0.02 21.03 <0.001 0.59
Covariance NCF OS 0.25 0.02 14.49 <0.001 0.57
Covariance NCF CA 0.42 0.02 17.35 <0.001 0.95
Covariance NCF SUS 0.32 0.02 16.6 <0.001 0.71
Covariance OS CA 0.4 0.02 21.89 <0.001 0.73
Covariance OS SUS 0.37 0.02 21.08 <0.001 0.65
Covariance CA SUS 0.41 0.02 23.15 <0.001 0.72
Table B.2: Pooled parameter estimates from the novel 6-factor SPQ model fit to 25 im-
puted datasets with a robust weighted-least-squares (WLSMV) estimator. Unstd. estimate
u¯nstandardised estimate. Std. estimate s¯tandardised estimate.
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading Aso 6 1 0 NA NA 0.56
Loading Aso 8 1.34 0.07 18.24 <0.001 0.75
Loading Aso 15 1.31 0.07 18.32 <0.001 0.73
Loading Aso 17 1.3 0.07 18.03 <0.001 0.72
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading Aso 24 1.25 0.07 18.07 <0.001 0.7
Loading Aso 26 1.35 0.08 16.38 <0.001 0.76
Loading Aso 33 1.3 0.07 18.16 <0.001 0.73
Loading Aso 35 1.24 0.07 16.63 <0.001 0.69
Loading Aso 41 1.22 0.07 17.14 <0.001 0.68
Loading Aso 42 1.3 0.07 17.8 <0.001 0.73
Loading Aso 43 1.35 0.07 18.6 <0.001 0.76
Loading Aso 51 1.21 0.07 17.56 <0.001 0.68
Loading Aso 52 1.32 0.08 17.61 <0.001 0.74
Loading Aso 57 1.34 0.07 18.6 <0.001 0.75
Loading Aso 62 0.97 0.07 14.07 <0.001 0.54
Loading Aso 66 1.42 0.08 18.53 <0.001 0.79
Loading Aso 68 1.08 0.07 15.59 <0.001 0.6
Loading Aso 69 1.37 0.08 18.03 <0.001 0.76
Loading Aso 73 1.3 0.07 17.53 <0.001 0.73
Loading AEB 1 1 0 NA NA 0.39
Loading AEB 3 1.47 0.13 10.91 <0.001 0.57
Loading AEB 4 1.7 0.14 12.17 <0.001 0.66
Loading AEB 12 1.51 0.13 11.22 <0.001 0.58
Loading AEB 13 1.72 0.14 12.26 <0.001 0.66
Loading AEB 21 1.63 0.14 12.06 <0.001 0.63
Loading AEB 22 1.72 0.17 10.32 <0.001 0.66
Loading AEB 28 1.74 0.14 12.48 <0.001 0.67
Loading AEB 30 1.38 0.13 10.73 <0.001 0.54
Loading AEB 31 1.76 0.15 11.81 <0.001 0.68
Loading AEB 37 1.72 0.14 12.41 <0.001 0.67
Loading AEB 39 1.59 0.15 10.66 <0.001 0.62
Loading AEB 40 1.98 0.17 11.47 <0.001 0.77
Loading AEB 47 1.61 0.15 10.75 <0.001 0.62
Loading AEB 55 1.68 0.15 10.94 <0.001 0.65
Loading AEB 56 1.61 0.14 11.62 <0.001 0.62
Loading AEB 61 2.08 0.17 12.42 <0.001 0.8
Loading AEB 64 2.08 0.17 12.43 <0.001 0.8
Loading PI 9 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading PI 10 0.72 0.03 21.95 <0.001 0.55
Loading PI 19 0.91 0.03 29.47 <0.001 0.7
Loading PI 27 0.84 0.03 27.56 <0.001 0.65
271
Table B.2 – continued from previous page
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading PI 36 1.09 0.03 34.55 <0.001 0.84
Loading PI 44 0.93 0.03 30.11 <0.001 0.72
Loading PI 45 0.87 0.03 27.6 <0.001 0.67
Loading PI 48 0.94 0.04 21.68 <0.001 0.73
Loading PI 53 0.97 0.03 35.35 <0.001 0.75
Loading PI 59 1.05 0.03 31.97 <0.001 0.81
Loading PI 60 1.03 0.03 34.82 <0.001 0.8
Loading PI 63 1.03 0.03 40.85 <0.001 0.8
Loading PI 65 0.9 0.03 28.22 <0.001 0.7
Loading Ecc 5 1 0 NA NA 0.83
Loading Ecc 14 0.92 0.03 33.07 <0.001 0.76
Loading Ecc 23 1.07 0.02 44.24 <0.001 0.89
Loading Ecc 32 1.04 0.03 40.52 <0.001 0.87
Loading Ecc 50 0.85 0.03 28.05 <0.001 0.7
Loading Ecc 67 1.12 0.03 44.49 <0.001 0.92
Loading Ecc 70 0.93 0.03 36.15 <0.001 0.77
Loading Ecc 74 0.92 0.04 22.23 <0.001 0.76
Loading SA 2 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading SA 11 1.06 0.03 30.23 <0.001 0.81
Loading SA 20 0.71 0.04 18.9 <0.001 0.54
Loading SA 29 1.03 0.03 31.04 <0.001 0.79
Loading SA 38 1.09 0.03 31.69 <0.001 0.84
Loading SA 46 1.21 0.03 36.07 <0.001 0.93
Loading SA 54 0.57 0.04 13.89 <0.001 0.44
Loading SA 71 1.19 0.03 34.9 <0.001 0.91
Loading OS 7 1 0 NA NA 0.8
Loading OS 16 0.8 0.04 20.59 <0.001 0.64
Loading OS 25 0.82 0.04 20.6 <0.001 0.65
Loading OS 34 0.81 0.04 20.72 <0.001 0.64
Loading OS 58 0.96 0.04 24.83 <0.001 0.77
Loading OS 72 1.01 0.04 24.97 <0.001 0.81
Threshold 0 -> 1 6 1.05 0.03 33.13 <0.001 1.05
Threshold 0 -> 1 8 0.53 0.03 19.64 <0.001 0.53
Threshold 0 -> 1 15 0.12 0.03 4.77 <0.001 0.12
Threshold 0 -> 1 17 0.15 0.03 5.81 <0.001 0.15
Threshold 0 -> 1 24 0.51 0.03 19.03 <0.001 0.51
Threshold 0 -> 1 26 1.5 0.04 37.79 <0.001 1.5
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 0 -> 1 33 0.46 0.03 17.08 <0.001 0.46
Threshold 0 -> 1 35 1.12 0.03 34.37 <0.001 1.12
Threshold 0 -> 1 41 0.83 0.03 28.33 <0.001 0.83
Threshold 0 -> 1 42 0.91 0.03 30.23 <0.001 0.91
Threshold 0 -> 1 43 0.98 0.03 31.9 <0.001 0.98
Threshold 0 -> 1 51 0.7 0.03 24.93 <0.001 0.7
Threshold 0 -> 1 52 -0.03 0.03 -1.01 0.031 -0.03
Threshold 0 -> 1 57 0.33 0.03 12.42 <0.001 0.33
Threshold 0 -> 1 62 1.35 0.04 37.09 <0.001 1.35
Threshold 0 -> 1 66 0.76 0.03 26.66 <0.001 0.76
Threshold 0 -> 1 68 0.85 0.03 28.96 <0.001 0.85
Threshold 0 -> 1 69 0.66 0.03 23.84 <0.001 0.66
Threshold 0 -> 1 73 -0.23 0.03 -9.03 <0.001 -0.23
Threshold 0 -> 1 1 0.24 0.03 9.31 <0.001 0.24
Threshold 0 -> 1 3 1.12 0.03 34.37 <0.001 1.12
Threshold 0 -> 1 4 0.15 0.03 5.73 <0.001 0.15
Threshold 0 -> 1 12 1.11 0.03 34.17 <0.001 1.11
Threshold 0 -> 1 13 0.51 0.03 18.9 <0.001 0.51
Threshold 0 -> 1 21 0.77 0.03 26.89 <0.001 0.77
Threshold 0 -> 1 22 1.49 0.04 37.86 <0.001 1.49
Threshold 0 -> 1 28 0.81 0.03 27.94 <0.001 0.81
Threshold 0 -> 1 30 1.02 0.03 32.52 <0.001 1.02
Threshold 0 -> 1 31 0.99 0.03 32.16 <0.001 0.99
Threshold 0 -> 1 37 1.17 0.03 35.24 <0.001 1.17
Threshold 0 -> 1 39 1.5 0.04 37.85 <0.001 1.5
Threshold 0 -> 1 40 1.39 0.04 37.33 <0.001 1.39
Threshold 0 -> 1 47 1.33 0.04 36.97 <0.001 1.33
Threshold 0 -> 1 55 1.45 0.04 37.76 <0.001 1.45
Threshold 0 -> 1 56 0.79 0.03 27.33 <0.001 0.79
Threshold 0 -> 1 61 0.49 0.03 18.39 <0.001 0.49
Threshold 0 -> 1 64 0.66 0.03 23.67 <0.001 0.66
Threshold 0 -> 1 9 0.25 0.03 9.77 <0.001 0.25
Threshold 0 -> 1 10 0.18 0.03 7.13 <0.001 0.18
Threshold 0 -> 1 19 0.6 0.03 21.83 <0.001 0.6
Threshold 0 -> 1 27 -0.05 0.03 -2.12 0.013 -0.05
Threshold 0 -> 1 36 0.62 0.03 22.51 <0.001 0.62
Threshold 0 -> 1 44 0.56 0.03 20.52 <0.001 0.56
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 0 -> 1 45 0.4 0.03 15.03 <0.001 0.4
Threshold 0 -> 1 48 1.37 0.04 37.22 <0.001 1.37
Threshold 0 -> 1 53 0.37 0.03 14.01 <0.001 0.37
Threshold 0 -> 1 59 1.03 0.03 32.89 <0.001 1.03
Threshold 0 -> 1 60 0.39 0.03 14.7 <0.001 0.39
Threshold 0 -> 1 63 0.16 0.03 6.2 <0.001 0.16
Threshold 0 -> 1 65 0.57 0.03 20.99 <0.001 0.57
Threshold 0 -> 1 5 0.28 0.03 10.68 <0.001 0.28
Threshold 0 -> 1 14 0.47 0.03 17.45 <0.001 0.47
Threshold 0 -> 1 23 0.05 0.03 1.94 0.05 0.05
Threshold 0 -> 1 32 0.8 0.03 27.53 <0.001 0.8
Threshold 0 -> 1 50 0.34 0.03 13.09 <0.001 0.34
Threshold 0 -> 1 67 0.6 0.03 21.82 <0.001 0.6
Threshold 0 -> 1 70 0.43 0.03 16.17 <0.001 0.43
Threshold 0 -> 1 74 1.36 0.04 37.22 <0.001 1.36
Threshold 0 -> 1 2 0.39 0.03 14.68 <0.001 0.39
Threshold 0 -> 1 11 0.56 0.03 20.5 <0.001 0.56
Threshold 0 -> 1 20 -0.06 0.03 -2.45 0.01 -0.06
Threshold 0 -> 1 29 -0.2 0.03 -7.87 <0.001 -0.2
Threshold 0 -> 1 38 -0.33 0.03 -12.6 <0.001 -0.33
Threshold 0 -> 1 46 0.27 0.03 10.45 <0.001 0.27
Threshold 0 -> 1 54 -0.55 0.03 -20.3 <0.001 -0.55
Threshold 0 -> 1 71 0.32 0.03 12.12 <0.001 0.32
Threshold 0 -> 1 7 0.45 0.03 16.73 <0.001 0.45
Threshold 0 -> 1 16 -0.12 0.03 -4.82 <0.001 -0.12
Threshold 0 -> 1 25 -0.27 0.03 -10.2 <0.001 -0.27
Threshold 0 -> 1 34 0.08 0.03 3.09 <0.001 0.08
Threshold 0 -> 1 58 0.18 0.03 7.04 <0.001 0.18
Threshold 0 -> 1 72 0.9 0.03 30.2 <0.001 0.9
Residual 6 0.69 0 141.5 <0.001 0.69
Residual 8 0.44 0 181.8 <0.001 0.44
Residual 15 0.46 0 151.5 <0.001 0.46
Residual 17 0.48 0 309.6 <0.001 0.48
Residual 24 0.51 0 234.5 <0.001 0.51
Residual 26 0.43 0 123.5 <0.001 0.43
Residual 33 0.47 0 198.9 <0.001 0.47
Residual 35 0.52 0 149.9 <0.001 0.52
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual 41 0.53 0 120.6 <0.001 0.53
Residual 42 0.47 0 165.1 <0.001 0.47
Residual 43 0.43 0 99.32 <0.001 0.43
Residual 51 0.54 0 195.6 <0.001 0.54
Residual 52 0.45 0 164.5 <0.001 0.45
Residual 57 0.44 0 153.7 <0.001 0.44
Residual 62 0.71 0.01 140.6 <0.001 0.71
Residual 66 0.37 0 108.8 <0.001 0.37
Residual 68 0.64 0 279.9 <0.001 0.64
Residual 69 0.42 0 155.4 <0.001 0.42
Residual 73 0.47 0 196.5 <0.001 0.47
Residual 1 0.85 0 643.9 <0.001 0.85
Residual 3 0.68 0 194.6 <0.001 0.68
Residual 4 0.57 0 217 <0.001 0.57
Residual 12 0.66 0 173.5 <0.001 0.66
Residual 13 0.56 0 228.7 <0.001 0.56
Residual 21 0.6 0 230.5 <0.001 0.6
Residual 22 0.56 0 136.9 <0.001 0.56
Residual 28 0.55 0 164.4 <0.001 0.55
Residual 30 0.71 0 193 <0.001 0.71
Residual 31 0.54 0 130.8 <0.001 0.54
Residual 37 0.56 0 134.6 <0.001 0.56
Residual 39 0.62 0.01 111.4 <0.001 0.62
Residual 40 0.41 0.01 70.43 <0.001 0.41
Residual 47 0.61 0 206.3 <0.001 0.61
Residual 55 0.58 0 122.6 <0.001 0.58
Residual 56 0.61 0 286.4 <0.001 0.61
Residual 61 0.35 0 148.3 <0.001 0.35
Residual 64 0.35 0 149.1 <0.001 0.35
Residual 9 0.4 0 195.5 <0.001 0.4
Residual 10 0.69 0 403.9 <0.001 0.69
Residual 19 0.51 0 173.6 <0.001 0.51
Residual 27 0.57 0 180.3 <0.001 0.57
Residual 36 0.29 0 71.36 <0.001 0.29
Residual 44 0.48 0 186.9 <0.001 0.48
Residual 45 0.55 0 170.2 <0.001 0.55
Residual 48 0.47 0.01 93.5 <0.001 0.47
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual 53 0.44 0 175.1 <0.001 0.44
Residual 59 0.34 0 100.7 <0.001 0.34
Residual 60 0.37 0 173.2 <0.001 0.37
Residual 63 0.37 0 127.2 <0.001 0.37
Residual 65 0.51 0 227.8 <0.001 0.51
Residual 5 0.31 0 104.1 <0.001 0.31
Residual 14 0.42 0 178.1 <0.001 0.42
Residual 23 0.21 0 91.06 <0.001 0.21
Residual 32 0.25 0 66.73 <0.001 0.25
Residual 50 0.5 0 159.7 <0.001 0.5
Residual 67 0.15 0 56.18 <0.001 0.15
Residual 70 0.41 0 129.9 <0.001 0.41
Residual 74 0.42 0.01 70.78 <0.001 0.42
Residual 2 0.41 0 185.9 <0.001 0.41
Residual 11 0.34 0 115.7 <0.001 0.34
Residual 20 0.7 0 330.8 <0.001 0.7
Residual 29 0.37 0 137.8 <0.001 0.37
Residual 38 0.29 0 124.1 <0.001 0.29
Residual 46 0.14 0 54.45 <0.001 0.14
Residual 54 0.81 0 415.4 <0.001 0.81
Residual 71 0.16 0 62.57 <0.001 0.16
Residual 7 0.36 0 119.6 <0.001 0.36
Residual 16 0.59 0 255.3 <0.001 0.59
Residual 25 0.57 0 177.5 <0.001 0.57
Residual 34 0.58 0 215 <0.001 0.58
Residual 58 0.4 0 162.3 <0.001 0.4
Residual 72 0.35 0 137.3 <0.001 0.35
Variance Aso Aso 0.31 0.03 9.84 <0.001 1
Variance AEB AEB 0.15 0.02 6.63 <0.001 1
Variance PI PI 0.6 0.03 23.86 <0.001 1
Variance Ecc Ecc 0.69 0.02 28.39 <0.001 1
Variance SA SA 0.59 0.03 19.58 <0.001 1
Variance OS OS 0.64 0.04 17.62 <0.001 1
Covariance Aso AEB 0.1 0.01 9.4 <0.001 0.44
Covariance Aso PI 0.28 0.02 15.87 <0.001 0.64
Covariance Aso Ecc 0.27 0.02 15.47 <0.001 0.58
Covariance Aso SA 0.32 0.02 15.84 <0.001 0.75
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Covariance Aso OS 0.25 0.02 14.72 <0.001 0.57
Covariance AEB PI 0.2 0.02 11.77 <0.001 0.68
Covariance AEB Ecc 0.19 0.02 11.73 <0.001 0.58
Covariance AEB SA 0.1 0.01 9.37 <0.001 0.35
Covariance AEB OS 0.17 0.02 11.23 <0.001 0.56
Covariance PI Ecc 0.37 0.02 22.12 <0.001 0.58
Covariance PI SA 0.33 0.02 20.03 <0.001 0.56
Covariance PI OS 0.37 0.02 20.93 <0.001 0.6
Covariance Ecc SA 0.25 0.02 14.32 <0.001 0.39
Covariance Ecc OS 0.45 0.02 22.67 <0.001 0.69
Covariance SA OS 0.27 0.02 15.11 <0.001 0.43
Covariance SA UPE 0.21 0.02 13.33 0.001 0.43
Covariance SA OB 0.25 0.02 14.49 0.001 0.4
Covariance SA NCF 0.35 0.02 16.3 0.001 0.77
Covariance SA OS 0.28 0.02 17.11 0.001 0.5
Covariance SA CA 0.42 0.02 22.4 0.001 0.73
Covariance SA SUS 0.34 0.02 19.76 0.001 0.57
Covariance MT UPE 0.34 0.02 14.55 0.001 0.8
Covariance MT OB 0.24 0.02 11.36 0.001 0.42
Covariance MT NCF 0.09 0.01 6.43 0.001 0.23
Covariance MT OS 0.22 0.02 11.51 0.001 0.44
Covariance MT CA 0.15 0.02 7.99 0.001 0.3
Covariance MT SUS 0.27 0.02 12.99 0.001 0.52
Covariance UPE OB 0.33 0.02 18.4 0.001 0.62
Covariance UPE NCF 0.17 0.01 11.63 0.001 0.45
Covariance UPE OS 0.32 0.02 18.15 0.001 0.69
Covariance UPE CA 0.26 0.02 15.89 0.001 0.56
Covariance UPE SUS 0.34 0.02 19.06 0.001 0.7
Covariance OB NCF 0.25 0.02 14.32 0.001 0.51
Covariance OB OS 0.44 0.02 23.12 0.001 0.73
Covariance OB CA 0.38 0.02 20.78 0.001 0.61
Covariance OB SUS 0.37 0.02 21.03 0.001 0.59
Covariance NCF OS 0.25 0.02 14.49 0.001 0.57
Covariance NCF CA 0.42 0.02 17.35 0.001 0.95
Covariance NCF SUS 0.32 0.02 16.6 0.001 0.71
Covariance OS CA 0.4 0.02 21.89 0.001 0.73
Covariance OS SUS 0.37 0.02 21.08 0.001 0.65
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Covariance CA SUS 0.41 0.02 23.15 0.001 0.72
Table B.3: Parameter estimates from the 3-factor model of the BSSI fit to 5-category data using
a robust maximum likelihood estimator, with missing value estimated using full-information
maximum likelihood.
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading SA 1 1 0 NA NA 0.55
Loading SA 4 1.24 0.08 15.52 <0.001 0.65
Loading SA 7 1.85 0.12 15.3 <0.001 0.86
Loading SA 11 1.93 0.13 15.39 <0.001 0.9
Loading SA 14 1.8 0.12 15.13 <0.001 0.88
Loading SA 17 1.83 0.12 14.76 <0.001 0.85
Loading AEB 2 1 0 NA NA 0.73
Loading AEB 5 0.84 0.08 10.65 <0.001 0.62
Loading AEB 8 0.57 0.08 7.08 <0.001 0.55
Loading AEB 10 0.41 0.07 5.53 <0.001 0.35
Loading AEB 13 0.33 0.07 4.67 <0.001 0.48
Loading AEB 16 0.39 0.06 6.88 <0.001 0.5
Loading AEB 18 1.04 0.06 16.65 <0.001 0.73
Loading AEB 20 0.36 0.05 6.78 <0.001 0.54
Loading PI 3 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading PI 9 0.91 0.06 14.41 <0.001 0.78
Loading PI 12 0.68 0.05 13.45 <0.001 0.7
Loading PI 15 1.11 0.06 19.25 <0.001 0.91
Loading PI 19 0.63 0.05 11.5 <0.001 0.56
Residual 1 0.59 0.04 15.19 <0.001 0.7
Residual 4 0.53 0.04 14.29 <0.001 0.57
Residual 7 0.3 0.02 12.39 <0.001 0.25
Residual 11 0.23 0.02 13.15 <0.001 0.2
Residual 14 0.23 0.03 7.72 <0.001 0.22
Residual 17 0.33 0.03 12.44 <0.001 0.28
Residual 2 0.34 0.04 8.07 <0.001 0.47
Residual 5 0.44 0.05 9.37 <0.001 0.61
Residual 8 0.3 0.03 9.74 <0.001 0.7
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual 10 0.47 0.06 8.31 <0.001 0.88
Residual 13 0.15 0.02 7.06 <0.001 0.77
Residual 16 0.18 0.03 7.06 <0.001 0.75
Residual 18 0.38 0.05 7.97 <0.001 0.47
Residual 20 0.12 0.02 5.38 <0.001 0.71
Residual 3 0.38 0.04 10.55 <0.001 0.41
Residual 9 0.3 0.02 12.79 <0.001 0.4
Residual 12 0.27 0.02 13.34 <0.001 0.51
Residual 15 0.14 0.02 7.58 <0.001 0.17
Residual 19 0.47 0.04 12.22 <0.001 0.68
Variances SA SA 0.25 0.03 7.25 <0.001 1
Variances AEB AEB 0.39 0.06 6.98 <0.001 1
Variances PI PI 0.56 0.06 9.76 <0.001 1
Covariances SA AEB 0.08 0.01 5.53 <0.001 0.26
Covariances SA PI 0.18 0.02 7.57 <0.001 0.48
Covariances AEB PI 0.21 0.03 7.65 <0.001 0.44
Intercepts 1 1.56 0.03 52.78 <0.001 1.7
Intercepts 4 1.66 0.03 53.94 <0.001 1.74
Intercepts 7 1.91 0.03 55.19 <0.001 1.78
Intercepts 11 2.08 0.03 59.97 <0.001 1.93
Intercepts 14 1.83 0.03 55.79 <0.001 1.8
Intercepts 17 2.06 0.03 59.34 <0.001 1.91
Intercepts 2 1.46 0.03 52.68 <0.001 1.7
Intercepts 5 1.41 0.03 51.5 <0.001 1.66
Intercepts 8 1.26 0.02 59.69 <0.001 1.93
Intercepts 10 1.26 0.02 53.08 <0.001 1.72
Intercepts 13 1.12 0.01 78.84 <0.001 2.57
Intercepts 16 1.16 0.02 73.14 <0.001 2.38
Intercepts 18 1.45 0.03 50.15 <0.001 1.62
Intercepts 20 1.1 0.01 81.56 <0.001 2.63
Intercepts 3 1.95 0.03 62.34 <0.001 2.01
Intercepts 9 1.61 0.03 57.06 <0.001 1.84
Intercepts 12 1.36 0.02 57.85 <0.001 1.87
Intercepts 15 1.75 0.03 59.58 <0.001 1.92
Intercepts 19 1.54 0.03 57.3 <0.001 1.85
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Table B.4: Pooled parameter estimates from the BSSI 3-factor model, fit to 25 imputed datasets
with a robust weighted-least-squares (WLSMV) estimator. Unstd. estimate u¯nstandardised
estimate. Std. estimate s¯tandardised estimate.
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading SA 1 1 0 NA NA 0.66
Loading SA 4 1.08 0.05 20.93 0 0.72
Loading SA 7 1.29 0.06 22.88 0 0.85
Loading SA 11 1.38 0.06 23.96 0 0.92
Loading SA 14 1.38 0.06 23.52 0 0.92
Loading SA 17 1.31 0.06 22.83 0 0.87
Loading AEB 2 1 0 NA NA 0.81
Loading AEB 5 0.95 0.05 18.51 0 0.76
Loading AEB 8 0.83 0.05 15.54 0 0.67
Loading AEB 10 0.76 0.06 12.37 0 0.61
Loading AEB 13 0.96 0.06 16.34 0 0.77
Loading AEB 16 0.84 0.06 13.31 0 0.68
Loading AEB 18 0.98 0.05 21.68 0 0.79
Loading AEB 20 0.93 0.06 15.35 0 0.75
Loading PI 3 1 0 NA NA 0.78
Loading PI 9 1.04 0.04 26.69 0 0.81
Loading PI 12 0.99 0.04 25.33 0 0.77
Loading PI 15 1.16 0.04 30.65 0 0.91
Loading PI 19 0.93 0.04 21.39 0 0.73
Threshold 0->1 1 0.43 0.04 9.78 0 0.43
Threshold 1->2 1 0.96 0.05 19.65 0 0.96
Threshold 0->1 4 0.23 0.04 5.93 0 0.23
Threshold 1->2 4 0.95 0.05 19.96 0 0.94
Threshold 0->1 7 -0.11 0.04 -2.68 0.01 -0.11
Threshold 1->2 7 0.73 0.05 16.1 0 0.73
Threshold 0->1 11 -0.41 0.04 -9.73 0 -0.41
Threshold 1->2 11 0.6 0.04 13.4 0 0.6
Threshold 0->1 14 -0.07 0.04 -1.73 0.08 -0.07
Threshold 1->2 14 0.87 0.05 18.28 0 0.87
Threshold 0->1 17 -0.41 0.04 -10.03 0 -0.41
Threshold 1->2 17 0.7 0.04 15.89 0 0.7
Threshold 0->1 2 0.58 0.04 14 0 0.58
Threshold 1->2 2 1.15 0.05 23.24 0 1.15
Threshold 0->1 5 0.67 0.04 15.08 0 0.67
Threshold 1->2 5 1.26 0.06 21.92 0 1.26
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 0->1 8 0.96 0.05 20.94 0 0.96
Threshold 1->2 8 1.5 0.06 24.14 0 1.5
Threshold 0->1 10 1.06 0.05 22.09 0 1.06
Threshold 1->2 10 1.49 0.06 23.53 0 1.49
Threshold 0->1 13 1.34 0.06 22.14 0 1.34
Threshold 1->2 13 1.95 0.09 21.54 0 1.95
Threshold 0->1 16 1.19 0.05 21.93 0 1.19
Threshold 1->2 16 1.89 0.08 24.69 0 1.89
Threshold 0->1 18 0.62 0.04 15.24 0 0.62
Threshold 1->2 18 1.22 0.05 23.43 0 1.22
Threshold 0->1 20 1.49 0.06 24.03 0 1.49
Threshold 1->2 20 2.01 0.09 23.13 0 2.01
Threshold 0->1 3 -0.33 0.04 -8.19 0 -0.33
Threshold 1->2 3 0.78 0.04 17.73 0 0.78
Threshold 0->1 9 0.2 0.04 4.73 0 0.2
Threshold 1->2 9 1.11 0.05 23.2 0 1.11
Threshold 0->1 12 0.69 0.05 14.83 0 0.69
Threshold 1->2 12 1.43 0.06 23.68 0 1.43
Threshold 0->1 15 -0.05 0.04 -1.36 0.17 -0.05
Threshold 1->2 15 1.01 0.05 21.25 0 1.01
Threshold 0->1 19 0.32 0.04 7.58 0 0.32
Threshold 1->2 19 1.17 0.05 22.77 0 1.17
Residual 1 0.56 0.01 42.6 0 0.56
Residual 4 0.48 0.02 27.58 0 0.48
Residual 7 0.27 0.01 19.51 0 0.27
Residual 11 0.16 0.01 16.55 0 0.16
Residual 14 0.16 0.01 15.82 0 0.16
Residual 17 0.24 0.01 16.73 0 0.24
Residual 2 0.35 0.02 14.76 0 0.35
Residual 5 0.42 0.03 15.15 0 0.42
Residual 8 0.55 0.02 22.96 0 0.55
Residual 10 0.62 0.02 35.02 0 0.62
Residual 13 0.4 0.03 14.66 0 0.4
Residual 16 0.54 0.04 15.32 0 0.54
Residual 18 0.37 0.02 17.6 0 0.37
Residual 20 0.44 0.03 16.32 0 0.44
Residual 3 0.39 0.02 23.72 0 0.39
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or
factor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual 9 0.34 0.02 18.76 0 0.34
Residual 12 0.4 0.01 29.2 0 0.4
Residual 15 0.18 0.01 16.94 0 0.18
Residual 19 0.47 0.02 25.03 0 0.47
Variance SA SA 0.44 0.04 12.08 0 1
Variance AEB AEB 0.65 0.04 15.13 0 1
Variance PI PI 0.61 0.03 18.1 0 1
Covariance SA AEB 0.18 0.02 7.87 0 0.33
Covariance SA PI 0.25 0.02 11.99 0 0.48
Covariance AEB PI 0.36 0.02 14.67 0 0.57
B.2 Parameter estimates of models from Chapter 5
Table B.5: Parameter estimates from 9-factor SPQ model (WLSMV, 25 imputed datasets)
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading GF Delusions
(Interview)
1 0 NA NA 0.62
Loading GF Anomalous
Experiences
(Interview)
0.65 0.15 4.23 0 0.4
Loading GF Hallucinations
(Interview)
1 0.13 7.97 0 0.62
Loading GF Believe In
Telepathy
1.31 0.13 9.79 0 0.81
Loading GF Force
Around
You
1.21 0.12 9.75 0 0.75
Loading GF See Special
Signs
1.13 0.11 10.01 0 0.7
Loading GF Hear Voice
Speaking
Thoughts
0.92 0.11 8.56 0 0.57
Loading GF See Invisible
Things
1.2 0.13 9.01 0 0.74
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading GF Others
Feel Your
Feelings
1.13 0.11 9.93 0 0.7
Loading GF Believe In
Clairvoyancy
1.32 0.13 10.16 0 0.81
Loading GF Telepathic
Experiences
1.26 0.13 9.63 0 0.78
Loading GF Talked
About Be-
hind Back
0.93 0.14 6.71 0 0.58
Loading GF People Talk
About You
0.82 0.15 5.49 0 0.51
Loading GF Others Have
It In For You
0.92 0.14 6.5 0 0.57
Loading GF Others Often
Talk About
You
0.89 0.17 5.35 0 0.55
Loading GF People
Watch You
1.11 0.12 8.95 0 0.68
Loading SF1 Hallucinations 1 0 NA NA 0.5
Loading SF1 Delusions 1.56 1 1.55 0.12 0.78
Loading SF1 Anomalous
Experiences
0.55 0.29 1.89 0.06 0.28
Loading SF2 Believe In
Telepathy
1 0 NA NA 0.27
Loading SF2 Force
Around
You
-0.15 0.29 -0.53 0.6 -0.04
Loading SF2 See Special
Signs
0.23 0.23 1.01 0.31 0.06
Loading SF2 Hear Voice
Speaking
Thoughts
-0.32 0.32 -1 0.32 -0.09
Loading SF2 See Invisible
Things
-0.23 0.35 -0.67 0.5 -0.06
Loading SF2 Others
Feel Your
Feelings
0.26 0.24 1.05 0.29 0.07
Loading SF2 Believe In
Clairvoyancy
1.17 0.19 6.12 0 0.32
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading SF2 Telepathic
Experiences
0.9 0.22 4.08 0 0.25
Loading SF2 Talked
About Be-
hind Back
-2.03 0.76 -2.66 0.01 -0.56
Loading SF2 People Talk
About You
-2.36 0.84 -2.81 0 -0.65
Loading SF2 Others Have
It In For You
-2.01 0.77 -2.62 0.01 -0.55
Loading SF2 Others Often
Talk About
You
-3 1.05 -2.86 0 -0.82
Loading SF2 People
Watch You
-1.03 0.51 -2.02 0.04 -0.28
Threshold 0->1 Hallucinations 1.62 0.07 23.63 0 1.62
Threshold 0->1 Delusions 1.96 0.09 22.25 0 1.96
Threshold 0->1 Anomalous
Experiences
1.55 0.07 23.65 0 1.55
Threshold 0->1 Believe In
Telepathy
0.61 0.04 13.76 0 0.61
Threshold 1->2 Force
Around
You
1.17 0.05 21.92 0 1.17
Threshold 0->1 See Special
Signs
0.69 0.05 15.28 0 0.69
Threshold 1->2 Hear Voice
Speaking
Thoughts
1.26 0.06 22.58 0 1.26
Threshold 0->1 See Invisible
Things
0.97 0.05 19.64 0 0.97
Threshold 1->2 Others
Feel Your
Feelings
1.48 0.06 23.56 0 1.48
Threshold 0->1 Believe In
Clairvoyancy
1.08 0.05 21.07 0 1.08
Threshold 1->2 Telepathic
Experiences
1.5 0.06 23.59 0 1.5
Threshold 0->1 Talked
About Be-
hind Back
1.39 0.06 23.29 0 1.39
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 1->2 People Talk
About You
1.96 0.09 22.25 0 1.96
Threshold 0->1 Others Have
It In For You
1.21 0.05 22.24 0 1.21
Threshold 1->2 Others Often
Talk About
You
1.89 0.08 22.7 0 1.89
Threshold 0->1 People
Watch You
0.63 0.04 14.27 0 0.63
Threshold 1->2 t2 1.22 0.05 22.28 0 1.22
Threshold 0->1 t1 1.54 0.07 23.65 0 1.54
Threshold 1->2 t2 2.02 0.09 21.82 0 2.02
Threshold 0->1 t1 -0.3 0.04 -7.2 0 -0.3
Threshold 1->2 t2 0.8 0.05 17.21 0 0.8
Threshold 0->1 t1 0.24 0.04 5.69 0 0.24
Threshold 1->2 t2 1.12 0.05 21.43 0 1.12
Threshold 0->1 t1 0.72 0.05 15.78 0 0.72
Threshold 1->2 t2 1.46 0.06 23.51 0 1.46
Threshold 0->1 t1 -0.03 0.04 -0.69 0.49 -0.03
Threshold 1->2 t2 1.01 0.05 20.15 0 1.01
Threshold 0->1 t1 0.34 0.04 8.12 0 0.34
Threshold 1->2 t2 1.19 0.05 22.06 0 1.19
Residual Delusions 0.36 0 NA NA 0.36
Residual Anomalous
Experiences
0.23 0 NA NA 0.23
Residual Hallucinations 0.54 0 NA NA 0.54
Residual Believe In
Telepathy
0.26 0 NA NA 0.26
Residual Force
Around
You
0.43 0 NA NA 0.43
Residual See Special
Signs
0.5 0 NA NA 0.5
Residual Hear Voice
Speaking
Thoughts
0.67 0 NA NA 0.67
Residual See Invisible
Things
0.44 0 NA NA 0.44
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual Others
Feel Your
Feelings
0.5 0 NA NA 0.5
Residual Believe In
Clairvoyancy
0.23 0 NA NA 0.23
Residual Telepathic
Experiences
0.33 0 NA NA 0.33
Residual Talked
About Be-
hind Back
0.36 0 NA NA 0.36
Residual People Talk
About You
0.33 0 NA NA 0.33
Residual Others Have
It In For You
0.37 0 NA NA 0.37
Residual Others Often
Talk About
You
0.03 0 NA NA 0.03
Residual People
Watch You
0.45 0 NA NA 0.45
Variance General
Factor
General Fac-
tor
0.38 0.08 5 0 1
Variance Specific
Factor
1
Specific Fac-
tor 1
0.25 0.17 1.47 0.14 1
Variance Specific
Factor
2
Specific Fac-
tor 2
0.07 0.04 1.7 0.09 1
Covariance General
Factor
Specific Fac-
tor 1
0 0 NA NA 0
Covariance General
Factor
Specific Fac-
tor 2
0 0 NA NA 0
Covariance Specific
Factor
1
Specific Fac-
tor 2
0 0 NA NA 0
Table B.5: Parameter estimates from bifactor model fit to combined PLIKSi and BSSI items
with a robust weighted-least-squares (WLSMV) estimator. GF = general factor. SF1 = specific
PLIKSi factor. SF2 = specific BSSI factor. Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std.
estimate = standardised estimate. t1 = First item threshold. t2 = Second item threshold (BSSI
only).
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B.3 Parameter estimates from structural equation models in Chap-
ter 8
Table B.6: Parameter estimates from cross-lagged models of Asociality and Anomalous Experi-
ences & Beliefs
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
l8 0.94 0.02 46.06 < 0.001 0.76
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
l9 0.92 0.02 39.21 < 0.001 0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
l10 0.86 0.02 38.1 < 0.001 0.7
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
l11 0.95 0.02 46.96 < 0.001 0.75
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
l12 1.41 0.03 46.25 < 0.001 0.83
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
l8 0.94 0.02 46.06 < 0.001 0.77
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
l9 0.92 0.02 39.21 < 0.001 0.75
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
l10 0.86 0.02 38.1 < 0.001 0.71
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
l11 0.95 0.02 46.96 < 0.001 0.76
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
l12 1.41 0.03 46.25 < 0.001 0.83
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
l1 1 0 NA NA 0.64
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
l2 1.11 0.03 32.07 < 0.001 0.75
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
l3 0.86 0.03 26.18 < 0.001 0.7
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
l4 0.69 0.03 22.57 < 0.001 0.65
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
l5 0.65 0.03 20.68 < 0.001 0.66
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
l6 1.15 0.04 29.3 < 0.001 0.69
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
l1 1 0 NA NA 0.6
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
l2 1.11 0.03 32.07 < 0.001 0.71
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
l3 0.86 0.03 26.18 < 0.001 0.66
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
l4 0.69 0.03 22.57 < 0.001 0.61
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
l5 0.65 0.03 20.68 < 0.001 0.62
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
l6 1.15 0.04 29.3 < 0.001 0.65
Regression ASO (FU) ASO (BL) 0.84 0.02 39.58 < 0.001 0.83
Regression ASO (FU) AEB (BL) -0.04 0.03 -1.34 0.181 -0.03
Regression AEB (FU) AEB (BL) 0.63 0.03 18.56 < 0.001 0.7
Regression AEB (FU) ASO (BL) 0.04 0.02 2 0.046 0.05
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ia1 1.04 0.13 7.83 < 0.001 1.18
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ia2 0.77 0.15 5.21 < 0.001 0.92
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ia3 0.53 0.11 4.6 < 0.001 0.76
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ia4 0.42 0.09 4.51 < 0.001 0.69
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ia5 0.32 0.09 3.68 < 0.001 0.57
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ia6 0.89 0.15 5.77 < 0.001 0.93
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ia7 0.92 0.17 5.53 < 0.001 0.99
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ia8 0.84 0.16 5.36 < 0.001 0.98
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ia9 0.69 0.15 4.51 < 0.001 0.8
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ia10 0.62 0.14 4.31 < 0.001 0.72
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ia11 1.01 0.16 6.36 < 0.001 1.14
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ia12 1.31 0.24 5.56 < 0.001 1.1
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
ia1 1.04 0.13 7.83 < 0.001 1.23
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
ia2 0.77 0.15 5.21 < 0.001 0.97
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
ia3 0.53 0.11 4.6 < 0.001 0.8
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
ia4 0.42 0.09 4.51 < 0.001 0.72
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
ia5 0.32 0.09 3.68 < 0.001 0.6
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
ia6 0.89 0.15 5.77 < 0.001 0.98
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
ia7 0.92 0.17 5.53 < 0.001 0.97
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
ia8 0.84 0.16 5.36 < 0.001 0.96
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
ia9 0.69 0.15 4.51 < 0.001 0.79
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
ia10 0.62 0.14 4.31 < 0.001 0.72
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
ia11 1.01 0.16 6.36 < 0.001 1.12
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
ia12 1.31 0.24 5.56 < 0.001 1.08
Intercept Male 0.47 0 NA NA 0.93
Intercept Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0 NA NA -0.01
Intercept Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0 NA NA 0.38
Intercept Age (years) 19.08 0 NA NA 6.35
Intercept Non-white
ethnicity
0.23 0 NA NA 0.54
Intercept Any family
psychiatric
history
0.11 0 NA NA 0.35
Intercept Urban/rural
index
5.47 0 NA NA 7.31
Intercept Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
1.73 0 NA NA 1.56
Intercept ASO (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept ASO (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Male 0.1 0.03 3.12 0.002 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -2.45 0.014 -0.06
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.05 0.05 0.97 0.333 0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Age (years) 0 0 0.15 0.881 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.11 0.04 2.75 0.006 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.16 0.05 2.87 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.02 -0.33 0.741 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -4.3 < 0.001 -0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Male -0.03 0.03 -1.11 0.268 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.05 0.02 -3.12 0.002 -0.08
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.04 3.02 0.003 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Age (years) -0.01 0 -3.26 0.001 -0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.12 0.04 3.25 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.13 0.04 2.84 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.04 0.02 2.04 0.041 0.05
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -5.25 < 0.001 -0.12
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Male -0.01 0.02 -0.45 0.652 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.01 0.01 0.91 0.36 0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.06 0.04 1.4 0.161 0.03
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -0.29 0.768 0
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
0.01 0.03 0.4 0.688 0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.01 0.04 0.24 0.812 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Urban/rural
index
0 0.01 -0.2 0.844 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.03 0.01 -2.3 0.021 -0.04
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Male -0.04 0.02 -2.09 0.037 -0.04
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.01 0.01 0.98 0.33 0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.14 0.04 3.48 < 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -1.09 0.274 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
-0.04 0.03 -1.56 0.119 -0.04
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.05 0.04 1.25 0.211 0.03
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.01 -1.23 0.219 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.03 0.01 -3.07 0.002 -0.06
Covariance ASO (BL) AEB (BL) 0.14 0.01 13.23 < 0.001 0.37
Covariance ASO (FU) AEB (FU) 0.06 0.01 9.64 < 0.001 0.45
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
0.11 0.02 6.87 < 0.001 0.23
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
0.06 0.01 5.24 < 0.001 0.2
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
0.08 0.01 8.1 < 0.001 0.34
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
0.04 0.01 4.61 < 0.001 0.18
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
0.06 0.01 6.63 < 0.001 0.33
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
0.2 0.02 11.47 < 0.001 0.43
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
0.11 0.01 8.58 < 0.001 0.28
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
0.09 0.01 9.02 < 0.001 0.3
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
0.11 0.01 9.42 < 0.001 0.32
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
0.13 0.01 10.24 < 0.001 0.36
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
0.1 0.01 8.99 < 0.001 0.29
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
0.06 0.02 3.77 < 0.001 0.14
Table B.6: Parameter estimates of the cross-lagged model of ASO and AEB fit to NSPN data
with a robust maximum-likelihood estimator, with missing data estimated using full-information
maximum likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed to be equal.
Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
Table B.7: Parameter estimates from cross-lagged models of Asociality and Paranoid Ideation
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
l8 0.94 0.02 46.06 < 0.001 0.76
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
l9 0.93 0.02 39.61 < 0.001 0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
l10 0.86 0.02 38.48 < 0.001 0.71
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
l11 0.96 0.02 47.15 < 0.001 0.75
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
l12 1.43 0.03 46.89 < 0.001 0.83
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
l8 0.94 0.02 46.06 < 0.001 0.76
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
l9 0.93 0.02 39.61 < 0.001 0.75
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
l10 0.86 0.02 38.48 < 0.001 0.71
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
l11 0.96 0.02 47.15 < 0.001 0.76
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
l12 1.43 0.03 46.89 < 0.001 0.84
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
l13 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
l14 0.96 0.02 46.9 < 0.001 0.74
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
l15 0.86 0.02 48.2 < 0.001 0.78
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
l16 1.41 0.03 52.98 < 0.001 0.87
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
l13 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
l14 0.96 0.02 46.9 < 0.001 0.74
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
l15 0.86 0.02 48.2 < 0.001 0.78
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
l16 1.41 0.03 52.98 < 0.001 0.87
Regression ASO (FU) ASO (BL) 0.84 0.03 32.2 < 0.001 0.82
Regression ASO (FU) PI (BL) -0.01 0.02 -0.51 0.608 -0.01
Regression PI (FU) PI (BL) 0.64 0.03 19.76 < 0.001 0.64
Regression PI (FU) ASO (BL) 0.1 0.03 2.92 0.004 0.09
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ia7 0.93 0.17 5.62 < 0.001 1
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ia8 0.85 0.16 5.46 < 0.001 0.99
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ia9 0.7 0.15 4.55 < 0.001 0.81
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ia10 0.63 0.14 4.36 < 0.001 0.74
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ia11 1.02 0.16 6.39 < 0.001 1.15
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ia12 1.33 0.24 5.6 < 0.001 1.11
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
ia13 1.63 0.18 8.84 < 0.001 1.59
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
ia14 1.58 0.18 9 < 0.001 1.55
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
ia15 1.25 0.16 7.92 < 0.001 1.44
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
ia16 1.99 0.26 7.76 < 0.001 1.57
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
ia7 0.93 0.17 5.62 < 0.001 0.99
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
ia8 0.85 0.16 5.46 < 0.001 0.98
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
ia9 0.7 0.15 4.55 < 0.001 0.8
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
ia10 0.63 0.14 4.36 < 0.001 0.73
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
ia11 1.02 0.16 6.39 < 0.001 1.13
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
ia12 1.33 0.24 5.6 < 0.001 1.09
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
ia13 1.63 0.18 8.84 < 0.001 1.6
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
ia14 1.58 0.18 9 < 0.001 1.55
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
ia15 1.25 0.16 7.92 < 0.001 1.45
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
ia16 1.99 0.26 7.76 < 0.001 1.57
Intercept Male 0.47 0 NA NA 0.93
Intercept Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0 NA NA -0.01
Intercept Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0 NA NA 0.38
Intercept Age (years) 19.08 0 NA NA 6.35
Intercept Non-white
ethnicity
0.23 0 NA NA 0.54
Intercept Any family
psychiatric
history
0.11 0 NA NA 0.35
Intercept Urban/rural
index
5.47 0 NA NA 7.31
Intercept Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
1.73 0 NA NA 1.56
Intercept ASO (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept ASO (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept PI (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept PI (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Male 0.09 0.03 3.11 0.002 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -2.42 0.015 -0.06
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.05 0.05 0.98 0.325 0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Age (years) 0 0 0.13 0.898 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.11 0.04 2.74 0.006 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.15 0.05 2.86 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.02 -0.4 0.689 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -4.32 < 0.001 -0.09
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Male -0.09 0.03 -2.5 0.012 -0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.05 0.02 -2.47 0.013 -0.06
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.05 2.29 0.022 0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Age (years) -0.03 0.01 -5.3 < 0.001 -0.11
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.07 0.04 1.6 0.11 0.04
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.24 0.06 4.01 < 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.03 0.02 1.19 0.234 0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.09 0.02 -5.69 < 0.001 -0.12
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Male -0.01 0.02 -0.4 0.693 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.02 0.01 1.1 0.27 0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.06 0.04 1.36 0.174 0.03
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -0.24 0.81 0
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
0.01 0.03 0.33 0.74 0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.01 0.04 0.16 0.877 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Urban/rural
index
0 0.01 -0.34 0.731 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.02 0.01 -2.18 0.029 -0.04
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Male -0.05 0.03 -1.58 0.114 -0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.05 0.02 2.65 0.008 0.06
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.1 0.05 1.87 0.062 0.04
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Age (years) -0.01 0 -1.48 0.138 -0.02
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
0.01 0.04 0.16 0.875 0
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.05 0.05 0.87 0.385 0.02
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Urban/rural
index
-0.03 0.02 -2.16 0.031 -0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.04 0.01 -2.67 0.007 -0.05
Covariance ASO (BL) PI (BL) 0.31 0.01 21.97 < 0.001 0.59
Covariance ASO (FU) PI (FU) 0.14 0.01 13.99 < 0.001 0.6
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
0.11 0.01 8.52 < 0.001 0.27
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
0.1 0.01 9.18 < 0.001 0.3
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
0.11 0.01 9.42 < 0.001 0.32
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
0.13 0.01 10.31 < 0.001 0.36
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
0.1 0.01 9.09 < 0.001 0.29
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
0.06 0.02 3.83 < 0.001 0.14
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariance PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
0.11 0.02 7.55 < 0.001 0.27
Covariance PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
0.15 0.02 9.86 < 0.001 0.32
Covariance PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
0.06 0.01 5.23 < 0.001 0.19
Covariance PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
0.06 0.02 3.2 0.001 0.14
Table B.7: Parameter estimates of the cross-lagged model of ASO and PI fit to NSPN data
with a robust maximum-likelihood estimator, with missing data estimated using full-information
maximum likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed to be equal.
Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
Table B.8: Parameter estimates from cross-lagged models of Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs
and Paranoid Ideation
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
l13 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
l14 0.94 0.02 46.69 < 0.001 0.73
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
l15 0.86 0.02 47.62 < 0.001 0.78
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
l16 1.41 0.03 52.65 < 0.001 0.87
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
l13 1 0 NA NA 0.77
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
l14 0.94 0.02 46.69 < 0.001 0.73
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
l15 0.86 0.02 47.62 < 0.001 0.78
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
l16 1.41 0.03 52.65 < 0.001 0.87
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
l1 1 0 NA NA 0.65
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
l2 1.1 0.03 32.7 < 0.001 0.75
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
l3 0.83 0.03 26.31 < 0.001 0.69
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
l4 0.69 0.03 22.91 < 0.001 0.65
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
l5 0.63 0.03 20.79 < 0.001 0.65
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
l6 1.16 0.04 29.98 < 0.001 0.7
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
l1 1 0 NA NA 0.61
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
l2 1.1 0.03 32.7 < 0.001 0.72
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
l3 0.83 0.03 26.31 < 0.001 0.65
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
l4 0.69 0.03 22.91 < 0.001 0.61
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
l5 0.63 0.03 20.79 < 0.001 0.6
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
l6 1.16 0.04 29.98 < 0.001 0.66
Regression PI (FU) PI (BL) 0.65 0.03 18.82 < 0.001 0.65
Regression PI (FU) AEB (BL) 0.1 0.05 2 0.045 0.07
Regression AEB (FU) AEB (BL) 0.61 0.04 14.87 < 0.001 0.68
Regression AEB (FU) PI (BL) 0.04 0.02 1.84 0.066 0.07
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ia1 1.07 0.13 7.98 < 0.001 1.21
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ia2 0.81 0.15 5.43 < 0.001 0.96
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ia3 0.55 0.11 4.9 < 0.001 0.79
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ia4 0.44 0.09 4.74 < 0.001 0.72
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ia5 0.34 0.09 3.95 < 0.001 0.6
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ia6 0.93 0.16 5.89 < 0.001 0.98
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
ia13 1.62 0.18 8.78 < 0.001 1.59
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
ia14 1.56 0.17 9.01 < 0.001 1.54
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
ia15 1.24 0.16 7.84 < 0.001 1.44
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
ia16 1.98 0.26 7.7 < 0.001 1.56
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
ia1 1.07 0.13 7.98 < 0.001 1.26
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
ia2 0.81 0.15 5.43 < 0.001 1.01
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
ia3 0.55 0.11 4.9 < 0.001 0.83
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
ia4 0.44 0.09 4.74 < 0.001 0.76
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
ia5 0.34 0.09 3.95 < 0.001 0.63
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
ia6 0.93 0.16 5.89 < 0.001 1.03
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
ia13 1.62 0.18 8.78 < 0.001 1.59
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
ia14 1.56 0.17 9.01 < 0.001 1.54
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
ia15 1.24 0.16 7.84 < 0.001 1.44
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
ia16 1.98 0.26 7.7 < 0.001 1.57
Intercept Male 0.47 0 NA NA 0.93
Intercept Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0 NA NA -0.01
Intercept Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0 NA NA 0.38
Intercept Age (years) 19.08 0 NA NA 6.35
Intercept Non-white
ethnicity
0.23 0 NA NA 0.54
Intercept Any family
psychiatric
history
0.11 0 NA NA 0.35
Intercept Urban/rural
index
5.47 0 NA NA 7.31
Intercept Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
1.73 0 NA NA 1.56
Intercept PI (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept PI (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Male -0.09 0.03 -2.51 0.012 -0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.05 0.02 -2.49 0.013 -0.06
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.05 2.28 0.022 0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Age (years) -0.03 0.01 -5.29 < 0.001 -0.11
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.07 0.04 1.6 0.11 0.04
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.24 0.06 4 < 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.03 0.02 1.22 0.221 0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.09 0.02 -5.66 < 0.001 -0.12
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Male -0.03 0.03 -1.05 0.292 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.05 0.02 -3.09 0.002 -0.08
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.04 3.01 0.003 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Age (years) -0.01 0 -3.48 0.001 -0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.12 0.04 3.25 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.13 0.04 2.88 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.04 0.02 1.91 0.056 0.05
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -5.27 < 0.001 -0.12
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Male -0.05 0.03 -1.43 0.152 -0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.04 0.02 2.6 0.009 0.06
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.08 0.05 1.58 0.115 0.04
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -1.22 0.223 -0.02
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
0.01 0.04 0.22 0.824 0
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.04 0.05 0.76 0.446 0.02
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Urban/rural
index
-0.03 0.02 -2.25 0.024 -0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.04 0.01 -2.74 0.006 -0.06
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Male -0.04 0.02 -1.82 0.069 -0.04
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.01 0.01 0.99 0.325 0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.14 0.04 3.53 < 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -0.77 0.439 -0.01
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
-0.04 0.03 -1.4 0.162 -0.03
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.04 0.04 1.12 0.264 0.03
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.01 -1.43 0.153 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.03 0.01 -3.11 0.002 -0.06
Covariance PI (BL) AEB (BL) 0.27 0.01 19.56 < 0.001 0.62
Covariance PI (FU) AEB (FU) 0.12 0.01 12.58 < 0.001 0.63
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
0.1 0.02 6.68 < 0.001 0.22
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
0.06 0.01 5.37 < 0.001 0.21
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
0.09 0.01 8.51 < 0.001 0.35
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
0.04 0.01 4.55 < 0.001 0.17
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
0.06 0.01 6.85 < 0.001 0.34
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
0.19 0.02 11.28 < 0.001 0.42
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariance PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
0.11 0.02 7.26 < 0.001 0.26
Covariance PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
0.15 0.02 9.99 < 0.001 0.32
Covariance PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
0.06 0.01 5.17 < 0.001 0.19
Covariance PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
0.05 0.02 3.13 0.002 0.14
Table B.8: Parameter estimates of the cross-lagged model of AEB and PI fit to NSPN data
with a robust maximum-likelihood estimator, with missing data estimated using full-information
maximum likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed to be equal.
Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
Table B.9: Parameter estimates from cross-lagged mediation models of Asociality, Anomalous
Experiences & Beliefs and social support
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
l8 0.93 0.02 46.14 < 0.001 0.76
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
l9 0.93 0.02 39.63 < 0.001 0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
l10 0.85 0.02 38.01 < 0.001 0.7
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
l11 0.96 0.02 47.04 < 0.001 0.75
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
l12 1.41 0.03 46.84 < 0.001 0.83
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
l8 0.93 0.02 46.14 < 0.001 0.77
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
l9 0.93 0.02 39.63 < 0.001 0.75
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
l10 0.85 0.02 38.01 < 0.001 0.71
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
l11 0.96 0.02 47.04 < 0.001 0.76
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
l12 1.41 0.03 46.84 < 0.001 0.83
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
l1 1 0 NA NA 0.64
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
l2 1.11 0.03 32.06 < 0.001 0.75
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
l3 0.86 0.03 26.18 < 0.001 0.7
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
l4 0.69 0.03 22.57 < 0.001 0.65
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
l5 0.65 0.03 20.67 < 0.001 0.66
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
l6 1.15 0.04 29.32 < 0.001 0.69
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
l1 1 0 NA NA 0.6
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
l2 1.11 0.03 32.06 < 0.001 0.71
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
l3 0.86 0.03 26.18 < 0.001 0.66
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
l4 0.69 0.03 22.57 < 0.001 0.61
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
l5 0.65 0.03 20.67 < 0.001 0.62
Loading AEB (FU) AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
l6 1.15 0.04 29.32 < 0.001 0.65
Regression ASO (FU) ASO (BL) 0.68 0.02 28.21 < 0.001 0.66
Regression ASO (FU) AEB (BL) -0.04 0.03 -1.52 0.128 -0.03
Regression AEB (FU) AEB (BL) 0.63 0.03 18.95 < 0.001 0.7
Regression AEB (FU) ASO (BL) -0.03 0.02 -1.25 0.212 -0.04
Regression ASO (FU) Family Re-
lationship
Quality
-0.09 0.01 -6.87 < 0.001 -0.12
Regression ASO (FU) Friendship
Quality
-0.18 0.01 -
12.48
< 0.001 -0.25
Regression AEB (FU) Family Re-
lationship
Quality
-0.05 0.01 -4.08 < 0.001 -0.1
Regression AEB (FU) Friendship
Quality
-0.06 0.01 -4.59 < 0.001 -0.11
Regression Family Re-
lationship
Quality
ASO (BL) -0.49 0.04 -
12.45
< 0.001 -0.34
Regression Family Re-
lationship
Quality
AEB (BL) -0.05 0.06 -0.95 0.341 -0.03
Regression Friendship
Quality
ASO (BL) -0.67 0.04 -
17.25
< 0.001 -0.47
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Regression Friendship
Quality
AEB (BL) 0.03 0.05 0.5 0.617 0.02
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ia1 1.04 0.13 7.93 < 0.001 1.18
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ia2 0.78 0.15 5.29 < 0.001 0.92
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ia3 0.53 0.11 4.67 < 0.001 0.76
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ia4 0.42 0.09 4.58 < 0.001 0.69
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ia5 0.32 0.09 3.74 < 0.001 0.57
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ia6 0.89 0.15 5.85 < 0.001 0.94
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ia7 0.94 0.16 6.06 < 0.001 1
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ia8 0.85 0.14 5.89 < 0.001 0.99
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ia9 0.71 0.14 4.92 < 0.001 0.81
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ia10 0.63 0.13 4.77 < 0.001 0.74
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ia11 1.03 0.15 6.93 < 0.001 1.16
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ia12 1.33 0.22 6.1 < 0.001 1.12
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
ia1 1.04 0.13 7.93 < 0.001 1.23
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
ia2 0.78 0.15 5.29 < 0.001 0.98
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
ia3 0.53 0.11 4.67 < 0.001 0.8
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
ia4 0.42 0.09 4.58 < 0.001 0.72
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
ia5 0.32 0.09 3.74 < 0.001 0.6
Intercept AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
ia6 0.89 0.15 5.85 < 0.001 0.98
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
ia7 0.94 0.16 6.06 < 0.001 0.99
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
ia8 0.85 0.14 5.89 < 0.001 0.98
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
ia9 0.71 0.14 4.92 < 0.001 0.8
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
ia10 0.63 0.13 4.77 < 0.001 0.73
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
ia11 1.03 0.15 6.93 < 0.001 1.14
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
ia12 1.33 0.22 6.1 < 0.001 1.1
Intercept Family Re-
lationship
Quality
-0.27 0.27 -0.99 0.32 -0.27
Intercept Friendship
Quality
0.64 0.28 2.3 0.022 0.64
Intercept Male 0.47 0 NA NA 0.93
Intercept Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0 NA NA -0.01
Intercept Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0 NA NA 0.38
Intercept Age (years) 19.08 0 NA NA 6.35
Intercept Non-white
ethnicity
0.23 0 NA NA 0.54
Intercept Any family
psychiatric
history
0.11 0 NA NA 0.35
Intercept Urban/rural
index
5.47 0 NA NA 7.31
Intercept Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
1.73 0 NA NA 1.56
Intercept ASO (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept ASO (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Male 0.09 0.03 3.11 0.002 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -2.45 0.014 -0.06
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.05 0.05 0.97 0.333 0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Age (years) 0 0 0.09 0.926 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.11 0.04 2.75 0.006 0.07
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.16 0.05 2.87 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.02 -0.43 0.67 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -4.33 < 0.001 -0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Male -0.03 0.03 -1.11 0.267 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.05 0.02 -3.12 0.002 -0.08
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.04 3.02 0.003 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Age (years) -0.01 0 -3.3 0.001 -0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.12 0.04 3.25 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.13 0.04 2.84 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.04 0.02 2.03 0.042 0.05
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -5.25 < 0.001 -0.12
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Male 0.02 0.02 0.9 0.371 0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0 0.01 0.34 0.735 0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.09 0.04 2.3 0.022 0.04
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -1.19 0.233 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
-0.02 0.03 -0.69 0.491 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
-0.03 0.04 -0.68 0.494 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Urban/rural
index
0 0.01 -0.04 0.971 0
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.02 0.01 -1.64 0.102 -0.03
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Male -0.03 0.02 -1.61 0.107 -0.03
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.01 0.01 0.72 0.469 0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.14 0.04 3.62 < 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -1.4 0.161 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
-0.06 0.03 -2.08 0.038 -0.05
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.04 0.04 0.9 0.37 0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.01 -1.19 0.233 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.02 0.01 -2.64 0.008 -0.05
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Male 0.03 0.05 0.61 0.541 0.01
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.03 -1.39 0.166 -0.04
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
-0.21 0.07 -2.88 0.004 -0.07
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Age (years) 0 0.01 0.61 0.544 0.01
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Non-white
ethnicity
-0.12 0.06 -1.86 0.062 -0.05
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Any family
psychiatric
history
-0.13 0.08 -1.6 0.11 -0.04
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Urban/rural
index
0.02 0.03 0.45 0.651 0.01
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
0.06 0.02 2.72 0.006 0.06
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Male 0.15 0.04 3.37 0.001 0.07
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0.03 -0.27 0.79 -0.01
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.27 0.07 3.89 < 0.001 0.09
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Age (years) -0.02 0.01 -3.4 0.001 -0.07
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Non-white
ethnicity
-0.14 0.06 -2.45 0.014 -0.06
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Any family
psychiatric
history
-0.14 0.08 -1.8 0.073 -0.04
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Urban/rural
index
-0.05 0.03 -1.49 0.137 -0.04
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
0.01 0.02 0.58 0.563 0.01
Covariance ASO (BL) AEB (BL) 0.14 0.01 13.23 < 0.001 0.37
Covariance ASO (FU) AEB (FU) 0.05 0.01 8.61 < 0.001 0.41
Covariance Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Friendship
Quality
0.14 0.02 6.28 < 0.001 0.17
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
0.11 0.02 6.86 < 0.001 0.23
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
0.06 0.01 5.23 < 0.001 0.2
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
0.08 0.01 8.09 < 0.001 0.34
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
0.04 0.01 4.63 < 0.001 0.18
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
0.06 0.01 6.64 < 0.001 0.33
Covariance AEB: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
AEB: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
0.2 0.02 11.46 < 0.001 0.43
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
0.11 0.01 8.56 < 0.001 0.28
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
0.1 0.01 9.35 < 0.001 0.31
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
0.11 0.01 9.26 < 0.001 0.31
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
0.13 0.01 10.41 < 0.001 0.36
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
0.1 0.01 8.75 < 0.001 0.28
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
0.07 0.02 4.18 < 0.001 0.16
Table B.9: Parameter estimates of the cross-lagged mediation model of AEB, ASO and so-
cial support fit to NSPN data with a robust maximum-likelihood estimator, with missing data
estimated using full-information maximum likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality con-
straint label were fixed to be equal. Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate
= standardised estimate.
Table B.10: Parameter estimates from cross-lagged mediation models of Asociality, Paranoid
Ideation and social support
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.73
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
l8 0.91 0.03 33.9 < 0.001 0.73
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
l9 0.96 0.03 30.42 < 0.001 0.75
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
l10 0.85 0.03 27.42 < 0.001 0.69
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
l11 1.01 0.03 36.03 < 0.001 0.78
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
l12 1.43 0.04 36.23 < 0.001 0.82
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
l7 1 0 NA NA 0.74
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
l8 0.91 0.03 33.9 < 0.001 0.74
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
l9 0.96 0.03 30.42 < 0.001 0.76
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
l10 0.85 0.03 27.42 < 0.001 0.7
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
l11 1.01 0.03 36.03 < 0.001 0.79
Loading ASO (FU) ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
l12 1.43 0.04 36.23 < 0.001 0.83
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
l13 1 0 NA NA 0.76
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
l14 1.06 0.03 31.99 < 0.001 0.81
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
l15 0.82 0.03 31.39 < 0.001 0.74
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
l16 1.36 0.04 34.11 < 0.001 0.84
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
l13 1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
l14 1.06 0.03 31.99 < 0.001 0.81
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
l15 0.82 0.03 31.39 < 0.001 0.73
Loading PI (FU) PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
l16 1.36 0.04 34.11 < 0.001 0.83
Regression ASO (FU) ASO (BL) 0.7 0.03 23.79 < 0.001 0.68
Regression ASO (FU) PI (BL) -0.05 0.02 -2.1 0.036 -0.06
Regression PI (FU) PI (BL) 0.61 0.03 18.41 < 0.001 0.62
Regression PI (FU) ASO (BL) -0.03 0.04 -0.92 0.359 -0.03
Regression ASO (FU) Family Re-
lationship
Quality
-0.08 0.01 -5.97 < 0.001 -0.12
Regression ASO (FU) Friendship
Quality
-0.18 0.02 -
11.64
< 0.001 -0.26
Regression PI (FU) Family Re-
lationship
Quality
-0.1 0.02 -5.46 < 0.001 -0.13
Regression PI (FU) Friendship
Quality
-0.15 0.02 -7.85 < 0.001 -0.2
Regression Family Re-
lationship
Quality
ASO (BL) -0.4 0.05 -7.72 < 0.001 -0.27
Regression Family Re-
lationship
Quality
PI (BL) -0.2 0.04 -4.6 < 0.001 -0.16
Regression Friendship
Quality
ASO (BL) -0.61 0.05 -
11.84
< 0.001 -0.41
Regression Friendship
Quality
PI (BL) -0.12 0.05 -2.66 0.008 -0.09
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ia7 1.05 0.19 5.58 < 0.001 1.16
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ia8 0.96 0.17 5.57 < 0.001 1.16
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ia9 0.84 0.18 4.63 < 0.001 0.98
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ia10 0.72 0.16 4.51 < 0.001 0.87
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ia11 1.15 0.19 6.03 < 0.001 1.33
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ia12 1.51 0.27 5.57 < 0.001 1.29
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
ia13 1.39 0.22 6.39 < 0.001 1.37
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
ia14 1.38 0.23 5.97 < 0.001 1.36
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
ia15 1.03 0.18 5.77 < 0.001 1.21
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
ia16 1.63 0.29 5.54 < 0.001 1.3
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
ia7 1.05 0.19 5.58 < 0.001 1.14
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
ia8 0.96 0.17 5.57 < 0.001 1.14
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
ia9 0.84 0.18 4.63 < 0.001 0.97
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
ia10 0.72 0.16 4.51 < 0.001 0.86
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
ia11 1.15 0.19 6.03 < 0.001 1.3
Intercept ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
ia12 1.51 0.27 5.57 < 0.001 1.27
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
ia13 1.39 0.22 6.39 < 0.001 1.39
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
ia14 1.38 0.23 5.97 < 0.001 1.39
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
ia15 1.03 0.18 5.77 < 0.001 1.23
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
ia16 1.63 0.29 5.54 < 0.001 1.32
Intercept Family Re-
lationship
Quality
-0.28 0.3 -0.95 0.342 -0.29
Intercept Friendship
Quality
0.88 0.32 2.74 0.006 0.88
Intercept Male 0.43 0.01 33.19 < 0.001 0.87
Intercept Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.05 0.03 1.87 0.061 0.05
Intercept Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.1 0.01 12.92 < 0.001 0.34
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept Age (years) 19.07 0.08 235.92 < 0.001 6.19
Intercept Non-white
ethnicity
0.21 0.01 19.92 < 0.001 0.52
Intercept Any family
psychiatric
history
0.1 0.01 12.54 < 0.001 0.33
Intercept Urban/rural
index
5.49 0.02 279.51 < 0.001 7.35
Intercept Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
1.81 0.03 63.31 < 0.001 1.66
Intercept ASO (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept ASO (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept PI (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept PI (FU) 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Male 0.07 0.04 1.85 0.064 0.05
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -1.9 0.058 -0.06
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
-0.05 0.06 -0.79 0.431 -0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Age (years) 0 0.01 0.11 0.913 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.09 0.05 1.88 0.06 0.06
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.13 0.07 1.94 0.053 0.06
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Urban/rural
index
-0.04 0.03 -1.47 0.142 -0.04
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.05 0.02 -2.73 0.006 -0.08
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Male -0.09 0.04 -2.15 0.032 -0.06
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.06 0.03 -2.49 0.013 -0.08
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.04 0.07 0.55 0.583 0.01
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Age (years) -0.02 0.01 -3.57 < 0.001 -0.1
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.1 0.06 1.79 0.074 0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.31 0.08 3.78 < 0.001 0.12
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.04 0.03 1.34 0.181 0.04
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.02 -2.8 0.005 -0.08
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Male 0.01 0.02 0.39 0.695 0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.01 0.01 0.49 0.621 0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.08 0.04 1.98 0.048 0.04
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -1.51 0.131 -0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
0 0.03 -0.16 0.877 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
-0.03 0.04 -0.84 0.402 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Urban/rural
index
0 0.01 -0.28 0.777 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.02 0.01 -1.41 0.159 -0.02
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Male -0.04 0.03 -1.34 0.18 -0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.04 0.02 2.16 0.031 0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.09 0.05 1.72 0.085 0.04
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Age (years) 0 0 -0.99 0.324 -0.02
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Non-white
ethnicity
-0.03 0.04 -0.69 0.489 -0.02
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.01 0.05 0.17 0.866 0
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Urban/rural
index
-0.03 0.02 -1.79 0.073 -0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (FU) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.03 0.01 -2.07 0.038 -0.04
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Male 0.04 0.05 0.86 0.388 0.02
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.03 -1.33 0.182 -0.04
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
-0.23 0.08 -2.97 0.003 -0.07
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Age (years) 0 0.01 0.11 0.913 0
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Non-white
ethnicity
-0.09 0.07 -1.33 0.183 -0.04
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Any family
psychiatric
history
-0.1 0.09 -1.12 0.264 -0.03
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Urban/rural
index
0.01 0.04 0.33 0.743 0.01
Covariate
regression
Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
0.05 0.02 2.19 0.029 0.05
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Male 0.17 0.05 3.62 < 0.001 0.08
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0.03 -0.44 0.66 -0.01
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.25 0.07 3.43 0.001 0.08
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Age (years) -0.03 0.01 -3.84 < 0.001 -0.09
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Non-white
ethnicity
-0.17 0.06 -2.63 0.009 -0.07
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Equality
Con-
straint
Unstd.
estimate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Any family
psychiatric
history
-0.05 0.08 -0.58 0.561 -0.01
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Urban/rural
index
-0.09 0.04 -2.39 0.017 -0.07
Covariate
regression
Friendship
Quality
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
0 0.02 -0.07 0.944 0
Covariance ASO (BL) PI (BL) 0.29 0.02 15.94 < 0.001 0.59
Covariance ASO (FU) PI (FU) 0.1 0.01 11 < 0.001 0.56
Covariance Family Re-
lationship
Quality
Friendship
Quality
0.13 0.02 5.92 < 0.001 0.17
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 1 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 1 (FU)
0.11 0.01 7.36 < 0.001 0.28
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 2 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 2 (FU)
0.12 0.01 9.53 < 0.001 0.36
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 3 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 3 (FU)
0.09 0.01 6.84 < 0.001 0.28
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 4 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 4 (FU)
0.13 0.02 8.86 < 0.001 0.37
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 5 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 5 (FU)
0.07 0.01 5.43 < 0.001 0.23
Covariance ASO: Par-
cel 6 (BL)
ASO: Par-
cel 6 (FU)
0.06 0.02 2.88 0.004 0.14
Covariance PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
PI: Parcel 1
(FU)
0.14 0.02 7.7 < 0.001 0.31
Covariance PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
PI: Parcel 2
(FU)
0.06 0.02 3.28 0.001 0.17
Covariance PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
PI: Parcel 3
(FU)
0.09 0.01 6.32 < 0.001 0.26
Covariance PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
PI: Parcel 4
(FU)
0.11 0.02 4.66 < 0.001 0.23
Table B.10: Parameter estimates of the cross-lagged mediation model of PI, ASO and social sup-
port fit to NSPN data with a robust maximum-likelihood estimator, with missing data estimated
using full-information maximum likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality constraint label
were fixed to be equal. Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standard-
ised estimate.
315
Table B.11: Parameter estimates from structural equation model predicting future depressive
symptoms
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std. er-
ror
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
1 (BL)
1 0 NA NA 0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
2 (BL)
0.95 0.03 37.71 <
0.001
0.76
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.91 0.03 31.16 <
0.001
0.73
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.86 0.03 31.81 <
0.001
0.7
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
5 (BL)
0.95 0.02 38.53 <
0.001
0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.41 0.04 37.7 <
0.001
0.83
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
0.99 0.03 38.94 <
0.001
0.74
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
0.86 0.02 38.69 <
0.001
0.76
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
1.4 0.03 43.8 <
0.001
0.85
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
1 (BL)
1 0 NA NA 0.6
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
2 (BL)
1.16 0.04 26.02 <
0.001
0.72
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.9 0.04 20.67 <
0.001
0.67
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.77 0.04 19.33 <
0.001
0.64
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
5 (BL)
0.71 0.04 17.77 <
0.001
0.63
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.24 0.05 23.93 <
0.001
0.68
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.41 0.03 14 <
0.001
0.4
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
AEB (BL) 0.02 0.07 0.29 0.774 0.01
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
ASO (BL) 0.18 0.04 4.53 <
0.001
0.13
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
PI (BL) 0.21 0.05 4.22 <
0.001
0.17
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Intercept ASO: Parcel
1 (BL)
0.96 0.17 5.54 <
0.001
1.02
Intercept ASO: Parcel
2 (BL)
0.88 0.17 5.3 <
0.001
1.01
Intercept ASO: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.72 0.16 4.55 <
0.001
0.82
Intercept ASO: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.65 0.15 4.31 <
0.001
0.75
Intercept ASO: Parcel
5 (BL)
1.04 0.16 6.32 <
0.001
1.17
Intercept ASO: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.36 0.24 5.58 <
0.001
1.15
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
1.88 0.19 9.73 <
0.001
1.82
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
1.85 0.19 9.74 <
0.001
1.78
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
1.46 0.17 8.76 <
0.001
1.67
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
2.31 0.27 8.6 <
0.001
1.81
Intercept AEB: Parcel
1 (BL)
1.28 0.14 9.19 <
0.001
1.45
Intercept AEB: Parcel
2 (BL)
1.01 0.16 6.25 <
0.001
1.18
Intercept AEB: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.7 0.13 5.57 <
0.001
0.99
Intercept AEB: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.58 0.11 5.35 <
0.001
0.91
Intercept AEB: Parcel
5 (BL)
0.46 0.1 4.64 <
0.001
0.77
Intercept AEB: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.15 0.17 6.65 <
0.001
1.19
Intercept Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
1.75 0.22 7.85 <
0.001
1.81
Intercept Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
2.62 0.22 11.66 <
0.001
2.8
Intercept Male 0.47 0 NA NA 0.93
Intercept Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0 NA NA -0.01
Intercept Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0 NA NA 0.38
Intercept Age (years) 19.08 0 NA NA 6.35
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Intercept Non-white
ethnicity
0.23 0 NA NA 0.54
Intercept Any family
psychiatric
history
0.11 0 NA NA 0.35
Intercept Urban/rural
index
5.47 0 NA NA 7.31
Intercept Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
1.73 0 NA NA 1.56
Intercept ASO (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept PI (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Male 0.1 0.03 3.14 0.002 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -2.34 0.019 -0.06
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.05 0.05 1 0.318 0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Age (years) 0 0.01 0 0.997 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.11 0.04 2.69 0.007 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.16 0.05 2.9 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.02 -0.47 0.638 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -4.39 <
0.001
-0.1
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Male -0.09 0.03 -2.54 0.011 -0.06
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -2.05 0.04 -0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.05 2.27 0.023 0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Age (years) -0.03 0.01 -5.93 <
0.001
-0.13
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.06 0.04 1.37 0.171 0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.24 0.06 4 <
0.001
0.1
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Urban/rural
index
0 0.03 0.06 0.949 0
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.09 0.02 -5.94 <
0.001
-0.13
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Male -0.03 0.02 -1.08 0.279 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.01 -2.64 0.008 -0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.04 3.05 0.002 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Age (years) -0.02 0 -4.11 <
0.001
-0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.1 0.03 3.05 0.002 0.08
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.12 0.04 2.86 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.01 0.02 0.76 0.447 0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -5.47 <
0.001
-0.13
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Male -0.11 0.04 -2.96 0.003 -0.06
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.04 0.02 1.72 0.085 0.04
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.16 0.06 2.72 0.007 0.05
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Age (years) 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.336 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Non-white
ethnicity
0 0.05 -0.01 0.991 0
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Any family
psychiatric
history
0.08 0.06 1.3 0.193 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Urban/rural
index
-0.02 0.03 -0.89 0.375 -0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.01 0.02 -0.54 0.589 -0.01
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Male -0.19 0.04 -5.15 <
0.001
-0.1
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.07 0.02 -3.07 0.002 -0.07
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.31 0.06 5.39 <
0.001
0.11
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Age (years) 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.383 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Non-white
ethnicity
0.08 0.05 1.59 0.112 0.04
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Any family
psychiatric
history
0.44 0.07 6.57 <
0.001
0.15
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Urban/rural
index
0.02 0.03 0.68 0.496 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.02 -3.77 <
0.001
-0.08
Covariance ASO (BL) AEB (BL) 0.14 0.01 12.87 <
0.001
0.38
Covariance ASO (BL) PI (BL) 0.31 0.01 21.45 <
0.001
0.6
Covariance PI (BL) AEB (BL) 0.25 0.01 17.82 <
0.001
0.63
Covariance AEB (BL) Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.18 0.01 13.61 <
0.001
0.38
Covariance PI (BL) Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.4 0.02 22.42 <
0.001
0.58
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Covariance ASO (BL) Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.35 0.02 21.9 <
0.001
0.56
Table B.11: Parameter estimates of the model of baseline depressive symptoms, ASO, PI and
AEB predicting future depressive symptoms. The model was fit to NSPN data with a robust
maximum-likelihood estimator, with missing data estimated using full-information maximum
likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed to be equal. Unstd.
estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
Table B.12: Parameter estimates from structural equation model predicting future psychiatric
help-seeking
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std. er-
ror
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
1 (BL)
1 0 NA NA 0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
2 (BL)
0.95 0.03 37.71 <
0.001
0.76
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.91 0.03 31.16 <
0.001
0.73
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.86 0.03 31.81 <
0.001
0.7
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
5 (BL)
0.95 0.02 38.53 <
0.001
0.74
Loading ASO (BL) ASO: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.41 0.04 37.7 <
0.001
0.83
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
1 0 NA NA 0.75
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
0.99 0.03 38.94 <
0.001
0.74
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
0.86 0.02 38.69 <
0.001
0.76
Loading PI (BL) PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
1.4 0.03 43.8 <
0.001
0.85
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
1 (BL)
1 0 NA NA 0.6
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
2 (BL)
1.16 0.04 26.02 <
0.001
0.72
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.9 0.04 20.67 <
0.001
0.67
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.77 0.04 19.33 <
0.001
0.64
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
5 (BL)
0.71 0.04 17.77 <
0.001
0.63
Loading AEB (BL) AEB: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.24 0.05 23.93 <
0.001
0.68
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.41 0.03 14 <
0.001
0.4
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
AEB (BL) 0.02 0.07 0.29 0.774 0.01
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
ASO (BL) 0.18 0.04 4.53 <
0.001
0.13
Regression Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
PI (BL) 0.21 0.05 4.22 <
0.001
0.17
Intercept ASO: Parcel
1 (BL)
0.96 0.17 5.54 <
0.001
1.02
Intercept ASO: Parcel
2 (BL)
0.88 0.17 5.3 <
0.001
1.01
Intercept ASO: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.72 0.16 4.55 <
0.001
0.82
Intercept ASO: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.65 0.15 4.31 <
0.001
0.75
Intercept ASO: Parcel
5 (BL)
1.04 0.16 6.32 <
0.001
1.17
Intercept ASO: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.36 0.24 5.58 <
0.001
1.15
Intercept PI: Parcel 1
(BL)
1.88 0.19 9.73 <
0.001
1.82
Intercept PI: Parcel 2
(BL)
1.85 0.19 9.74 <
0.001
1.78
Intercept PI: Parcel 3
(BL)
1.46 0.17 8.76 <
0.001
1.67
Intercept PI: Parcel 4
(BL)
2.31 0.27 8.6 <
0.001
1.81
Intercept AEB: Parcel
1 (BL)
1.28 0.14 9.19 <
0.001
1.45
Intercept AEB: Parcel
2 (BL)
1.01 0.16 6.25 <
0.001
1.18
Intercept AEB: Parcel
3 (BL)
0.7 0.13 5.57 <
0.001
0.99
Intercept AEB: Parcel
4 (BL)
0.58 0.11 5.35 <
0.001
0.91
Intercept AEB: Parcel
5 (BL)
0.46 0.1 4.64 <
0.001
0.77
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Intercept AEB: Parcel
6 (BL)
1.15 0.17 6.65 <
0.001
1.19
Intercept Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
1.75 0.22 7.85 <
0.001
1.81
Intercept Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
2.62 0.22 11.66 <
0.001
2.8
Intercept Male 0.47 0 NA NA 0.93
Intercept Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.01 0 NA NA -0.01
Intercept Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0 NA NA 0.38
Intercept Age (years) 19.08 0 NA NA 6.35
Intercept Non-white
ethnicity
0.23 0 NA NA 0.54
Intercept Any family
psychiatric
history
0.11 0 NA NA 0.35
Intercept Urban/rural
index
5.47 0 NA NA 7.31
Intercept Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
1.73 0 NA NA 1.56
Intercept ASO (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept PI (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Intercept AEB (BL) 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Male 0.1 0.03 3.14 0.002 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -2.34 0.019 -0.06
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.05 0.05 1 0.318 0.02
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Age (years) 0 0.01 0 0.997 0
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.11 0.04 2.69 0.007 0.07
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.16 0.05 2.9 0.004 0.07
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Urban/rural
index
-0.01 0.02 -0.47 0.638 -0.01
Covariate
regression
ASO (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -4.39 <
0.001
-0.1
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Male -0.09 0.03 -2.54 0.011 -0.06
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.02 -2.05 0.04 -0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.05 2.27 0.023 0.05
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Age (years) -0.03 0.01 -5.93 <
0.001
-0.13
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.06 0.04 1.37 0.171 0.03
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.24 0.06 4 <
0.001
0.1
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Urban/rural
index
0 0.03 0.06 0.949 0
Covariate
regression
PI (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.09 0.02 -5.94 <
0.001
-0.13
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Male -0.03 0.02 -1.08 0.279 -0.02
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.04 0.01 -2.64 0.008 -0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.12 0.04 3.05 0.002 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Age (years) -0.02 0 -4.11 <
0.001
-0.09
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Non-white
ethnicity
0.1 0.03 3.05 0.002 0.08
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Any family
psychiatric
history
0.12 0.04 2.86 0.004 0.07
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Urban/rural
index
0.01 0.02 0.76 0.447 0.02
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Covariate
regression
AEB (BL) Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.01 -5.47 <
0.001
-0.13
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Male -0.11 0.04 -2.96 0.003 -0.06
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
0.04 0.02 1.72 0.085 0.04
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.16 0.06 2.72 0.007 0.05
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Age (years) 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.336 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Non-white
ethnicity
0 0.05 -0.01 0.991 0
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Any family
psychiatric
history
0.08 0.06 1.3 0.193 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Urban/rural
index
-0.02 0.03 -0.89 0.375 -0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(FU)
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.01 0.02 -0.54 0.589 -0.01
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Male -0.19 0.04 -5.15 <
0.001
-0.1
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Socioeconomic
deprivation
(IMD)
-0.07 0.02 -3.07 0.002 -0.07
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Cannabis
Use at
baseline
0.31 0.06 5.39 <
0.001
0.11
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Age (years) 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.383 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Non-white
ethnicity
0.08 0.05 1.59 0.112 0.04
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Any family
psychiatric
history
0.44 0.07 6.57 <
0.001
0.15
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-
score
P-
value
Std. es-
timate
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Urban/rural
index
0.02 0.03 0.68 0.496 0.02
Covariate
regression
Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
Mother’s
educational
qualifica-
tions
-0.06 0.02 -3.77 <
0.001
-0.08
Covariance ASO (BL) AEB (BL) 0.14 0.01 12.87 <
0.001
0.38
Covariance ASO (BL) PI (BL) 0.31 0.01 21.45 <
0.001
0.6
Covariance PI (BL) AEB (BL) 0.25 0.01 17.82 <
0.001
0.63
Covariance AEB (BL) Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.18 0.01 13.61 <
0.001
0.38
Covariance PI (BL) Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.4 0.02 22.42 <
0.001
0.58
Covariance ASO (BL) Depressive
Symptoms
(BL)
0.35 0.02 21.9 <
0.001
0.56
Table B.12: Parameter estimates of the model of baseline psychiatric help-seeking, ASO, PI and
AEB predicting future help-seeking. The model was fit to NSPN data with a robust maximum-
likelihood estimator, with missing data estimated using full-information maximum likelihood.
Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed to be equal. Unstd. estimate =
unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
B.4 Parameter estimates from structural equation models in Chap-
ter 9
Table B.13: Parameter estimates structural equation model of childhood adversity predicting
depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena in ROOTS.
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading SMFQ: 1 DS 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.61
Loading SMFQ: 2 DS 1.00 0.05 18.71 < 0.001 0.61
Loading SMFQ: 3 DS 0.84 0.07 11.54 < 0.001 0.42
Loading SMFQ: 4 DS 0.77 0.07 10.37 < 0.001 0.38
Loading SMFQ: 5 DS 1.23 0.07 17.09 < 0.001 0.75
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading SMFQ: 6 DS 1.00 0.07 14.02 < 0.001 0.58
Loading SMFQ: 7 DS 1.14 0.07 16.02 < 0.001 0.59
Loading SMFQ: 8 DS 1.08 0.07 15.25 < 0.001 0.73
Loading SMFQ: 9 DS 0.72 0.07 9.95 < 0.001 0.58
Loading SMFQ: 10 DS 1.33 0.07 17.97 < 0.001 0.69
Loading SMFQ: 11 DS 0.95 0.07 13.23 < 0.001 0.66
Loading SMFQ: 12 DS 1.16 0.08 14.37 < 0.001 0.64
Loading SMFQ: 13 DS 1.05 0.07 14.17 < 0.001 0.69
Loading AEB: 1 AEB 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.72
Loading AEB: 2 AEB 0.80 0.07 12.27 < 0.001 0.61
Loading AEB: 3 AEB 0.63 0.08 8.27 < 0.001 0.56
Loading AEB: 4 AEB 0.39 0.07 5.87 < 0.001 0.36
Loading AEB: 5 AEB 0.38 0.06 6.26 < 0.001 0.49
Loading AEB: 6 AEB 0.44 0.06 7.71 < 0.001 0.51
Loading AEB: 7 AEB 0.96 0.05 19.94 < 0.001 0.71
Loading AEB: 8 AEB 0.38 0.05 7.20 < 0.001 0.53
Loading PI: 1 PI 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.73
Loading PI: 2 PI 0.98 0.05 18.21 < 0.001 0.75
Loading PI: 3 PI 0.74 0.05 15.24 < 0.001 0.66
Loading PI: 4 PI 1.14 0.05 24.88 < 0.001 0.86
Loading PI: 5 PI 0.73 0.05 14.02 < 0.001 0.57
Regression DS CA 0.06 0.01 4.33 < 0.001 0.17
Regression AEB CA 0.06 0.02 2.53 0.011 0.11
Regression PI CA 0.06 0.02 2.77 0.006 0.11
Covariate
Regression
CA Male 0.02 0.06 0.42 0.678 0.01
Covariate
Regression
CA Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.46 0.11 4.19 < 0.001 0.16
Covariate
Regression
CA Non-white eth-
nicity
0.08 0.13 0.58 0.565 0.02
Covariate
Regression
CA Cannabis use
at 17
0.04 0.12 0.34 0.737 0.01
Covariate
Regression
CA Mother’s years
of education
post-16
-0.06 0.01 -5.11 < 0.001 -0.15
Covariate
Regression
CA Family psychi-
atric history
0.68 0.08 8.15 < 0.001 0.27
Covariate
Regression
DS Male -0.14 0.02 -6.03 < 0.001 -0.21
Covariate
Regression
DS Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.02 0.04 0.49 0.622 0.02
Covariate
Regression
DS Non-white eth-
nicity
0.07 0.05 1.30 0.194 0.05
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
Regression
DS Cannabis use
at 17
0.09 0.03 2.56 0.01 0.08
Covariate
Regression
DS Mother’s years
of education
post-16
0.01 0.00 1.50 0.133 0.05
Covariate
Regression
DS Family psychi-
atric history
0.04 0.03 1.38 0.166 0.05
Covariate
Regression
AEB Male -0.14 0.04 -3.19 0.001 -0.14
Covariate
Regression
AEB Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.10 0.07 1.52 0.127 0.07
Covariate
Regression
AEB Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.05 0.07 -0.79 0.427 -0.03
Covariate
Regression
AEB Cannabis use
at 17
0.13 0.06 2.40 0.016 0.08
Covariate
Regression
AEB Mother’s years
of education
post-16
-0.02 0.01 -2.15 0.032 -0.08
Covariate
Regression
AEB Family psychi-
atric history
0.12 0.06 2.19 0.029 0.10
Covariate
Regression
PI Male -0.15 0.04 -3.90 < 0.001 -0.13
Covariate
Regression
PI Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.11 0.06 1.80 0.072 0.07
Covariate
Regression
PI Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.03 0.08 -0.42 0.674 -0.01
Covariate
Regression
PI Cannabis use
at 17
0.19 0.06 3.14 0.002 0.11
Covariate
Regression
PI Mother’s years
of education
post-16
0.00 0.01 -0.35 0.728 -0.01
Covariate
Regression
PI Family psychi-
atric history
0.09 0.05 1.79 0.073 0.07
Residual SMFQ: 1 0.18 0.01 26.05 < 0.001 0.62
Residual SMFQ: 2 0.19 0.01 19.17 < 0.001 0.62
Residual SMFQ: 3 0.36 0.01 24.37 < 0.001 0.82
Residual SMFQ: 4 0.38 0.02 23.38 < 0.001 0.85
Residual SMFQ: 5 0.13 0.01 13.51 < 0.001 0.44
Residual SMFQ: 6 0.22 0.01 16.90 < 0.001 0.66
Residual SMFQ: 7 0.27 0.01 22.15 < 0.001 0.65
Residual SMFQ: 8 0.11 0.01 12.02 < 0.001 0.46
Residual SMFQ: 9 0.11 0.01 15.07 < 0.001 0.67
Residual SMFQ: 10 0.22 0.01 15.61 < 0.001 0.53
Residual SMFQ: 11 0.13 0.01 12.50 < 0.001 0.56
Residual SMFQ: 12 0.21 0.01 15.94 < 0.001 0.59
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Residual SMFQ: 13 0.13 0.01 14.21 < 0.001 0.52
Residual AEB: 1 0.24 0.03 9.53 < 0.001 0.49
Residual AEB: 2 0.27 0.02 12.92 < 0.001 0.63
Residual AEB: 3 0.22 0.02 12.22 < 0.001 0.69
Residual AEB: 4 0.26 0.02 11.14 < 0.001 0.87
Residual AEB: 5 0.11 0.01 8.38 < 0.001 0.76
Residual AEB: 6 0.13 0.01 9.04 < 0.001 0.74
Residual AEB: 7 0.23 0.02 9.57 < 0.001 0.50
Residual AEB: 8 0.09 0.01 8.46 < 0.001 0.72
Residual PI: 1 0.27 0.02 14.34 < 0.001 0.47
Residual PI: 2 0.22 0.02 13.78 < 0.001 0.43
Residual PI: 3 0.21 0.01 15.55 < 0.001 0.56
Residual PI: 4 0.14 0.01 9.54 < 0.001 0.26
Residual PI: 5 0.33 0.02 16.92 < 0.001 0.67
Residual CA 0.87 0.05 17.93 < 0.001 0.86
Residual DS 0.10 0.01 10.23 < 0.001 0.91
Residual AEB 0.23 0.03 9.07 < 0.001 0.93
Residual PI 0.29 0.02 13.41 < 0.001 0.94
Covariance DS AEB 0.05 0.01 6.42 < 0.001 0.33
Covariance DS PI 0.10 0.01 10.61 < 0.001 0.56
Covariance AEB PI 0.12 0.01 9.27 < 0.001 0.45
Intercept SMFQ: 1 1.82 0.02 73.41 < 0.001 3.36
Intercept SMFQ: 2 1.41 0.03 55.62 < 0.001 2.60
Intercept SMFQ: 3 1.85 0.03 71.65 < 0.001 2.78
Intercept SMFQ: 4 1.65 0.03 64.86 < 0.001 2.47
Intercept SMFQ: 5 1.32 0.03 45.94 < 0.001 2.41
Intercept SMFQ: 6 1.35 0.03 49.23 < 0.001 2.34
Intercept SMFQ: 7 1.77 0.03 60.88 < 0.001 2.73
Intercept SMFQ: 8 1.23 0.03 47.40 < 0.001 2.49
Intercept SMFQ: 9 1.18 0.02 62.12 < 0.001 2.86
Intercept SMFQ: 10 1.49 0.03 46.19 < 0.001 2.31
Intercept SMFQ: 11 1.20 0.02 49.26 < 0.001 2.51
Intercept SMFQ: 12 1.39 0.03 50.19 < 0.001 2.31
Intercept SMFQ: 13 1.28 0.03 51.31 < 0.001 2.54
Intercept AEB: 1 1.46 0.04 36.62 < 0.001 2.08
Intercept AEB: 2 1.39 0.03 41.44 < 0.001 2.12
Intercept AEB: 3 1.27 0.03 46.03 < 0.001 2.25
Intercept AEB: 4 1.23 0.02 56.48 < 0.001 2.25
Intercept AEB: 5 1.13 0.02 68.01 < 0.001 2.94
Intercept AEB: 6 1.17 0.02 61.80 < 0.001 2.73
Intercept AEB: 7 1.43 0.04 36.01 < 0.001 2.11
Intercept AEB: 8 1.11 0.02 62.77 < 0.001 3.11
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept PI: 1 1.86 0.04 47.98 < 0.001 2.46
Intercept PI: 2 1.57 0.04 40.28 < 0.001 2.18
Intercept PI: 3 1.34 0.03 42.71 < 0.001 2.18
Intercept PI: 4 1.70 0.04 39.85 < 0.001 2.32
Intercept PI: 5 1.51 0.03 46.79 < 0.001 2.15
Intercept CA -0.05 0.06 -0.87 0.385 -0.05
Intercept DS 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercept AEB 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercept PI 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercept Male 0.46 0.00 NA NA 0.91
Intercept Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.14 0.00 NA NA 0.41
Intercept Non-white eth-
nicity
0.06 0.00 NA NA 0.25
Intercept Cannabis use
at 17
0.11 0.00 NA NA 0.36
Intercept Mother’s years
of education
post-16
2.41 0.00 NA NA 1.00
Intercept Family psychi-
atric history
0.20 0.00 NA NA 0.49
Table B.13: Parameter estimates of structural equation model of childhood adversity predicting
depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena fit to ROOTS data with a robust maximum-
likelihood estimator. Missing data were estimated using full-information maximum likelihood.
Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed to be equal. Unstd. estimate =
unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
Table B.14: Parameter estimates structural equation model of childhood adversity predicting
depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena in NSPN.
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading SMFQ: 1 DS 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.59
Loading SMFQ: 2 SMFQ 1.17 0.05 22.22 < 0.001 0.66
Loading SMFQ: 3 SMFQ 0.97 0.06 15.24 < 0.001 0.47
Loading SMFQ: 4 SMFQ 0.95 0.07 14.43 < 0.001 0.45
Loading SMFQ: 5 SMFQ 1.58 0.07 22.20 < 0.001 0.80
Loading SMFQ: 6 SMFQ 0.88 0.06 13.57 < 0.001 0.49
Loading SMFQ: 7 SMFQ 1.43 0.07 21.37 < 0.001 0.66
Loading SMFQ: 8 SMFQ 1.44 0.07 20.10 < 0.001 0.76
Loading SMFQ: 9 SMFQ 1.10 0.07 16.56 < 0.001 0.65
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading SMFQ: 10 SMFQ 1.59 0.07 22.08 < 0.001 0.70
Loading SMFQ: 11 SMFQ 1.31 0.08 16.88 < 0.001 0.70
Loading SMFQ: 12 SMFQ 1.58 0.08 19.86 < 0.001 0.71
Loading SMFQ: 13 SMFQ 1.35 0.07 19.03 < 0.001 0.74
Loading AEB: 1 AEB 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.41
Loading AEB: 2 AEB 0.85 0.11 7.40 < 0.001 0.46
Loading AEB: 3 AEB 1.21 0.12 10.18 < 0.001 0.46
Loading AEB: 4 AEB 0.83 0.11 7.91 < 0.001 0.51
Loading AEB: 5 AEB 1.37 0.13 10.53 < 0.001 0.60
Loading AEB: 6 AEB 0.95 0.10 9.45 < 0.001 0.47
Loading AEB: 7 AEB 0.45 0.07 6.17 < 0.001 0.36
Loading AEB: 8 AEB 1.03 0.08 12.25 < 0.001 0.52
Loading AEB: 9 AEB 0.97 0.12 8.30 < 0.001 0.51
Loading AEB: 10 AEB 0.65 0.09 7.42 < 0.001 0.36
Loading AEB: 11 AEB 0.70 0.06 10.85 < 0.001 0.49
Loading AEB: 12 AEB 0.34 0.06 5.55 < 0.001 0.31
Loading AEB: 13 AEB 0.66 0.09 7.73 < 0.001 0.52
Loading AEB: 14 AEB 0.68 0.09 7.37 < 0.001 0.49
Loading AEB: 15 AEB 0.55 0.08 7.37 < 0.001 0.47
Loading AEB: 16 AEB 0.88 0.10 8.96 < 0.001 0.42
Loading AEB: 17 AEB 1.17 0.12 9.52 < 0.001 0.52
Loading AEB: 18 AEB 1.18 0.12 10.20 < 0.001 0.54
Loading PI: 1 PI 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.68
Loading PI: 2 PI 0.77 0.04 17.54 < 0.001 0.52
Loading PI: 3 PI 0.65 0.04 15.62 < 0.001 0.52
Loading PI: 4 PI 0.79 0.04 20.61 < 0.001 0.50
Loading PI: 5 PI 0.78 0.04 19.84 < 0.001 0.59
Loading PI: 6 PI 0.74 0.04 18.29 < 0.001 0.59
Loading PI: 7 PI 0.79 0.04 18.24 < 0.001 0.57
Loading PI: 8 PI 0.30 0.04 8.13 < 0.001 0.39
Loading PI: 9 PI 0.93 0.03 27.16 < 0.001 0.67
Loading PI: 10 PI 0.63 0.04 16.24 < 0.001 0.61
Loading PI: 11 PI 0.98 0.04 26.01 < 0.001 0.69
Loading PI: 12 PI 1.10 0.03 36.96 < 0.001 0.74
Loading PI: 13 PI 0.72 0.04 17.07 < 0.001 0.54
Regression DS CA 0.11 0.01 10.12 < 0.001 0.34
Regression PI CA 0.10 0.01 10.63 < 0.001 0.32
Regression AEB CA 0.04 0.01 6.37 < 0.001 0.25
Covariate
Regression
DS Age (years) -0.01 0.00 -1.77 < 0.001 -0.05
Covariate
Regression
DS Male -0.03 0.02 -1.92 < 0.001 -0.05
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
Regression
DS Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.01 0.01 -0.59 < 0.001 -0.02
Covariate
Regression
DS Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.03 0.02 -1.18 < 0.001 -0.03
Covariate
Regression
DS Mother’s edu-
cational qualifi-
cations
-0.02 0.01 -2.26 < 0.001 -0.06
Covariate
Regression
DS Urban-rural in-
dex
0.00 0.01 -0.03 < 0.001 0.00
Covariate
Regression
DS Family psychi-
atric history
0.09 0.03 2.77 < 0.001 0.09
Covariate
Regression
DS Cannabis use 0.04 0.03 1.67 < 0.001 0.05
Covariate
Regression
PI Age (years) -0.01 0.00 -1.47 < 0.001 -0.04
Covariate
Regression
PI Male -0.03 0.02 -1.81 < 0.001 -0.05
Covariate
Regression
PI Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
0.01 0.01 0.73 < 0.001 0.02
Covariate
Regression
PI Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.02 0.02 -0.68 < 0.001 -0.02
Covariate
Regression
PI Mother’s edu-
cational qualifi-
cations
-0.04 0.01 -4.57 < 0.001 -0.13
Covariate
Regression
PI Urban-rural in-
dex
0.02 0.01 1.08 < 0.001 0.03
Covariate
Regression
PI Family psychi-
atric history
0.04 0.03 1.17 < 0.001 0.04
Covariate
Regression
PI Cannabis use 0.00 0.02 0.15 < 0.001 0.00
Covariate
Regression
AEB Age (years) 0.00 0.00 -0.78 < 0.001 -0.02
Covariate
Regression
AEB Male -0.01 0.01 -1.38 < 0.001 -0.04
Covariate
Regression
AEB Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.01 0.01 -1.91 < 0.001 -0.07
Covariate
Regression
AEB Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.01 0.01 -0.85 < 0.001 -0.03
Covariate
Regression
AEB Mother’s edu-
cational qualifi-
cations
-0.02 0.00 -3.85 < 0.001 -0.11
Covariate
Regression
AEB Urban-rural in-
dex
0.01 0.01 1.67 < 0.001 0.06
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Covariate
Regression
AEB Family psychi-
atric history
0.03 0.02 1.40 < 0.001 0.05
Covariate
Regression
AEB Cannabis use 0.05 0.02 2.64 < 0.001 0.10
Covariate
Regression
CA Age (years) 0.01 0.01 1.24 < 0.001 0.03
Covariate
Regression
CA Male -0.04 0.05 -0.90 < 0.001 -0.02
Covariate
Regression
CA Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.10 0.03 -3.58 < 0.001 -0.10
Covariate
Regression
CA Non-white eth-
nicity
0.15 0.06 2.27 < 0.001 0.06
Covariate
Regression
CA Mother’s edu-
cational qualifi-
cations
-0.09 0.02 -3.98 < 0.001 -0.09
Covariate
Regression
CA Urban-rural in-
dex
0.04 0.04 1.09 < 0.001 0.03
Covariate
Regression
CA Family psychi-
atric history
0.49 0.08 6.03 < 0.001 0.15
Covariate
Regression
CA Cannabis use 0.15 0.07 2.28 < 0.001 0.05
Residual SMFQ: 1 0.19 0.01 31.55 < 0.001 0.65
Residual SMFQ: 2 0.19 0.01 22.43 < 0.001 0.57
Residual SMFQ: 3 0.35 0.01 29.75 < 0.001 0.78
Residual SMFQ: 4 0.38 0.01 29.09 < 0.001 0.80
Residual SMFQ: 5 0.15 0.01 18.52 < 0.001 0.37
Residual SMFQ: 6 0.25 0.01 19.96 < 0.001 0.76
Residual SMFQ: 7 0.28 0.01 26.85 < 0.001 0.57
Residual SMFQ: 8 0.15 0.01 17.89 < 0.001 0.42
Residual SMFQ: 9 0.17 0.01 18.46 < 0.001 0.58
Residual SMFQ: 10 0.28 0.01 23.76 < 0.001 0.51
Residual SMFQ: 11 0.18 0.01 17.21 < 0.001 0.50
Residual SMFQ: 12 0.26 0.01 21.15 < 0.001 0.50
Residual SMFQ: 13 0.15 0.01 16.75 < 0.001 0.45
Residual AEB: 1 0.16 0.01 24.74 < 0.001 0.83
Residual AEB: 2 0.09 0.01 15.37 < 0.001 0.79
Residual AEB: 3 0.18 0.01 28.60 < 0.001 0.79
Residual AEB: 4 0.06 0.00 13.18 < 0.001 0.74
Residual AEB: 5 0.11 0.01 18.07 < 0.001 0.64
Residual AEB: 6 0.10 0.01 17.90 < 0.001 0.78
Residual AEB: 7 0.05 0.00 9.99 < 0.001 0.87
Residual AEB: 8 0.09 0.01 16.51 < 0.001 0.73
Residual AEB: 9 0.09 0.01 14.52 < 0.001 0.74
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Residual AEB: 10 0.09 0.01 16.17 < 0.001 0.87
Residual AEB: 11 0.05 0.00 12.24 < 0.001 0.76
Residual AEB: 12 0.04 0.00 8.34 < 0.001 0.90
Residual AEB: 13 0.04 0.00 11.22 < 0.001 0.73
Residual AEB: 14 0.05 0.00 11.67 < 0.001 0.76
Residual AEB: 15 0.04 0.00 10.14 < 0.001 0.78
Residual AEB: 16 0.12 0.01 19.10 < 0.001 0.83
Residual AEB: 17 0.12 0.01 18.49 < 0.001 0.73
Residual AEB: 18 0.11 0.01 17.77 < 0.001 0.71
Residual PI: 1 0.12 0.01 20.03 < 0.001 0.54
Residual PI: 2 0.17 0.01 25.94 < 0.001 0.73
Residual PI: 3 0.11 0.01 20.25 < 0.001 0.73
Residual PI: 4 0.18 0.01 32.44 < 0.001 0.75
Residual PI: 5 0.12 0.01 20.10 < 0.001 0.65
Residual PI: 6 0.11 0.01 19.77 < 0.001 0.66
Residual PI: 7 0.14 0.01 21.78 < 0.001 0.68
Residual PI: 8 0.05 0.00 11.26 < 0.001 0.85
Residual PI: 9 0.11 0.01 17.74 < 0.001 0.54
Residual PI: 10 0.07 0.00 17.15 < 0.001 0.63
Residual PI: 11 0.10 0.01 19.13 < 0.001 0.52
Residual PI: 12 0.10 0.01 17.50 < 0.001 0.46
Residual PI: 13 0.13 0.01 21.73 < 0.001 0.71
Residual CA 0.96 0.03 27.58 < 0.001 0.95
Residual DS 0.09 0.01 11.22 < 0.001 0.85
Residual AEB 0.03 0.00 6.43 < 0.001 0.89
Residual PI 0.09 0.01 16.12 < 0.001 0.86
Covariance DS AEB 0.02 0.00 7.28 < 0.001 0.37
Covariance DS PI 0.05 0.00 13.17 < 0.001 0.58
Covariance AEB PI 0.03 0.00 9.57 < 0.001 0.57
Intercepts SMFQ: 1 1.00 0.10 10.08 < 0.001 1.84
Intercepts SMFQ: 2 0.60 0.12 5.19 < 0.001 1.05
Intercepts SMFQ: 3 0.98 0.10 9.96 < 0.001 1.46
Intercepts SMFQ: 4 0.85 0.10 8.78 < 0.001 1.23
Intercepts SMFQ: 5 0.67 0.16 4.24 < 0.001 1.04
Intercepts SMFQ: 6 0.45 0.09 5.11 < 0.001 0.78
Intercepts SMFQ: 7 1.02 0.14 7.10 < 0.001 1.44
Intercepts SMFQ: 8 0.57 0.14 3.99 < 0.001 0.93
Intercepts SMFQ: 9 0.47 0.11 4.25 < 0.001 0.85
Intercepts SMFQ: 10 0.96 0.16 6.07 < 0.001 1.30
Intercepts SMFQ: 11 0.51 0.13 3.85 < 0.001 0.84
Intercepts SMFQ: 12 0.80 0.16 5.09 < 0.001 1.11
Intercepts SMFQ: 13 0.54 0.13 4.03 < 0.001 0.92
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercepts AEB: 1 0.25 0.07 3.77 < 0.001 0.56
Intercepts AEB: 2 0.12 0.06 2.10 < 0.001 0.35
Intercepts AEB: 3 0.33 0.08 4.12 < 0.001 0.69
Intercepts AEB: 4 0.08 0.05 1.54 < 0.001 0.29
Intercepts AEB: 5 0.20 0.09 2.24 < 0.001 0.48
Intercepts AEB: 6 0.14 0.06 2.33 < 0.001 0.40
Intercepts AEB: 7 0.05 0.03 1.61 < 0.001 0.21
Intercepts AEB: 8 0.13 0.07 1.99 < 0.001 0.37
Intercepts AEB: 9 0.13 0.06 1.99 < 0.001 0.36
Intercepts AEB: 10 0.11 0.04 2.61 < 0.001 0.34
Intercepts AEB: 11 0.06 0.05 1.39 < 0.001 0.24
Intercepts AEB: 12 0.04 0.02 1.61 < 0.001 0.18
Intercepts AEB: 13 0.05 0.04 1.05 < 0.001 0.20
Intercepts AEB: 14 0.06 0.04 1.28 < 0.001 0.23
Intercepts AEB: 15 0.04 0.04 1.11 < 0.001 0.19
Intercepts AEB: 16 0.16 0.06 2.77 < 0.001 0.42
Intercepts AEB: 17 0.19 0.08 2.47 < 0.001 0.47
Intercepts AEB: 18 0.17 0.08 2.28 < 0.001 0.44
Intercepts PI: 1 0.41 0.11 3.65 < 0.001 0.88
Intercepts PI: 2 0.42 0.09 4.78 < 0.001 0.87
Intercepts PI: 3 0.25 0.07 3.42 < 0.001 0.64
Intercepts PI: 4 0.52 0.09 5.80 < 0.001 1.04
Intercepts PI: 5 0.30 0.09 3.38 < 0.001 0.71
Intercepts PI: 6 0.27 0.08 3.18 < 0.001 0.66
Intercepts PI: 7 0.34 0.09 3.83 < 0.001 0.77
Intercepts PI: 8 0.09 0.03 2.65 < 0.001 0.37
Intercepts PI: 9 0.35 0.11 3.27 < 0.001 0.78
Intercepts PI: 10 0.18 0.07 2.57 < 0.001 0.55
Intercepts PI: 11 0.37 0.11 3.31 < 0.001 0.81
Intercepts PI: 12 0.44 0.12 3.54 < 0.001 0.92
Intercepts PI: 13 0.30 0.08 3.67 < 0.001 0.70
Intercepts Age (years) 20.07 0.00 NA NA 8.05
Intercepts Male 0.47 0.00 NA NA 0.94
Intercepts Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.04 0.00 NA NA -0.04
Intercepts Non-white eth-
nicity
0.23 0.00 NA NA 0.55
Intercepts Mother’s edu-
cational qualifi-
cations
1.67 0.00 NA NA 1.51
Intercepts Urban-rural in-
dex
5.43 0.00 NA NA 7.36
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercepts Family psychi-
atric history
0.11 0.00 NA NA 0.35
Intercepts Cannabis use 0.15 0.00 NA NA 0.42
Intercepts CA -0.33 0.29 -1.13 < 0.001 -0.33
Intercepts DS 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercepts AEB 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercepts PI 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Table B.14: Parameter estimates of structural equation model of childhood adversity predicting
depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena fit to NSPN data with a robust maximum-
likelihood estimator. Missing data were estimated using full-information maximum likelihood.
Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed to be equal. Unstd. estimate =
unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
Table B.15: Parameter estimates structural equation model of longitudinal relationships be-
tween childhood adversity, social support and depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena in
ROOTS.
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading SMFQ: 1 DS 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.61
Loading SMFQ: 2 DS 1.00 0.05 18.75 < 0.001 0.61
Loading SMFQ: 3 DS 0.84 0.07 11.59 < 0.001 0.42
Loading SMFQ: 4 DS 0.77 0.07 10.37 < 0.001 0.39
Loading SMFQ: 5 DS 1.23 0.07 17.14 < 0.001 0.75
Loading SMFQ: 6 DS 1.00 0.07 13.99 < 0.001 0.58
Loading SMFQ: 7 DS 1.14 0.07 16.03 < 0.001 0.59
Loading SMFQ: 8 DS 1.08 0.07 15.26 < 0.001 0.73
Loading SMFQ: 9 DS 0.71 0.07 9.96 < 0.001 0.58
Loading SMFQ: 10 DS 1.33 0.07 17.97 < 0.001 0.69
Loading SMFQ: 11 DS 0.95 0.07 13.25 < 0.001 0.66
Loading SMFQ: 12 DS 1.16 0.08 14.38 < 0.001 0.64
Loading SMFQ: 13 DS 1.05 0.07 14.16 < 0.001 0.69
Loading AEB: 1 AEB 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.71
Loading AEB: 2 AEB 0.80 0.07 12.29 < 0.001 0.61
Loading AEB: 3 AEB 0.63 0.08 8.26 < 0.001 0.56
Loading AEB: 4 AEB 0.39 0.07 5.87 < 0.001 0.36
Loading AEB: 5 AEB 0.38 0.06 6.25 < 0.001 0.49
Loading AEB: 6 AEB 0.44 0.06 7.70 < 0.001 0.51
Loading AEB: 7 AEB 0.96 0.05 19.95 < 0.001 0.71
Loading AEB: 8 AEB 0.38 0.05 7.20 < 0.001 0.53
Loading PI: 1 PI 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.73
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading PI: 2 PI 0.99 0.05 18.19 < 0.001 0.75
Loading PI: 3 PI 0.74 0.05 15.23 < 0.001 0.66
Loading PI: 4 PI 1.14 0.05 24.85 < 0.001 0.86
Loading PI: 5 PI 0.73 0.05 14.02 < 0.001 0.57
Regression DS CA 0.05 0.01 3.56 < 0.001 0.14
Regression AEB CA 0.05 0.02 2.29 0.022 0.10
Regression PI CA 0.05 0.02 2.07 0.039 0.08
Regression DS Family support -0.06 0.01 -4.90 < 0.001 -0.19
Regression DS Friendship sup-
port
-0.04 0.01 -3.07 0.002 -0.12
Regression AEB Family support -0.03 0.02 -1.72 0.085 -0.06
Regression AEB Friendship sup-
port
0.00 0.02 -0.20 0.844 -0.01
Regression PI Family support -0.09 0.02 -4.21 < 0.001 -0.16
Regression PI Friendship sup-
port
-0.06 0.02 -3.04 0.002 -0.12
Regression Family
support
CA -0.15 0.04 -4.32 < 0.001 -0.15
Regression Friendship
support
CA -0.05 0.04 -1.19 0.235 -0.05
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Family psychi-
atric history
-0.07 0.08 -0.92 0.358 -0.03
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Male 0.02 0.06 0.39 0.695 0.01
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.02 0.09 0.21 0.833 0.01
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Non-white eth-
nicity
0.06 0.13 0.45 0.653 0.01
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Cannabis use at
17
-0.35 0.12 -2.94 0.003 -0.11
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Mother’s years of
education post-
16
0.01 0.01 0.44 0.661 0.01
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Family psychi-
atric history
-0.19 0.08 -2.28 0.023 -0.08
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Male 0.11 0.06 1.77 0.076 0.05
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.00 0.09 -0.02 0.983 0.00
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.58 0.13 -4.36 < 0.001 -0.14
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Cannabis use at
17
0.04 0.11 0.34 0.733 0.01
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Mother’s years of
education post-
16
-0.02 0.01 -1.65 0.099 -0.05
Cov. Reg. DS Family psychi-
atric history
0.03 0.03 1.00 0.317 0.04
Cov. Reg. DS Male -0.13 0.02 -6.00 < 0.001 -0.20
Cov. Reg. DS Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.01 0.03 0.30 0.765 0.01
Cov. Reg. DS Non-white eth-
nicity
0.05 0.05 1.04 0.299 0.04
Cov. Reg. DS Cannabis use at
17
0.07 0.03 1.97 0.049 0.06
Cov. Reg. DS Mother’s years of
education post-
16
0.01 0.00 1.45 0.148 0.05
Cov. Reg. AEB Family psychi-
atric history
0.12 0.06 2.12 0.034 0.09
Cov. Reg. AEB Male -0.14 0.04 -3.16 0.002 -0.14
Cov. Reg. AEB Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.10 0.06 1.47 0.142 0.07
Cov. Reg. AEB Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.05 0.07 -0.72 0.474 -0.02
Cov. Reg. AEB Cannabis use at
17
0.12 0.05 2.25 0.024 0.08
Cov. Reg. AEB Mother’s years of
education post-
16
-0.02 0.01 -2.11 0.035 -0.08
Cov. Reg. PI Family psychi-
atric history
0.07 0.05 1.38 0.167 0.05
Cov. Reg. PI Male -0.14 0.04 -3.81 < 0.001 -0.13
Cov. Reg. PI Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.10 0.06 1.64 0.101 0.07
Cov. Reg. PI Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.06 0.07 -0.78 0.434 -0.03
Cov. Reg. PI Cannabis use at
17
0.16 0.06 2.66 0.008 0.09
Cov. Reg. PI Mother’s years of
education post-
16
0.00 0.01 -0.46 0.642 -0.02
Cov. Reg. CA Family psychi-
atric history
0.67 0.08 8.09 < 0.001 0.26
Cov. Reg. CA Male 0.03 0.06 0.44 0.657 0.01
Cov. Reg. CA Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.46 0.11 4.21 < 0.001 0.16
Cov. Reg. CA Non-white eth-
nicity
0.07 0.13 0.55 0.583 0.02
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Cov. Reg. CA Cannabis use at
17
0.03 0.12 0.26 0.797 0.01
Cov. Reg. CA Mother’s years of
education post-
16
-0.06 0.01 -5.12 < 0.001 -0.15
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 1 0.18 0.01 26.14 < 0.001 0.62
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 2 0.19 0.01 19.16 < 0.001 0.62
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 3 0.36 0.01 24.38 < 0.001 0.82
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 4 0.38 0.02 23.36 < 0.001 0.85
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 5 0.13 0.01 13.59 < 0.001 0.44
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 6 0.22 0.01 16.93 < 0.001 0.67
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 7 0.27 0.01 22.16 < 0.001 0.65
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 8 0.11 0.01 11.99 < 0.001 0.47
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 9 0.11 0.01 15.07 < 0.001 0.67
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 10 0.22 0.01 15.62 < 0.001 0.52
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 11 0.13 0.01 12.54 < 0.001 0.56
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 12 0.21 0.01 15.97 < 0.001 0.59
Cov. Reg. SMFQ: 13 0.13 0.01 14.26 < 0.001 0.52
Cov. Reg. AEB: 1 0.24 0.03 9.52 < 0.001 0.49
Cov. Reg. AEB: 2 0.27 0.02 12.91 < 0.001 0.63
Cov. Reg. AEB: 3 0.22 0.02 12.19 < 0.001 0.69
Cov. Reg. AEB: 4 0.26 0.02 11.14 < 0.001 0.87
Cov. Reg. AEB: 5 0.11 0.01 8.38 < 0.001 0.76
Cov. Reg. AEB: 6 0.13 0.01 9.04 < 0.001 0.74
Cov. Reg. AEB: 7 0.23 0.02 9.57 < 0.001 0.50
Cov. Reg. AEB: 8 0.09 0.01 8.46 < 0.001 0.72
Cov. Reg. PI: 1 0.27 0.02 14.32 < 0.001 0.47
Cov. Reg. PI: 2 0.22 0.02 13.75 < 0.001 0.43
Cov. Reg. PI: 3 0.21 0.01 15.58 < 0.001 0.56
Cov. Reg. PI: 4 0.14 0.01 9.54 < 0.001 0.26
Cov. Reg. PI: 5 0.33 0.02 16.91 < 0.001 0.67
Cov. Reg. Family support 0.96 0.05 20.80 < 0.001 0.96
Cov. Reg. Friendship sup-
port
0.96 0.05 18.12 < 0.001 0.97
Cov. Reg. CA 0.87 0.05 17.92 < 0.001 0.86
Cov. Reg. DS 0.10 0.01 10.27 < 0.001 0.86
Cov. Reg. AEB 0.23 0.03 9.07 < 0.001 0.93
Cov. Reg. PI 0.27 0.02 13.17 < 0.001 0.90
Covariance DS AEB 0.05 0.01 6.32 < 0.001 0.33
Covariance DS PI 0.09 0.01 10.24 < 0.001 0.54
Covariance AEB PI 0.11 0.01 9.25 < 0.001 0.45
Covariance Family
support
Friendship sup-
port
0.20 0.03 5.67 < 0.001 0.20
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type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept SMFQ: 1 1.83 0.02 74.59 < 0.001 3.36
Intercept SMFQ: 2 1.42 0.03 56.59 < 0.001 2.61
Intercept SMFQ: 3 1.85 0.03 72.65 < 0.001 2.79
Intercept SMFQ: 4 1.65 0.02 66.22 < 0.001 2.48
Intercept SMFQ: 5 1.33 0.03 46.86 < 0.001 2.42
Intercept SMFQ: 6 1.36 0.03 49.75 < 0.001 2.35
Intercept SMFQ: 7 1.77 0.03 62.15 < 0.001 2.74
Intercept SMFQ: 8 1.24 0.03 47.90 < 0.001 2.51
Intercept SMFQ: 9 1.19 0.02 62.54 < 0.001 2.87
Intercept SMFQ: 10 1.50 0.03 47.11 < 0.001 2.33
Intercept SMFQ: 11 1.21 0.02 49.99 < 0.001 2.52
Intercept SMFQ: 12 1.40 0.03 50.92 < 0.001 2.32
Intercept SMFQ: 13 1.29 0.02 52.08 < 0.001 2.55
Intercept AEB: 1 1.46 0.04 36.42 < 0.001 2.08
Intercept AEB: 2 1.39 0.03 41.21 < 0.001 2.12
Intercept AEB: 3 1.27 0.03 45.77 < 0.001 2.25
Intercept AEB: 4 1.23 0.02 56.21 < 0.001 2.25
Intercept AEB: 5 1.13 0.02 67.33 < 0.001 2.94
Intercept AEB: 6 1.17 0.02 61.33 < 0.001 2.74
Intercept AEB: 7 1.43 0.04 35.74 < 0.001 2.11
Intercept AEB: 8 1.11 0.02 62.41 < 0.001 3.11
Intercept PI: 1 1.87 0.04 48.66 < 0.001 2.48
Intercept PI: 2 1.58 0.04 40.75 < 0.001 2.19
Intercept PI: 3 1.35 0.03 43.05 < 0.001 2.19
Intercept PI: 4 1.71 0.04 40.54 < 0.001 2.34
Intercept PI: 5 1.51 0.03 47.07 < 0.001 2.16
Intercept Family support 0.02 0.06 0.27 0.785 0.02
Intercept Friendship sup-
port
0.08 0.06 1.24 0.215 0.08
Intercept CA -0.04 0.06 -0.80 0.425 -0.04
Intercept Family psychi-
atric history
0.20 0.00 NA NA 0.49
Intercept Male 0.46 0.00 NA NA 0.91
Intercept Low socioeco-
nomic status
0.14 0.00 NA NA 0.41
Intercept Non-white eth-
nicity
0.06 0.00 NA NA 0.25
Intercept Cannabis use at
17
0.11 0.00 NA NA 0.36
Intercept Mother’s years of
education post-
16
2.41 0.00 NA NA 1.00
Intercept DS 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept AEB 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercept PI 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Table B.15: Parameter estimates of structural equation model of relationships between childhood
adversity, social support and later depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena fit to ROOTS
data with a robust maximum-likelihood estimator. Missing data were estimated using full-
information maximum likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed
to be equal. Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
Table B.16: Parameter estimates structural equation model of longitudinal relationships be-
tween childhood adversity, social support and depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena in
ROOTS.
Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading SMFQ: 1 DS 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.59
Loading SMFQ: 2 DS 1.17 0.05 22.24 < 0.001 0.66
Loading SMFQ: 3 DS 0.97 0.06 15.26 < 0.001 0.47
Loading SMFQ: 4 DS 0.95 0.07 14.44 < 0.001 0.45
Loading SMFQ: 5 DS 1.57 0.07 22.21 < 0.001 0.79
Loading SMFQ: 6 DS 0.88 0.06 13.57 < 0.001 0.49
Loading SMFQ: 7 DS 1.43 0.07 21.39 < 0.001 0.66
Loading SMFQ: 8 DS 1.44 0.07 20.12 < 0.001 0.76
Loading SMFQ: 9 DS 1.10 0.07 16.55 < 0.001 0.65
Loading SMFQ: 10 DS 1.59 0.07 22.10 < 0.001 0.70
Loading SMFQ: 11 DS 1.31 0.08 16.89 < 0.001 0.70
Loading SMFQ: 12 DS 1.58 0.08 19.95 < 0.001 0.71
Loading SMFQ: 13 DS 1.34 0.07 19.06 < 0.001 0.74
Loading AEB: 1 AEB 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.41
Loading AEB: 2 AEB 0.85 0.11 7.39 < 0.001 0.46
Loading AEB: 3 AEB 1.21 0.12 10.15 < 0.001 0.46
Loading AEB: 4 AEB 0.83 0.11 7.90 < 0.001 0.51
Loading AEB: 5 AEB 1.38 0.13 10.51 < 0.001 0.60
Loading AEB: 6 AEB 0.95 0.10 9.44 < 0.001 0.47
Loading AEB: 7 AEB 0.45 0.07 6.16 < 0.001 0.36
Loading AEB: 8 AEB 1.03 0.08 12.24 < 0.001 0.52
Loading AEB: 9 AEB 0.97 0.12 8.29 < 0.001 0.51
Loading AEB: 10 AEB 0.65 0.09 7.40 < 0.001 0.36
Loading AEB: 11 AEB 0.70 0.06 10.85 < 0.001 0.49
Loading AEB: 12 AEB 0.34 0.06 5.54 < 0.001 0.31
Loading AEB: 13 AEB 0.66 0.09 7.73 < 0.001 0.52
Loading AEB: 14 AEB 0.68 0.09 7.37 < 0.001 0.49
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Loading AEB: 15 AEB 0.56 0.08 7.38 < 0.001 0.47
Loading AEB: 16 AEB 0.88 0.10 8.96 < 0.001 0.42
Loading AEB: 17 AEB 1.17 0.12 9.50 < 0.001 0.52
Loading AEB: 18 AEB 1.18 0.12 10.19 < 0.001 0.54
Loading PI: 1 PI 1.00 0.00 NA NA 0.68
Loading PI: 2 PI 0.77 0.04 17.52 < 0.001 0.52
Loading PI: 3 PI 0.64 0.04 15.61 < 0.001 0.52
Loading PI: 4 PI 0.79 0.04 20.67 < 0.001 0.50
Loading PI: 5 PI 0.78 0.04 20.01 < 0.001 0.59
Loading PI: 6 PI 0.74 0.04 18.30 < 0.001 0.59
Loading PI: 7 PI 0.79 0.04 18.26 < 0.001 0.57
Loading PI: 8 PI 0.30 0.04 8.14 < 0.001 0.39
Loading PI: 9 PI 0.93 0.03 27.16 < 0.001 0.67
Loading PI: 10 PI 0.63 0.04 16.31 < 0.001 0.61
Loading PI: 11 PI 0.98 0.04 26.00 < 0.001 0.69
Loading PI: 12 PI 1.10 0.03 36.97 < 0.001 0.74
Loading PI: 13 PI 0.72 0.04 17.10 < 0.001 0.54
Regression DS CA 0.06 0.01 5.15 < 0.001 0.19
Regression DS Friendship sup-
port
-0.06 0.01 -5.60 < 0.001 -0.18
Regression DS Family support -0.06 0.01 -6.07 < 0.001 -0.19
Regression AEB CA 0.04 0.01 4.72 < 0.001 0.21
Regression AEB Friendship sup-
port
-0.02 0.01 -3.80 < 0.001 -0.13
Regression AEB Family support 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.952 0.00
Regression PI CA 0.06 0.01 5.93 < 0.001 0.20
Regression PI Friendship sup-
port
-0.07 0.01 -7.47 < 0.001 -0.23
Regression PI Family support -0.03 0.01 -2.85 0.004 -0.10
Regression Friendship
support
CA -0.29 0.02 -
12.13
< 0.001 -0.29
Regression Family
support
CA -0.51 0.02 -
25.27
< 0.001 -0.51
Cov. Reg. DS Age (years) 0.00 0.00 -0.73 0.466 -0.02
Cov. Reg. DS Male -0.03 0.02 -1.85 0.064 -0.05
Cov. Reg. DS Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
0.00 0.01 -0.41 0.679 -0.01
Cov. Reg. DS Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.02 0.02 -1.04 0.298 -0.03
Cov. Reg. DS Mother’s educa-
tional qualifica-
tions
-0.01 0.01 -1.85 0.064 -0.05
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Cov. Reg. DS Urban-rural in-
dex
0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.948 0.00
Cov. Reg. DS Family psychi-
atric history
0.09 0.03 2.70 0.007 0.09
Cov. Reg. DS Cannabis use 0.05 0.02 2.30 0.021 0.06
Cov. Reg. PI Age (years) 0.00 0.00 -0.82 0.414 -0.02
Cov. Reg. PI Male -0.03 0.02 -1.68 0.093 -0.04
Cov. Reg. PI Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
0.01 0.01 0.99 0.322 0.03
Cov. Reg. PI Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.01 0.02 -0.54 0.586 -0.02
Cov. Reg. PI Mother’s educa-
tional qualifica-
tions
-0.03 0.01 -4.32 < 0.001 -0.12
Cov. Reg. PI Urban-rural in-
dex
0.01 0.01 1.06 0.288 0.03
Cov. Reg. PI Family psychi-
atric history
0.03 0.03 1.05 0.292 0.03
Cov. Reg. PI Cannabis use 0.02 0.02 0.96 0.335 0.03
Cov. Reg. AEB Age (years) 0.00 0.00 -0.63 0.529 -0.02
Cov. Reg. AEB Male -0.01 0.01 -1.30 0.195 -0.04
Cov. Reg. AEB Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.01 0.01 -1.79 0.073 -0.07
Cov. Reg. AEB Non-white eth-
nicity
-0.01 0.01 -0.80 0.424 -0.03
Cov. Reg. AEB Mother’s educa-
tional qualifica-
tions
-0.02 0.00 -3.78 < 0.001 -0.11
Cov. Reg. AEB Urban-rural in-
dex
0.01 0.01 1.65 0.099 0.05
Cov. Reg. AEB Family psychi-
atric history
0.03 0.02 1.35 0.177 0.05
Cov. Reg. AEB Cannabis use 0.06 0.02 3.02 0.003 0.11
Cov. Reg. CA Age (years) 0.01 0.01 1.22 0.224 0.03
Cov. Reg. CA Male -0.03 0.05 -0.72 0.471 -0.02
Cov. Reg. CA Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.11 0.03 -3.71 < 0.001 -0.10
Cov. Reg. CA Non-white eth-
nicity
0.14 0.06 2.13 0.033 0.06
Cov. Reg. CA Mother’s educa-
tional qualifica-
tions
-0.09 0.02 -4.02 < 0.001 -0.09
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Cov. Reg. CA Urban-rural in-
dex
0.04 0.04 1.00 0.315 0.03
Cov. Reg. CA Family psychi-
atric history
0.48 0.08 6.04 < 0.001 0.15
Cov. Reg. CA Cannabis use 0.16 0.06 2.45 0.014 0.06
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Age (years) 0.01 0.01 0.65 0.516 0.01
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Male -0.05 0.05 -1.01 0.31 -0.02
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
0.03 0.03 0.99 0.321 0.03
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Non-white eth-
nicity
0.03 0.06 0.47 0.636 0.01
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Mother’s educa-
tional qualifica-
tions
0.04 0.02 1.84 0.066 0.04
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Urban-rural in-
dex
-0.02 0.03 -0.52 0.603 -0.01
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Family psychi-
atric history
-0.07 0.08 -0.91 0.361 -0.02
Cov. Reg. Friendship
support
Cannabis use 0.27 0.06 4.28 < 0.001 0.09
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Age (years) 0.04 0.01 4.84 < 0.001 0.10
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Male -0.02 0.04 -0.56 0.578 -0.01
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.01 0.02 -0.44 0.662 -0.01
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Non-white eth-
nicity
0.01 0.05 0.13 0.894 0.00
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Mother’s educa-
tional qualifica-
tions
0.05 0.02 2.85 0.004 0.06
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Urban-rural in-
dex
0.00 0.03 0.08 0.935 0.00
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Family psychi-
atric history
-0.08 0.06 -1.18 0.239 -0.02
Cov. Reg. Family
support
Cannabis use -0.08 0.06 -1.37 0.17 -0.03
Residual SMFQ: 1 0.19 0.01 31.55 < 0.001 0.65
Residual SMFQ: 2 0.19 0.01 22.45 < 0.001 0.57
Residual SMFQ: 3 0.35 0.01 29.73 < 0.001 0.78
Residual SMFQ: 4 0.38 0.01 29.11 < 0.001 0.80
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Residual SMFQ: 5 0.15 0.01 18.58 < 0.001 0.37
Residual SMFQ: 6 0.25 0.01 19.98 < 0.001 0.76
Residual SMFQ: 7 0.28 0.01 26.81 < 0.001 0.57
Residual SMFQ: 8 0.15 0.01 17.99 < 0.001 0.42
Residual SMFQ: 9 0.17 0.01 18.53 < 0.001 0.58
Residual SMFQ: 10 0.27 0.01 23.71 < 0.001 0.51
Residual SMFQ: 11 0.18 0.01 17.26 < 0.001 0.50
Residual SMFQ: 12 0.26 0.01 21.17 < 0.001 0.50
Residual SMFQ: 13 0.15 0.01 16.88 < 0.001 0.45
Residual AEB: 1 0.16 0.01 24.73 < 0.001 0.83
Residual AEB: 2 0.09 0.01 15.36 < 0.001 0.79
Residual AEB: 3 0.18 0.01 28.55 < 0.001 0.79
Residual AEB: 4 0.06 0.00 13.19 < 0.001 0.74
Residual AEB: 5 0.11 0.01 18.07 < 0.001 0.64
Residual AEB: 6 0.10 0.01 17.90 < 0.001 0.78
Residual AEB: 7 0.05 0.00 9.98 < 0.001 0.87
Residual AEB: 8 0.09 0.01 16.50 < 0.001 0.73
Residual AEB: 9 0.09 0.01 14.50 < 0.001 0.74
Residual AEB: 10 0.09 0.01 16.17 < 0.001 0.87
Residual AEB: 11 0.05 0.00 12.24 < 0.001 0.76
Residual AEB: 12 0.04 0.00 8.34 < 0.001 0.90
Residual AEB: 13 0.04 0.00 11.22 < 0.001 0.73
Residual AEB: 14 0.05 0.00 11.67 < 0.001 0.76
Residual AEB: 15 0.04 0.00 10.14 < 0.001 0.78
Residual AEB: 16 0.12 0.01 19.09 < 0.001 0.83
Residual AEB: 17 0.12 0.01 18.48 < 0.001 0.73
Residual AEB: 18 0.11 0.01 17.79 < 0.001 0.71
Residual PI: 1 0.12 0.01 20.06 < 0.001 0.54
Residual PI: 2 0.17 0.01 25.94 < 0.001 0.73
Residual PI: 3 0.11 0.01 20.28 < 0.001 0.73
Residual PI: 4 0.18 0.01 32.43 < 0.001 0.75
Residual PI: 5 0.11 0.01 20.03 < 0.001 0.65
Residual PI: 6 0.11 0.01 19.84 < 0.001 0.66
Residual PI: 7 0.14 0.01 21.79 < 0.001 0.68
Residual PI: 8 0.05 0.00 11.26 < 0.001 0.85
Residual PI: 9 0.11 0.01 17.79 < 0.001 0.55
Residual PI: 10 0.07 0.00 17.18 < 0.001 0.63
Residual PI: 11 0.10 0.01 19.16 < 0.001 0.52
Residual PI: 12 0.10 0.01 17.58 < 0.001 0.46
Residual PI: 13 0.13 0.01 21.78 < 0.001 0.71
Residual CA 0.97 0.03 27.64 < 0.001 0.95
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Residual Friendship sup-
port
0.94 0.03 33.03 < 0.001 0.90
Residual Family support 0.72 0.02 32.92 < 0.001 0.72
Residual DS 0.08 0.01 11.21 < 0.001 0.78
Residual AEB 0.03 0.00 6.36 < 0.001 0.88
Residual PI 0.08 0.01 16.17 < 0.001 0.80
Covariance Friendship
support
Family support 0.21 0.02 10.52 < 0.001 0.26
Covariance DS AEB 0.02 0.00 7.06 < 0.001 0.35
Covariance DS PI 0.04 0.00 12.71 < 0.001 0.55
Covariance AEB PI 0.03 0.00 9.42 < 0.001 0.56
Intercept SMFQ: 1 0.93 0.10 9.69 < 0.001 1.70
Intercept SMFQ: 2 0.51 0.11 4.61 < 0.001 0.89
Intercept SMFQ: 3 0.91 0.09 9.62 < 0.001 1.35
Intercept SMFQ: 4 0.78 0.09 8.38 < 0.001 1.12
Intercept SMFQ: 5 0.55 0.15 3.63 < 0.001 0.85
Intercept SMFQ: 6 0.39 0.08 4.55 < 0.001 0.67
Intercept SMFQ: 7 0.91 0.14 6.59 < 0.001 1.28
Intercept SMFQ: 8 0.46 0.14 3.35 0.001 0.75
Intercept SMFQ: 9 0.38 0.11 3.64 < 0.001 0.70
Intercept SMFQ: 10 0.84 0.15 5.51 < 0.001 1.14
Intercept SMFQ: 11 0.41 0.13 3.23 0.001 0.68
Intercept SMFQ: 12 0.68 0.15 4.50 < 0.001 0.94
Intercept SMFQ: 13 0.44 0.13 3.41 0.001 0.75
Intercept AEB: 1 0.24 0.07 3.68 < 0.001 0.55
Intercept AEB: 2 0.11 0.06 2.00 0.045 0.33
Intercept AEB: 3 0.32 0.08 4.04 < 0.001 0.67
Intercept AEB: 4 0.08 0.05 1.44 0.15 0.27
Intercept AEB: 5 0.19 0.09 2.15 0.032 0.46
Intercept AEB: 6 0.14 0.06 2.24 0.025 0.38
Intercept AEB: 7 0.05 0.03 1.52 0.128 0.20
Intercept AEB: 8 0.13 0.07 1.89 0.059 0.36
Intercept AEB: 9 0.12 0.06 1.89 0.059 0.35
Intercept AEB: 10 0.11 0.04 2.52 0.012 0.33
Intercept AEB: 11 0.06 0.05 1.29 0.196 0.23
Intercept AEB: 12 0.03 0.02 1.51 0.131 0.17
Intercept AEB: 13 0.04 0.04 0.95 0.341 0.18
Intercept AEB: 14 0.05 0.04 1.18 0.236 0.21
Intercept AEB: 15 0.04 0.04 1.01 0.312 0.17
Intercept AEB: 16 0.15 0.06 2.67 0.008 0.41
Intercept AEB: 17 0.18 0.08 2.38 0.017 0.45
Intercept AEB: 18 0.17 0.08 2.18 0.029 0.42
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Parameter
type
Factor or
threshold
Item or factor Unstd.
esti-
mate
Std.
error
Z-
score
P-value Std.
esti-
mate
Intercept PI: 1 0.36 0.11 3.29 0.001 0.77
Intercept PI: 2 0.38 0.08 4.46 < 0.001 0.79
Intercept PI: 3 0.22 0.07 3.07 0.002 0.56
Intercept PI: 4 0.48 0.09 5.47 < 0.001 0.96
Intercept PI: 5 0.26 0.09 3.00 0.003 0.62
Intercept PI: 6 0.23 0.08 2.81 0.005 0.57
Intercept PI: 7 0.30 0.09 3.48 < 0.001 0.68
Intercept PI: 8 0.08 0.03 2.29 0.022 0.31
Intercept PI: 9 0.30 0.10 2.91 0.004 0.68
Intercept PI: 10 0.15 0.07 2.19 0.029 0.46
Intercept PI: 11 0.32 0.11 2.96 0.003 0.71
Intercept PI: 12 0.38 0.12 3.18 0.001 0.81
Intercept PI: 13 0.26 0.08 3.31 0.001 0.62
Intercept CA -0.30 0.29 -1.04 0.298 -0.30
Intercept Friendship sup-
port
-0.10 0.28 -0.35 0.727 -0.09
Intercept Family support -0.85 0.25 -3.48 0.001 -0.85
Intercept Age (years) 20.07 0.00 NA NA 8.05
Intercept Male 0.47 0.00 NA NA 0.94
Intercept Socioeconomic
Deprivation
(rank)
-0.04 0.00 NA NA -0.04
Intercept Non-white eth-
nicity
0.23 0.00 NA NA 0.55
Intercept Mother’s educa-
tional qualifica-
tions
1.67 0.00 NA NA 1.51
Intercept Urban-rural in-
dex
5.43 0.00 NA NA 7.36
Intercept Family psychi-
atric history
0.11 0.00 NA NA 0.35
Intercept Cannabis use 0.15 0.00 NA NA 0.42
Intercept DS 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercept AEB 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Intercept PI 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Table B.16: Parameter estimates of structural equation model of relationships between childhood
adversity, social support and later depressive symptoms and psychotic phenomena fit to NSPN
data with a robust maximum-likelihood estimator. Missing data were estimated using full-
information maximum likelihood. Parameters with the same Equality constraint label were fixed
to be equal. Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
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Appendix C
Psychotic experiences are an index of
extreme distress in adolescents and
young adults: evidence from two
general population samples
C.1 Research questions
• Are self-report PEs a common manifestation of distress, like classical depressive or anxious symptoms, in
young people?
• If so, what severity of distress do they indicate?
Abstract
Psychotic experiences (PEs) can be measured by self-report instruments or interview in-
struments, where the veracity of the PEs is externally assessed. These instruments tend
to be developed and applied in different fields; self-report instruments through schizotypy
and individual differences frameworks and interview instruments through clinically-oriented
psychosis-risk research. It is not known whether self-report and interview instruments mea-
sure the same underlying phenomena and whether they measure PEs of the same or different
severity/intensity. The convergent validity of different instruments would be supported by
showing the same patterns of associations with other variables. Interview-assessed PEs can
be modelled as being partly explained by an underlying dimension of common mental dis-
tress, which also captures classical depressive symptoms. Interview-assessed PEs have been
shown to measure more severe distress than self-report depressive symptoms. In this set of
analyses, I tested whether this same pattern can be found for self-report PEs. I attempted
to replicate these findings in two large, epidemiologically-principled cohorts of young people
with latent variable modelling of self-report state and trait PEs and depressive symptoms.
In both cohorts, a bifactor model with a general ‘common mental distress’ factor explaining
some variance in all measured responses and specific factors explaining orthogonal variance
in some responses, outperformed models with separate factors or a single factor. Using item
response theory, I calculated the severity range of distress measured by each item type and
how much information they contributed per item. In one cohort, two trait dimensions of
PEs (AEB: anomalous experiences and beliefs; PI: Paranoid ideation) measured more severe
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distress than state depressive symptoms, while only state AEB measured more severe dis-
tress than state depressive symptoms in the second cohort. PI contributed more information
on distress than AEB in both cohorts. These results support that PEs are a transdiag-
nostic manifestation of severe distress in the general population and support the validity of
self-report instruments as measuring similar phenomena to interview assessments.
Psychotic phenomena occurring in the general population are a risk-indicator for psychotic (Fusar-Poli et al.,
2013) and non-psychotic (Fusar-Poli et al., 2014) illnesses. Interview-measured psychotic experiences (PEs) and
self-report depression-like and anxiety-like symptoms can be well explained by a bifactor latent variable model,
in which a general distress factor explains some of the variance in all psychosis and distress items (Stochl et al.,
2015). When examined using item response theory analysis, psychotic experiences uniquely measure a more severe
range of the general distress factor, not measured by traditional symptoms of depression and anxiety.
In this chapter, I set out to replicate findings that psychotic phenomena are an index of extreme distress in two
general population cohorts of adolescents and young adults using self-report measurements of PEs, rather than
interview assessments. I generated the following set of analyses to test this hypothesis.
C.1.1 Psychotic phenomena will co-occur with depressive/anxious symp-
toms
First, I predicted self-report psychotic phenomena would be associated with distress, indicated by correlation
between scores on these self-report measures and higher depressive/anxious symptoms in those with interview-
verified PEs than those without PEs. People with recent and persistent PEs would experience more depres-
sive/anxious/anxious symptoms than those with non-recent and transient PEs.
C.1.2 A common mental distress factor will underlie psychotic phenomena
and depressive/anxious symptoms
Second, I predicted a general factor would explain shared variance in depressive/anxious/anxious symptoms
and psychotic phenomena, indicated by a latent bifactor model outperforming unidimensional, correlated-factors
and uncorrelated-factors models (Figure C.1) when fit to data on self-report depressive/anxious symptoms and
psychosis items. This would be good evidence for a common mental distress factor underlying both psychotic
phenomena and depressive/anxious symptoms, suggesting self-report psychotic phenomena are a manifestation of
common distress.
C.1.3 Psychosis items will have residual variance that is orthogonal to dis-
tress
Thirdly, I predicted there would be additional information explained by a specific factor of psychotic phenomena in
the bifactor model. This would be indicated by significant loadings of psychosis items on a specific factor and the
ω statistic for that factor, approximating how much of the variance in the items it explains. This would replicate
previous findings and suggest that there is covariance among self-report psychosis items that is orthogonal to
distress, as was found for interview PEs (Stochl et al., 2015).
C.1.4 Psychosis items will measure a more severe distribution of mental dis-
tress than depressive/anxious symptoms
I predicted self-report psychotic phenomena would measure the more extreme distress than classical depres-
sive/anxious symptoms, replicating findings of Stochl et al. (2015). This would be supported firstly by higher
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Figure C.1: Family of model structures compared
Figure C.1: Diagrams of latent variable model structures. To investigate whether self-report
and interview instruments measured the same underlying PEs or distinct constructs, I com-
pared a model with a single factor, two uncorrelated factors, two correlated factors or a bifactor
model with a general factor explaining common variance and specific factors explaining residual
instrument-specific variance.
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thresholds on this factor for psychosis items (the severity of the latent trait at which different categorical re-
sponses are emitted). This would also be supported, secondly, by information distributions from unidimensional
item response theory (IRT) models (estimations of how precisely an item or group of items measures ‘true’ scores
across the range of severity of the latent trait), fit to the combined psychosis & depressive/anxious symptom
items, showing that psychosis items uniquely measure a more severe range of common mental distress. I then
attempted to extend the work of Stochl & colleagues with two further analyses. Firstly, I planned to test whether
psychosis items or traditional distress items were more informative about common mental distress, on average, by
comparing the area under the curve (AUC) of information distributions. Secondly, to understand the implications
of a common mental distress factor for traditional sum-score measurements of PEs and depressive symptoms, I
quantified the proportion of variance in sum scores on each instrument that is attributable to common mental
distress and likely shared with all psychopathology domains, versus specific to domains of psychotic phenomena
or depressive symptoms. I estimated scores on the general distress factor and any specific factors, then tested the
variance they explain in sum scores (r2) using a series of linear regressions.
C.2 Methods
C.2.1 Data
Data come from both ROOTS and NSPN. For full information on the cohorts, see Methodology.
C.2.2 Instruments
In ROOTS, self-report psychotic phenomena were measured using the Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory
(BSSI), a 20-item self-report instrument measuring psychotic phenomena in the last two weeks. It measures three
domains: Anomalous Experiences and Beliefs (AEB), comprising perceptual abnormalities and magical thinking
(8 items); Paranoid Ideation (PI), comprising suspiciousness and ideas of reference (6 items, of which one is
redundant); and Social Anxiety (SA, 8 items). One item from PI is redundant with another and was removed.
The AEB and PI scales measure the same underlying psychosis factor as a semi-structured interview method
(Horwood et al., 2008).
Questions were structured as a set of statements or questions. Participants indicated how often that statement
applied to them in the last two weeks on a 5-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occasionally’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’ and
‘All the time’.
Due to low endorsement of some categories, in analyses using latent variable modelling, responses were collapsed
into a 3-point scale (‘Not at all’, ‘Occasionally’, ‘Sometimes/Often/All the time’). Collapsing these high-severity
responses loses some measurement precision at the more severe ranges of the traits, more so for PI and SA than
AEB, but is necessary for model convergence.
In NSPN, self-report psychotic phenomena were measured with the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ),
which comprises 74 dichotomous items intended to measure general, trait-like experience of 9 dimensions associated
with psychosis-proneness. In Chapter 1, I showed that, while these 9 dimensions are reliable, a number are likely
to be redundant. While second-order latent variable models suggest three or four variables explain scores on
these subscales, they are not reliable when estimated at the item level. Instead, I identified a reliable 6-factor
solution without redundantly high correlations among factors. Of relevance for this study are the dimensions
most similar to typical psychotic phenomena: ‘Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs’ (AEBSPQ), comprising 18 items
measuring unusual perceptual experiences and magical thinking and ‘Paranoid Ideation’ (PISPQ), comprising 13
items measuring suspiciousness and ideas of reference.
In both cohorts, self-report depressive/anxious symptoms were measured with the Mood and Feelings Question-
naire (MFQ) (Costello and Angold, 1988). The full questionnaire comprises 33 items on common symptoms
of depression and anxiety occurring over the last two weeks. The full MFQ is likely to be multidimensional
(Brodbeck et al., 2011) and has more items than the AEB and PI scales of both the SPQ and SSI, which may
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pull any common factors estimated from combined psychosis and distress items towards measuring traditional
distress and result in numerous specific factors. I therefore used the items that comprise the Short Mood and
Feelings Questionnaire (SMFQ) (Angold et al., 1995), which are contained within the full MFQ. These items were
used previously in identifying a common factor underlying mood, anxiety and psychotic experiences (Stochl et
al., 2015). The SMFQ is likely to be unidimensional and is able to predict clinical depression and anxiety with
reasonable sensitivity (Turner et al., 2014).
In ROOTS, I combined all 8 items from the AEBBSSI scale and 5 of the 6 items from the PIBSSI scale with the
13 SMFQ items, creating a pool of 26 psychosis-distress items.
In NSPN, the SPQ items were dichotomous and more numerous than the SMFQ items, with 18 items on the
AEBSPQ scale and 13 on the PISPQ scale. Polychoric correlations account for the differences in item response
levels. Data from 44 items were entered into latent variable modelling.
C.2.3 Statistical analyses
Due to highly skewed distributions of total scores on distress and psychotic phenomena, I used non-parametric
Spearman’s rank correlations and partial correlations to compare scores on self-report distress and psychotic
phenomena. To compare distress in groups of participants with different verified PEs, I used Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests.
To test the latent model structure that best explains psychosis-proneness and distress items, I fit a number
of latent variable models to the combined items using a full-information robust maximum likelihood estimator
(MLR), with missing data patterns estimated using maximum likelihood. This generated comparative fit indices
AIC, BIC and SABIC. The model with the lowest value on these indices was the winner.
I compared four families of model structures: unidimensional, correlated-factors, uncorrelated-factors and bifactor
models (Figure C.1). Briefly, in unidimensional models, all items are explained by a single latent variable.
In correlated-factors models, there is a latent variable for each scale type that are allowed to correlate. In
uncorrelated-factors models, there is a latent variable for each scale type and the latent variables are constrained
to be orthogonal. In a bifactor model, there is a single general factor explaining common variance among all
items and a number of specific factors explaining variance in smaller groups of items. The general and all specific
factors are constrained to be orthogonal to ensure identifiability.
I estimated two bifactor models with different structures of specific factors (Bifactor A: One specific factor for
SMFQ items, one for AEB items, one for PI items; Bifactor B: One specific factor for SMFQ items, one for AEB
& PI items).
Provided good fit of the MLR-estimated bifactor model, I approximated how much of the variance in the items
is explained by each latent factor and how much is attributable to error by calculating Omega values.
To test the information distributions of psychosis and distress items, I fit unidimensional two-parameter logistic
(2PL) item response theory (IRT) to all items, approximating the general factor. To account for non-normality
of the latent trait distribution, I estimated IRT solutions with the conventional assumption of a normal latent
trait distribution and with a prior on the trait distribution empirically estimated using histograms of item scores,
allowing for non-normality. I calculated information values for each item across a broad severity range of the
latent trait measured. Information is additive, so I calculated the mean information contributed for each scale at
each location on the trait distribution and compared the distributions for each scale. I also calculated information
contributed by taking the area under the curve (AUC) of each item and compared these across scales using
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
To quantify variance in traditional sum scores explained by latent factors, I estimated factor scores from the
winning model using an empirical Bayes modal method that allowed for non-normality of latent variable distri-
butions. I then regressed these factor scores on to sum scores, individually then in conjunction, and reported the
r2 statistic for each one.
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Table C.1: Results of comparison of different model structures fit to combined self-report PEs
and depressive symptoms in ROOTS
Model AIC BIC SABIC
Unidimensional 37310.26491 37690.12907 37442.4027
Two Correlated Factors 36096.37553 36481.10975 36230.20739
Two Uncorrelated Factors 36413.66505 36793.52922 36545.80285
Three Correlated Factors 35275.83825 35670.31258 35413.05827
Three Uncorrelated Factors 35745.47311 36125.33727 35877.6109
Bifactor A 34973.5029 35479.98845 35149.68662
Bifactor B 35090.18551 35596.67107 35266.36924
Table C.1: Results of model comparison of competing structures fit to self-report and interview
PEs data in ROOTS using fit indices that trade-off model fit with model parsimony. Lower
values indicate better fit. The winning model was Bifactor A.
C.3 Results
C.3.1 Results I: ROOTS
Data
1074 ROOTS participants took part at the third assessment (when aged 17).
1056 participants completed the PLIKSi. 939 had complete data on the AEBBSSI scale and 950 had complete
data on the PIBSSI scale. 997 had complete data on the SMFQ items.
914 people had fully complete data on the AEBBSSI, PIBSSI and SMFQ scales.
Psychotic phenomena co-occur with distress
Total scores on the SMFQ rank-correlated with AEBBSSI (rho = 0.32, p < 0.0001), and PIBSSI (rho = 0.55, p <
0.0001).
Paranoid ideation and distress appeared to overlap more so than distress and anomalous experiences and beliefs.
On partial correlations, AEBBSSI showed a small but significant rank-correlation with SMFQ, controlling for
PIBSSI (partial rho = 0.11, p = 0.0003). PIBSSI showed a large partial rank-correlation with SMFQ, controlling
for AEBBSSI (partial rho = 0.47, p < 0.0001).
A common distress factor underlies psychotic phenomena and traditional symptoms
of distress
Table C.1 shows the comparative fit indices of the MLR-estimated latent variable models.
The winning model was Bifactor A, with a general factor and three specific factors each explaining residual
variance in items from the SMFQ, AEBBSSI or PIBSSI scales.
However, when this model was fit to the data using a WLSMV estimator, one of the items was estimated with
a negative residual variance, making the model results inadmissible. This issue also occurred for this item when
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fitting a bifactor model to combined verified and self-report psychosis items using this scale in Chapter 6 (main
text).
The second best-fitting MLR-estimated model was Bifactor B, with a general factor, one specific factor explaining
residual variance in the SMFQ items and one specific factor explaining residual variance in the combined AEBBSSI
and PIBSSI items. This model also performed well on other fit indices (CFI = 0.918, TLI = 0.902, RMSEA =
0.045). All of the loadings on the specific factor of SMFQ items were positive and significant. 4 of the 13 loadings
of PI items on the specific factor of AEBBSSI and PIBSSI items were negative and non-significant.
Table C.2: Parameter estimates from combined SMFQ and BSSI items in ROOTS (WLSMV, 25
imputed datasets)
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading GF AEB: 2 1 0 NA NA 0.45
Loading GF AEB: 5 1.24 0.12 10.01 0 0.57
Loading GF AEB: 8 1.09 0.11 9.55 0 0.51
Loading GF AEB: 10 1.11 0.15 7.64 0 0.52
Loading GF AEB: 13 1.32 0.14 9.45 0 0.61
Loading GF AEB: 16 1.09 0.12 8.92 0 0.5
Loading GF AEB: 18 0.98 0.07 13.41 0 0.44
Loading GF AEB: 20 1.02 0.13 8.18 0 0.47
Loading GF PI: 3 1.69 0.21 7.9 0 0.79
Loading GF PI: 9 1.65 0.22 7.4 0 0.77
Loading GF PI: 12 1.69 0.22 7.81 0 0.79
Loading GF PI: 15 1.87 0.25 7.49 0 0.87
Loading GF PI: 19 1.49 0.16 9.23 0 0.7
Loading GF SMFQ: 1 0.88 0.13 6.99 0 0.41
Loading GF SMFQ: 2 1 0.14 7.24 0 0.47
Loading GF SMFQ: 3 0.7 0.11 6.34 0 0.33
Loading GF SMFQ: 4 0.74 0.12 6.35 0 0.35
Loading GF SMFQ: 5 0.95 0.13 7.04 0 0.44
Loading GF SMFQ: 6 0.82 0.12 6.94 0 0.39
Loading GF SMFQ: 7 0.9 0.13 6.91 0 0.42
Loading GF SMFQ: 8 1.16 0.15 7.6 0 0.54
Loading GF SMFQ: 9 1.02 0.14 7.09 0 0.48
Loading GF SMFQ: 10 1.1 0.15 7.47 0 0.51
Loading GF SMFQ: 11 1.16 0.16 7.4 0 0.54
Loading GF SMFQ: 12 1.02 0.14 7.1 0 0.48
Loading GF SMFQ: 13 1.02 0.15 6.99 0 0.48
Loading SF1 AEB: 2 1 0 NA NA 0.12
Loading SF1 AEB: 5 2.09 0.99 2.12 0.03 0.25
Loading SF1 AEB: 8 1.01 0.55 1.81 0.07 0.12
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading SF1 AEB: 10 2.74 1.19 2.31 0.02 0.33
Loading SF1 AEB: 13 -1.42 1.16 -1.23 0.22 -0.17
Loading SF1 AEB: 16 -6.22 3.67 -1.7 0.09 -0.73
Loading SF1 AEB: 18 -3.66 2.35 -1.55 0.12 -0.44
Loading SF1 AEB: 20 -3.88 2.39 -1.62 0.1 -0.47
Loading SF1 PI: 3 -2.04 1.45 -1.41 0.16 -0.25
Loading SF1 PI: 9 -3.29 2.15 -1.53 0.13 -0.4
Loading SF1 PI: 12 -4.04 2.51 -1.61 0.11 -0.48
Loading SF1 PI: 15 -6.3 3.74 -1.68 0.09 -0.74
Loading SF1 PI: 19 -5.43 3.22 -1.69 0.09 -0.64
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 1 1 0 NA NA 0.63
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 2 0.82 0.07 11.74 0 0.51
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 3 0.55 0.07 8.46 0 0.35
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 4 0.48 0.07 7.1 0 0.3
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 5 1.14 0.07 15.24 0 0.72
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 6 0.86 0.07 12.87 0 0.54
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 7 0.82 0.07 12.06 0 0.52
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 8 1.07 0.07 16.02 0 0.67
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 9 0.8 0.08 10.05 0 0.5
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 10 0.89 0.06 14.46 0 0.56
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 11 0.97 0.07 13.09 0 0.61
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 12 0.85 0.07 11.68 0 0.54
Loading SF2 SMFQ: 13 1 0.08 13.22 0 0.63
Covariance General
Factor
SF1 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariance General
Factor
SF2 0 0 NA NA 0
Covariance SF1 SF2 0 0 NA NA 0
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 2 0.58 0.04 14 0 0.56
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 2 1.15 0.05 23.24 0 1.12
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 5 0.67 0.04 15.08 0 0.66
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 5 1.26 0.06 21.92 0 1.24
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 8 0.96 0.05 20.94 0 0.94
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 8 1.5 0.06 24.14 0 1.48
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 10 1.06 0.05 22.09 0 1.05
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 10 1.49 0.06 23.53 0 1.48
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 13 1.34 0.06 22.14 0 1.33
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 13 1.95 0.09 21.54 0 1.93
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 16 1.19 0.05 21.93 0 1.18
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 16 1.89 0.08 24.69 0 1.86
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 18 0.62 0.04 15.24 0 0.6
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 18 1.22 0.05 23.43 0 1.18
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 20 1.49 0.06 24.03 0 1.45
Threshold 1->2 AEB: 20 2.01 0.09 23.13 0 1.96
Threshold 0->1 PI: 3 -0.33 0.04 -8.19 0 -0.33
Threshold 1->2 PI: 3 0.78 0.04 17.73 0 0.78
Threshold 0->1 PI: 9 0.2 0.04 4.73 0 0.2
Threshold 1->2 PI: 9 1.11 0.05 23.2 0 1.11
Threshold 0->1 PI: 12 0.69 0.05 14.83 0 0.68
Threshold 1->2 PI: 12 1.43 0.06 23.68 0 1.43
Threshold 0->1 PI: 15 -0.05 0.04 -1.36 0.17 -0.05
Threshold 1->2 PI: 15 1.01 0.05 21.25 0 1.01
Threshold 0->1 PI: 19 0.32 0.04 7.58 0 0.32
Threshold 1->2 PI: 19 1.17 0.05 22.77 0 1.16
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 1 -0.63 0.04 -15.42 0 -0.63
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 1 1.52 0.06 24.92 0 1.52
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 2 0.33 0.04 8.09 0 0.33
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 2 1.95 0.08 24.91 0 1.94
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 3 -0.47 0.04 -11.7 0 -0.46
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 3 1.05 0.05 22.21 0 1.05
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 4 -0.07 0.04 -1.73 0.08 -0.07
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 4 1.25 0.05 24.26 0 1.25
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 5 0.66 0.04 15.5 0 0.66
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 5 1.75 0.07 26.31 0 1.75
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 6 0.61 0.04 14.18 0 0.61
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 6 1.63 0.06 26.27 0 1.63
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 7 -0.35 0.04 -8.63 0 -0.35
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 7 1.22 0.05 23.82 0 1.22
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 8 0.97 0.05 20.42 0 0.97
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 8 1.83 0.07 25.64 0 1.83
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 9 1 0.05 20.84 0 0.99
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 9 2.23 0.1 22.54 0 2.23
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 10 0.29 0.04 7.09 0 0.29
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 10 1.42 0.06 24.65 0 1.42
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 11 1.07 0.05 22.65 0 1.07
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 11 1.8 0.07 25.36 0 1.8
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 12 0.5 0.04 12.09 0 0.5
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 12 1.55 0.06 25.44 0 1.55
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 13 0.73 0.04 17.24 0 0.73
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 13 1.93 0.08 25.37 0 1.93
Residual AEB: 2 0.27 0.02 14.02 0 0.26
Residual AEB: 5 0.49 0.02 21.96 0 0.48
Residual AEB: 8 0.54 0.02 27.07 0 0.53
Residual AEB: 10 0.68 0.02 42.63 0 0.67
Residual AEB: 13 0.48 0.03 18.16 0 0.47
Residual AEB: 16 0.53 0.03 15.4 0 0.51
Residual AEB: 18 0.27 0.02 13.2 0 0.25
Residual AEB: 20 0.38 0.03 13.67 0 0.37
Residual PI: 3 0.36 0.01 27.36 0 0.36
Residual PI: 9 0.35 0.02 20.58 0 0.34
Residual PI: 12 0.36 0.02 23.82 0 0.36
Residual PI: 15 0.13 0.01 11.57 0 0.13
Residual PI: 19 0.49 0.01 33.21 0 0.49
Residual SMFQ: 1 0.44 0.02 19.62 0 0.44
Residual SMFQ: 2 0.52 0.01 41.87 0 0.52
Residual SMFQ: 3 0.77 0.01 92.21 0 0.77
Residual SMFQ: 4 0.79 0.01 96.04 0 0.79
Residual SMFQ: 5 0.29 0.02 12.78 0 0.29
Residual SMFQ: 6 0.56 0.02 32.81 0 0.56
Residual SMFQ: 7 0.56 0.01 41.29 0 0.56
Residual SMFQ: 8 0.25 0.02 12.87 0 0.25
Residual SMFQ: 9 0.52 0.01 42.95 0 0.52
Residual SMFQ: 10 0.42 0.01 35.5 0 0.42
Residual SMFQ: 11 0.34 0.02 17.3 0 0.34
Residual SMFQ: 12 0.48 0.01 34.06 0 0.48
Residual SMFQ: 13 0.38 0.01 40.1 0 0.38
Variance General Fac-
tor
0.22 0.05 4.31 0 1
Variance SF1 0.01 0.01 1.08 0.28 1
Variance SF2 0.39 0.04 9.46 0 1
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Table C.2: Parameter estimates from bifactor model fit to combined SMFQ and BSSI items with
a robust weighted-least-squares (WLSMV) estimator to 25 imputed data sets in ROOTS. GF =
general factor. SF1 = specific BSSI factor. SF2 = specific SMFQ factor. Unstd. estimate =
unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
This model fit the data from 25 imputed datasets excellently when fit with a WLSMV estimator (CFI = 0.977,
TLI = 0.971, RMSEA = 0.039). There were no negative residual item variances. Table C.2) shows the parameter
estimates from this model fit to imputed datasets.
The general distress factor explains the majority of the variance in psychosis and
distress items
I calculated ω statistics from the MLR-estimated model. This statistic cannot be estimated from factors with nega-
tive loadings. I therefore re-estimated a factor model, deleting all negative-loading items from the AEBBSSI/PIBSSI
specific factor.
The general factor explained 64.6% of the item variance. The specific factor of SMFQ items explained 18.9%
of the variance. The specific factor of AEBBSSI/PIBSSI items explained 8.3% of the variance. 8.1% of the item
variance was residual error.
Anomalous experiences and beliefs measure more severe common mental distress
than paranoia and traditional depressive/anxious and anxious symptoms
SMFQ and PIBSSI items measured similar severity ranges of mental distress, shown by mostly overlapping in-
formation distributions, whether the latent trait was estimated assuming a Gaussian distribution or empirically
constructing a prior on the shape of the distribution (see Figure C.2). AEBBSSI items measured a more severe
range of mental distress, indicated by these items uniquely contributing information to the higher end of the
distress trait. This replicates previous findings with interview psychotic experiences and confirms that, when co-
varying with other markers of distress, anomalous experiences and beliefs indicate the most severe distress.
SMFQ items contributed more information to the distress factor, on average, than AEB items, indicated by higher
AUC for the information distributions of SMFQ items than AEB items, revealed with Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(SMFQ: mean AUC = 3.32, SD = 0.96; AEBBSSI: mean AUC = 1.38, SD = 0.32; W = 102, p < 0.0001). PI items
also contributed more information to the distress factor than AEB items (PI: mean AUC = 2.67, SD = 0.43; W
= 40, p = 0.002). The average information contributed by SMFQ and PI items did not significantly differ.
Variance in sum scores attributable to general distress and specific factors
See Table C.3 for full results of linear regressions on sum scores.
35.0% of the variance in AEB scores was explained by the general distress factor, while the specific factor of
SMFQ items explained a negligible amount and the specific factor of PE items explained 49.7%. Together, the
distress factor and the specific PEs factor explained 85.0% of the variance.
358
Figure C.2 Information distributions of self-report PEs and depressive symptoms
in ROOTS
Figure C.2: Information distributions were estimated using parametric item response theory
analyses with two-parameter logistic curves. The curves quantify where along the distribution
of a latent trait an item contributes information and thus is able to measure common mental
distress. Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs uniquely measured a slightly more severe range of
distress than Paranoid Ideation or depressive symptoms. The distributions were very similar for
both traits assumed to have a normal distribution and empirically-estimated distributions.
Table C.3: Proportion of variance in sum-scores on self-report PEs and depressive symptoms
that is explained by the general and specific factors from the bifactor model in ROOTS.
Factor AEBBSSI PIBSSI SMFQ
GF 0.35 0.907 0.388
SF1 (SMFQ) 0 0.002 0.653
SF2 (PE) 0.497 0.019 0
GF + SF1 (SMFQ) 0.356 0.916 0.918
GF + SF2 (PE) 0.85 0.929 0.388
All factors 0.853 0.939 0.918
Table C.3: AEB = Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs, PI = Paranoid Ideation, SMFQ = Short
Mood and Feelings Questionnaire. BSSI = Brief Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory.
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Table C.4: Results of comparison of different model structures fit to combined self-report PEs
and depressive symptoms in NSPN
Model AIC BIC SABIC
Unidimensional 112053.9467 112816.6153 112397.2228
Two Correlated Factors 107607.6349 108376.0813 107953.5115
Three Correlated Factors 105580.1949 106360.197 105931.2728
Two Uncorrelated Factors 108402.673 109165.3416 108745.9491
Three Uncorrelated Factors 107240.675 108003.3437 107583.9511
"Bifactor (Sp. SMFQ, Sp. AEB, Sp. PI)" 104430.6377 105447.5292 104888.3391
"Bifactor (Sp. SMFQ, SP. AEB & PI)" 104886.6925 105903.584 105344.3939
"Bifactor (Sp. SMFQ, Sp. AEB)" 105112.1702 106053.9504 105536.0642
Table C.4: Results of model comparison of competing structures fit to self-report and interview
PEs data in NSPN using fit indices that trade-off model fit with model parsimony. Lower values
indicate better fit. The winning model was Bifactor (Sp. SMFQ, Sp. AEB, Sp. PI).
90.7% of the variance in PI was explained by the general distress factor. The specific factors of SMFQ and PEs
each explained less than 2% of the variance. This suggests that paranoia always tends to manifest in conjunction
with distress.
38.8% of the variance in depressive symptoms were explained by the general distress factor. The specific factor of
SMFQ Items explained 65.3% of the variance, while the specific PEs factor explained none. Together, the general
factor and specific SMFQ factors explained 91.8% of the variance.
C.3.2 Results II: NSPN
Data
2388 participants returned questionnaire packs at baseline, as of July 2016. 2322 had complete data on all SMFQ
items, 2287 had complete data on all AEBSPQ items and 2290 had complete data on all PISPQ items. 2170
participants had complete data on the SMFQ, AEBSPQ and PISPQ.
Psychotic phenomena co-occur with distress
Total scores on the SMFQ rank-correlated with AEBSPQ (rho = 0.38, p < 0.0001), and PISPQ (rho = 0.54, p <
0.0001).
Paranoid ideation and distress appeared to overlap more so than distress and anomalous experiences and beliefs.
On partial correlations, AEBSPQ showed a small but significant rank-correlation with SMFQ, controlling for
PISPQ (partial rho = 0.11, p < 0.0001). PISPQ showed a larger partial rank-correlation with SMFQ, controlling
for AEBSPQ (partial rho = 0.42, p < 0.0001).
A common distress factor underlies psychotic phenomena and depressive/anxious
symptoms
Table C.4 shows the comparative fit indices of the MLR-estimated latent variable models.
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The winning model was Bifactor (Sp. SMFQ, Sp. AEB, Sp. PI), with a general factor and three specific factors
each explaining residual variance in items from the SMFQ, AEBSPQ or PISPQ scales. This model also performed
well on RMSEA but fell short of acceptable fit on CFI and TLI (CFI = 0.895, TLI = 0.884, RMSEA = 0.035). All
of the loadings on the general factor and the specific factors of SMFQ and AEB items were positive and significant.
9 of the 13 item loadings on the specific PI factor were positive and significant; the rest were non-significant, for
1 of which the loading was negative.
Table C.5: Parameter estimates from bifactor SMFQ & SPQ model in NSPN (WLSMV, 25
imputed datasets)
Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading GF SMFQ: 1 1 0 NA NA 0.46
Loading GF SMFQ: 2 0.97 0.05 17.78 0 0.44
Loading GF SMFQ: 3 0.84 0.06 14.61 0 0.38
Loading GF SMFQ: 4 0.76 0.06 13.23 0 0.35
Loading GF SMFQ: 5 1.14 0.06 19.46 0 0.52
Loading GF SMFQ: 6 0.88 0.06 14.11 0 0.4
Loading GF SMFQ: 7 1.01 0.06 18.04 0 0.46
Loading GF SMFQ: 8 1.22 0.06 19.92 0 0.56
Loading GF SMFQ: 9 1.21 0.07 17.51 0 0.55
Loading GF SMFQ: 10 1.04 0.05 19.02 0 0.47
Loading GF SMFQ: 11 1.26 0.07 18.88 0 0.57
Loading GF SMFQ: 12 1.15 0.06 18.68 0 0.52
Loading GF SMFQ: 13 1.28 0.07 18.39 0 0.58
Loading GF AEB: 1 0.67 0.07 9.69 0 0.3
Loading GF AEB: 3 0.7 0.08 8.4 0 0.32
Loading GF AEB: 4 1.13 0.07 15.36 0 0.52
Loading GF AEB: 12 0.68 0.08 8.32 0 0.31
Loading GF AEB: 13 1.02 0.08 13.55 0 0.47
Loading GF AEB: 21 1.11 0.08 13.92 0 0.51
Loading GF AEB: 22 1.09 0.1 10.78 0 0.5
Loading GF AEB: 28 1.03 0.08 13.08 0 0.47
Loading GF AEB: 30 0.62 0.08 7.74 0 0.28
Loading GF AEB: 31 1.04 0.08 12.6 0 0.48
Loading GF AEB: 37 1.03 0.08 12.3 0 0.47
Loading GF AEB: 39 0.96 0.1 9.85 0 0.44
Loading GF AEB: 40 1.14 0.09 12.24 0 0.52
Loading GF AEB: 47 0.79 0.09 8.8 0 0.36
Loading GF AEB: 55 0.95 0.1 9.75 0 0.43
Loading GF AEB: 56 0.92 0.08 12.06 0 0.42
Loading GF AEB: 61 1.3 0.08 16.13 0 0.6
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading GF AEB: 64 1.31 0.08 16.27 0 0.6
Loading GF PI: 9 1.64 0.09 17.4 0 0.75
Loading GF PI: 10 1.11 0.08 13.45 0 0.51
Loading GF PI: 19 1.54 0.09 17.31 0 0.71
Loading GF PI: 27 1.51 0.09 17.08 0 0.69
Loading GF PI: 36 1.71 0.1 17.82 0 0.78
Loading GF PI: 44 1.56 0.09 16.98 0 0.72
Loading GF PI: 45 1.34 0.09 15.34 0 0.61
Loading GF PI: 48 1.59 0.1 15.98 0 0.73
Loading GF PI: 53 1.48 0.09 16.04 0 0.68
Loading GF PI: 59 1.82 0.1 17.65 0 0.83
Loading GF PI: 60 1.6 0.09 17.2 0 0.73
Loading GF PI: 63 1.58 0.1 16.17 0 0.72
Loading GF PI: 65 1.5 0.09 16.69 0 0.68
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 1 1 0 NA NA 0.61
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 2 0.84 0.04 20.37 0 0.51
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 3 0.58 0.04 13.44 0 0.35
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 4 0.51 0.04 11.59 0 0.31
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 5 1.12 0.04 25.68 0 0.68
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 6 0.78 0.05 16.5 0 0.48
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 7 0.9 0.04 21.28 0 0.55
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 8 1.1 0.04 25.5 0 0.67
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 9 0.79 0.05 17.35 0 0.48
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 10 0.98 0.04 23.67 0 0.6
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 11 1 0.05 21.72 0 0.61
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 12 0.96 0.04 22.13 0 0.58
Loading SF1 SMFQ: 13 0.94 0.04 21.21 0 0.57
Loading SF2 AEB: 1 1 0 NA NA 0.31
Loading SF2 AEB: 3 2.08 0.24 8.52 0 0.64
Loading SF2 AEB: 4 0.81 0.13 6.38 0 0.25
Loading SF2 AEB: 12 2.31 0.25 9.08 0 0.71
Loading SF2 AEB: 13 1.84 0.21 8.64 0 0.57
Loading SF2 AEB: 21 0.99 0.15 6.79 0 0.3
Loading SF2 AEB: 22 1.24 0.18 6.78 0 0.38
Loading SF2 AEB: 28 1.67 0.19 8.92 0 0.51
Loading SF2 AEB: 30 2.34 0.27 8.76 0 0.72
Loading SF2 AEB: 31 1.14 0.17 6.71 0 0.35
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Loading SF2 AEB: 37 1.6 0.18 8.69 0 0.49
Loading SF2 AEB: 39 1.46 0.2 7.19 0 0.45
Loading SF2 AEB: 40 1.88 0.24 7.9 0 0.58
Loading SF2 AEB: 47 2.09 0.24 8.59 0 0.64
Loading SF2 AEB: 55 1.86 0.23 8.14 0 0.57
Loading SF2 AEB: 56 1.25 0.17 7.32 0 0.39
Loading SF2 AEB: 61 1.1 0.15 7.34 0 0.34
Loading SF2 AEB: 64 1.3 0.17 7.64 0 0.4
Loading SF3 PI: 9 1 0 NA NA 0.25
Loading SF3 PI: 10 1.85 0.29 6.34 0 0.46
Loading SF3 PI: 19 0.03 0.16 0.2 0.84 0.01
Loading SF3 PI: 27 0.22 0.15 1.45 0.15 0.06
Loading SF3 PI: 36 -0.28 0.19 -1.49 0.14 -0.07
Loading SF3 PI: 44 -0.09 0.17 -0.56 0.58 -0.02
Loading SF3 PI: 45 1.85 0.28 6.58 0 0.46
Loading SF3 PI: 48 -0.74 0.26 -2.85 0 -0.19
Loading SF3 PI: 53 1.93 0.26 7.43 0 0.48
Loading SF3 PI: 59 0.5 0.15 3.21 0 0.12
Loading SF3 PI: 60 1.03 0.17 5.99 0 0.26
Loading SF3 PI: 63 2.34 0.31 7.6 0 0.58
Loading SF3 PI: 65 -0.22 0.18 -1.2 0.23 -0.06
Loading General
Factor
SF1 0 0 NA NA 0
Loading General
Factor
SF2 0 0 NA NA 0
Loading General
Factor
SF3 0 0 NA NA 0
Loading SF1 SF2 0 0 NA NA 0
Loading SF1 SF3 0 0 NA NA 0
Loading SF2 SF3 0 0 NA NA 0
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 1 -0.84 0.03 -28.76 0 -0.84
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 1 1.27 0.03 36.48 0 1.27
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 2 0.19 0.03 7.46 0 0.19
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 2 1.66 0.04 37.96 0 1.66
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 3 -0.51 0.03 -18.81 0 -0.51
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 3 0.86 0.03 29.18 0 0.86
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 4 -0.18 0.03 -7.14 0 -0.18
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 4 1.06 0.03 33.41 0 1.06
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 5 0.38 0.03 14.47 0 0.38
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 5 1.32 0.04 37 0 1.32
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 6 0.65 0.03 23.49 0 0.65
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 6 1.55 0.04 38.08 0 1.55
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 7 -0.53 0.03 -19.51 0 -0.53
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 7 0.9 0.03 30.09 0 0.9
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 8 0.56 0.03 20.54 0 0.56
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 8 1.39 0.04 37.52 0 1.39
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 9 0.52 0.03 19.23 0 0.52
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 9 1.68 0.04 37.94 0 1.68
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 10 -0.13 0.03 -4.87 0 -0.13
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 10 0.98 0.03 31.94 0 0.98
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 11 0.72 0.03 25.37 0 0.72
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 11 1.42 0.04 37.68 0 1.42
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 12 0.11 0.03 4.1 0 0.11
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 12 1 0.03 32.38 0 1
Threshold 0->1 SMFQ: 13 0.5 0.03 18.52 0 0.5
Threshold 1->2 SMFQ: 13 1.51 0.04 37.99 0 1.51
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 1 0.24 0.03 9.33 0 0.24
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 3 1.12 0.03 34.42 0 1.12
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 4 0.15 0.03 5.76 0 0.15
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 12 1.11 0.03 34.15 0 1.11
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 13 0.51 0.03 18.91 0 0.51
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 21 0.77 0.03 26.95 0 0.77
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 22 1.49 0.04 37.95 0 1.49
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 28 0.81 0.03 27.95 0 0.81
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 30 1.02 0.03 32.56 0 1.02
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 31 0.99 0.03 32.11 0 0.99
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 37 1.17 0.03 35.2 0 1.17
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 39 1.5 0.04 37.89 0 1.5
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 40 1.4 0.04 37.45 0 1.4
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 47 1.33 0.04 36.93 0 1.33
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 55 1.45 0.04 37.81 0 1.45
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 56 0.79 0.03 27.28 0 0.79
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 61 0.49 0.03 18.39 0 0.49
Threshold 0->1 AEB: 64 0.66 0.03 23.64 0 0.66
Threshold 0->1 PI: 9 0.26 0.03 9.82 0 0.26
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Threshold 0->1 PI: 10 0.18 0.03 7.15 0 0.18
Threshold 0->1 PI: 19 0.6 0.03 21.87 0 0.6
Threshold 0->1 PI: 27 -0.06 0.03 -2.15 0.03 -0.06
Threshold 0->1 PI: 36 0.63 0.03 22.6 0 0.63
Threshold 0->1 PI: 44 0.56 0.03 20.51 0 0.56
Threshold 0->1 PI: 45 0.4 0.03 15.04 0 0.4
Threshold 0->1 PI: 48 1.37 0.04 37.22 0 1.37
Threshold 0->1 PI: 53 0.37 0.03 14.06 0 0.37
Threshold 0->1 PI: 59 1.03 0.03 32.85 0 1.03
Threshold 0->1 PI: 60 0.39 0.03 14.72 0 0.39
Threshold 0->1 PI: 63 0.16 0.03 6.24 0 0.16
Threshold 0->1 PI: 65 0.57 0.03 21.02 0 0.57
Residual SMFQ: 1 0.42 0 181.73 0 0.42
Residual SMFQ: 2 0.54 0 288.92 0 0.54
Residual SMFQ: 3 0.73 0 643.16 0 0.73
Residual SMFQ: 4 0.78 0 622.03 0 0.78
Residual SMFQ: 5 0.26 0 472.51 0 0.26
Residual SMFQ: 6 0.61 0 489.21 0 0.61
Residual SMFQ: 7 0.49 0 549.35 0 0.49
Residual SMFQ: 8 0.24 0 383.67 0 0.24
Residual SMFQ: 9 0.47 0 351.1 0 0.47
Residual SMFQ: 10 0.42 0 361.32 0 0.42
Residual SMFQ: 11 0.3 0 213.57 0 0.3
Residual SMFQ: 12 0.39 0 427.06 0 0.39
Residual SMFQ: 13 0.33 0 223.16 0 0.33
Residual AEB: 1 0.81 0 456.76 0 0.81
Residual AEB: 3 0.49 0 127.83 0 0.49
Residual AEB: 4 0.67 0 340.06 0 0.67
Residual AEB: 12 0.4 0.01 69.93 0 0.4
Residual AEB: 13 0.46 0 221.19 0 0.46
Residual AEB: 21 0.65 0 233.66 0 0.65
Residual AEB: 22 0.61 0 218.44 0 0.61
Residual AEB: 28 0.52 0 203.18 0 0.52
Residual AEB: 30 0.4 0 102.12 0 0.4
Residual AEB: 31 0.65 0 244.68 0 0.65
Residual AEB: 37 0.54 0.01 98.81 0 0.54
Residual AEB: 39 0.6 0 128.78 0 0.6
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Parameter
type
Factor
or
thresh-
old
Item or fac-
tor
Unstd.
esti-
mate
Standard
error
Z-score P-value Std. es-
timate
Residual AEB: 40 0.39 0 83.55 0 0.39
Residual AEB: 47 0.46 0 128.31 0 0.46
Residual AEB: 55 0.48 0 111.69 0 0.48
Residual AEB: 56 0.67 0 277.31 0 0.67
Residual AEB: 61 0.53 0 212.56 0 0.53
Residual AEB: 64 0.48 0 194.75 0 0.48
Residual PI: 9 0.37 0 188.74 0 0.37
Residual PI: 10 0.53 0.01 65.28 0 0.53
Residual PI: 19 0.5 0 202.27 0 0.5
Residual PI: 27 0.52 0 230.63 0 0.52
Residual PI: 36 0.38 0 88.91 0 0.38
Residual PI: 44 0.49 0 115.61 0 0.49
Residual PI: 45 0.41 0.01 61.73 0 0.41
Residual PI: 48 0.44 0.01 61.13 0 0.44
Residual PI: 53 0.31 0 100.09 0 0.31
Residual PI: 59 0.29 0 77.66 0 0.29
Residual PI: 60 0.4 0 170.53 0 0.4
Residual PI: 63 0.13 0.01 20.83 0 0.13
Residual PI: 65 0.53 0 208.41 0 0.53
Variance General Fac-
tor
0.21 0.02 9.88 0 1
Variance SF1 0.37 0.03 14.47 0 1
Variance SF2 0.09 0.02 4.67 0 1
Variance SF3 0.06 0.02 3.39 0 1
Table C.5: Parameter estimates from bifactor model fit to combined SMFQ and BSSI items with
a robust weighted-least-squares (WLSMV) estimator to 25 imputed data sets in NSPN. GF =
general factor. SF1 = specific SMFQ factor. SF2 = specific AEB factor. SF3 = specific AEB
factor. Unstd. estimate = unstandardised estimate. Std. estimate = standardised estimate.
This model fit the data from 25 imputed datasets excellently with a WLSMV estimator (CFI = 0.975, TLI
= 0.971, RMSEA = 0.039). There were no negative residual item variances. Table C.5 shows full parameter
estimates.
The general distress factor explains the majority of the variance in psychosis and
distress items
I calculated ω statistics from the a full-information MLR-estimated bifactor model with the negative loading on
the specific PI factor removed. Again, the fit fell just short of predefined criteria for CFI and TLI, though RMSEA
indicated very good fit (CFI = 0.895, TLI = 0.884, RMSEA = 0.035).
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Figure C.3 Information distributions of self-report PEs and depressive symptoms
in ROOTS
Figure C.3: Information distributions were estimated using parametric item response theory
analyses with two-parameter logistic curves in NSPN. The curves quantify where along the dis-
tribution of a latent trait an item contributes information and thus is able to measure common
mental distress. Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs and Paranoid Ideation both measured a
slightly more severe range of distress than depressive symptoms. The distributions were very
similar for both traits assumed to have a normal distribution and empirically-estimated distri-
butions.
The general factor explained 67.5% of the item variance. The specific factor of SMFQ items explained 8.5% of
the variance, the specific factor of AEBSPQ items explained 21.1% of the variance and the specific factor of PI
items explained 1.9% of the variance. 1.0% of the item variance was residual error.
Anomalous experiences and beliefs measure more severe common mental distress
than paranoia and traditional depressive/anxious and anxious symptoms
SMFQ, AEBSPQ and PISPQ items measured similar severity ranges of mental distress, shown by mostly over-
lapping information distributions for both the Gaussian and the empirical latent trait distribution (Figure C.3).
AEBSPQ and PISPQ items both measured a more severe range of mental distress, indicated by these items uniquely
contributing information to the higher end of the distress trait. PISPQ items measured a slightly more severe range
than AEBSPQ, in contrast to the results in ROOTS.
SMFQ items contributed more information to the distress factor, on average, than AEBSPQ items, indicated by
higher AUC for the information distributions of SMFQ items than AEBSPQ items and PISPQ items, indicated by
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (SMFQ: mean AUC = 2.62, SD = 0.72, AEBSPQ: mean AUC = 1.00, SD = 0.20, W =
233, p < 0.0001; PI: mean AUC = 1.54, SD = 0.30, W = 151, p = 0.0003). PISPQ items also contributed more
information to the distress factor than AEBSPQ items (W = 15, p < 0.0001).
Variance in sum scores attributable to general distress and specific factors
See Table C.6 for full results of linear regressions on sum scores.
44.4% of the variance in AEB scores was explained by the general distress factor, while the specific factors of
SMFQ and PI items explained negligible amounts and the specific factor of AEB items explained 58.0%. Together,
the distress factor and the specific AEB factor explained 91.5% of the variance.
87.6% of the variance in PI was explained by the general distress factor. The specific factors of SMFQ and
AEB each explained negligible variance and the specific factor of PI items explained only 10.4%. This suggests
that paranoia always tends to manifest in conjunction with distress. All factors together explained 94.2% of PI
variance.
45.2% of the variance in depressive symptoms were explained by the general distress factor. The specific factor of
SMFQ Items explained 64.8% of the variance, while the specific AEB and PI factors explained negligible amounts.
Together, the general factor and specific SMFQ factors explained 93.9% of the SMFQ variance.
C.4 Discussion
In two general population cohorts of young people, I showed that PEs and depressive symptoms can be modelled
as arising from a distribution of common mental distress using self-report measurements of PEs. This replicated
previous work conducted with interview assessments of PEs, thus lending convergent validity to self-report mea-
surements of PEs. In both NSPN and ROOTS, I found that a common latent distress factor explained around
65% of the variance in self-report depressive symptoms and both state (ROOTS) and trait (NSPN) PEs. State
AEBBSSI and trait AEBSPQ and PISPQ measured more severe distress than classical depressive symptoms, but
there was additional variance in PEs that was unrelated to distress in both cohorts. The common distress factor
explained between a third and a half of the variance in sum scores on AEB in each sample and around 90% of
the variance in sum scores on PI. Only up to around 10% of the variance in PI scores was explained by specific
(i.e. orthogonal to the distress general factor) PEs or PI factors, while around half the variance in AEB was
due to a specific PEs factor. This suggests that variance in PEs that is orthogonal to distress tends to manifest
as non-paranoid unusual perceptions and experiences, rather than paranoid beliefs. The large overlap between
common distress and PI suggests that paranoid beliefs are likely to co-occur with many comorbid symptoms of
psychopathology.
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Table C.6: Proportion of variance in sum-scores on self-report PEs and depressive symptoms
that is explained by the general and specific factors from the bifactor model in NSPN.
Factor AEBSPQ PISPQ SMFQ
GF 0.44 0.88 0.45
SF1 (SMFQ) 0 0 0.65
SF2 (AEB) 0.58 0 0
SF3 (PI) 0 0.1 0
GF + SF1 (SMFQ) 0.46 0.89 0.94
GF + SF2 (AEB) 0.91 0.89 0.46
GF + SF3 (PI) 0.46 0.93 0.47
All factors 0.92 0.94 0.94
Table C.6: AEB = Anomalous Experiences & Beliefs, PI = Paranoid Ideation, SMFQ = Short
Mood and Feelings Questionnaire. SPQ = Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire.
These results replicate findings using interview-assessed PEs (Stochl et al., 2015) and, in the ROOTS cohort,
shows that this continuum is true of symptoms measured over the same recent two-week interval. This supports
PEs as a transdiagnostic manifestation of psychopathology in the general population and suggest convergent
validity of self-report and interview-verified PEs. This is important as self-report instruments are easier and
cheaper to administer and might enable far larger sample sizes or repeat measurements than would be feasible
with interview assessments. This study has the strengths of utilising data from two general population cohorts
and replication of results in independent cohorts. The study is limited by inability to generalise these results to
other instruments and by relatively simplistic interpretation of complex latent variables.
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1 
 
   Department of Psychiatry  
William Hardy Building 
     Downing Site 
         Downing Street 
Version1 (12/02/13)                         Cambridge, CB2 3EB 
 
Participant Number: 
 
CONSENT FORM (Psychophysical Testing) 
 
Ethics Approval Ref: PRE.2013.31 
Title of Study: Psychophysical and fMRI Investigation of Feed-Back Processes in the Human Visual 
System 
 
 
Chief Investigator:  Prof. Paul Fletcher 
 
Having read the Information Sheet (12/02/13 Version1 – psychophysical testing), please read the 
following statements and initial to show that you have understood and agree to the conditions. Please 
do not hesitate to ask, should you have any further questions.  
 
1. I confirm that I have read, understood, and accept the conditions 
contained in the information sheet, version1 – psychophysical testing 
dated 12/02/13, for the above study and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions.  
 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without any 
penalty. 
 
 
3. I understand that I will be asked to complete some questionnaires 
designed to evaluate my everyday experiences and beliefs. I also 
understand that there is no obligation to answer these questions.  
 
  
4. I understand that the data will be accessed by the research team and 
by collaborating researchers or from regulatory authorities where it is 
relevant to my taking part in research. I give permission for these 
individuals to have access to these records.  
 
5. I understand that I will be paid £8 per hour for participating in this 
study.  
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study.   
 
 
 
 
……………………………………….       ……………………   ……………………... 
Name of Participant       Date           Signature 
 
 
 
……………………………………….       ……………………    …………………….. 
Name of Research Team Member               Date                Signature 
If you have any further questions or worries please contact;  
2 
 
 
Either: 
 
Dr Christoph Teufel 
Tel:  01223 768501 
Email:  crt35@cam.ac.uk 
Postal address:       Brain Mapping Unit, Department of Psychiatry 
William Hardy Building 
                                Downing Street 
                                 Cambridge, CB2 3EB 
 
Or 
 
Prof. Paul Fletcher (chief investigator) 
Tel:  01223 336988 
Email:   pcf22@cam.ac.uk  
Postal address:  Department of Psychiatry 
  Box 189, Addenbrookes Hospital 
  Cambridge, CB2 2QQ  
 
 
  
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET – 
Psychophysical Testing 
 
Dept. of Psychiatry 
  Version 2 
Date: 19/03/2013 
 
Study title:  Psychophysical and fMRI Investigation of Feed-Back Processes in the 
Human Visual System 
 
The project has received ethical approval from the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Cambridge. 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part.  
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. 
 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Part 1. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the visual system processes images. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
The aim of the present study is to better understand the computational processes mediating 
visual perception by healthy participants. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide. We will describe the study and go through this information sheet. 
We will then ask you to sign a consent form to show you have agreed to take part. You are 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The study will involve a minimum of one and a maximum of or several test five test sessions 
depending on which specific experiment you take part in., Eeach session will lasting at most 
90 minutes. In case you take part in more than one test session, the sessions will be 
separated by a minimum of two days. During the testing session you will be shown neutral 
images and you will be asked to make simple decisions using a computer keyboard. After 
completion of the experiment, you will be asked to complete some questionnaires designed 
to evaluate your everyday experiences and beliefs. Some of the questions will be about 
unusual experiences/beliefs while others are about typical experiences/beliefs. You are 
under no obligation to answer these questions. 
 
You will be paid £8 per hour for your participation, which you will receive at the end of final 
session you take part in. 
 
What about time and travel expenses? 
You will be paid £8 per hour for your participation, which you will receive at the end of final 
session you take part in. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
While we hope that, should you choose to participate in the study, you would find it 
interesting and comfortable, there are no direct benefits to you of taking part. You will, 
however, be compensated for time and inconvenience. We will pay you £8 per hour for your 
participation.   
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible harm 
you might suffer will be addressed. Please contact either Dr Christoph Teufel or Prof. Paul 
Fletcher (see contact details at the end of this information sheet). 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be handled in 
confidence. The details are included in Part 2. 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, 
please read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision. 
 
Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
The data derived from this study will be stored on a secure network and on password 
protected computers. Only authorised members of the Behavioural and Clinical 
Neuroscience Institute (BCNI) and members of the research group will have access to the 
data. The University is deemed to be the Data Controller and all enquiries concerning access 
to the data should be addressed to him. The Administrator of the BCNI will be able to tell you 
the name and address of this officer. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
When data from several volunteers is collected, it will be analyzed and written up for 
publication in a scientific journal. The results may also be presented at scientific meetings, or 
in talks at academic institutions. Results will always be presented in such a way that data 
from individual volunteers cannot be identified. Data will be kept securely for a minimum of 
10 years and possibly indefinitely in the BCNI data archive in accordance with good research 
practice. 
 
Who is organizing and funding the research? 
This study is organized by a research team headed by Prof. Paul Fletcher at the University of 
Cambridge, Department of Psychiatry, Brain Mapping Unit. The research is funded by a 
grant awarded to Prof. Paul Fletcher by the Wellcome Trust. 
 
Are there compensation arrangements if something goes wrong? 
The University of Cambridge has approved this study and arranged insurance cover in the 
unlikely event of something going wrong. 
 
You are entirely free to withdraw from the study at any time without having to explain 
why. Non-participation would not affect your future treatment in any way. 
 
If you have any questions about the study (or if you wish to complain), please contact: 
 
Name: Prof. Paul Fletcher 
Address: University of Cambridge 
Department of Psychiatry, Brain Mapping 
Unit 
Name: Dr. Christoph Teufel 
Address: University of Cambridge 
Department of Psychiatry, Brain Mapping 
Unit 
Addenbrooke's Hospital (Box 189) 
Hills Road 
Cambridge CB2 2QQ, UK 
Mail: pcf22@cam.ac.uk 
Phone: 01223 336988 
Downing Street 
Cambridge, CB2 3EB, UK 
Mail: crt35@cam.ac.uk 
Phone: 01223 768501 
 
 
